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Introduction
A Long Lost Text: Galen’s Περὶ Ἀλυπίας
Caroline Petit
This volume arises from a one-day conference, the “Galen Day”, held at Warwick 
University on July 1, 2014 and supported by the Faculty of Arts at the University 
of Warwick, the Department of Classics and Ancient History, and a Wellcome 
Trust Medical Humanities Small Grant (105153/Z/14/Z). I wish to express my 
gratitude to those institutions for their support, and to Simon Swain (then 
chair of the Faculty of Arts) in particular for encouraging and actively backing 
the project. The chosen theme of the conference was Galen’s newly discovered 
περὶ ἀλυπίας (henceforth: PA), a text that has generated more discussion since 
its discovery than any other work by the great Galen. Several reasons helped 
me decide to select the PA as the focus of the conference. A new translation by 
Vivian Nutton had just appeared, as part of a fine new volume edited by Peter 
Singer.1 As a new English translation by the most accomplished Galen scholar 
alive, it signalled a turning point and marked a significant improvement on 
what was available to scholars. As such, it was a landmark worth celebrating, 
and a potential starting point for new discussions around the text. Indeed, the 
Greek text is available in two main editions (Kotzia/Soutiroudis, and Boudon-
Millot/Jouanna/Pietrobelli, henceforth KS and BJP, both published in 2010), 
which significantly differ from one another; Nutton brings a new take on both, 
and, with it, new interpretations. No translation is definitive, and neither of the 
editions cited above is, as recently published conjectures demonstrate;2 but 
Nutton’s new translation was certainly instrumental in the speakers’ prepara-
tion, and in finalising the papers presented here. It is certainly a new high for 
many scholars interested in this vibrant little work. Vivian Nutton was present 
at the conference, which he accepted to introduce, and chair: this volume is 
dedicated to him with gratitude, for this and the many other times he has given 
support and advice.
The inspirational nature of the PA is exemplified by Peter Singer’s consid-
erable contribution to this volume, in the form of three different, extensive 
1   P. N. Singer, Galen. Psychological Writings, Cambridge University Press, 2013.
2   For example Polemis, I. ‘Διορθωτικά στο Περί Αλυπίας του Γαληνού’, Επιστημονική Επετηρίδα της 
Φιλοσοφικής Σχολής του Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών 43 (2011), 1–8; Kotzia, P. ‘Galen περὶ ἀλυπίας: Title, 
Genre and Two Cruces’. In Studi sul De indolentia di Galeno, ed. D. Manetti, 2012, 69–91.
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pieces, which were originally supposed to make just one chapter. Peter’s of-
ferings shed new light on the significance of the manuscript (Vlat. 14) and of 
the new text, and on Galen’s thought as well as his complex compositional 
strategies. His contribution far exceeds what any editor would expect from a 
collaborator, and I feel humbled in the face of his dedication to this text and, as 
a result, to this volume. I owe him very special thanks. I hope readers will feel 
equally privileged upon discovering his insights on Galen’s PA.
Simon Swain has kindly read and corrected the English of non-native speak-
ers’ papers (notably mine!), for which I am especially grateful.
Beyond the new English translation, another reason to pick the PA among 
so many Galenic texts worth studying, was that its sensational discovery suc-
ceeded in finally bringing together classicists, historians and philosophers 
around Galen, well beyond the usual (small) circle of its specialists. The bibli-
ography dedicated to this text demonstrates new, widespread interest in what 
Galen has to say about the circulation of texts (medical and not), the Great 
Fire of 192, ancient libraries (especially in Rome), and many additional topics 
that have little to do with medicine as a technical field. The idea of a “Galen 
Day” aimed precisely at bringing together a diverse audience, interested in 
the many facets of Galen’s œuvre, beyond the ‘usual suspects’. The PA, having 
produced so many studies in such a short time by so many different scholars, 
thus seemed the ideal focus for such an enterprise. The papers gathered here 
embrace multiple aspects of the text, with a purpose to shed as much light as 
possible on its various points of interest. It is hoped that they will further the 
public’s passion for it.
As a recently unearthed treasure, the PA has invited us Galen specialists to 
cast a retrospective look at what we knew, or thought we knew about Galen, 
and how we deal with his texts. The sensational discovery made by Antoine 
Pietrobelli more than ten years ago, at the very least reminded scholars that, 
against common preconceptions, nothing is definitive about our knowledge 
of antiquity: new evidence may resurface any day and invite us to reconsider 
some of our assumptions. Finding new material is not the privilege of archae-
ologists. As far as Galen is concerned, it is not impossible that more texts are 
found in forgotten manuscripts, not necessarily in Greek, but potentially in 
Latin, Syriac or Arabic.3 There are already many examples of this. Every time a 
new text or fragment appears, it might change our notions of Galen’s biography 
3   Examples are found in all three languages, and include the De virt. cent. written by a rival 
of Galen and edited by Vivian Nutton on the basis of Latin manuscripts; the Syriac Galen 
Palimpsest, which contains large swathes of Galen’s treatise On simple drugs; the fragments 
from Galen’s major work On demonstration in Arabic, etc.
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and ideas, of his literary production or of his medical practices. But the PA has 
shaken those notions to the core, far much than any other text, from Galen’s 
life at the imperial court and his philosophical opinions, to the contents of his 
library, and the range of his possessions. Its interest extends to areas of ancient 
history (such as the location of libraries and storerooms in Rome), literature 
and philosophy that normally stay untouched by those I am tempted to call 
“Galenists”. Meanwhile, it has ensured that those who didn’t read Galen regu-
larly now turn towards him a little more often. The PA has brought to Galen a 
new audience.
In the following pages, I intend to offer a very brief summary of the history 
and points of interest of this text (all of which have already been extensively 
and clearly presented by Vivian Nutton4), and a presentation of the contents 
of the present volume.
The existence of Galen’s PA was known through a handful of quotations in 
Arabic and Hebrew, but the text was reputed forever lost, until a then-PhD 
student in Paris, Antoine Pietrobelli, started studying a Greek manuscript in 
the library of the Vlatades monastery, Thessaloniki, Greece, in 2005. The fol-
lowing examination by Véronique Boudon-Millot led to the ‘discovery’ of the 
work in the midst of an impressive collection of Galenic texts, some of which 
unpublished or previously not available in Greek.5 This is how the περὶ ἀλυπίας 
resurfaced among modern scholars. The 15th c. manuscript is poor, and has 
already generated much debate as to how best to interpret several passages.6 
For that reason, several translations have already appeared, in English, French, 
Italian and German, with different takes on the difficulties posed by scribal er-
rors and other transmission problems.7 The papers presented here engage with 
the various interpretations at hand wherever needed. I will give one example. 
Although the Budé text by Jouanna and Boudon-Millot is the basis used by the 
contributors, all contributors in this volume agree on περὶ ἀλυπίας as the best 
possible title, against the conservative περὶ ἀλυπησίας printed by Jouanna and 
4   V. Nutton in P. N. Singer (ed.) 2013, 45–76; see also C. Rothschild/T. Thompson 2014, 3–18 and 
V. Boudon-Millot/J. Jouanna 2010, vii–lxxvi.
5   See A. Pietrobelli, ‘Variation autour du Thessalonicensis Vlatadon 14: un manuscrit copié au 
xenon du Kral, peu avant la chute de Constantinople’, Revue des Études Byzantines 68, 2010, 
95–126.
6   See V. Nutton in P. N. Singer 2013, pp. 100–106; both Garofalo/Lami and Rothschild/Thompson 
have attempted to provide lists of respective emendations in their editions, and Brodersen 
offers a list of departure points for his own translation.
7   Available translations include that of Jouanna/Boudon-Millot and Pietrobelli (2010), 
Rothschild and Thompson (2011), Garofalo and Lami (2012), Vegetti (2013), Nutton (2013) and 
Brodersen (2015).
4 Petit
Boudon-Millot on the basis of the manuscript.8 Such disagreements are com-
mon with a poorly transmitted text, and chances are that new editions, or at 
least new conjectures, will appear in the future. Meanwhile, additional exam-
ination of the manuscript has led to nuance the importance of Vlat. 14 in the 
textual history of Galenic works generally: the manuscript from Thessaloniki 
is pivotal in supplementing lacunous texts, such as Propr. Plac., a new edition 
of which is being prepared by Antoine Pietrobelli; but it is of little interest 
in the case of other texts with richer, well-established manuscript traditions.9 
Readers will find more information on the contents and significance of the 
manuscript for Galen’s textual history in Peter Singer’s adjacent Note on MS 
Vlatadon 14.10
Generic definition has been at the heart of discussions around the PA: a 
letter to an anonymous friend, a philosophical treatise on the familiar theme 
of ἀλυπία (absence of distress, to select but one possible translation), the text 
has also somehow reminded scholars of the genre of consolatio well known 
through Plutarch and Cicero. A fine connoisseur of Greek literature and phi-
losophy, Galen conforms to some well-established literary and argumentative 
codes and delivers many expected quotations on the topic; Stoic, Epicurean, 
and other traditions underpin much of his argument. In such respects he may 
simply be following a trend, or rather, trends. But a large part of the treatise is 
dedicated to a highly personal account of Galen’s own losses, and of the impact 
of the Fire, as well as Commodus and the plague on life in Rome around 193 AD. 
Galen thus gives us more than a variation on a common topic. The following 
papers explore in turn, in great detail, the reasons why this text is an original 
take on the much-debated topic of ἀλυπία; how it changes, to some extent, our 
perception of the Galenic corpus and of Galen himself; and how it allows us to 
think again about such major disasters of that period as the Antonine ‘plague’ 
and the reign of Commodus. Following up on previous collective projects,11 the 
present studies will hopefully supplement nicely the scholarship already avail-
able, raise new questions and bridge some gaps.
The present volume is formed of ten chapters of varying length, and falls 
into three parts, followed by an epilogue investigating possible engagement 
of Islamic scholars with the text (Pietrobelli). In the first part, titled The PA in 
8    About the question of the title, see P. Singer in this volume (Note) p. 19.
9    See the critical editions of Libr. Propr. by V. Boudon-Millot, 2007, pp. 42–49, and of the 
pseudo-Galenic Introd. sive medicus by C. Petit, 2009, p. xciii and n. 137. See also V. Boudon-
Millot, ‘Un nouveau témoin grec inédit de l’Ars medica de Galien, le Vlatadon 14’, 2008.
10   See pp. 10–37.
11   Manetti, D. (ed.) Studi sul De indolentia di Galeno, 2012; Rothschild, C. K. and Thompson, 
T. W. (eds), Galen’s De indolentia, 2013.
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Galen’s Œuvre, three chapters explore what precious further insight Galen’s PA 
gives us to understand his monumental, multifaceted oeuvre. In Death, Posterity 
and the Vulnerable Self: Galen’s PA in the context of his later works, Caroline Petit 
studies Galen’s PA in the context of his later works, looking for new insights 
into Galen’s rhetorical persona. Galen’s rhetorical mastery, and his concern for 
public approval appear in most of his works; they especially come through in 
the autobiographical features of his later writings. The Great Fire of 192 is cho-
sen here as a cut-off date and a turning point in Galen’s life. There and then 
Galen puts the final touches to a character he has created through a lifetime 
of working and writing, for the sake of his practitioner’s reputation, and for 
posterity. Galen’s PA holds no insignificant part in this architecture of words: 
establishing his own character as one of virtue, resilience and courage, yet not 
exempt of human frailty, Galen finalises the self-portrait that emerges from 
the wide-ranging set of works he wrote in his old age. This chapter investigates 
the evidence scattered in Galen’s many later works, in order to emphasise the 
specific features of PA as an autobiographical and self-characterising effort in 
the wake of life-changing events.
In the second chapter, New light and old texts: Galen on his own books, Peter 
Singer investigates what PA brings us scholars in terms of new texts (or parts 
of texts), and explores in some depth new information provided by some pas-
sages in PA about Galen’s understanding of “publication” (ekdosis). Although it 
is often put forward that Galen distinguishes carefully between works written 
for his friends or hetairoi (in other words, his close circle) and works written 
pros ekdosin (usually translated as ‘for publication’), close reading of the pas-
sages he devotes to this topic in fact show, Singer argues, that Galen did not 
necessarily exclude wider circulation of his works as a consequence of writing/
dedicating them to friends. Evidence from PA confirms that Galen was content 
for his work to spread across larger circles, following adjustments and correc-
tions to preliminary versions circulated in private.
In her paper, Galen and the Language of Old Comedy: glimpses of a lost trea-
tise at PA 23b–28, Amy Coker focuses on a specific passage of PA, in which Galen 
provides crucial information on the contents of his lost (and considerable) 
works on ancient comedy. Based on an extensive review of the available evi-
dence scattered throughout Galen’s works and in the PA, Coker reveals the pos-
sible range of texts used by Galen in his lost works on comedy, and attempts a 
reconstruction of the latter. In so doing, Coker hypothesises the possible use by 
Galen of lexicographers’ works and standard plays, and demonstrates the close 
relationship between Galen and contemporary authors, much in the manner 
of the “sophists” he tends to vilify. The picture of a medical writer profoundly 
indebted to, and in phase with Second Sophistic figures, emerges at last. This 
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first part therefore addresses Galen’s PA as new evidence for our understanding 
and appreciation of his overall project.
The second and most substantial part of the volume is, understandably, 
dedicated to Galen’s philosophical position in PA. All four papers shed light 
on a particular aspect of Galen’s ideas in this text: a long philosophical – not 
 medical – tradition has shaped the ancients’ thinking about emotions, espe-
cially distress (λυπή). In the first chapter, Galen’s PA as philosophical therapy: 
how coherent is it?, Christopher Gill explores Galen’s new text against the 
backdrop of long-standing interrogations among Greek philosophers about 
the possible ways to control our emotions. Galen, although a doctor, deals 
with those problems in two related surviving works, Avoiding Distress (De 
Indolentia, or Ind.) and the first book of The Diagnosis and Treatment of the 
Affections and Errors Peculiar to Each Person’s Soul (Aff. Pecc. Dig., and Aff. Dig. 
for book I). Here, Gill argues, Galen focuses on philosophical therapy, moving 
away from medical concerns. Issues of structure and coherence are the start-
ing point of Gill’s discussion, who goes on to identify patterns of cohesion 
both internally and between the two works, showing that PA offers an origi-
nal voice among works dedicated to the same topic. Gill concludes, however, 
with an open question on the therapy apparently adopted and promoted by 
Galen in this text: suggesting that ἀπληστία must precede ἀλυπία, Galen seems 
to rule out the therapeutic value of his own life-long (and well-established) 
medical and literary project. Somehow, Galen seems at odds with the therapy 
he advocates.
Jim Hankinson’s paper focuses on the skeptical background to Galen’s PA. 
In fact, for the sake of appropriate contextualisation, he is led to delivering a 
thorough account of Galen’s Stoic, Epicurean and Skeptical background across 
his many philosophical works. Arguing in favour of Galen’s proximity with 
the Pyrrhonists, with whom he has fundamental disagreements, is bold; but 
Hankinson points to discrete points of convergence between their ideas and 
Galen’s attempt at tackling distress. Whilst not quite mentioning metriopathe-
ia, a sceptic notion, Galen’s point of view in PA is evocative of similar ideas, and 
appeals to the powers of reasoning to fight against any invasive emotions, in a 
way that is not without reminding Sextus Empiricus.
Peter Singer, in A New Distress: Galen’s Ethics in the PA and beyond, argues 
that lupè (distress) is at the crossroads of ethics and medicine. A dangerous 
emotion if left unchecked and allowed to grow, lupè is medical in so far as it has 
serious physical and mental consequences. More annoyingly for Galen in the 
context of PA, it can develop into a serious obstacle on an individual’s moral 
quest to fortitude. As such, it is pointless to deny the existence of negative emo-
tions or claim they can be superseded – rather acknowledge them, says Galen, 
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but work out the way to control them. Thus Galen’s voice is unique among 
the more trenchant opinions of Stoic as well as other philosophers. Lupè, and 
therefore alupia, can be approached through a more acceptant, humbler un-
derstanding of emotions. This is what is advocated by Galen.
Finally, Teun Tieleman analyses PA against the backdrop of a long tradition 
of ancient philosophical therapeutics, the roots of which are to be found es-
pecially in the Stoic tradition. An ardent admirer of Plato, Galen succeeds in 
combining his Platonic creed and the Stoic heritage to offer a personal take 
on the virtue of apatheia, which he considers neither wholly attainable nor 
desirable for vulnerable human beings. Tieleman thus confirms and supple-
ments an important strand of Singer’s argument: Galen’s undeniably profound 
engagement with the Stoic tradition.
Part three of the volume delivers new insights into the troubled history of 
the final years of the Antonines: in Galen and the Plague, Rebecca Flemming 
examines afresh our evidence and recent scholarship about the Antonine 
‘plague’, using Galen’s new testimony to show how utterly bewildering and 
challenging the deadly disease was to Galen and his contemporaries. Whilst 
attempting to pin down the nature of the disease thanks to ancient and medi-
eval (Arabic) sources, Flemming demonstrates that there is no point in trying 
to draw too much from imperial writers and other sources: a monstrous fatality 
imposed on the world, the ‘plague’ was in no way understood and analysed for 
what it was, but simply conveyed dread, fear, and resignation. This is true of 
Galen, too, she argues.
Matthew Nicholls, in Galen and the Last Days of Commodus, revisits the 
dreaded reign of Commodus in the light of Galen’s testimony. Galen’s letter, 
he argues, may have arisen from the need to clear himself from any wrongdo-
ing or crime by association, as he remained attached to the Palace throughout 
Commodus’ reign until his assassination. A physician at the service of Marcus 
Aurelius, and of Commodus since childhood, Galen presumably stood no 
chance to escape back to Pergamum – but his surviving the reign free of any 
of the calamities endured by many of his friends may have raised questions, or 
even malignant suggestions as to his integrity. Whether or not Galen felt com-
pelled to write a somehow apologetic work about his Commodus years, his text 
remains a highly intriguing testimony about life at court during that period.
Finally, Antoine Pietrobelli’s paper stands alone in the final section of the 
book (epilogue), titled Arabic περὶ ἀλυπίας: Did al-Kindî and Râzî read Galen? 
Antoine Pietrobelli’s study investigates possible interactions with the text in 
the Islamic world. Whilst Galen’s text was remembered and commemorat-
ed, few had a genuine opportunity to engage directly with it: in the Islamic 
world just like in the West, no known copies of the text survive. According 
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to Pietrobelli however, this may not always have been the case: close reading 
shows that Râzi most likely read, pondered and imitated Galen’s PA. Al-Kindi, 
on the other hand, perhaps for reasons of inter-school rivalry in Baghdad, was 
almost certainly not able to interact with the Arabic translation of the text. 
In any case, it is clear that Galen’s PA haunted medical minds well beyond its 
production in 193.
A list of the most common abbreviations and editions used in this volume 
will be found at the end of the following Note by Peter Singer.
With regard to the denomination of the text, a flexible approach has been 
chosen: each contributor favoured either the Greek title (περὶ ἀλυπίας), the 
abbreviated PA, or the Latin title (De indolentia, abbr. Ind.) – in the footnotes 
and in the index locorum, however, references to the text will be found under 
Ind. (De indolentia).
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chapter 1
Note on MS Vlatadon 14: a Summary of the Main 
Findings and Problems
P. N. Singer
The Galenic manuscript fortuitously discovered by Antoine Pietrobelli in a 
Greek monastery in 2005 contains four items with significant new Galenic ma-
terial: an entire text which had previously been lost to us, περὶ ἀλυπίας (Ind.); 
the full Greek text of a work which had been available in Greek only in small 
part, the rest having to be supplied from an Arabo-Latin and a Graeco-Latin 
translation, My Own Doctrines (Prop. Plac.);1 and an additional version of the 
Greek text of two works which were already extant, but with significant la-
cunae, in the only previously-known Greek manuscript, My Own Books (Lib. 
Prop.) and The Order of My Own Books (Ord. Lib. Prop.).2
In the case of the last two works mentioned, then, the Vlatadon manuscript 
was able to fill these lacunae. The discovery of the wholly new text, περὶ ἀλυπίας, 
has given rise to a veritable flurry of international scholarly activity, including 
both a great deal of philological work on problems in the text and a number 
of analyses of the new light – and of the questions and puzzles – which the 
text sheds and raises. Meanwhile, the full Greek version of My Own Doctrines 
has attracted some, though comparatively much less, attention; and discovery 
of some missing sentences from the two works of auto-bibliography, My Own 
Books and The Order of My Own Books, has gone more or less unnoticed. In 
1   The editio princeps of the partial Greek text supplemented by Latin sources was produced 
by Nutton, V. (1999). Galen: De propriis placitis, and that of the full Greek text, with French 
translation, by Boudon-Millot, V. and Pietrobelli, A. (2005). ‘Galien ressucité: édition prin-
ceps du texts grec du De propriis placitis’, Revue des Études Grecques 118, 168–213; the lat-
ter scholar is preparing a full critical edition of the text. See Nutton’s edition, 14–45 and 
Pietrobelli, A. (2013). ‘Galien agnostique: un texte caviardé par la tradition’, Revue des Études 
Grecques 126, 103–35, at 106–9, for further detail on the textual tradition (which also includes 
a section in Hebrew translation).
2   A peculiarity of the nature of the damage to the single previously known manuscript of these 
two texts that it gave rise to lacunae covering significantly overlapping material in the two 
texts, which both list Galen’s own works. The edition and translation of Boudon-Millot, V. 
(2007). Galien, Tome 1, takes account of the new material; see also Boudon-Millot V. (2014). 
‘Vlatadon 14 and Ambrosianus Q3: Two Twin Manuscripts’. In Rothschild, C. K. and Thompson, 
T. W. (eds) Galen’s De indolentia, 41–55.
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view of the wealth of scholarly publications that have already appeared, in a 
wide range of different languages, books and journals – and especially in view 
of the fact that in some cases these have appeared after the publication of the 
critical editions of περὶ ἀλυπίας, or at least too late to be fully taken into account 
by their various editors – it may be helpful to offer an overview both of the new 
information and fresh insights that have accrued from research on the man-
uscript thus far, and of the chief problems and areas of dispute. This chapter 
attempts such an overview, considering both the main research findings and 
controversies and, in the context of a highly problematic and already much 
discussed manuscript, the most significant and/or debated textual cruces in 
the text of περὶ ἀλυπίας.
1 Main Findings
The main gains and research findings arising from the discovery may, I think, 
be listed under five heads or topics:
(i) archaeology: the location, and nature, of Roman libraries and storehous-
es in the imperial period;
(ii) scholarship and bibliographical practice: specific features of manuscript 
collection and scholarly traditions in second-century-AD Rome, as well as 
the nature of book production and book distribution;
(iii) Galen’s practices of book-study and of book-composition;
(iv) moral philosophy: Galen’s contribution to the genre;
(v) Galen’s summation of, and attitude to, his own central philosophical 
doctrines.
While the text of περὶ ἀλυπίας sheds new light on topics (i) and (iv) above, both 
this and the texts of My Own Books and The Order of My Own Books shed light 
on topics (ii) and (iii).3
A considerable amount of recent scholarship has been devoted to (i), ex-
ploring the location and nature of both the public imperial library collections 
mentioned by Galen and his own private storehouse, as well as the nature and 
extent of the damage inflicted in this geographical area by the fire of 192. Some 
clarity has emerged – we seem for example to have a fairly clear idea of the 
3   But the list is not exhaustive. Another debate re-ignited by the codex concerns the vexed ques-
tion of Galen’s gentilicium: is it possible that he was called Claudius after all? See Alexandru, S. 
(2011). ‘Newly Discovered Witness Asserting Galen’s Affiliation to the Gens Claudia’, Annali 
della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, ser. 5, 3/2, 385–433 and Nutton, V. (2015). ‘What’s in a 
Nomen? Vlatadon 14 and an Old Theory Resuscitated’, in Holmes, B. and Fischer, K.-D. (eds), 
The Frontiers of Ancient Science: Essays in Honour of Heinrich von Staden, 451–62.
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location of Galen’s own storehouse, in the Horrea Pipertaria – but there re-
main significant uncertainties in relation to library locations, arising from the 
highly problematic nature of certain passages of the Greek text. That a library 
attached to the Temple of Peace was one of the major ones destroyed in the 
fire is clear; a library attached to Tiberius’ palace is also mentioned; but a prob-
lem arises in the relevant passage (sections 12b–18), as to the precise location, 
and number, of the libraries to which Galen is referring when he mentions the 
‘Palatine’ (or ‘palace’) libraries; and a particularly thorny problem as to the lo-
cation indicated by Galen’s reference to a further set of book losses, not by fire 
but by damp and looting (and possibly rodent damage). Is he here referring to 
library location in a marshy place in the Forum (and if so, precisely where), or 
rather to a library not at Rome at all but in Antium?4 (See further below for the 
problematic passage of text from which this debate arises.)
On topic (ii) – obviously related to (i), but touching on broader questions in 
the history of texts and intellectual traditions, as well as the history of the book 
as a physical object – there has been even more activity;5 and here too areas 
of clarity are counterbalanced by considerable uncertainties of interpretation. 
Among the results that have emerged with clarity we may mention: the exist-
ence of a range of texts, most especially but not only in the Aristotelian tradi-
tion,6 that were not previously known to be available to or of interest to Galen; 
4   A clear overview, of likely geographical situations and of the recent debate and the problems, 
is given by Nutton (2013). Avoiding Distress, in Singer, P. N. (ed.) Galen: Psychological Writings, 
53–61. See also Dix, T. K. and Houston, G. W. (2006). ‘Public Libraries in the City of Rome: 
From the Augustan Age to the Time of Diocletian’, Mélanges de l’École Française de Rome: 
Antiquité 118:2, 671–717; Houston, G. W. (2008). ‘Galen, His Books and the Horrea Pipertaria at 
Rome’, Memoirs of the British Academy in Rome 48 (2008), 45–51; Tucci, P. L. (2008). ‘Galen’s 
Storeroom, Roman Libraries, and the Fire of AD 192’, JRA 21, 133–49; id. (2009). ‘Antium, the 
Palatium and the Domus Tiberiana Again’ JRA 22, 398–401; id. (2013). ‘Galen and the Library 
at Antium: The State of the Question’, Classical Philology 108:3, 240–51; Jones, C. P. (2009). 
‘Books and Libraries in a Newly-Discovered Treatise of Galen’, JRS 22, 390–7; Rothschild, 
C. K. and Thompson, T. W. (2011). ‘Galen’s On the Avoidance of Grief: The Question of a Library 
at Antium’, Early Christianity 2.1, 110–29; cf. Boudon-Millot, V. and Jouanna, J. (2010). Galien, 
Oeuvres 4: Ne pas se chagriner, xxii–xxvii and 66; Nicholls, M. ‘A Library at Antium?’, in 
Rothschild, C. K. and Thompson, T. W. (2013). Galen’s De indolentia, 65–78.
5   See Nutton, Avoiding Distress and Manetti, D. (ed.) (2012). Studi sul De indolentia di Galeno; 
further bibliography on specific debates in relation to cruces is given below.
6   The focus on and engagement with Aristotle and Aristotelians – and, more specifically, first-
generation Aristotelians – is emphasized by the grouping, ‘Theophrastus, Aristotle, Eudemus, 
Clytus and Phaenias’ at the beginning of the list of examples of works whose manuscripts 
Galen had carefully corrected to create a new edition, at 15, 6,18–19 BJP. The point is made 
by Rashed, M. (2011). ‘Aristote à Rome au IIe siécle: Galien, De indolentia §§ 15–18’, Elenchos 
32, 57–8 (arguing convincingly for following more closely the MS reading κλίτου, against 
Jouanna’s emendation Κλειτομάχου). Rashed goes further (73–7), and links the survival of 
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and the nature of his own use of material from such particular collections, 
ranging from intensive study and collation to marking up for copying to form 
new editions. We also gain from this text a far clearer picture than before of 
the possibilities and realities of scholarly activity amongst intellectuals in im-
perial Rome, of the nature of library use and of the practices of book-copying, 
book-editing and book-circulation.7 Matters that remain debated are: whether 
or at what points Galen is referring to unique manuscripts from the collection 
of an illustrious collector (or even, in some cases, the autograph manuscripts 
of the author himself), as opposed to simply copies deriving from a particular, 
important manuscript tradition; and, in several cases, the precise identity of 
the works or authors in question. (On these points again, see the discussion 
of the problem passages of Greek below.)
The text has also brought new perspectives on broader questions related 
to the nature of both book production and book distribution in the Graeco- 
Roman world. One new finding is the apparent existence of an early form of 
codex or paginated book, at least in the context of collections of drug recipes.8 
A broader area is the (already much discussed) nature or practice of book ‘pub-
lication’ or distribution (ekdosis) in the ancient world, and the relationship 
between texts intended for different persons or uses. The text of περὶ ἀλυπίας 
certainly provides new evidence on book copying; on book distribution; on the 
nature of Galen’s own intentions and claims in relation to his own works; and, 
of course, on the extent of his actual losses in the fire – even if the evidence in 
none of these areas is easy to interpret.9
To move to topic (iii): some aspects of Galen’s literary and scholarly activ-
ity have already been considered under (ii); but as regards his statements on 
the order, intention and nature of his own compositions, remarks both in Περὶ 
these Aristotelian works, uniquely in Rome, in the second century AD, with the ancient tra-
dition that Theophrastus’ own collection of texts of the school was extant in Athens in the 
first century BC, from where it was brought to Rome by Sulla after his sack of the city (and 
subsequently formed the basis of Andronicus’ scholarly work).
7   For interpretation of what Galen says in section 13 in relation to specific extant editions, 
in particular of Plato, see Gourinat, J.-B. (2008). ‘Le Platon de Panétius: à propos d’un té-
moignage inédit de Galien’, Philosophie Antique 8, 139–51 and Dorandi, T. (2010). ‘“Editori” 
antichi di Platone’, Antiquorum philosophia 4, 161–74.
8   This is the conclusion of Nicholls, M. (2010). ‘Parchment Codices in a New Text of Galen’, 
Greece and Rome 2:57, 378–86, followed by Nutton, Avoiding Distress, 87 n. 67 and BJP ad loc. 
A ‘drug book’ of this kind would, then, be a sort of proto-codex, something loosely bound in 
leather, to which further recipes could be added ad hoc. But an alternative interpretation sees 
the diphthera rather simply as a leather folder containing recipes or lists of recipes.
9   These questions are discussed in detail in my chapter ‘New Light and Old Books’, in this 
volume.
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ἀλυπίας and in the previously missing parts of Lib. Prop. and of Ord. Lib. Prop. 
shed new light. The importance of the latter material, although it is included 
by V. Boudon-Millot in her very thorough 2007 edition and commentary on 
those works, has not been significantly discussed. It is of considerable interest 
in the light it sheds on Galen’s own view of the order and relationship between 
certain of his central works; and further study is needed to bring these pas-
sages in relation to what Galen says about the books in question, and their 
place in his oeuvre, elsewhere. But some summary of the ‘new’ passages may 
be of value here.
In My Own Books, first: the previous lacuna (at XIX.108 K.) covered the tran-
sition from Galen’s discussion of his works of anatomy (ch. 4 [3]10) to that of 
his works of disease classification, which thus appeared abruptly, without any 
further chapter heading; they now appear some way into ch. 6 [3]; see further 
below. Thus, we previously arrived at De morborum differentiis (Morb. Diff.) in 
the middle of a discussion of works of anatomy, without any understanding 
of the relationship Galen intended between this work of disease classification 
and the immediately preceding, anatomical works. The Vlatadon manuscript 
adds a substantial amount of material both to the end of ch. 4 [3] and to the 
beginning of ch. 6 [3], while also adding a wholly new chapter 5 – as well as 
the chapter titles of both the latter. The new ch. 4 material completes  Galen’s 
account of his epitomes of Marinus’, and then Lycus’, anatomical works, before 
mentioning some more general anatomical works (interestingly including De 
partium homoeomerium differentia) and summing up by saying that all these 
teach the nature of the constitution (kataskeuē) of the parts of the body; and 
that what follows after these is the discussion of the activities (energeiai) and 
function (chreia) of each part.
Such, indeed, is the heading of ch. 5: ‘in which books are contained the ac-
tivities and functions of those parts which are made apparent in anatomy’. This 
is in itself of considerable interest: Galen is essentially isolating a category of 
physiological works (those which describe energeia and chreia), works which 
have a distinct position, logically and paedagogically, after anatomical works 
but before therapeutic ones – or, to be more precise, before a set of works 
which provide a curriculum ‘leading up to’ the therapeutic works. The chap-
ter starts by listing the lost The Motion of the Chest and the Lungs, De causis 
10   For My Own Books I give the new chapter number, resulting from the full text of Vlatadon 
14, followed by the old chapter number in square brackets. The discrepancy that has aris-
en by ch. 4 [3] is not due to a substantive addition, but simply that of a new chapter title 3, 
‘The books written after these’, at XIX.17 K., just after the account of his return home, and 
of the reappearance at that stage of certain youthful works, and just before his summons 
to join the imperial party on campaign.
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respirationis and the lost De voce. Next is De motu musculorum. Arresting here 
is the previously unknown characterization of this work as covering, specifi-
cally, the activities of the soul – by contrast with De naturalibus facultatibus, 
mentioned next, which covers those of nature, as does Excretion of Urine. Be-
longing to the same theōria, too (by which is meant, presumably, the overall 
chapter topic rather than the narrower one ‘of nature’), are: De usu pulsuum, De 
usu respirationis, An in arteriis sanguis contineatur, De purgantium medicamen-
torum facultate and, ‘all that has been said on the leading-part11 of the soul and 
on the sources that manage us’ in De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis (PHP). The 
reference to ten books of PHP, here, as opposed to the nine which we now pos-
sess, incidentally supports evidence which was already known from the Arabic 
translation of chapters 3 and 16 of the work, where the work is also mentioned. 
Indeed, the mention of PHP here – alongside those other mentions in My Own 
Books, both in the chronological account and under the heading ‘related to 
the philosophy of Plato – adds to our understanding of Galen’s own view of 
the work within his oeuvre: that is, its status in relation to the teaching of ac-
tivity and function. Finally, within the new chapter, we have De usu partium 
(UP), which is described as ‘following from all those mentioned’. This inter-
nal self-ordering of Galen’s works relevant to anatomy and physiology, and in 
particular the precise nature of the distinction between discussions of activity 
(energeia) and those of function (chreia), are important points to consider in 
any attempt to understand the status and intention of his various scientific 
discussions of the human body.12
Turning to ch. 6: we are now in a position to understand the proper position 
of Morb. Diff., and a list of other works related to disease classification, within 
Galen’s suggested order and, more than that, the nature of the whole category 
to which he claims that these works belong. They are those to be read, or un-
derstood, before The Therapeutic Method (MM). The pivotal, or culminating, 
place that this gives to MM is interesting in itself. We then see how the intel-
lectual ground needed for the understanding of that medical magnum opus is 
built up, starting from element and mixture theory (De elementis ex Hippocra-
tis sententia, the first two books of De temperamentis (Temp.)), then – though 
these are optional at this stage – book 3 of Temp. and the eleven books of the 
11   But n.b. that the term hēgemonikon here (155 Boudon-Millot) is supplied by Boudon- 
Millot on the basis of the Arabic.
12   The passage is to be put alongside a similar remark within UP itself, at 6.12 (III.463 
K. = i.337,22–338,1 Helmreich), where again works on anatomy precede works on energeia, 
which precede discussions of chreia.
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great pharmacological work, Simples; then De optimo corporis nostri constitu-
tione, De bono habitu, De inaequali intemperie.
The new material thus gives us a much clearer picture than before of an 
order of instruction which goes from anatomy, through physiology, to element 
theory and disease classification before reaching therapeutics – as well as of 
which specific works Galen regards as physiological in this sense (dealing with 
energeia and chreia).
That last sequence was, admittedly, already known from Ord. Lib. Prop. 2 – 
where, however, before the discovery of the Vlatadon material, MM itself did 
not make an appearance. It in fact appears, now, right at the beginning of the 
new material, that is, just after those works just mentioned in the previous 
paragraph – except that, rather confusingly, it is then followed by a consid-
erable list of works which ‘precede’ it. These, again, to a considerable extent 
confirm what is now suggested in Lib. Prop. 6 [3], mentioning a set of works on 
disease classification, though the situation is more complex and, one is tempt-
ed to say, more rambling, here. The precise order in that other text – ironically, 
in a work which claims to focus precisely on the question of order – is much 
harder to follow than that in My Own Books. However, the insights which may 
arise from close study of this text remain unexplored. To take just one example: 
the text’s construction of the category of a ‘semiotic’ branch of the art of medi-
cine, divided into diagnostic and prognostic, and its discussion of a number of 
texts – in particular on pulse and on crises – in this context, is surely worthy of 
further consideration.
Topic (iv) has provoked a number of different studies, focussing varyingly 
on genre and ancient parallels, on social context and on philosophical analysis 
(or on some combination of these). Christopher Gill’s 2010 book gave a seri-
ous analysis of aspects of περὶ ἀλυπίας, contextualizing it both within Galen’s 
other ethical work and within the tradition of ethical writing; a number have 
focussed on questions of genre and socio-literary context; and there has been 
discussion, too, of the work’s position within Galen’s philosophical writings.13 
Certain new perspectives on the Galenic concept of lupē and his ‘practical 
ethics’ are certainly introduced by the work, though again there are passag-
es which elude straightforward interpretation. Several chapters in the present 
book take forward the analysis of Galen’s discussion in this ethical area.
Let us turn to topic (v). The discovery of the full Greek text may, arguably, 
not revolutionize our understanding of the work in question: a considera-
ble portion was already extant in Greek, and where there were problems of 
13   For further details of this bibliography see in this volume my chapter ‘A New Distress’, 
n. 3.
17Note on MS Vlatadon 14
interpretation with this, the new source does not always resolve them. Howev-
er, the new complete version of the text in Greek certainly corrects a number 
of errors, unclarities and distortions in the Arabo-Latin and Hebrew versions; 
and beyond that, I suggest, it adds fresh material of significant philosophical 
interest.
Some of this material has already received attention. As shown by Antoine 
Pietrobelli in his discussion of the opening chapters of the work, relevant pas-
sages had been significantly distorted for theological reasons in the ‘transla-
tions’ which were previously our only source for them; there were also some 
names which were simply garbled in those versions.14 These passages in fact 
offer an unambiguous assertion of the gods’ direct influence on human affairs, 
including Galen’s own: he has experienced the activity of the Dioscuri at sea, as 
well as Asclepius’ personal interventions (in the latter case, admittedly, there 
are a couple of similar references elsewhere in the corpus). They also show 
Galen adopting a distinctive position in relation to religious scepticism and 
belief. Interesting here is Galen’s alignment of his own views with those of 
Socrates. Although the text is both somewhat elliptical and far from perfectly 
transmitted, he appears by this to mean that he follows Socrates in his respect 
for traditional religious observance in general, and in his willingness to obey 
the specific instructions of Apollo in particular; and moreover that he con-
trasts this Socratic–Galenic combination of theism on the one hand and pro-
fessed ignorance of abstract theological–metaphysical questions on the other 
with the more thoroughgoing agnosticism of Protagoras.15
14   See Pietrobelli, ‘Galien agnostique’, esp. 109–20. Apart from the occlusion of individual 
gods (Asclepius, Dioscuri) for ideological reasons, and the distortion of the argument 
in relation to Socrates and Protagoras (cf. esp. Pietrobelli’s chart laying out the different 
versions at 109–11), the Arabo-Latin text sometimes just hopelessly distorts names, e.g. 
that of Empedocles as ‘Elumerephilis’ (vel sim.) at Prop. Plac. 7 (179,23 Boudon-Millot and 
Pietrobelli), or simply omits them, e.g. those of Plato and Chrysippus in the attribution 
of arguments on the incorporeal or corporeal nature of the soul at Prop. Plac. 7 (179,18 
Boudon-Millot and Pietrobelli).
15   For both gods’ personal interventions and the argument in relation to Socrates and 
Protagoras, see Prop. Plac. 2 (172,31–173,12 Boudon-Millot and Pietrobelli), with Pietrobelli 
(cited in the previous note). Pietrobelli’s further argument that the text justifies a place 
for Galen in the history of ‘agnosticism’ seems to me overstated. Galen is agnostic in spe-
cific areas. This is already clear elsewhere in the corpus, although Prop. Plac. enriches the 
picture, elaborating the distinction between unknowable matters which provoke useless 
discussion and knowable matters, useful for medicine or ethics, with a third category, 
where arguments of plausibility may be advanced but where secure knowledge claims 
cannot be made; the last category is further understood as one where secure knowledge 
would hypothetically be an ‘adornment’ to the medical and ethical results achieved 
through things that do admit of precise knowledge (Prop. Plac. 14, 188,6–18 Boudon-Millot 
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Other parts of the text await a more thorough analysis, which may, I 
suggest, contribute significantly to our analysis of Galen’s mature medical–
philosophical thought in certain important areas. Those include: his epistemo-
logical views on the domain and limits of certainty; his formulation of his own 
views on certain central doctrinal areas (e.g. element theory, humoral theory, 
the nature of mixture) in relation to that epistemological framework; his un-
derstanding of the relationship of the soul, and of higher-level capacities more 
generally, to the body.16
2 The Cruces
The following is by no means an exhaustive account, either of every locus 
which has attracted a textual discussion, nor, in the case of those which have, of 
every individual emendation or interpretive suggestion that has been put for-
ward. It does claim to present the most significant variant readings and inter-
pretations of the most textually problematic passages, and especially for those 
where the differences are most significant for our understanding on points 
of substance. Not all of what follows is of equal interpretive significance; but 
I draw attention especially to points (c), (f) and (g), which address the major – 
and much-discussed – problems regarding ancient libraries, books and edito-
rial practices; and also points (r), (s) and (t), which are of importance for the 
understanding of Galen’s ethical position, in relation both to Stoicism and to 
the compromise with ‘real life’. The method I follow in presenting these is to 
print the text which, after consideration, seems to me the most plausible, fol-
lowed by an apparatus offering the most significant variant options, discussion 
of these variants and the related interpretations and, where necessary, English 
translation. (In one particularly complex and debated case, I have in the inter-
ests of readability presented two alternative versions of the Greek text, each 
followed by translation.)
and Pietrobelli). In terms of religious agnosticism, while Galen denies that we can know 
the substance of the gods (that is, there is very little we can say about their nature), on 
their existence and power in the natural world – on the validity of the argument from 
design – he has no doubt. There is similar agnosticism – again repeated throughout the 
corpus – on the substance of the soul.
16   A first attempt at such analysis is made in my forthcoming article, ‘Galen on his Own 
Opinions: Textual Questions and Fresh Perspectives from MS Vlatadon 14’.
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(a) The title
Περὶ ἀλυπίας
ἀλυγισίας MS ἀλυπίας BM ἀλυπησίας BJP
Immediately in the title line we have an indication of the level of the scrib-
al errors in this MS and of the difficulties that will result from them. There 
may seem to be little interpretive significance in this case, but BJP argue that 
ἀλυπησία (a noun formation paralleled by e.g. ἀοργησία, ἀοχλησία) has a more 
active sense and is therefore more appropriate to the context of this work: 
while ἀλυπία properly means ‘absence of distress’, ἀλυπησία would mean ‘the 
activity of not being distressed’. In favour of BJP’s reading is the fact that a 
lengthened form (although not the same lengthened form) appears at each of 
the four MS occurrences: here; at 69 (21,12 BJP: ἀλυπεισίας); at 79b (24,11 BJP: 
ἀλυπισίαν); and in the end line – highly distorted there (ἀλογισίας at 26,4 BJP) 
as it is in the title line. Against them is the fact that the emendation involves 
the positing of an otherwise unattested Greek word; the fact that the title ap-
pears in the more expected form Περὶ ἀλυπίας in its mention in ch. 15 [12] of 
Lib. Prop. (XIX.45 K. = 169,17 Boudon-Millot); and evidence for the existence 
of a tradition of philosophical works Περὶ ἀλυπίας. The other editors have pre-
ferred the less challenging form.
(b) Ind. 4 (3,6–7 BJP)
πλῆθος ἄλλο τῶν συγγεγραμμένων αὐτοῦ
συγραμένων MS συγγεγραμμένων BM σεσωρευμένων Garofalo
The more obvious emendation, adopted by BJP, seems to make this a reference 
to writings made in situ (‘la masse de mes écrits rédigés ici même’); Nutton, 
finding this reference to place odd, follows Garofalo: ‘a further mass of things 
stored there’. The significance of this latter reading is that if we accept it Galen 
is not then mentioning his own writings in this first listing of his losses, but 
only comes to them in a subordinate clause some twelve lines later. The no-
tion that Galen is referring to his ‘writings composed here’ does not seem to 
me so problematic as to motivate the emendation to such a distant form, and 
I wonder whether in fact αὐτοῦ has to be understood so literally as attached to 
συγγεγραμμένων. With regard to the verb σωρεύω, Galen uses this verb on sever-
al occasions, usually with a very concrete physical sense of ‘pile up’, rather than 
just ‘store’. So, its use here is perhaps not supported by its occurrence a little 
later in this same text (where indeed it has that concrete, vivid sense), 10 (5,1–2 
BJP): συνέβη κἀκεῖνα πάντα σὺν τοῖς κειμηλίοις ἐκεῖ σωρευθέντα διαφθαρῆναι, ‘it 
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happened that they too [sc. the valuables from his own house] had all been 
piled up with the things stored there, and were destroyed’. If Galen in the sec-
ond passage is essentially repeating the same information, with a little more 
detail – that is, referring to the same objects again, those that were added to 
what was usually in storage in preparation for his departure – this would sup-
port the reading σεσωρευμένων; but he may, rather, be adding further informa-
tion: not only were all these things that I have mentioned already destroyed, 
but also the valuables I had ‘piled on’ just recently. (Pace Roselli,17 the adverb 
αὐτοῦ, given Galen’s use of the verb σωρεύω in the concrete physical sense 
mentioned, rather supports the latter interpretation: the mention of a stock 
of items ‘that I had piled up here’ – meaning ‘at Rome’ would be slightly odd, 
whereas in the later passage ἐκεῖ σωρευθέντα, ‘piled up there’, refers to a specific 
act of adding them to the storeroom.)
(c) Ind. 13 (6,5–7 BJP)
καὶ γὰρ γραμματικῶν πολλῶν αὐτόγραφα βιβλία τῶν παλαιῶν ἔκειντο καὶ 
ῥητόρων καὶ ἰατρῶν καὶ φιλοσόφων …
αὐτόγραφα MS ἀντίγραφα BJP
Here, faced with the apparently implausible claim that there were extant man-
uscripts from the hand of ancient authors, BJP emend αὐτόγραφα to ἀντίγρα-
φα, and their translation thus yields the less challenging claim that there were 
‘copies’ of many ancient grammarians, orators, etc.
Nutton defends the MS reading on the grounds that it there may have been 
works which were at least thought to be from the hand of ‘ancient’ authors. He 
translates:
There were also many autograph copies of ancient grammarians, orators, 
doctors and philosophers …
Manetti, however, has a quite different interpretation. Citing parallels on the 
usage of ‘autograph’ and similar terms,18 she offers an alternative translation 
which seems to remove the implausibility involved in the αὐτόγραφα claim, 
while preserving the MS reading:
17   Roselli, A. ‘Libri e biblioteche a Roma al tempo di Galeno: la testimonianza del de indolen-
tia’, Galenos 4 (2010), 127–48.
18   Manetti, D. ‘Galeno περὶ ἀλυπίας e il difficile equilibrismo dei filologi’, in Manetti, Studi, 15, 
citing in particular Fronto, Ad M. Caes. 1.7.4 (15,13–21 van den Hout).
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There were also the autograph manuscripts of many grammarians, [con-
taining the texts of] ancient authors: orators, doctors and philosophers …
On this view, the identity of these manuscripts as ‘autographs’ is indeed being 
asserted, but not as autographs by those authors. The perceived value of an an-
cient work could, as she argues, be hugely enhanced by the status of the person 
who copied it, especially when that was a distinguished scholar or grammar-
ian. She thus separates the two sets of genitives in the above phrase: there are 
‘many grammarians’ and then there are ‘the ancients’, with ‘orators, doctors 
and philosophers’ functioning as a gloss of the latter (an interpretation which 
perhaps also offers a more natural usage for the three iterations of καὶ). What 
is in question, then, is not the rather implausible autograph manuscripts of 
the ancients, but autograph manuscripts by distinguished grammarians of the 
ancients. This seems to me the most convincing solution.
(d) Ind. 14 (6,9–10 BJP)
εἰς καθαρὸν ἔδαφος ἐγέγραπτό <μοι> βιβλία τῶν ἀσαφῶς <ἡρμηνευμένων>, 
ἡμαρτημένων δὲ κατὰ τὰς γράφας
ἀσαφῶν ἡμαρτημένων δὲ MS ἀσαφῶν μὲν, ἡμαρτημένων δὲ BM ἀσαφῶν ἢ τῶν ἡμαρτη-
μένων [om. δὲ] Roselli ἀσαφῶς ἡρμηνευμένων scripsi
The description is clearly one of manuscripts which contained errors and of 
which Galen had laboured to produce error-free, ‘clean’ copies. There is a prob-
lem in the syntax, the δὲ seeming to require a previous μὲν, which BM supplied; 
but even then the text reads rather baldly. Roselli points out19 the relevance 
to this context of a passage from his commentary on the Hippocratic Nature 
of Man, in which Galen is similarly describing the unclarity that can arise in 
manuscripts; he attributes it to two causes: poor expression on the part of 
the writer or error on the part of the transcriber: ἀσαφὲς δέ ἐστιν ἢ μὴ καλῶς 
ἡρμηνευμένον ὑπὸ τοῦ γράψαντος ἢ διὰ τοὺς μεταγραψαμένους ἡμαρτημένον, HNH 
(XV.46 K. = 26,2–3 Mewaldt). The fact that Galen seems to have two parallel 
phenomena in mind here, in conjunction with the similarity of the contexts, 
leads me tentatively to suggest the above emendation, inserting ἡρμηνευμένων, 
the omission of which through its similarity to the immediately following 
ἡμαρτημένων would be a very easy error. It is true that one would prefer a dif-
ferent connection, perhaps reading τε for δὲ; but the sense thus provided, that 
unclarity in the author’s expression goes hand in hand with errors that require 
correction in the MSS, seems the right one.
19   Roselli, ‘Libri’, 141.
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(e) Ind. 15 (6,19 BJP)
Κλύτου
κλίτου MS Κλειτομάχου BJP
BJP (followed by KS and GL) emend to make this a reference to the second-
century-BC Platonist Clitomachus; but as Rashed has shown (see n. 6 above), 
the context makes Clytus, an Aristotelian of the first generation, a much more 
likely choice: this also involves a minimal change to the MS reading. (The latter 
reading is also accepted by Nutton.)
(f) Ind. 16–17 (6,21–7,14 BJP)
The problems of this passage have been much discussed. Nutton gives a sepa-
rate appendix to his translation (101–6); a substantially different interpretation 
is given by Manetti; Rashed also gives detailed commentary and emendations. 
In view of the complexities, I print two versions of the Greek text first, that on 
which Nutton bases his translation (that of BJP with very small changes), then 
one which adopts the changes suggested by Manetti (2012), followed by an ap-
paratus (with line numbers referring to the first version here printed) and the 
relevant English translation in each case (mine, in the case of Manetti). Words 
corresponding to the most important differences in reading and interpretation 
have been highlighted in bold.
λυπήσει δέ σε καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα, ὡς τῶν ἐν τοῖς καλουμένοις πίναξι [τῶν] 
γεγραμμένων βιβλίων ἔξωθεν ευ�͂ρόν τινα κατά [τινά] τε τὰς ἐν τῷ Παλατίῳ 
βιβλιοθήκας καὶ τ<ιν>ὰ[ς] ἐναντίω<ς> ἃ φανερῶς <οὐκ> η�͂ν ου�͂περ 
ἐπεγέγραπτο, <οὔτε> κατὰ τὴν λέξιν οὔτε κατὰ <τὴν> διάνοιαν ὁμοιούμενα 
αὐτῷ. καὶ τὰ Θεοφράστου καὶ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστημονικὰς 
πραγματείας – ἔστιν ἄλλα τὰ Περὶ φυτῶν κατὰ δύο πραγματείας ἐκτεταμένας 
ἡρμηνευμένα πάντες ἔχουσι. ἡ δ ̓ Ἀριστοτέλ<ει> σύναρμος ἀκριβῶς η�͂ν 
εὑρεθεῖσά μοι καὶ μεταγραφεῖσα, ἣ καὶ νῦν ἀπολομένη · κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν 
τρόπον καὶ Θεοφράστου καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν ἀνδρῶν παλαιῶν μὴ φαινόμενα κατὰ 
τοὺς πίνακας, τινὰ δ  ̓ἐν ἐκείνοις γεγραμμένα μέν, μὴ φερόμενα δ ἀὐτά.
λυπήσει δέ σε καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα ὡς τῶν ἐν τοῖς καλουμένοις πίναξι [τῶν] 
γεγραμμένων βιβλίων ἔξωθεν ευ�͂ρόν τινα κατά τε τὰς ἐν τῷ Παλατίῳ 
βιβλιοθήκας καὶ τὰς ἐν Ἀντίῳ, ἅ φανερῶς η�͂ν ου�͂περ ἐπεγέγραπτο, κατὰ τὴν 
λέξιν [ου]τε κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ὅμοια. <ἔστι> μὲν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ Θεοφράστου 
καὶ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστημονικὰς πραγματείας, [ἔστιν] ἀλλὰ τὰ Περὶ 
φυτῶν κατὰ δύο πραγματείας ἐκτεταμένας ἡρμηνευμένα πάντες ἔχουσι, ἡ δ  ̓
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Ἀριστοτέλ<ους> σύναρμος ἀκριβῶς η�͂ν εὑρεθεῖσά μοι καὶ μεταγραφεῖσα, ἣ 
καὶ νῦν ἀπολομένη · κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ Θεοφράστου καὶ ἄλλων 
τινῶν ἀνδρῶν παλαιῶν μὴ φερόμενα κατὰ τοὺς πίνακας, τινὰ δ ̓ἐν ἐκείνοις 
γεγραμμένα μέν, μὴ φαινόμενα δ  ̓αὐτά.
3 τὰ MS τινὰς BJP ἐναντίω MS ἐναντίως BJP ἐν Ἀντίῳ Jones οὐκ add. Jones 4 οὔτε add 
Nutton τε pro οὔτε Manetti 4–5 ὅμοια μὲν αὐτω. καὶ MS ὁμοιούμενα αὐτῷ. καὶ BJP 
ὅμοια. ἔστι μὲν αὐτῶν καὶ Manetti 6 ἔστιν om. Nutton et Manetti ἀλλα MS ἄλλα BJP 
ἀλλὰ Manetti 7 Ἀριστοτέλ MS Ἀριστοτέλει BM Ἀριστοτέλους Garofalo σύναρμος MS 
συνάριθμος Garofalo συνώνυμος vel ὁμώνυμος Nutton 9 φερόμενα MS φαινόμενα 
Nutton 10 φαινόμενα MS φερόμενα Garofalo, Nutton (Nutton thus transposes the 
MS φερόμενα and φαινόμενα; Garofalo reads φερόμενα twice.)
Nutton:
You will be particularly distressed to learn that I had found in the Palatine 
libraries some books not described in the so-called Catalogues and some, 
that were clearly not the work of the author whose name they bore, 
being similar neither in language nor in ideas. There were also writings 
of Theophrastus, and especially his books on science – the other books 
on plants, explicated in two long treatises, everyone has. There was also 
a work of the same name by Aristotle which I carefully found and tran-
scribed but which is now also lost, and likewise works by Theophrastus 
and other ancient writers that did not appear in the Catalogues, as well 
as others that were mentioned there, but did not circulate widely.
Manetti/Singer:
You will be particularly distressed to learn that, beyond the books de-
scribed in the so-called Catalogues, I found some, both in the Palatine 
libraries and in those in Antium, which clearly were the work of the au-
thor whose name they bore, being similar both in language and in ideas. 
Amongst them are the works of Theophrastus, and especially his books 
on science; but the works on plants, explicated in two long treatises, 
everyone has, while that of Aristotle was found by me immediately fol-
lowing on from that one [sc. that of Theophrastus], and transcribed, but 
is now lost. And in the same way I found works, both of Theophrastus and 
of certain other ancient writers which were not contained in the Cata-
logues, and some which were mentioned there, but were evidently not 
those works.
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Here there are three key differences: (1) the reading ‘in Antium’ (proposed 
by Jones and now widely discussed, but rejected by Nutton and Jouanna); 
(2) the change of negative to positive propositions in the places noted in bold 
(note that an emendation is required in either case: other editors have made 
sense by adding the second negative, ‘neither’); (3) a different reconstruction 
of the beginning of the second sentence, and thus of its logical relationship 
with the first; (4) the interpretation of σύναρμος as ‘contiguous’, that is to say, 
‘physically part of the same manuscript’ (and of the adverb ἀκριβῶς as qual-
ifying that – i.e. ‘immediately’ contiguous – rather than referring to Galen’s 
activity).
The question of the reading ἐν Ἀντίῳ (in Antium) arises again in further 
passages below. Without attempting to address all the arguments, one may 
point out (a) that a main strength of the reading ἐν Ἀντίῳ is that it provides a 
linguistically satisfying solution to the problem presented by the MS of three 
separate occurrences of forms of the word ἐναντίος, none of which admits of 
an entirely convincing interpretation as such (see further below); (b) that in 
that case the subsequent discussion of losses due to misappropriation and to 
water damage would, in both cases, refer to what happened to the collection 
of this Antium library, rather than to, respectively, a library in Rome and (in a 
way which is seems difficult to explain) some of Galen’s own books; (c) that 
whatever difficulties the ‘Antium’ interpretation presents – the main one, of 
course, is the lack of other evidence for a library in that location – it does thus 
solve both a linguistic puzzle and a difficulty in understanding the location, 
as well as explaining what is otherwise an unclear transition to an account of 
a different cause of damage to books which has nothing to do with fire (see 
further below).
From that point on, Manetti’s readings enable her to reconstruct in a plau-
sible way the connection between the general remark about the books that 
Galen had found and what follows about Theophrastus and Aristotle. It is some 
lost works of Theophrastus on science – works which clearly are in accord with 
his views – which he found, in spite of their not being in the ‘catalogues’; there 
follows a parenthetical remark about Theophrastus’ work on plants, which by 
contrast is widely available; and finally we come to the most valuable work 
lost, that of Aristotle on plants (as also accepted by Nutton), which Galen had 
found in the same manuscript as the equivalent work of Theophrastus. BJP, 
by contrast, take the reference to be to a work of Theophrastus which was per-
fectly in accord with Aristotle (reading the dative Ἀριστοτέλει), this being their 
interpretation of the term sunarmos; but the exact nature of this book, and its 
relationship to the previous remark about plants, are then difficult, whereas 
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the interpretation whereby this a lost work by Aristotle seems to make much 
better sense of the sentence as a whole.
The main differences of interpretation, then, are: (a) the identity of the book 
which Galen describes himself as having discovered and (b) the relationship of 
the books mentioned here in general to the libraries or their lists,20 which de-
pends upon whether one adds two additional negatives to the sentence (with 
BJP and Nutton) or emends (with Manetti) to remove the existing negative. 
The latter seems to me to give clearly better sense: Galen is talking about works 
not contained in library catalogues, but which were evidently authentic works 
of the authors whose names they bore.
I note here, without going into all its details, the reconstruction of Rashed. 
This agrees with the above version of Manetti in essentials – the key point is 
the availability to Galen, before the fire, of works not in the catalogues, which 
nevertheless were apparently authentic works of ancient authors – but has a 
more elaborately emended version of the sentence containing the references 
to Theophrastus, leading however to the same essential conclusion, that Galen 
had access to and copied Aristotle’s De plantis, which is now lost. (He emends 
σύναρμος to συναρμοττοῦσα and takes the word with ἀκριβῶς to mean ‘rigoure-
sement concordant’.) On the term σύναρμος itself, it seems to me that (a) its 
usual meaning and (b) its non-appearance elsewhere in Galen argue strongly 
in favour of the view that it is in this specific context referring to a physical 
feature of a book, and thus in favour of the interpretation of the word as re-
ferring here to physical contiguity in a manuscript. Τhe text in question was 
‘attached to’, ‘following on from’, the other; this thus adds further to the plau-
sibility of Manetti’s reconstruction: Galen is here explaining the particular 
circumstances – attached to a manuscript of Theophrastus – in which he 
found this otherwise non-extant work of Aristotle.
Finally, on the last part of the passage, after ἀπολομένη. This part is not dis-
cussed by Manetti; the main point at issue is the reading and interpretation of 
the MS words φερόμενα and φαινόμενα. As seen above, Nutton transposes the 
two terms, to give the sense ‘did not appear … did not circulate widely’. BJP have 
no trouble with φερόμενα in the sense of appearing in a catalogue (‘n’étaient 
pas mentionnés’), and take the latter phrase in the sense ‘avaient disparus’. 
20   We note that Nutton, Manetti and Rashed all take ἔξωθεν prepositionally in relation to the 
books which appeared in the pinakes: ‘beyond’ or ‘not described in’. Manetti takes ‘cata-
logues’ (pinakes) here to refer simply to the library catalogues, since the famous listing 
of Andronicus, which has been suggested as the reference here, did, apparently, contain 
Aristotle’s work on plants.
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Nutton’s transposition seems unnecessary; but there is another point, which is 
that none of the existing interpretations seems to make good sense of the final 
word, αὐτά. It seems that Galen is making the additional point that, as well as 
authentic works which were not in the catalogues (and which he found), there 
were also some books which were in the catalogues, but which were, in fact, 
‘manifestly not those books’ (taking αὐτά as a complement). 
(g) Ind. 17 (7,14–16 BJP); 18 (8,3–6 BJP)
One should, then, relatedly, consider the two remaining problematic places 
which give rise to the possible ‘Antium’ reading:
τούτων οὖν ἐγὼ πολλὰ μὲν ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸ Παλάτιον βιβλιοθήκαις εὗρον, τ<ι-
ν>ὰ δ᾽ ἐναντίως κατεσεύασα.
τὰ δ᾽ἐναντία MS; τινὰ δ᾽ἐναντίως Jouanna; τὰ δ᾽ἀντίγραφα Leith; τὰ δ᾽ἐν Ἀντίῳ 
Jones
τ<ιν>ὰ δ᾽ ἐναντίως διὰ τὴν ἀμέλειαν τῶν ἑκάστοτε ἐμπιστευομένων ἐκ διαδο-
χῆς αὐτὰ […] καθ᾽ὃν χρόνον ἐγὼ ἀνέβην εἰς Ῥώμην πρῶτον, ἐγγὺς ἦν τοῦ 
διεφθάρθαι.
τὰ δ᾽ἐναντίω MS τινὰ δ᾽ἐναντίως Jouanna τὰ δ᾽ἀντίγραφα Leith τὰ δ᾽ἐν Ἀντίῳ Jones 
ληστευομένων MS πιστευομένων Garofalo ἐμπιστευομένων Manetti In lacuna μυσὶ 
βεβρωμένα coni. Rashed
If one is not persuaded of Antium, one has a choice of a translation along the 
lines of ‘à l’opposé’, with BJP, or Leith’s ‘copies’ – which perhaps works better 
with the verb, κατεσεύασα, ‘I procured’ (or ‘I had prepared’), at 7,16.21
In the second of these two passages, BJP are again forced to expand τὰ to 
τινὰ; and again Leith’s τὰ δ᾽ἀντίγραφα is perhaps the most plausible non-Antium 
solution: the emendation itself makes much easier Greek than any of the 
attempts to make sense of some form of the word for ‘opposite’; and it pro-
vides good sense in these two instances. (It seems to make less good sense in 
the earlier instance, discussed above at (f), because then the text would seem 
to say that he found both books in the Palatine libraries and copies, when it is 
precisely the destruction of the Palatine collection that is at stake.) In purely 
palaeographical terms, the distortion of the fairly common term ἀντίγραφα is 
harder to explain than that of the unfamiliar place name Antium.
21   In this case Nutton presents the problem, but does not actually translate the phrase.
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In the remainder of this admittedly corrupt text, one has a choice between 
the carelessness of a succession of the [librarians] who are being robbed 
and the carelessness of the [librarians] who were successively entrusted 
with the books. Rashed’s conjecture, based on a consideration of the precise 
length of the lacuna, as well as the possible discernibility of the letters μ, σ 
and ι within it, has the manuscripts in question ‘eaten by mice’ rather than 
looted. (Rashed also accepts the Antium emendation.) The more fundamen-
tal question here remains, whether Galen is now talking about a completely 
different library, at Antium, or giving further information about depredations 
at Rome. In the passage immediately following the above, Galen talks spe-
cifically of damp (σηπεδόνος, 8,9 BJP) as the cause of the fact that the man-
uscripts in question are now ‘useless’: they cannot be opened. This in turn is 
related to the location: ‘marshy’ (ἑλῶδες) and ‘lying in a hollow’ (κοῖλον), which 
makes it ‘stifling’ (πνιγηρόν) in summer (8,10–11 BJP). Nutton discusses the ar-
chaeological options in detail: it is possible that Galen is talking about some 
library, or library annex, undamaged by the fire but in a marshy area of the 
Forum; although it is the easiest emendation of the Greek to accept ‘Antium’ 
three times, there is no other evidence for a major library there. The above 
description of the location as ‘marshy, lying in a hollow and stifling in sum-
mer’ may also seem a major obstacle to the Antium theory: one would ex-
pect such a library to have been high up, overlooking the sea. But κοῖλον may 
mean ‘lying between cliffs’, as well as ‘in a hollow’, and ἑλῶδες could perhaps 
be taken to refer to damp, rather than literally to a ‘marshy’ environment; and 
it is, presumably, possible that the specifics of the library’s location or con-
struction caused it to be both poorly ventilated (‘stifling’, πνιγηρόν) and prone 
to damp.
(h) Ind. 26 (10,10 BJP)
… κωμικοῖς, Ἀριστομένει ἢ Ἀριστοφάνει. ἀλλ᾽ὅσα μη σαφῆ …
Ἀβυδομῆν ἢ Ἀβυστοκινεῖν. ἀλλ᾽ MS Ἀριστομένει ἢ Ἀριστοφάνει. ἀλλ BM ἀβυδοκόμαν 
ἢ ἀβυρτάκην, ἄλλ’ Polemis
Polemis ends the sentence after κωμικοῖς and starts a new one with ἀβυδοκόμαν 
ἢ ἀβυρτάκην, which he then connects with the next phrase, reading ἄλλ᾽. The 
point is that these are obscure lexical items, exemplifying Galen’s philologi-
cal practice: ‘Abudokoma and aburtakē, and all other unclear terms, were de-
fined …’ The extreme distortion of the names Aristomenes and Aristophanes 
in the MS, as well as the particular choice of Aristomenes, seems difficult to 
explain; and Polemis’ ingenious emendation may well be correct.
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(i) Ind. 28 (10,21–24 BJP)
… ἐν βιβλίοις ὄντα τεσσαράκοντα ὀκτὼ μεγάλοις ὧν ἔνια διελεῖν ἴσως δεήσει 
δίχα πλειόνων ἢ τετρακισχιλίων ἐπῶν ἑξαμέτρων ἐχόντων.
ἐξάριθμον MS αμετρον Vlat.γρ ἐξάριθμον ἔχοντα GL ἑξάριθμον Jouanna ἑξαμέτρων 
ἐνόντων Puglia 2011, Stramaglia 2011
Galen, speaking of his forty-eight books on the vocabulary of Attic prose au-
thors, adds that some of these may yet have to be divided into further books 
because of their length. Jouanna is surely right to prefer a form with rough 
breathing: the reference is to a hexameter line, which was used also as a unit 
of measurement for prose works, and ἐξάριθμον makes little sense here. But 
ἑξάριθμον is a fairly rare term, and the word ἑξαμέτρων – already implied by 
the superscript suggestion in the MS – provides a more natural way for Galen 
to express this thought, as attested by his use of the very same phrase, ἐπῶν 
ἑξαμέτρων (also in the context of line length within a prose work) at PHP 8 
(V.655 K. = 486,12 De Lacy). (The further emendation of ἐχόντων to ἐνόντων 
seems unnecessary: one might prefer it if the grammar more logically (as also 
with GL’s ἔχοντα) specified the subset of these long books, ἔνια, as having this 
excessive length – but the sense is clear enough.)
(j)  Ind. 32 (11,19 BJP)
ὅσα κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν ἦν εὐδοκιμοῦντα παρ᾽ ἑκάστῳ τῶν νῦν ἰατρῶν
οὐσίαν MS Ἀσίαν Garofalo νῦν add. BM
The context is that of a large collection of drugs, in the hands of someone 
who, it has been clarified, comes from Asia (τῶν παῤ  ἡμῖν, 11,15 BJP). Garofalo’s 
emendation, adopted by BJP and Nutton, seems plausible, and is printed here; 
at the same time, it seems to me not completely obvious that the MS reading 
(according to which the drugs were valued ‘by virtue of their substance’, rather 
than ‘in Asia’) is to be rejected.
(k) Ind. 34 (12,9 BJP) Εὐμενοῦς
Εὐμενοῦς MS Εὐδήμου BM
According to the MS reading, Galen mentions a Pergamene doctor called 
Eumenes as the source of a collection of drug recipes which came into his pos-
session, via another fellow Pergamene, Teuthras. The fact that this Eumenes is 
otherwise unknown, alongside the fact that Galen elsewhere mentions, in the 
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specific context of drug recipes, a doctor called Eudemus, who was also from 
Pergamum, makes BM’s emendation tempting; but both BJP and Nutton ad 
loc. argue against the identity on chronological grounds, and perhaps palaeo-
graphic caution should prevail.
(l)  Ind. 39 (13,12–15 BJP)
<ὁ > φιλόσοφος ᾽Αριστίππος, οὐκ ἀρκούμενος διαίτῃ εὐτελεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ πολυτε-
λείαις ὄψων ἑκάστης ἡμέρας διδοὺς ἀργύριον ἑκάστοτε δαψιλὲς ταῖς θερμοτέ-
ραις τῶν κατ᾽αὐτὸν ἑταιρῶν …
φιλότιμος MS φιλήδονος ὢν Kotzia φιλόσοφος prop. Nutton τοῖς θερμοτέροις MS ταῖς 
θερμοτέραις Garofalo εὐμορφοτέραις KS κατ᾽αὐτῶν ἑτέρων MS κατ᾽αὐτὸν ἑταίρων 
BJP κατ᾽αὐτὸν ἑταιρῶν Garofalo
There are further, in particular syntactic, difficulties for the reconstruction of 
this sentence; but the main points at issue are: with what characterizing noun 
is Aristippus being introduced, and is he shown lavishing banquets and money 
on male associates or on courtesans? What is at stake is the precise nature 
of the example that Aristippus is thought to be offering. BJP defend the MS 
φιλότιμος, but wish to take it in the sense ‘prodigue’; this is an attested sense, 
but the frequent occurrence of the term and its cognates in Galen, always with 
reference to a concern for one’s own reputation, renders such an interpretation 
implausible. KS’s φιλήδονος (‘pleasure-loving’, Nutton) certainly makes sense; 
but on balance the admittedly flat φιλόσοφος, suggested by Nutton (though not 
adopted in his translation), seems the most likely solution. As for the question 
of companions (or pupils) versus prostitutes: the use of the adjective θερμός 
would seem very strange in relation to the former: its usual sense in relation 
to character is ‘hot-headed’. This, in conjunction with the literary tradition on 
Aristippus’ associations with prostitutes, seems – pace BJP, and though θερμός 
as an adjective referring to the mores or appearance of women is not very clear-
ly attested – to me to justify Garofalo’s emendation, also followed by Nutton. 
KS’s εὐμορφοτέραις would also make good sense, if one accepts the feminine 
interpretation, but is harder on the basis of the MS.
(m) Ind. 50a (16,8–10 BJP)
οὐδὲ τοῦτο μέγα, μὴ μανῆναι τὴν μανίαν πολλῶν τῶν ἐν αὐλῇ βασιλικῇ 
καταγηρασάντων
αὐτὴν post τὴν add. Polemis πολλοῖς Polemis κατηγωρισάντων MS κατολιγωρήσα-
ντα Garofalo apud Nutton καταγορασάντων Jouanna 1 κατηγορησάντων Jouanna 2 
καταγηρασάντων Polemis
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Amid many suggestions as to the form of the participle here, Polemis’ seems 
to give the best sense: Galen is commenting on the ‘madness’ of ‘many who 
have grown old in the imperial court’, and this seems in keeping with his re-
marks elsewhere on the corruption attendant on a life concerned with social 
or political advancement. (Polemis’ other emendations, to give the sense ‘the 
same madness as many who …’, seem to me unnecessary; he is followed by GL 
on all points.) Jouanna’s earlier suggestion, with the sense, ‘ceux qui flânent 
dans la cour du palais’, was superseded by that adopted in BJP, whereby the 
phrase from πολλῶν would be a genitive absolute with the sense ‘malgré le 
nombre des accusateurs à la cour impériale’. Nutton, finally, prefers Garofalo’s 
earlier emendation, and translates ‘since I cared little for life at the Imperial 
court’. But all the suggestions apart from that of Polemis (and Jouanna 1) require 
τὴν μανίαν to stand alone in an implausible way: it is surely closely dependent 
on the participle that follows: ‘the madness of those who …’. (Nutton translates 
‘the madness of most people, since …’; but this would require the further inser-
tion of τῶν before πολλῶν.)
(n) Ind. 52 (16,21–2 BJP)
παιδεύει καὶ θέα πραγμάτων πολιτικῶν ἀναμινμῄσκουσα τῶν τῆς τύχης ἔργων
τέχνης MS τύχης Garofalo
A choice must be made here between two terms which frequently appear as 
opposites in the philosophical discourse of Galen’s time. In spite of BJP’s spir-
ited defence of the MS reading, ‘observation of the deeds of art’ simply does 
not fit this context, where it is precisely the praemeditatio malorum, a con-
sideration of all that may go wrong – focussing here especially on the ‘ran-
dom’ nature of political or everyday events – which is recommended to the 
reader: ‘reminding us of the actions of chance’ (Nutton) is surely the right 
sense.
(o) Ind. 52 (17,5 BJP); repeated at 77 (23,8 BJP)
εἰς φροντίδ᾽ ἀεὶ συμφορᾶς ἐβαλλόμην
φροντίδα ἐκ συμφορᾶς MS φροντιδ᾽ἀεὶ συμφορὰς Wyttenbach (cf. BJP)
There are a number of variants in the ancient transmission of this extract from 
a non-extant play of Euripides, which is cited also by Plutarch and elsewhere 
by Galen himself at PHP 4 (V.418 K. = 282,18–23 De Lacy). The problems are dis-
cussed at length by BJP ad loc. But in this particular line, although the ἐκ of the 
MS is in need of emendation, the genitive singular seems to me to give a prefer-
able sense to the accusative plural elsewhere in the tradition. ἐβαλλόμην should 
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be taken as medio-passive intransitive: ‘I used to be thrown/throw myself ’; and 
εἰς φροντίδ᾽ … συμφορᾶς seems to make perfect sense as ‘into worry/concern 
about disaster’. The alternative, preferred by BJP, takes ἐβαλλόμην as transitive 
with συμφορὰς as its object: ‘I used to throw disasters into my mind’. This seems 
to me less natural, and φροντίς usually has a sense of sense of ‘worry’, ‘con-
cern’ or ‘thought’, rather than ‘mind’ as a receptacle for thoughts. (On the other 
hand, as a further alternative, the text of PHP reads εἰς φροντίδας νοῦν συμφορὰς 
τ᾽ ἐβαλλόμην.)
(p)  Ind. 59 (19,4–6 BJP) τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχιτεκτονίαν … 
ἐν αἷς καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνος ἦν πρῶτος
οἷς … αὐτὸ ἐκεινῷ ἦν πρῶτον MS αἷς KS, GL αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνος … πρῶτος GL
BJP follow the MS, translating: ‘domaines dans lesquel la conduite (morale) 
était aussi, aux yeux de cet homme-là, primordiale’, taking αὐτὸ as referring 
back to τοῦτο, which was used in the previous sentence to stand for a capacity 
or respect for justice and self-control. But the phrase seems tortured, and it 
is difficult to see what sense can be made of the conceptual extension of this 
capacity to the domains of ‘virtue and architecture’. GL’s emendation – so, ‘in 
which domains that very man, too, was pre-eminent’ – seems to be demanded 
on linguistic grounds, and makes perfect sense in the context of the argument 
relating both to his own family’s virtues and the nature and importance of 
early nurture and natural endowments.
(q)  Ind. 65 (20,15–17) καὶ σχολῇ γ᾽ἂν ἄρμενα καὶ φάρμακα καὶ βιβλία καὶ δόξαν 
καὶ πλοῦτον ἄξια σπουδῆς ὑποπλάβοιμι.
σχολ καὶ MS σχολῇ γ᾽ἂν GL σχολὴν καὶ BJP post πλοῦτον add. πῶς ἂν BJP, καὶ οὐκ KS
Galen is listing material or social goods which, as a result of his rearing and 
reasoning, he sets at a low rate. ‘Leisure’, in such a list as this, seems simply 
out of place, while σχολῇ in the sense ‘hardly’ (‘figurarsi’, GL) seems clearly to 
provide the required sense: ‘I would hardly take instruments, medicines, etc., 
to be worth the expense of energy.’ The reading also obviates the need for BJP’s 
or KS’s insertion of further words.
(r) Ind. 70 (21,13–15 BJP)
τάχα γὰρ οἴει με, καθάπερ ἔνιοι τῶν φιλοσόφων ὑπέσχοντο μηδέποτε μηδένα 
λυπηθήσεσθαι τῶν σοφῶν, οὕτως καὶ αὐτὸν ἀποφαίνεσθαι …
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μηδ … μηδὲ νῦν MS μηδέποτε μηδὲ νῦν BJP μηδέποτε μηδένα Garofalo λυπηθήσεσθαι 
τῶν φιλοσόφων MS λυπηθήσεσθαι τῶν σοφῶν Garofalo τῶν φιλοσόφων om. BJP λυ-
πήσεσθαι τὸν φιλόσοφον Polemis
The MS repetition of τῶν φιλοσόφων has been universally agreed to be prob-
lematic; BJP omit it, giving the sense, ‘certain philosophers have promised that 
they will not be distressed, even in present circumstances’. But Garofalo’s re-
placement of the second occurrence with τῶν σοφῶν, in conjunction with the 
easy emendation of μηδὲ νῦν to μηδένα, surely gives the right sense. Galen is, as 
throughout this passage (see also the next text, (n) below), casting doubt on 
the specific claim made by some philosophers (in particular Stoics) that the 
wise man (ὁ σοφός) is immune to distress (whereas Nutton follows Polemis: 
‘that the philosopher will never suffer distress’).
(s) Ind. 76 (23,2–4 BJP)
… μήτε τὸ σῶμα τὴν Ἡρακλέους ῥώμην ἕξειν ἐλπίζω μήτε τὴν ψυχήν, ἣν ἔνιοί 
φασι ὑπάρχειν τοῖς σοφοῖς
ἐμοί MS secl. Jouanna ἔνιοί Garofalo οἱ σοφοί MS τοῖς σοφοῖς Jouanna
The context is that of adjusting one’s aspirations, for both physical and eth-
ical health, to one’s own capacities: Galen states that he does not aspire for 
his body to have the strength of a Hercules, nor for his soul to have that – on 
the MS reading – ‘which the wise state that I have’. Both the introduction of 
‘the wise’ as a class of people passing judgement on Galen, and the sense, con-
tradicting the main force of the sentence, seem impossible. Taking Jouanna’s 
τοῖς σοφοῖς (not in the end adopted by BJP but followed by GL), in conjunction 
with Garofalo’s ἔνιοί for ἐμοί), we gain the the sense ‘which some state that the 
wise have’, which is surely preferable. On this interpretation Galen is here also 
returning to the theme raised by the statement five sections earlier, ‘I cannot 
say if there is anyone so wise (σοφός) as to be totally unaffected’ (71, 21,17–18 
BJP), and continuing the tone, anti-Stoic or at least critical of Stoic attitudes 
and aspirations, that runs through this whole passage. (Cf. also the previous 
passage discussed, (r).)
(t)  Ind. 80–81 (25,4–8 BJP)
… τούτῳ δὲ τῷ μοχθηροτάτῳ βίῳ περιπίπτουσιν οἷς ἄπληστοι ἐπιθυμίαι προσ-
γίνονται. τίνες οὖν οὐχ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λυποῦνται; οἳ μετρίως ἅπτονται τιμῆς καὶ 
πλούτου καὶ δόξης καὶ δυνάμεως πολιτικῆς …
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τοῦτο MS τούτῳ KS τούτου δ᾽ἔτι GL μοχθηροτέρῳ MS μοχθηροτάτῳ KS τοῖς ἀπλήστοις 
ἐπιθυμίας. προσγίνονταί τινες MS ταῖς ἀπλήστοις ἐπιθυμίαις. προσ γίνονταί τινες BJP 
οἷς ἄπληστοι ἐπιθυμίαι προσγίνονται. τίνες GL οὐχ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λυποῦνται om. BJP
Both KS and GL depart from the MS and from BJP (and Nutton), in starting a 
new sentence after προσγίνονται. (The version of KS is subtly different, and in 
particular prints τινὲς, starting a new sentence which is not a question.) Such a 
solution obviates the need to delete the whole phrase οὐχ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λυποῦνται, 
and seems convincing both in the better sense it gives for προσγίνονται and in 
the clear relationship it presents between non-attachment (or only moderate 
attachment to worldly goals) and freedom from distress. The sense is thus not: 
‘they succumb to this wretched form of life through insatiable desires. There 
then also come some who have a moderate attachment to honour, wealth, rep-
utation and political power’, but: ‘ … to this most wretched form of life suc-
cumb those in whom insatiable desires arise. Who, then, are the ones who do 
not suffer distress as others? Those who have a moderate attachment to hon-
our, wealth, reputation and political power …’. On this interpretation Galen 
is, to be sure, conceding more to the acceptability of attachment to material 
values than he does usually; but this is perhaps in keeping with the particular 
rhetorical stance he takes in this text in relation to Stoic views, on the one 
hand, and practically attainable life goals, on the other.
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chapter 2
Death, Posterity and the Vulnerable Self: Galen’s 
Περὶ Ἀλυπίας in the Context of His Late Writings
Caroline Petit
The form and contents of Galen’s newly recovered letter περὶ ἀλυπίας have 
come under intense scrutiny, especially since 2010, when both critical edi-
tions by Kotzia/Soutiroudis and Boudon-Millot/Jouanna respectively were 
published. Galen’s philosophical mindset, in particular, has attracted consider-
able interest, since he addresses a number of issues around pain and grief that 
have concerned philosophers before and after him. Similarly, the additional 
clues given away by Galen about his own life, possessions and opinions have 
overall been carefully studied, although some degree of controversy affects the 
interpretation of the text itself. Most specialists of Galen have come to grips 
with the meaning of the letter in the context of the rest of his production. 
But seldom has the text been subject to rhetorical analysis, beyond identify-
ing its main logical articulations and unfolding its overall argument. Galen’s 
words, however, lend themselves quite well to a rhetorical reading: the notion 
of μεγαλοψυχία (‘magnanimity’), prominent in the text,1 is as typical of a good 
rhetor’s ēthos as of a philosopher’s. In this chapter, I intend to explore what the 
περὶ ἀλυπίας brings us in terms of self-characterization by Galen at this point in 
life. In other words, what does the περὶ ἀλυπίας add to, or transform, in terms of 
our understanding of Galen’s ēthos? Is this just a typical old man stance about 
wisdom and knowledge, or is there more? How does it supplement Galen’s 
other extant texts about himself, especially among the works of his later life?
To answer this question, I will include some thoughts on the evidence about 
Galen’s last few years (a relatively neglected topic) and about the role of old 
age in his texts, both as a fact and as a literary construct. Indeed, with Galen 
issues of biography and autobiography and self-portrayal are closely inter-
twined. Separating the facts of Galen’s life from the way he writes about them 
is near impossible, firstly because he is our only source about himself, and 
1   As noted by V. Boudon-Millot and J. Jouanna, Galien. Ne pas se chagriner, 2010, p. xlvii; see 
Galen, Ind. 50–51. The edition of De indolentia I refer to is Boudon-Millot/Jouanna 2010 
throughout. About the interpretation of magnanimity as a Stoic virtue, see Tieleman’s dem-
onstration in the present volume.
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secondly because he is a skilful, conscious author whose every statement must 
be read in light of his authorial purposes. In other words, Galen’s person and 
ēthos intersect largely in his writings – a difficulty that has its benefits for the 
modern reader, for Galen has left us a particularly vivid portrait of his scholarly 
and authorial self. I will therefore take the gaps in our knowledge about the 
last period of his life as a starting point, before turning to the elements of self- 
portrayal that can be established through his own account. Finally, I will exam-
ine the contribution of the newly discovered text to Galen’s ēthos as we under-
stand it from other works. My point is that Galen, far from simply conforming 
to the conventional image of a wise old man delving into otium litterarum, in 
fact transforms the traditional ēthos of his situation into a powerful intellec-
tual and personal testament that supplements and nuances the self-portrait of 
his maturity. The path I have chosen is, admittedly, a meandering one, starting 
from a seemingly remote point towards the actual object of my study through 
concentric circles; but I hope my combined enquiry of Galen’s biography and 
self-portrayal will show a perceptible shift in Galen’s late life and shed some 
light on the importance of the new text. I am here building on my work on 
Galen’s rhetoric, in which the notion of ēthos proves fundamental.2
1 Old Age: Facts and Literature
Defining old age, as shown in recent scholarship, is partly a matter of conven-
tion (the age of retirement from various duties in Rome was 60, but 70 seems to 
have been seen as the genuine threshold of old age). To an extent, old age was 
a subjective matter. Cicero, and, later, Seneca, have provided us with priceless 
insights into experiencing old age. As Mary Harlow and Ray Lawrence put it:
There is a host of literary material on the survival into old age, because 
the elderly used the otium or leisure time associated with this period of 
life as time to write. They wrote as consolation for themselves in old age 
facing death and it is this format that produces much of what we today 
associate with a stoic philosophy of survival in adversity. That adversity 
was old age.3
2   Petit, C., Galien ou la rhétorique de la Providence. Médecine, littérature et pouvoir à Rome, Brill, 
2018.
3   Harlow, M. and Lawrence, R., “Viewing the old: recording and respecting the elderly at 
Rome and in the Empire”, in C. Krötzl and K. Mustakallio, On Old Age. Approaching Death in 
Antiquity and the Middle Ages, Brepols, 2011, 3–24. Naturally, not all references to old age in 
antiquity are negative: Plutarch, An seni res publica gerenda sit, offers an upbeat vision of old 
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Of course, that is not the entire story: writing about old age has developed 
into a long, complex literary tradition, culminating with highlights such as 
Petrarch’s Letters of old age, in which, coincidentally, Galen does play a role 
next to Cicero and other prominent inspirational authors of the past.4
For all the stoicism attached to them, such ancient testimonies about otium 
in old age are not entirely devoid from complacency, as old age becomes the 
time of reflecting on the past, recording earlier achievements and distributing 
prizes (to oneself) – Aristotle had long noticed this negative aspect of old age, 
conveniently opposed to the feelings experienced by the young. Old age, so it 
seems, is as much a social construction as it is a personal experience. Naturally, 
it also develops into a rhetorical topos. The characters of youth and old age 
feature prominently in rhetorical theory, starting with Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 
with which Galen was familiar. Several Plutarchan works deal with aspects of 
growing older, such as dealing with the fear of death, and the possibilities of 
continued public activity beyond retirement (De tranquillitate animi, An seni 
respublica gerenda sit). As suggested by Plutarch, health, not age, should be a 
criterion for continued activity – the benefits of stable, serene characters of 
older men are also praised by Cicero. But how does Galen fit in this literature 
on old age?
Galen’s testimony features prominently in recent studies on old age in antiq-
uity, but he is usually quoted as a medical authority: as a physician, Galen has 
dealt in relatively great detail with old age, especially in his six-book work on 
hygiene (with the ancient meaning of “preserving health”), De sanitate tuenda. 
He saw aging as the natural process of the human body drying out and wither-
ing away over time.5 Man, of course, mirrors the wider cosmos. Like a coun-
try, it has seasons. Like a plant, or indeed any living being, the body gradually 
loses its moisture until its functions fail and it eventually returns to dust. In the 
process, Galen adds further periodisation to the last part of life: using a rarely 
found terminology, he highlights three theoretical stages of old age, a feature 
that singles him out in the extant literature.6 More importantly, however, he 
age (Mor. 783a–797f). In Plutarch’s view, retiring to be a farmer or simply stay at home (like a 
woman!) are a waste and a shame for the once successful man.
4   Petrarch, Letters of Old Age (Rerum senilium libri); for an analysis of the theme of old age 
in Petrarch, see Skenazi, C., Aging Gracefully in the Renaissance. Stories of Later Life from 
Petrarch to Montaigne, Brill, 2013.
5   Galien, De sanitate tuenda – now available in a new English translation by Ian Johnston 
(Loeb, 2 vols., 2018). See also Minois, G., Histoire de la vieillesse en Occident, Paris, Fayard, 1987 
(chapter on ‘la médecine romaine et la vieillesse’); Morand, A. F., ‘« Chimie » de la vieillesse. 
Explications galéniques de cet âge de la vie’, In L. Mathilde Cambron-Goulet and Laetitia 
Monteils-Laeng (ed.), La Vieillesse dans l’Antiquité, entre déchéance et sagesse, Cahiers des 
études anciennes 55, 2018, pp. 125–143.
6   Galen, San. Tu. V, 12 p. 167 Koch.
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analyses aging in the context of nutrition and lifestyle, and provides advice and 
cures to live longer, and in better health – thus answering widespread anxiety 
in Roman society about the vicissitudes of the last part of life, as witnessed by 
Pliny the Younger, whose account of the old age of Spurrina exemplifies the de-
sirable outcome of a well-managed life in the Roman upper classes.7 According 
to Galen, regimen, appropriate exercise, bathing and massage all contribute 
to aging gracefully: his own health history, he claims, demonstrates the qual-
ity and the validity of his lifestyle choices and should incite others to follow. 
Naturally, he also illustrates his point by recording a number of cases of old 
men thriving under his care, the most famous being Marcus Aurelius.8 Galen’s 
insight as a physician is therefore priceless, but his contribution on experienc-
ing old age and facing death has been overlooked. In the περὶ ἀλυπίας, written 
in 193 AD or slightly later, a 63-ish Galen advocates patience and courage in the 
face of loss and grief; he writes to his anonymous friend in a posture that is, to 
some extent, similar to that of Cicero writing to Atticus in their early sixties 
(Att. VI, 14, 21, 3),9 or to that of Seneca writing to Lucilius in his late sixties (Ep. 
24). He is thus framing his thoughts in a literary and philosophical context.
Indeed, Galen could not ignore the rich literary background to writing on 
old age: Cicero’s De senectute and Seneca’s Letters to Lucilius are only the most 
famous ancient texts on aging. Countless aphorisms and maxims about the el-
derly appear in tragedy, comedy and poetry; aging was also a rich philosophical 
theme even before Plato. Either pictured as epitomes of wisdom or laughing 
stock for the younger ones, educated elderly men were not always comfortable 
with their situation, as demonstrated in their texts (again, consider Plutarch’s 
An seni resp. gerend. sit); those who provided a personal testimony on old age 
postured as wise old men (the archetypal wise old man being the Homeric 
Nestor), whilst acknowledging debilitating conditions (such as Seneca’s asth-
ma) or moodiness and irritability (Cicero). Between philosophical posturing 
and genuine confession, aging litterati made old age a matter for discussion. 
Galen’s medical representation of old age is not just the objective stance of 
a doctor; it is combined with a subjective account in his later works, some of 
which he penned in his sixties and maybe later. The two areas conflate when 
7   Pliny Ep. 3, 1, the old age of Spurrina – “the ideal old age for the upper class Roman male” 
(see Harlow, M. and Lawrence, R., Growing up and Growing old in ancient Rome: A Lifecourse 
Approach, Routledge, 2001, pp. 123–124). About the (three) stages of old age, see Galen San. Tu. 
V, 12 = p. 167 Koch and for a survey of similar notions in ancient Greek texts, see Parkin, T. G., 
Old Age in the Roman World: A Cultural and Social History, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2003 (Appendix C., pp. 299–301).
8   Galen, De praen. 11 Nutton.
9   See his De senectute, written when Cicero was 62 and dedicated to a 65-year old Atticus.
45Death, Posterity and the Vulnerable Self
Galen shows off his own excellent health in the above-mentioned De sanitate 
tuenda (he was then in his early fifties10), a work in which his own healthy state 
serves as a selling point for his general method. But the promotional dimen-
sion seems to fade in the later hints at his weakening body and faltering con-
victions. As we will see, Galen no less chisels his own aging self-portrait than 
others do in the same period; and he no less cares for his own image than he 
did as a younger, ambitious doctor eager to promote his skills and methodol-
ogy. I am interested in tracing this shift in Galen’s writing, looking for clues in 
his extant later works, before turning to the περὶ ἀλυπίας.
2 Can the Enigma of Galen’s Last Years be Solved? Looking for a 
‘testament’
Galen’s later years have been left out of most accounts on his life, partly due 
to the lack of evidence. In the penultimate chapter of her authoritative biog-
raphy of Galen, Véronique Boudon-Millot explores the available evidence on 
the “diseases and death of a doctor”.11 While Galen is comparatively loquacious 
among ancient doctors about his own ailments, he is less and less inclined to 
record such personal information in his later works.12 As for the date of his 
death, accumulated evidence from Byzantine (beyond the Souda) and Arabic 
sources points to the later part of Caracalla’s reign, hence the now commonly 
accepted date of 216 instead of 199.13 Of course, issues regarding the authentic-
ity of late works14 cast a shadow on Galen’s last years: but it seems safe to as-
sume that Galen lived for another twenty to twenty-three years after he wrote 
his De indolentia in 193; this fits well with the picture of a still-prolific author, 
who penned inter alia the best part of thousands of pages of pharmacological 
works. Nonetheless, it is impossible to establish with certainty when Galen ac-
tually stopped thinking and writing, for his testimony does not hint at any sig-
nificant late life impairment.15 In this hazy context, Galen’s mentions of health 
10   Written shortly after the death of Marcus Aurelius (c. 180) according to Heiberg, followed 
by Koch.
11   Boudon-Millot, V., Galien de Pergame. Un médecin grec à Rome, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 
2012, pp. 225–245.
12   Ibid. pp. 225–226.
13   Ibid. pp. 241–244.
14   Especially in the case of the Theriac to Piso, of disputed authorship.
15   Pace V. Boudon-Millot, Galien de Pergame, 2012, p. 233. Hearing a book read aloud was 
considered a soothing form of entertainment in old age, not a sign of physical decline, as 
shown by Pliny the Younger’s famous description of Spurrina’s perfect regimen; Cf. Pliny 
the Younger, Ep. III, 1.
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problems linked with aging are rare: a recurring issue seems to have been the 
state of his teeth, since he comments on his difficulties as early as Alim. fac. 
(written before Marcus Aurelius died in 180), when he couldn’t chew on let-
tuce any more, and as late as Comp. med. sec. locos (written after 193), where he 
comments on the nature and location of toothache, in the gum or in the tooth 
itself (without quite referring to an actual pain at the very time of writing).16 
Allusions to disease in Character Traits (cf. P. N. Singer, Galen’s Psychological 
writings) are tricky, because the date of the treatise is uncertain, although re-
cent scholarship points to a post-192 date as plausible. More to the point, it is 
an epitome, surviving in Arabic: it is therefore relatively delicate to use. What 
we have, then, in Galen’s later works, is a body of indications of another nature. 
He is focussing on his legacy.
Galen famously has relatively few explicit mentions among writers in his 
lifetime;17 later biographers often sought to re-write his life in a colourful way, 
following new agendas.18 Therefore we have to rely on internal evidence in 
the Galenic corpus to understand how the Pergamene dealt with his physical 
 decline – if it is at all represented or even hinted at. As 192 AD marks a shift 
in his priorities, namely the recording and preserving of his own works in the 
form of his catalogue (Libr. Propr.; Ord. libr. propr.) and of additional copies of 
his own works, it is perhaps useful to use this date as the conventional begin-
ning of Galen’s old age – at the very least, the devastation caused by the great 
fire made the preservation of his works a pressing matter such as he never felt 
before, trusting the safety of the Palatine storage rooms. This is a turning point 
in Galen’s life, seemingly shifting his priorities. In order to gather the evidence 
given by Galen himself about his later years (roughly after the fire of 192), it is 
necessary to focus on the extant works clearly written after the event.19 Those 
include the last seven books (VII–XIV) of the De methodo medendi, the last 
three books (IX–XI) of De simpl. med. fac. ac temp., and the bulk of his other 
16   Galen, Alim. fac. II, 40 (K. VI, 626); Comp. med. sec. locos, V, 4 (K. XII, 848). Cf. V. Boudon-
Millot, Galien de Pergame, pp. 232–233; D. Gourevitch & M. Grmek, 1986, 45–64 (p. 58–59).
17   See, however, Nutton, V., ‘Galen in the eyes of his contemporaries’, BHM 58, 1984, pp. 315–
324 (Nutton refers especially to Athenaeus I, 1).
18   Illuminated by Swain, S. C. R., ‘Beyond the Limits of Greek Biography: Galen from 
Alexandria to the Arabs’, in B. McGing and J. Mossman (eds), The Limits of Ancient 
Biography, The Classical Press of Wales, 2006, pp. 395–433. To my knowledge, the first 
‘biography’ of Galen based on his own account is given by Symphorien Champier in his 
Speculum Galeni, 1517 (about which see Petit, C. ‘Symphorien Champier (1471–1539) et 
Galien: Médecine et littérature à la Renaissance’, to appear in C. La Charité & R. Menini 
eds., La médecine au temps de Rabelais).
19   Cf. V. Boudon-Millot, Galien de Pergame, 2012, pp. 220–224.
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pharmacological works (Comp. med. sec. locos; Comp. med. sec. gen.; Antid.20). 
The last book of De sanitate tuenda should be added, together with the brief De 
bonis malisque sucis; the De foet. formatione, and the last four books (preserved 
only in Arabic) of De anatomicis administrationibus. Last but not least, Galen’s 
De propriis placitis, dubbed “Galen’s philosophical testament”, highlights the 
issues that really matter to him now that his life has reached its course and his 
work is completed. Several psychological writings, including the περὶ ἀλυπίας, 
are also thought to belong to the later period of Galen’s life (again, post-192 
AD): the evidence is, however, slightly more contentious for some of them and 
in all cases, one should bear in mind Peter Singer’s cautious remarks on Galen’s 
compositional style.21 Indeed, there are reasons to envisage multiple layers of 
writing in many, if not most, Galenic works. Supposed dates of composition 
are thus relative, and one should be mindful of the fact that Galen may have 
more or less constantly altered his own writings. All in all, though, those works 
represent a considerable amount of text (thousands of pages in the standard 
edition of Kühn) and must have been written over many years in the aftermath 
of 192–193, although it is difficult to be more accurate than that, and to pin 
down the moment when Galen stopped writing (just as it is impossible to es-
tablish the date of his passing). Just like many of his predecessors and literary 
models, Galen may have enjoyed enhanced otium in his old age, perhaps retir-
ing from everyday medical practice in order to dedicate his time to writing; he 
may also, we can speculate, have appreciated a loosening of the imperial grip 
over the Palace in the wake of Commodus’ death. Still, such a considerable 
volume of work could not have been achieved without exceptional personal 
abilities and outstanding material support, in the form of personnel, books, 
and other resources.
Galen gives us hints about his working priorities: by his own account in De 
simpl. med. fac. ac temp., it sounds like he is on a mission to complete a large 
section of his oeuvre, namely his pharmacological project, covering simple and 
compound drugs, as well as the so-called εὐπόριστα (easy to procure remedies), 
purgatives and antidotes. Galen is not without expressing a certain sense of ur-
gency. In one of the later books, Galen indeed makes the following statement:
ταῦτα καίτοι τῆς προκειμένης οὐκ ὄντα πραγματείας, ἔγραψα διὰ τὸ θαρρεῖν τῷ 
φαρμάκῳ, μηδενὸς μηδέποτε ἀποθανόντος τῶν ὡς εἴρηται χρησαμένων αὐτῷ. 
20   It is unclear whether any of the three books of the Euporista currently preserved in the 
Kühn edition is authentic.
21   P. N. Singer, Galen. Psychological Writings, 2013, pp. 34–41; see also his contribution ‘New 
light and old texts’ in this volume.
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ποιήσομαι δὲ καὶ κατὰ μόνας ἑτέραν πραγματείαν περὶ τῶν ἰδιότητι τῆς ὅλης 
οὐσίας ἐνεργούντων, ἐν οἷς ἐστι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα. συγγινώσκειν οὖν χρὴ τῷ 
τῆς γραφῆς ἀκαίρῳ καὶ νῦν καὶ κατ’ ἄλλα χωρία τῆσδε τῆς πραγματείας ἐνίοτε 
γεγονότι, διὰ τὴν ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων ὠφέλειαν μεγίστην οὖσαν, ἣν διασώζεσθαι 
βούλομαι τοῖς μεθ’ ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώποις, εἰ καὶ μεταξὺ θάνατος γενόμενος 
ἀποκωλύσει με γράψαι τὰς ἐφεξῆς τῆσδε τῆς πραγματείας.22
Even though such details do not belong to the present work, my faith in 
this medicine23 leads me to record it, for no one who has used it accord-
ing to the prescription has ever died. I shall write a particular treatise 
about medicines that work as a result of the specific character of their 
general composition, including all such remedies as this one. You will 
need to forgive me for passages that are beside the point both here and 
occasionally elsewhere in this book, because the information is extreme-
ly valuable and I wish to preserve it for the sake of posterity, in case death 
should prevent me from writing treatises following this one.
A few pages away from completing his major work on simple drugs, then, 
Galen hints neatly at his age and the lurking possibility of death, with dramat-
ic effect – and potentially dramatic consequences for posterity, he suggests: 
Galen is so worried that he may not finish his work, that some exceptionally 
useful remedies might be lost forever if he doesn’t record them at once. This 
explains, Galen says, why his treatise On simple drugs includes material that 
should not be there.24 This sense of urgency (and fear?) is not found anywhere 
else in Galen’s works. But it is not the first time Galen attributes a change in his 
text to a particular circumstance in his life: in book X of the De usu partium, 
he explains that he was persuaded by a divine warning in a dream to include 
a  development on the eye at this point in his work, against the plan he had 
initially formed.25 Contemplating imminent death seems to have prompted 
Galen to alter his plan in a similar way. In both cases, the urgency is compel-
ling. At any rate, the evidence of the many pages that were subsequently added 
to his work On simple drugs in the form of additional treatises shows that 
Galen was blessed to continue writing for quite a while, and his fears, if genu-
ine, unfounded. Had Galen not been in his late sixties when he wrote those 
22   Galen, Simpl. med. temp. ac fac., XI, 34 (K. XII, 357–358).
23   Galen has just discussed the usefulness of burnt crab powder in rabies cases.
24   Another passage in the same work echoes this sense of urgency, when Galen apologises 
for inserting a digression on the preparation of theriac, for fear of not completing the rest 
of his pharmacological works (chapter XI, 1 on vipers’ flesh, K. XII, 319).
25   Galen, Usu part. X, 12 (Helmreich vol. II, 92–93).
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lines, there may have been a case for a rhetorical device here. But, given his 
age and the scale of the remaining books to be written to fulfil his publication 
plans, it should be stressed that Galen’s concerns are plausible – just as when 
he was persuaded in a dream to add this piece about the eye in book X of the 
De usu partium. Whilst he apparently brushes aside any considerations about 
his health at this point, age and the possibility of sudden death clearly are on 
his mind. This, in fact, fits well with the conspicuous haste affecting many of 
his late writings; as already observed by Vivian Nutton, “several of the books 
he wrote in old age end abruptly”, especially the final section of the Method of 
healing.26
A debated question is whether or not Galen stayed in Rome until he died: 
could he have travelled back to Pergamum, his native city, as suggested by 
some? Or did he enjoy the comfort of his home (in one of his several houses) 
to complete his work in the best possible conditions, instead of risking an ex-
hausting, potentially fatal journey home? Again, later sources cannot be relied 
on, and there are hardly any clues to be gleaned from Galen’s own words about 
a change of scenery; but why would a court physician who stayed through 
Commodus’ horrendous reign depart at any point following the relief brought 
by his death? Galen must have had either good reasons to stay, or no choice 
at all. In order to return to Pergamum permanently, Galen may have needed 
imperial permission, indeed to be granted a favour. We know, however, that 
apart from his special relationship with Marcus Aurelius, with whom he was 
able to negotiate to an extent, there is no evidence of similarly relaxed relation-
ships with later emperors such as Septimius Severus: as noted by Alain Billault, 
Galen may have been part of Julia Domna’s circle – but we have no evidence.27 
In any case, this is pure speculation.
I am tempted to interpret (even more tentatively) some features of his later 
works as signs that he may have stayed on in Rome. For example, in one of 
his last works, De antidotis I, 1 (K. XIV, 3–5), Galen recalls at some length the 
effects of theriac on Marcus Aurelius’ health, which might hint at a Roman 
readership; in Comp. med. sec. genera III, 2 (K. XIII, 603), he also evokes briefly 
his disciples’ disciples (in other words, a second generation of students) now 
reading anatomy (through his books on anatomy), hinting at an educational 
context. Many additional references to his dedicated audience, his ἑταῖροι, ap-
pear in his later pharmacological works, especially Comp. med. sec. locos and 
Comp. med. sec. genera (in the latter, he often addresses them in the second 
26   Nutton, V., ‘Galen’s Philosophical Testament’, in J. Wiesner ed., Aristoteles. Werk und 
Wirkung, Paul Moraux gewidmet Berlin/New York, vol. II, 1987, 27–51 (p. 44).
27   Billault, A., L’univers de Philostrate, Bruxelles, 2000, p. 6.
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person).28 Where better than Rome could this have taken place, a city in which 
he has almost entirely built his career, reputation and network?
A “philosophical testament” does survive among Galen’s later works: his De 
propris placitis (On my own opinions), a work in which the physician’s custom-
ary references to time and circumstances are absent. It is thus difficult to date, 
but definitely belongs to Galen’s late production. As pointed out by its first 
editor Vivian Nutton before the discovery of a full Greek text in ms. Vlatadon 
14, this work does not aim at promoting new ideas, or firm conclusions about 
any philosophical issue; rather, it states Galen’s final opinions on debated ques-
tions (notably the role of the soul) for the sake of posterity. Just like his De libr. 
propr. and Ord. libr. propr. aim at excluding any inauthentic work from his oeu-
vre, similarly his On my own opinions aims at dissipating any misunderstanding 
about his actual opinions, in order to disprove forgeries and avoid misguided 
criticism.29 Thus in this work and others from the same period, Galen empha-
sises his concern to see his own, authentic voice echoing through ages: poster-
ity is as central to this work, as the actual contents of his own opinions about 
the covered topics. This genuine concern contrasts with the old man’s frailty, 
as the work lacks the hallmarks of Galen’s previous rhetorical mastery. Vivian 
Nutton notes about the book’s abrupt ending:
The old man’s powers to control the overall structure of his investigations 
are noticeably weaker, his judgment less forceful, his criticisms less vigor-
ous. Whether death, or simply reaching the end of his secretary’s book 
roll, caused Galen to break off here is a matter only for sad conjecture.30
Whether Galen intended the apparent lack of order and completeness of his 
work is unclear. It may hint at Galen’s decline, or haste, or it could be a draft 
which he could not complete or rework for whatever reason. In any case, as we 
shall see, this sheer concern for posterity is central to Galen’s late ēthos.
But what Galen lets us know is certainly not the whole story; there are gaps in 
our information. Those are essentially due to accidents, such as works missing: 
either they were lost, or simply were not deemed authentic or worth copying. 
28   The dozens of mentions of ἑταῖροι in Galen’s later pharmacological works are only 
matched by his Anat. adm., also aimed at a students readership. I echo Peter Singer’s re-
marks in ‘New Light and Old Texts’, note 14.
29   Galen, Propr. Plac. 1 Nutton. Cf. Nutton, V., ‘Galen’s Philosophical Testament’, in J. Wiesner 
ed., Aristoteles. Werk und Wirkung, Paul Moraux gewidmet Berlin/New York, vol. II, 1987, 
27–51 (p. 51); eiusd., Galen. De propriis placitis, CMG V, 3, 2, 1999, introd. pp. 45–47; comm. 
p. 127.
30   V. Nutton, Galen. De propriis placitis, CMG V, 3, 2, 1999, comm. p. 218.
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Among lost works from his later life, we could mention a work κατ᾽ Ἐπικοῦρον 
mentioned in the περὶ ἀλυπίας (Ind. 68); a brief work περὶ τῶν φιλοχρημάτων 
πλουσίων, also mentioned in the same work (Ind. 84); and probably a work in 
two books On medicine in Homer (περὶ τῆς κατ᾽Ὅμηρον ἰατρικῆς), mentioned 
by Alexander of Tralles and Hunayn ibn Isḥaq alike. Gaps thus occasionally get 
filled by later sources, although their credibility has been questioned. In the 
case of the latter work, On medicine in Homer, authenticity has been dismissed 
on account of Galen’s ‘rationalist’ approach to medicine; Hunayn himself was 
unconvinced by the contents of the work.31 If we follow Alexander, however, 
Galen recognised the power of amulets and other magical remedies late in life, 
a fact that was reflected explicitly in the lost treatise. In fact, a simple com-
parison between the contents (as described, and quoted by Alexander) and 
Galen’s statements in the last three books of On simple drugs shows remark-
able agreement, and demonstrates a change in Galen’s opinions, or at least, en-
larged views.32 As argued by Alexander of Tralles, Galen held more pragmatic, 
inclusive views about remedies in his later life. It is therefore necessary to ac-
knowledge this additional evidence in assessing Galen’s final viewpoint on the 
medical art. More importantly, in all likeliness this episode shows that we are 
missing part of the picture: Galen’s exact feelings and thoughts may only come 
through partially, a limitation we must acknowledge.
3 Self-characterization in Galen’s Later Works: a Moraliste33
A distinctive tone creeps into Galen’s later works, away from the boisterous-
ness of some of his earlier works. Galen appears as a moraliste, displays revised 
(in a more sceptical fashion) views on the soul, shows off his experience and, 
finally, his detachment from the more materialistic aspects of life. Galen’s mor-
alistic statements seem to echo the Plutarchan preoccupations34 showed by 
his later works (see above, Galen’s lost περὶ τῶν φιλοχρημάτων πλουσίων) as well 
31   Kudlien, F., “Zum Thema ‘Homer und die Medizin’ ”, Rheinisches Museum 108, 1965, 
293–299.
32   See Petit, C., ‘Galen, Pharmacology and the Boundaries of Medicine: A Reassessment’, in 
M. Martelli and L. Lehmhaus eds., Collecting Recipes: Byzantine and Jewish Pharmacology 
in Dialogue, De Gruyter, 2017, 50–80 (p. 77–80).
33   In the following pages, I understand the French moraliste in the acceptation of an author 
describing the mores and ills of the society he lives in, in order to offer a reflection on 
human nature and condition. As there is no English equivalent to the best of my knowl-
edge, I am using the French term.
34   See Plutarch, De cupiditate divitiarum.
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as his long-standing interest in ethical philosophy.35 One such text appears at 
the beginning of book X of Simple drugs.36 In a long preface to the book, which 
is dedicated to animal parts in medicine, Galen provides precious informa-
tion about past scholarship on the topic; faithful to his sharp and critical mind, 
he exposes others’ lack of dignity and lawfulness. One victim of this charge is 
Xenocrates of Aphrodisias, the author of a comprehensive study about the use 
of animal parts. Animal parts famously include human body parts and fluids; 
Galen stresses his disgust (as expected from an educated Greek, and a Roman 
citizen) at the ingestion of bodily secretions such as earwax and menstrual 
blood. This statement is important in providing finishing touches to his self-
portrait: by criticising Xenocrates and his followers, he distances himself from 
dubious medical practices and presents himself as an enlightened practitio-
ner (and somehow a καλός κἀγαθός). Undoubtedly, Galen is aware that slander 
could affect him as a medical practitioner in a hardly-regulated field,37 and 
aims at diverting them through a clear statement; whether or not he is genu-
inely disgusted by the very thought of drinking menstrual blood does not really 
matter here. Prefatory rhetoric is instrumental in his authorial and medical 
posture.
Ultimately, however, this statement comes at a defining self-characteriza-
tion moment in the context of his later works: a supremely experienced physi-
cian, Galen dominates the field and its turpitudes and stresses the usefulness 
of some animal-based remedies. In the last two books, Galen accepts a number 
of them, including those involving animal, even human excrements. But dis-
playing a moral condemnation of the remedies closest to black magic gives 
him the higher ground; it conveniently puts him in a moraliste’s position. The 
tone of this very preface sounds distinctive, if compared with another preface 
in the same work, namely the preface to book VI, written much earlier in his 
life (before 180): in book VI, Galen simply ridicules Pamphilus as an incompe-
tent writer, whereas in book X Galen directs his criticism towards an appar-
ently similar target, Xenocrates, only to turn his attention and indignation to-
wards more dangerous prescriptions. Let us read indeed the last section of the 
preface to book X. Galen’s stance turns bitter as he accuses rogue practitioners 
of writing down harmful, even lethal recipes:
35   Galen, Libr. Propr. 15; the extant works of this category appear in P. N. Singer’s Galen. 
Psychological Writings, 2013.
36   For a study of this preface (Simpl. med. temp. ac fac. X, 1) in the context of Galen’s work On 
simple drugs, see my article cited n. 24.
37   As demonstrated in subsequent statements, for example dismissing crocodile blood for 
eye diseases, “because slanderers are swift to condemn physicians as sorcerers” (Simpl. 
med.. temp. ac fac. X, 6 = K. XII, 263).
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As far as I am concerned, I will not mention basilisks, elephants, hippo-
potamuses or any other animal of which I have no personal experience; 
as for the so-called philtres and charms to generate love, dreams or ha-
tred (I am deliberately using their very words), I would not mention them 
in writing even if I had sufficient experience in them, just as I would not 
record deadly poisons or those they call disease-makers. Their alleged 
properties are ridiculous: binding adversaries, for example, so they can-
not speak in court, causing a pregnant woman to miscarry, or preventing 
a woman from conceiving, and other similar stupidities. Experience has 
shown that most such charms are ineffective, and a few of them, albeit ef-
fective, are harmful to human life, which makes me wonder, by the gods, 
by what line of reasoning they came to write them down. For how could 
they believe that the knowledge that brings them infamy in life would 
bring them fame after death? If they were kings who tested these things 
on people sentenced to death, they would not be doing anything wrong. 
But since they had the arrogance to write these things down as laymen, 
over their entire life, then it can be only one of two explanations: either 
they write about things they have neither tested nor know, or, if they have 
tested them, then they are the most impious of all men, giving deadly 
poisons to people who have done no wrong, sometimes even to excellent 
men, for the sake of experimenting. A man noticed two physicians next 
to some hawkers and approached them to sell them some honey, as it 
seemed. Upon tasting it, they discussed the price, and, since they offered 
little, he quickly vanished, but neither physician survived. In sum, it is 
just to hate those who have written <about such poisons> more, not less, 
than those who commit all such poisonings, insofar as it is a lesser crime 
to do evil alone than it is to do so with the help of many others. And the 
knowledge of one’s evil deeds dies with the perpetrator, while knowledge 
of all the writers is immortal, providing weapons to criminals to perform 
their evil deeds. Let us now discuss things that are useful to men to the 
best of our knowledge.38
Here Galen gradually moves beyond the realm of the use of dubious (or magi-
cal) remedies and practices; this passage is about authorial responsibility and 
the very core of medical deontology: to help, or to do no harm. From the wide 
embracing look that he casts upon the field of medicine, Galen castigates 
criminals and the lack of law enforcement against them. He is asking strong 
questions from his professional field, but also, indirectly, from the Empire he 
38   Galen, Simpl. med. temp. ac fac. X, 1 (K. XII, 251–252). As per my article cited above.
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lives in. A moraliste he definitely is in those late-life pages. His ‘virtuous’ self, 
whilst befitting a good orator’s posture in general, is of course part of a more 
complex project of characterization: Galen offers an authorial perspective on 
the dangers of medical practice, especially of pharmacology. Galen’s insistence 
here on the lasting power of his writings and the responsibility that comes 
with authorship is also essential to his self-definition – as a scholar concerned 
with his legacy.
The posture of a righteous, Hippocratic doctor is ideally supplemented by 
Galen’s life-long experience and concern for patients outside his usual elite 
practice. In a small work, De bonis malisque succis, Galen begins with an illus-
trative tale about the direct effects of poor nutrition on health: his long open-
ing paragraph describes the effects of imperial economy on the health patterns 
of the countryside, which he links with hunger and emergency alimentation 
practices triggered by the cities, which absorb most or all of the good crops, 
leaving nothing but alternative roots and herbs for countryside people. This 
detailed description of the ever-increasing symptoms of malnutrition and rise 
of diseases can be read, at some level, as criticism of imperial policy, but Galen 
is careful not to explicitly condemn his rulers. What Galen is clear about, how-
ever, is how his life-long experience helps him identify and correct such pat-
terns, to the best of his knowledge. His description plays as a demonstration 
of his experience and talent for observation, which he stresses in the final sen-
tence of this paragraph.39 It also potentially demonstrates a caring personality, 
a doctor who is interested in the welfare of people generally beyond the small 
Roman elite that he is supposed to work with exclusively. The catastrophic 
fate of those poor people at the other end of the Empire resonates through 
Galen’s words. It is unlikely that his intention was primarily to draw attention 
to their plight; rather, his extremely accurate description is a display of com-
petence and knowledge, of observational powers and experience. At no point 
does Galen describe the facts in a way to arouse pathos. In my view, however, 
this description echoes Thucydides’ description of the plague of Athens, and 
thus contains more than facts. It is, once again, arising from a moraliste’s gaze, 
beyond its medical theme. A keen observer of Roman society, Galen is eager 
to transfer his experience into an informed, perceptive narrative, conveying 
authorial prowess and superior insight.
In the above mentioned “testament” of his De propriis placitis, Galen adds 
some finishing touches to the parts of his oeuvre that confine to philosophy. 
As pointed out by Vivian Nutton, not all topics broached by Galen through a 
lifetime of work are present in the text. Rather, this is a selection of particularly 
39   Galen, Bon. Mal. Succ. 1, 14 (CMG V, 4, 2, p. 392= K. VI, 755).
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sensitive topics about which his views could easily come under fire or be mis-
represented. In terms of contents, what is striking is the lack of firm answers to 
some questions, such as the role of the soul or its exact relationship with the 
body. In stark contrast to the ‘rhetoric of certainty’ that pervades his earlier 
works,40 his final texts exude intellectual prudence. This openly stated uncer-
tainty is no carelessness on Galen’s part. Rather, the relative scepticism that 
comes through this testamental work is emphasised, so as to lay bare an old 
man’s humility. By finally saying “I don’t know”, Galen chisels a more humane 
portrait of himself as a scholar and physician; perhaps, even, the portrait of a 
vulnerable old scholar. As we will see, this emphasis on uncertainty is no slip. 
On the contrary, it finalises Galen’s self-portrayal as a honest intellectual and 
gentleman. This “philosophical testament”, together with the revised approach 
to borderline remedies that he expresses towards the end of On simple drugs, 
give the reader an impression of a non-dogmatic scholar: a firmly grounded 
physician, whose knowledge is essentially down to experience and hard work. 
Another late work, De dubiis motibus (On unclear movements), also projects the 
image of a pragmatist.
A moraliste, a humble scholar, an old, experienced physician who has seen 
it all and understands the very mechanisms of Nature in and around the body, 
Galen is also deprived of greed, or any of the common human flaws chastised 
by philosophers. He is not accessible to sorrow or desire, to anger or envy. His 
famous pages about his education and values, if they are as late as is often sug-
gested (they are echoed in De bonis malisque succis and in the περὶ ἀλυπίας any-
way), show off in retrospect a good natured young man, keen to imitate only 
the virtues around him, namely those displayed by his father. Discussing prob-
lems of character and temper among his peers, Galen is keen to dismiss anger 
as a particularly degrading flaw. Galen’s self-characterization is thus finalised 
with reference to philosophical ideals of peace, self-control and ἀπάθεια. As we 
shall see, the newly discovered treatise adequately completes this self-portrait 
of humble wisdom – by contrast with the more confident texts of his youth, 
such as the self-promotional On prognosis (De praecogn).
4 Galen’s περὶ ἀλυπίας: Finalising a Scholar’s Self-portrait?
It is now time to go back to Galen’s περὶ ἀλυπίας and our proposed investiga-
tion. Much of the treatise (about half of it) revolves around Galen’s personal 
40   See Nutton, V., ‘Galen and the Rhetoric of Certainty’ in J. Coste/D. Jacquart/J.Pigeaud 
(eds.), La rhétorique médicale à travers les siècles, Genève, Droz, 2012, 39–49.
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experience and losses in the Great Fire of 192 AD. It is worth examining how 
Galen talks about himself, in a highly codified literary context. Periautologia 
or ‘discourse about oneself ’ has its pitfalls, and Galen more than anyone else 
is aware of the way he should (or should not) present himself to his chosen 
 audience.41 The virtues of the orator correspond to a great extent to the phil-
osophical virtues commonly extolled in the imperial period (and hailed by 
Galen himself). The same virtuous conduct is expected of physicians in partic-
ular, who, at least in principle, model their lifestyle onto high moral standards.42 
Galen is one of the most vocal promoters of the “doctor-philosopher” in an-
cient literature.43 Thus in his ethical discussions, Galen demonstrates aware-
ness of the character he should be displaying and promoting; in displaying and 
promoting it, he certainly shows his abilities to play on the social and literary 
codes of moral excellence. Yet, how original is his self-characterization, in the 
light of this newly discovered text? What special character, exactly, is Galen 
constructing here? Do we get a new picture of the great Galen?
It is not my purpose here to describe the περὶ ἀλυπίας in terms of rhetorical 
devices and strategies: this would require extensive space. In the wake of my 
previous remarks on Galen’s later works, I want to examine a limited aspect of 
Galen’s rhetoric in this text: the way he constructs his own ēthos here, and how 
this echoes his other late works. Among the many features that invite a rhetori-
cal reading in the περὶ ἀλυπίας, the theme of moral strength (or resilience) is 
of particular relevance. It is not by chance that μεγαλοψυχία (usually translated 
by ‘magnanimity’ but clearly revealing a form of strength, of resistence in this 
context, hence the term of ‘resilience’ I have chosen here) features at the turn-
ing point of the treatise, when Galen moves from exposing and narrating the 
facts to his moral stance on detachment from material goods. The term has a 
deep background in rhetoric and philosophy, as one of the chief components 
of ἀρετή;44 μεγαλοψυχία is rarely used by Galen, but always in contexts of stark 
41   Pernot, L., ‘Periautologia. Problèmes et méthodes de l’éloge de soi-même dans la tradition 
éthique et rhétorique gréco-romaine’, Revue des Etudes grecques 111–1, 1998, pp. 101–124; 
Rutherford, I., ‘The poetics of the Paraphthegma: Aelius Aristides and the Decorum of 
self-praise’, in D. Innes/H. Hine/C. Pelling (eds), Ethics and Rhetoric. Classical essays for 
Donald Russell on his Seventy-Fifth Birthday, Oxford, 1995, pp. 193–204. Both studies ex-
plore in depth the precious hints provided by Plutarch in De laude sui ipsius.
42   Cf. Von Staden, H., ‘Character and competence. Personal and professional conduct 
in Greek medicine’, in H. Flashar/J. Jouanna (eds), Médecine et morale dans l’antiquité. 
Entretiens de la Fondation Hardt vol. 43, Genève, Droz, 1997, 157–195.
43   Galen, The best doctor is also a philosopher; see edition with tr. and commentary by 
V. Boudon-Millot, Galien. Oeuvres, Tome I, 2007.
44   See Aristotle, Rhet. I, 6; I, 9; II, 12. Cf. Woerther, F., L’èthos aristotélicien. Genèse d’une notion 
rhétorique, Paris, 2007, pp. 222–223. According to Aristotle, μεγαλοψυχία belongs to young 
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admiration (talking about Chrysippus, PHP III, 2, 18, 1; Hippocrates, Dieb. crit. 
II, 12 = K. IX, 894) or as a virtue enabling the soul to overcome grief (λυπή): in 
Loc. Affect., V, 1 (K. VIII, 302) quoted below, Galen identifies those with a strong 
“tension” (τόνος) in the soul as the most resilient and less vulnerable patients. 
Others, weak in their souls and lacking education, are more likely to die from 
sudden, violent causes of distress.
ὅσοις γὰρ ἀσθενής ἐστιν ὁ ζωτικὸς τόνος, ἰσχυρά τε πάθη ψυχικὰ πάσχουσιν 
ἐξ ἀπαιδευσίας, εὐδιάλυτος τούτοις ἐστὶν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσία· τῶν τοιούτων 
ἔνιοι καὶ διὰ λύπην ἀπέθανον, οὐ μὴν εὐθέως ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς προειρημένοις· 
ἀνὴρ δ’ οὐδεὶς μεγαλόψυχος οὔτ’ ἐπὶ λύπαις οὔτ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσα λύπης 
ἰσχυρότερα θανάτῳ περιέπεσον· ὅ τε γὰρ τόνος τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῖς ἰσχυρός ἐστι 
τά τε παθήματα σμικρά.
In all those whose vital tension is weak and who are afflicted by grave psy-
chological ailments as a result of their lack of education, the substance of 
the soul is readily dissolved. Some of these even died of distress (λύπη), 
though not always instantly as in the cases I mentioned before; but no 
high-minded (μεγαλόψυχος) man ever died as a result of distressing ex-
periences or of any other affliction stronger than distress. With them the 
tension of the soul is strong, the ailments are small.
This passage clearly foreshadows Galen’s argument in the περὶ ἀλυπίας, in 
which resilience naturally accompanies a strong (masculine) soul, just like 
Galen’s, which was shaped and strengthened through generations of instilled 
virtue, as he carefully and pointedly explains (Ind. 58–60). It is thus most ap-
propriate to find μεγαλοψυχία twice within a couple of lines in the very centre 
of a work dedicated to ἀλυπία (Ind. 50–51); it is also a self-conscious assessment 
of Galen’s own moral accomplishment and, consequently, of his reliability as 
an «orator», or author.45 The intertwining of moral strength and authorial 
kudos is essential to our understanding of Galen’s ēthos. As we have seen above, 
Galen’s sharp authorial self-awareness is one of the defining features of the last 
period of his life, after 192 and the destruction of a great part of his library; 
his μεγαλοψυχία, in turn, allows him to move on and complete his authorial 
men rather than old. Galen is certainly playing on the expectations of his audience here. 
See also Teun Tieleman’s contribution in this volume.
45   As demonstrated in great detail by F. Woerther, the notion of èthos or character is con-
sistent and coherent throughout Aristotle’s works on ethics and rhetoric. Cf. Woerther, F., 
L’èthos aristotélicien. Genèse d’une notion rhétorique, Paris, 2007.
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destiny by gathering scattered copies of his works and rewriting whatever can 
be rewritten, and completing the works he has intended to write, such as his 
pharmacological texts.
There is no connotation of arrogance in μεγαλοψυχία; rather, as suggested by 
Galen, it represents the core of human resilience in front of adversity. The de-
tailed, precise account of his losses in the first part of the letter serves, of course, 
as a proof of his μεγαλοψυχία; the various echoes to his other ethical and psy-
chological works (such as the reference to cultivating his family virtues, inter 
alia) not only strengthen his case: they confirm the authenticity of his ēthos 
as a virtuous, resilient individual. In this sense, Galen’s περὶ ἀλυπίας definitely 
fills a gap in his production: this is the work where he best combines proofs of 
his superior nature, of his moral awareness, and of his drive towards posterity. 
If Galen’s concern for his legacy is apparent in many works of his later pe-
riod, as shown above, only the περὶ ἀλυπίας brings together with such intensity 
and effectiveness all the strings of Galen’s last push towards immortality. The 
factual details of a defining event, the 192 catastrophe that struck him and so 
many of his contemporaries, help build a truly resilient figure and a towering 
moral individual.
Others have rightly stressed Galen’s apparent humility in the περὶ ἀλυπίας: 
far from boasting of his resilience, Galen emphasises the limits of his pow-
ers of resistance, both physical and psychological.46 Under Commodus, Galen 
was not exempt from fear (Ind. 54–55); and he would not want to undergo the 
tortures of the Phalaris bull (Ind. 71). His core aspiration, in this later period 
of his life, is health (Ind. 74). In confessing his vulnerability in the wake of 
this proof of resilience, Galen probably scores higher than a standard, heroic 
Stoic. Galen’s περὶ ἀλυπίας thus portrays him in a special light, that of a humble 
creature eager to outlive Commodean terror, to enjoy his home and to finish 
his job as a medical author. In so doing, is Galen not distancing himself from 
the standard old man posture of imperial literature? Is he not giving us more 
than the strength of character involved in μεγαλοψυχία? While he plays on a 
number of commonplaces and standard exempla in his argument, and uses 
well-known literary quoting liberally, Galen, through a sincere self-assessment, 
succeeds in portraying himself as the quintessentially honest and strong gen-
tleman he has always advocated for others.
Galen’s confessed vulnerability in the περὶ ἀλυπίας should not be down-
played. In confessing fear during the reign of Commodus, for himself and for 
his friends, fear at the prospect of exile or excessive physical pain; in reporting 
46   See for instance V. Boudon-Millot and J. Jouanna, Galien. Ne pas se chagriner, intr. 
pp. liii–lv.
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others’ collapse through similar experiences (for example the grammarian 
who lost everything to the great fire and died of sorrow, Ind. 7), Galen displays 
a facet of his personality that is, as far as I am aware, hardly ever highlight-
ed: he offsets his tale of μεγαλοψυχία with expression of natural human feel-
ings. This chimes with rare passages highlighted above, such as his indignant 
stance against rogue practitioners in Simple drugs; or the prospect of death in 
the same work, and the fear that he will unable to complete his project. Thus 
Galen’s vulnerability may not be due simply to the familiar context of a let-
ter; according to me, it is deliberately underscored as part of Galen’s finishing 
strokes to his self-portrait, as the necessary counterpart to his moral and intel-
lectual excellence. Humbly affirming his uncertainties and emotions, though 
downplaying them for the sake of rhetorical and social conventions, Galen may 
seem no exception in the light of recent scholarship.47 But it must be stressed 
that Galen does so consciously, and purposefully: indeed, the last section of 
the treatise is a personal comment following up on what he thinks is an ac-
curate answer to his addressee’s question (how does he avoid distress, in the 
face of such adversity?): in Ind. 70–78 in particular, Galen insists that he is not 
inaccessible to the feelings of fear and sorrow that he has seemingly beaten. As 
a precise qualification (διορισμός) offseting the narrative of resilience that has 
dominated his treatise, this section builds on hints Galen gave his reader earli-
er on about the draining circumstances of living at court under a tyrant. It also 
mentions health and disease as essential components, not of happiness, but 
simply of “absence of distress” (ἀλυπία). Galen does not want to come across 
as this infallible, invincible human citadel he has been describing all along. 
He lists all the circumstances that could break him, and he prays to the gods 
to spare him such events that he may not overcome. He therefore deliberately 
brings in humility and vulnerability as the finishing touches to his self-portrait. 
The importance of this last twist to his argument is underpinned by the very 
phrasing of Ind. 70, in which he uses his signature coordinating device ἀτὰρ οὖν 
καί, which he seldom uses, perhaps once per work, but always with a view to 
emphasise an important moment in his argument.48 Prayer (εὔχομαι), too, is an 
unusual word in Galen’s texts, highlighting his loathing and fear of any unnec-
essary toils. He is thus offering an original take on the characteristic old man 
of rhetorical treatises – and cunningly playing on his reader’s expectations in 
this respect.
47   Cf. Harris, G. W., Dignity and Vulnerability. Strength and Quality of Character, University 
of California Press, 1997; McCoy, M., Wounded Heroes. Vulnerability as a Virtue in Ancient 
Greek Literature and Philosophy, Oxford, OUP, 2013.
48   C. Petit, ‘Greek particles in Galen’s Œuvre’ (forthcoming).
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5 Conclusion
Galen’s self-characterisation is an ongoing, long-term process that starts off 
in his earlier works and becomes finalised, quite logically, in the works of his 
old age. It is an important component of his diverse compositional strategies, 
aiming at presenting himself under the best possible light to his educated au-
dience of students and philiatroi. In so doing, Galen demonstrates his sound 
rhetorical training and his acute awareness of the power of words. The image 
conveyed by Galen’s later works exudes humility and detachment, whilst also 
highlighting his exceptional experience and intellectual honesty. A gentleman 
unafraid of displaying his vulnerabilities, Galen bares his profound nature to 
his readers, taking the last opportunities offered by his remarkable longevity 
to bring essential finishing touches to his self-portrait. Whilst this self-portrait 
will never be really complete for us, due to the loss of part of his works, charac-
teristically the περὶ ἀλυπίας brings added insight into Galen’s psyche and self-
assessment. It chimes with other extant works, hinting at a humble, authentic 
and vulnerable scholar whose chief purpose and desire is to finish the im-
mense task he has set for himself, and whose core values remain philanthropia, 
friendship, a simple life, and self-respect. Galen’s περὶ ἀλυπίας may convey the 
views of a philosopher;49 it may reflect the concerns of a man potentially com-
promised by his status as court physician to a despicable, recently assassinated 
emperor;50 it certainly completes Galen’s conscious self-portrait in view of pos-
terity. Galen’s concern for his intellectual and practical legacy comes through 
in many of his later works; in the περὶ ἀλυπίας it revolves around his moral 
fortitude as well as his lack of heroism in the face of adversity. Combined with 
his conscious, repeatedly asserted authorial project and the strong sense of re-
sponsibility that accompanies it, this display of authenticity creates a powerful 
intellectual and personal testament.
There is no easy way to untangle the real from the fictional Galen, espe-
cially in this later part of his life, when his authorial voice seemed shaped by 
urgency and anxiety (of influence, at least). There is nevertheless a case to 
be made for an enquiry into Galen’s last years: however speculative, such in-
vestigations are unseparable from the analysis for his post-192 production. If 
Galen, as an author, wears a mask, this was, for his learned readers, a transpar-
ent one; his conscious play on the literary and philosophical codes of his time 
could only delight his hetairoi (not fool them). It is important to bear in mind 
49   As shown in the thorough analyses of this text by Peter Singer, Christopher Gill, Jim 
Hankinson and Teun Tieleman in this volume.
50   A path explored by Matthew Nicholls in this volume.
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Galen’s essentially artificial persona. But, like his advisory dreams and his pa-
tient encounters, Galen’s allusions to imminent death, tyranny, or unsavoury 
practices in his later years are all rooted in his personal experience. By all ac-
counts, his περὶ ἀλυπίας is the most troubling testimony about his life to date; 
it shines back, in turn, on other later works and illuminates their significance 
and urgency.
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chapter 3
Galen and the Language of Old Comedy: Glimpses 
of a Lost Treatise at Ind. 23b–28
Amy Coker
Towards the middle of the περὶ ἀλυπίας, Galen singles out as a particular loss in 
the fire of AD 192 a treatise he had produced on the vocabulary of Old Comedy 
(Ind. 20–28). Galen describes this work in some detail at 23b–28, as follows:1
But Fate ambushed me, by destroying, along with many other of my 
books, most especially my work on the vocabulary of the entire of Old 
Comedy [τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων πραγματείαν …τῆς παλαιᾶς κωμῳδίας ὅλης], 
(24a) of which, as you know, Didymus had already made a study, both 
the everyday words and those requiring explanation [τὰ πολιτικὰ …τά 
τε γλωττηματικὰ πάντα], in fifty books, of which I made an epitome in 
6,000 lines. (24b) Such a procedure seemed to be of some value for ora-
tors and grammarians, or in general for anyone who might want to use an 
Attic idiom [ἢ οἵτινες ὅλως ἀττικίζειν βούλοιντο], (25) or words that have a 
significant bearing on practicalities, like the question that arose recently 
in Rome when a respected doctor announced that groats were not yet in 
use [οὔπω τὴν χρῆσιν εἶναι τοῦ χόνδρου] in the time of Hippocrates, and 
that that was why in Regimen in Acute Diseases he advocated barley gruel 
[πτισάνην] over all other cereal foodstuffs; for if groats had been known 
to the Greeks, he would not have chosen anything else in preference. (26) 
But groats are mentioned particularly in Regimen for Health, which some 
ascribe to him but others to Philistion or Ariston, both very early doc-
tors [ἀνδρῶν παλαιοτάτων], and also in the writers of Old Comedy [ἀλλὰ 
καὶ παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς κωμικοῖς]. Words like abudokomas or aburtakē2 
1   Trans. Nutton in Singer, Galen. Psychological Writings, 2013, pp. 85–6; the Greek text follows 
Boudon-Millot et al., Galien. Ne pas se chagriner (2010) (= BJP), with the exception of the 
emendation at the end of 26 by Polemis, see n. 2.
2   BJP print here Ἀριστομένει ἢ Ἀριστοφάνει, understanding the difficult sequence of letters in 
the manuscript as concealing the names of comic poets; Polemis (2011) 3–4 instead con-
jectures – I believe correctly – two obscure words in the Accusative Singular ἀβυδοκόμαν ἢ 
ἀβυρτάκην, and is followed by Nutton (2013). The significance of these two words is discussed 
below. Polemis (2011) 4 also suggests a change in punctuation in the passage, and that the 
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<and> (27) whatever else was unclear to the audience were defined in our 
 treatise – and was anticipated nicely in Didymus’ exposition – as follows: 
emmer, chick peas, vetch, groats and the other cereals, vegetables and 
late-summer fruits, wines made from the marc of grapes, with or without 
the addition of water, bushes, fruits, plants, animals, instruments, equip-
ment, tools, and everything else in daily life, and their names. (28) My 
selection of such words in Old Comedy [τὰ μὲν οὖν (λοιπὰ) ἐκ τῆς παλαιᾶς 
κωμῳδίας ἐξειλεγμένα τῶν τοιούτων ὀνομάτων] had not yet been transferred 
to Campania, but luckily my selection from prose authors already had, in 
forty-eight large books, of which those with the equivalent of more than 
4,000 hexameter lines will perhaps have to be divided in two.
It is clear from the detailed exposition in this passage, and comments else-
where in the Galenic corpus, that the language of Old Comedy was important 
for Galen, valuable as both a model of clarity of expression, and because of 
its practical utility in solving questions about the text of Hippocrates. None 
of Galen’s works on Old Comedy have however survived. Rather than focus-
sing on how Galen frames these losses listed here within the broader rhetorical 
strategy of the Peri alupias,3 this chapter takes this passage as a starting point 
for discussion of what Galen’s monumental treatise on the vocabulary of Old 
Comedy lost in the fire would have looked like, using clues from both the Peri 
alupias, and mentions of comedy scattered throughout the rest of the Galenic 
corpus. In doing so, this chapter raises questions about the place of Galen 
within the wider literary culture of second-century AD Rome, rather than con-
sidering him solely as a physician or philosopher.
Firstly, after discussing in brief the place of Old Comedy within Galen’s 
view of language,4 quotations from comic texts in the works of Galen extant 
in Greek are collected in order to allow an overview of his preferred authors, 
suggesting perhaps the range of authors included in the lost work. Secondly, 
a close reading of the final part Ind. 23b–28 allows further speculation about 
the source-texts and format of Galen’s work on Old Comedy, as well as about 
words ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς κωμικοῖς should be taken with what follows them, not with 
what proceeds. On this basis, with a full stop after ‘doctors’ in Nutton’s version, an English 
translation might read ‘But also from the playwrights of Old Comedy, the words Abudokomēs 
or aburtakē, and/or <ἤ> others not clear to the audience were defined in our treatise – and 
was anticipated nicely in Didymus’ exposition – as follows’. Sense-wise, it is difficult to chose 
between either version, although see the comments in n. 000, this chapter.
3   On which see Rosen (2014).
4   A study of the use of the vocabulary of Old Comedy itself within Galen’s Greek is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, and a desideratum of future work.
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his working practices more broadly. As will be shown, Galen’s oeuvre has more 
in common with lexicographically-informed works of the second century AD, 
and Galen with their authors whom he pejoratively labels ‘sophists’, than his 
scathing remarks about their linguistic endeavours sometimes suggest.5
1 Galen’s Atticism & Galen’s Comedy
Despite writing at a period of fervent interest in the revival of Attic Greek as the 
aspirational standard of the educated man,6 it is well known that Galen is criti-
cal of those who seek to reproduce apparent Attic norms for their own sake, 
especially if this is at the expense of clarity.7 For Galen, it is precision above 
all which should dictate matters of linguistic expression. Adherence to strict 
antiquarian norms are not useful per se, but some words from the sunētheia 
of the Classical past – if used correctly – can be tools for maintaining clarity: 
this is explicit in Galen’s own words at the end of his treatise The Order of My 
Own Books:8
It was because of the number of doctors and philosophers who lay down 
new meanings for Greek words […] for this reason I made this commen-
tary on the words which I collected in forty-six books from the Attic prose-
writers (and some others from the comic poets [καθάπερ ἐκ τῶν κωμικῶν 
ἄλλα]).9 The work is, as I have explained, written for the sake of the actual 
objects signified; at the same time, the reader gains a knowledge of Attic 
vocabulary, though this is of no great value in itself [σὺν τούτῳ δ᾽ εὐθέως 
ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀναγνωσομένοις αὐτὰ καὶ ἡ τῶν Ἀττικῶν ὀνομάτων γνῶσις οὐδὲν 
αὐτὴ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν ἄξιον ἔχουσα μεγάλης σπουδῆς]. Because of those who 
5   Nutton (2009) 34 highlights this as a distinct – albeit perhaps controversial – possibility, cf. 
Kollesch (1981). As Zadorojnyi (2013) 389 puts it, “Notwithstanding his dislike of ‘sophistry’, 
Galen is a dextrous (if grouchy) self-promoter well-versed in the challenges and strategems 
of the Second Sophistic.”
6   See Kim (2010) for a recent state-of-the-art account of linguistic archaism in the first two 
centuries AD, which stresses the internal variety of Atticism; Swain (1996) and Schmitz (1997) 
are now classic works on the topic.
7   See for example von Staden (1995) 516 with further references, and Sluiter (1995); Hankinson 
(1994), esp. 171–180, dicusses Galen’s principles of naming, as does Morison (2008); Barnes 
(1997) explores Galen’s apparently “schizophrenic” attitude to language, ambivalence mixed 
with strictness.
8   Ord. Lib. Prop. 5.4–6 (= XIX.61 K.) ed. Boudon-Millot, trans. Singer (1997) 28–9.
9   The same work on prose mentioned at Ind. 28, and listed by Galen in Lib. Prop. 20.1 (see below 
n. 17), as being in 48 books.
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use words badly, however, I composed another work, on their correctness 
[πραγματεία περὶ τῆς ὀρθότητος αὐτῶν] – a work, in fact, which would be 
best read first of all.
Here it can be seen that it is the misuse of vocabulary with novel mean-
ings which riles Galen – a concern he held in common with the Atticist 
 lexicographers – and it is for this reason that he produced a work for the spe-
cific purpose of elucidating the proper meaning of words.10 These works are 
not catalogues of philological ornaments, as the efforts of those who ‘hyper-
Atticise’ were sometimes characterised by the more satirical commentators of 
the period.11 Such works are associated in particular with Phrynichus and his 
ilk, a kind of scholarly enterprise from which Galen seeks to distance himself, 
despite sharing much common ground.
The most overt indication that it is words from Attic Comedy, as opposed 
to those from other varieties of the Classical language, which for Galen are the 
most useful in maintaining his principle of clarity, is found in the first book of 
the Περὶ τῶν ἰατρικῶν ὀνομάτων, or De nominibus medicis ‘On Medical Names’ 
(Med. Nom.), a text which survives only in Arabic translation.12 Here Galen tells 
us it is Aristophanes’ usage of words which should be followed as a model be-
cause of the intelligibility of the language of the comic theatre for the popu-
lace in general.13 This explains in part why in Galen’s other catalogue of his 
works, On My Own Books, no fewer than five treatises on comedy and comic 
playwrights are listed (Lib. Prop. 20.1 = XIX.48 K.). Going by their titles which, 
notwithstanding any new discoveries is all that survives of these works, there 
is one on the vocabulary of each of the ‘big three’ playwrights of Old Comedy 
(Cratinus, Aristophanes and Eupolis),14 and two more general works, one on 
10   Perhaps to be identified with the work entitled Ἀττικῶν παράσημα listed at Lib. Prop. 20.2, 
see n. 17, but otherwise unknown.
11   See for example the figure of the teacher of rhetoric in Lucian’s Praeceptor rhetorum, esp. 
17; compare Galen’s own comments at PHP 5.7.42.
12   Meyerhof & Schacht (1931) gives the Arabic text and translation into German; a brief 
history of its transmission in Arabic and Syriac is given at (1931) 4; Deichgräber (1957) 
discusses the text and its significance for Galen’s principles of naming. On comedy and 
clarity see von Staden (1995) 81–2.
13   Meyerhof & Schacht (1931) 31–3 (= 103v–104v).
14   On vocabulary current at the time of Eupolis, three books (τῶν παρ’ Εὐπόλιδι πολιτικῶν 
ὀνομάτων τρία), On vocabulary current at the time of Aristophanes, five books (τῶν παρὰ 
Ἀριστοφάνει πολιτικῶν ὀνομάτων πέντε), On vocabulary current at the time of Cratinus, two 
books (τῶν παρὰ Κρατίνῳ πολιτικῶν ὀνομάτων δύο). πολιτικά is taken to mean ‘everyday’, 
as for example Nutton (2009) 30 n. 76 and Rosen (2014) 168, against other translations as 
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vocabulary found only in comic plays,15 and one on the utility of Old Comedy 
as reading for students.16 A number of other works on language are also listed 
in this final section of On My Own Books under τὰ τοῖς γραμματικοῖς καὶ ῥήτορσι 
κοινά,17 but not the 6,000 line epitome of Didymus on Old Comedy mentioned 
in the Peri alupias.18 Presumably after the destruction of this work in AD 192 
Galen did not (or could not, through the loss of his source texts) reproduce it 
or, if he did, he reworked or rearranged the material so that it could be called 
by a different name, and it lurks behind one of the titles Galen lists in cata-
logues of his own works.
The loss of all of Galen’s works on Old Comedy necessitates an alternative 
approach to the matter of which comic texts or comic playwrights he is using 
or reading. The list below stands as a first pass at capturing mentions of com-
edy and comic playwrights in Galen’s extant works, assembled through elec-
tronically searching the online Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (TLG).19 This is an 
admittedly crude approach and does not claim to provide a comprehensive 
account of Comedy in Galen, yet produces a larger amount of material than 
hitherto collected, and allows some positive statements to be made about the 
‘political’. Sluiter (1995) 524 suggests an opposition in Galen of language which is normal 
or proper (πολιτικός), and that which is rhetorical.
15   Examples of words peculiar to comedy, one book (τῶν ἰδίων κωμικῶν ὀνομάτων παραδείγματα 
ἕν).
16   If old comedy is useful reading for students (εἰ χρήσιμον ἀνάγνωσμα τοῖς παιδευομένοις ἡ 
παλαιὰ κωμῳδία), perhaps reminiscent of Plutarch’s earlier Comparison of Aristophanes 
and Menander (Mor. 853a–854d).
17   At 20.1 is listed τῶν παρὰ τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς συγγραφεῦσιν ὀνομάτων ὀκτὼ καὶ τεσσαράκοντα 
(On the vocabulary of Attic writers, forty eight books), and at 20.2 πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιτιμῶντας 
τοῖς σολοικίζουσι τῇ φωνῇ ἑπτά (Against those who are critical of the authors of solecisms 
in their language, seven books); Ἀττικῶν παράσημα ἕν (Improprieties in Attic, one book); 
περὶ σαφηνείας καὶ ἀσαφείας (On clarity and obscurity); εἰ δύναταί τις εἶναι κριτικὸς καὶ 
γραμματικός ἕν (If one can be at the same time critic and grammarian, one book). Morison 
(2008) 116–7 gives a convenient list of Galen’s works on language, Skoda (2001) a sketch 
of his lexicographical interests; she dubs Galen “un amateur de lexicologie et de linguis-
tique” (p. 194).
18   At Ind. 28 Galen tells us that 4000 hexameter lines is around the upper limit for the length 
of a single book, suggesting perhaps that Galen’s epitome was in two books. On ancient 
book lengths see BJP ad loc (pp. 94–5), and especially Johnson (2004) 87–8, 143–60, who 
stresses the complexity of identifying a standard length for a papyrus bookroll.
19   http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu/. Searches took place in June 2014, and were checked again 
in May 2015. The initial search strings were κωμικ, κωμῳδ (to catch general references), 
ἀριστοφ, κρατιν, εὐπολ, μενανδ (for playwrights) and λυσιστρ, θεσμοφ, βατραχο, εκκλησι, 
πλουτο, αχαρν, ιππε, νεφελα, σφηκ, ειρην, ορνιθ (as a sample for finding plays, based around 
the eleven extant complete plays of Aristophanes). All texts listed in the TLG under 
“Galen” and “Ps-Galen” were searched, with “Ps-Galen” yielding no results.
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extent of Galen’s knowledge of ancient comic texts.20 Quotations are listed 
first (1.1), with the quoted text in footnotes, followed by additional mentions of 
names of plays, playwrights, or ‘a comic poet’ divided into those which make 
linguistic comment (1.2) and those which are more general (1.3).21 
1.1 Quotations from Comic Plays in Galen
Hipp. Art. XVIIIa.340 K. Eupolis, fr. 60 K-A
  (Αὐτόλυκος α’ β’, Autolycus)22
Aff. Dig. 7.10 (CMG V 4.1.1) Eupolis, fr. *105 K-A (Δῆμοι, Demes)23
 (= V.38 K.) 
Diff. Puls. VIII.653 K. Eupolis, fr. *116 K-A (Δῆμοι, Demes)24
Dig. Puls. VIII.943 K. Eupolis, fr. *116 K-A (Δῆμοι, Demes)
   (= previous note)
SMT 11.37 (= XII. 360 K.) Aristophanes, Birds 471
   (Ὄρνιθες, Birds)25
Gloss. XIX.113 K. Aristophanes, Acharnians 872
   (Ἁχαρνῆς, Acharnians)26
Gloss. XIX.66–7 K. Aristophanes, fr. 205 K-A
   (Δαιταλῆς, Banqueters)27
20   Some quotes from Comedy in Galen are listed in Nutton (2009) 29–31, who also consid-
ers Galen’s reading of classical literature more broadly; compare too the collection by 
von Staden (1998) 81–2, n. 56. As a check, all the citations given under Galen in the index 
to Rusten (2011) 740 are captured by this method: the true test will be when the volume 
of Indices to Poetae Comici Graeci appears. De Lacy (1966) is more limited than its title 
suggests.
21   Excluded are examples of κωμῳδ found in a doublet τραγῳδία καὶ κωμῳδία vel sim. where 
these refer to comic competition or performance, e.g. Comp. Med. Loc. XIII.6 K., UP IV.356 
K., Hipp. Epid. XVIIa.507 K.; there is also κωμικοί καὶ τραγικοὶ ποιηταί at PHP 5.7.43, and 
HNH XV.24 K. (= comm. 1.2, on which see n. 58), cf. also von Staden (1998) 68 n. 12, 70 
n. 25. Examples of the search words in Lib. Prop. and Ord. Lib. Prop. are also excluded.
22   Eupolis, fr. 60 K-A: (A.) ἐπὶ καινοτέρας ἰδέας ἀσεβῆ βίον, ὦ μοχθηρός, ἔτριβες. (Β) πῶς ὦ πολλῶν 
ἤδη λοπάδων τοὺς ἄμβωνας περιλείξας; Galen quotes the second half of the second line: “καὶ 
τις τῶν κωμικῶν ἐπεῖπειν ἐπισκώπτων τινὰ δὴ τῶν λοπάδων τοὺς ἄμβωνας περιλείχειν”. The 
quotation in Galen is identified in Manetti (2009) 165.
23   Eupolis, fr. *105 K-A: (Α.) † ητίας ὢν † ἐγένου δίκαιος οὕτω διαπρεπῶς; | (Αρ.) ἡ μὲν φύσις τὸ 
μέγιστον <ἦν>, ἔπειτα δὲ | κἀγὼ προθύμως τῆι φύσει συνελάμβανον.
24   Eupolis, fr. *116 K-A: λαλεῖν ἄριστος, ἀδυνατώτατος λέγειν. Also probably quoted at Med. 
Nom. (Meyerhof-Schacht 1931, 31 = 102v).
25   Aristophanes, Birds 471: ἀμαθὴς γὰρ ἔφυς κοὐ πολυμπράγμων, οὐδ᾽ Αἴσωπον πεπάτηκας. 
Kühn’s text of Galen has μεμάθηκας as the final word.
26   Gloss XIX.313 K.: κόλλικας• τοὺς τροχίσκους· καὶ τὸ ἐν Ἀχαρνεῦσι, κολλικοφάγε βοιώτιε, ἐπὶ τῶν 
σμικρῶν ἀρτίσκων εἴρηται; Acharnians 872 (OCT) ὦ χαῖρε, κολλικοφάγε Βοιωτίδιον.
27   Aristophanes, fr. 205 K-A: (Α.) ἀλλ᾽ εἶ σορέλλη καὶ μύρον καὶ ταινίαι. | (Β.) ἰδοὺ σορέλλη· τοῦτο 
παρὰ Λυσιστράτου. | (Α.) ἦ μὴν ἴσως σὺ καταπλιγήσηι τῶι χρόνωι. | (Β.) τὸ καταπλιγήσηι τοῦτο 
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Gloss. XIX.65 K. Aristophanes, fr. 233 K-A
   (Δαιταλῆς, Banqueters)28
Alim. Fac. 1.27.1 (CMG V 4.2) Aristophanes, fr. 428 K-A
 (=VI.541 K.) (Ὁλκάδες, Merchant Ships)29
Hipp. Aph. XVIIIa.148 K. Aristophanes, fr. 526 K-A
   (Ταγηνισταί, Fry Cooks)30
Hipp. Fract. XVIIIb.347 K. Aristophanes, fr. 630 K-A
   (incerta fabula)31
Med. Nom (Reconstructed from Aristophanes, fr. 346 K-A
 Arabic, see Deichgräber 1957)  (Θεσμοφοριάζουσαι β’)
Hipp. Aph. 7.149 (CMG V 4.1.2) Plato (= Plato comicus) fr. 200 K-A
 (= XVIIIa.149 K.)  (incerta fabula)32
Qual. Incorp. XIX.467 K. Menander, fr. 477 K-A
   (incerta fabula)33
PHP 4.6.34 (= V.412 K.) Menander, fr. 476 K-A
   (incerta fabula)34
Diff. Puls. VIII.656 K. Adespota fr. 229 K-A35
Hipp. Art. XVIIIa.531 K. “Aristophanes”, according to Galen36
Di. Dec. IX.814–5 K. ‘The Comic’37
παρὰ τῶν ῥητόρων. | (Α.) ἀποβήσεταί σοι ταῦτά ποι τὰ ῥήματα. | (Β.) παρ᾽ Ἀλκιβιάδου τοῦτο τἀ-
ποβήσεται. | (Α.) τί ὑποτεκμαίρηι καὶ κακῶς ἄνδρας λέγεις | καλοκἀγαθίαν ἀσκοῦντας; (Β.) οἴμ᾽ 
ὦ Θρασύμαχε, | τίς τοῦτο τῶν ξυνηγόρων τερατεύται; There are a large number of differences 
between Kühn’s text of Galen and the fragment reconstructed in PCG.
28   Aristophanes, fr. 233 K-A: πρὸς ταύτας δ᾽ αὖ λέξον Ὁμήρου γλώττας· τί καλοῦσι κόρυμβα; | ˘ 
˘ - ˘ ˘ - ˘ ˘ - ˘ ˘ - τί καλοῦσ᾽ ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα; | (Β.) ὁ μὲν οὖν σός, ἐμὸς δ᾽ οὗτος ἀδελφὸς φρασάτω· 
τί καλοῦσιν ἰδύους; | ˘ ˘ - ˘ ˘ - ˘ ˘ - ˘ ˘ - ˘ ˘ - τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν ὀπύειν;
29   Aristophanes, fr. 428 K-A: ἀράκους, πυρούς, πτισάνην, χόνδρον, ζείας, αἴρας, σεμίδαλιν.
30   Aristophanes, fr. 526 K-A: κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἀμφαριστερὸν Ἀριστοφάνης εἶπεν ἐν 
Ταγηνίταις [sic] ἄνθρωπον ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἀριστερόν.
31   Aristophanes, fr. 630 K-A: χωρεῖ᾽ πὶ γραμμὴν λορδὸς ὡς <εἰς> ἐμβολήν.
32   Plato comicus, fr. 200 K-A: μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ | † Εὐαγόρου ὁ παῖς ἐκ πλευρίτιδος Κινησίας † | 
σκελετός, ἄπυγος, καλάμινα σκέλη φορῶν, | φθόης προφήτης, ἐσχάρας κεκαυμένος | πλείστας 
ὑπ᾽ Εὐρυφῶντος ἐν τῶι σώματι.
33   Menander, fr. 477 K-A: ταῦτα σ᾽ ἀπολώλεκ᾽, ὦ πονηρέ; as with fr. 476, introduced as τὸ 
Μενάνδρειον.
34   Menander, fr. 476 K-A: [˘/- - - ˘ -] τὸν νοῦν ἔχων ὑποχείριον | εἰς τὸν πίθον δέδωκα (δέδυκα 
Cobet).
35   Adespota fr. 229 K-A: οὔτε στρεβλὸν ὀρθοῦται ξύλον | † οὔτε γεράνδρυον † μετατεθὲν 
μοσχεύεται.
36   εἴπερ δὴ κρανέω γε καὶ εἰ τετελεσμένον ἔσται given as a quotation; see below, p. 72.
37   καὶ σπάνιόν ἐστ’ ἄνθρωπος ὅτ’ ἄνθρωπος given as a quotation; see below, p. 72.
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1.2 Additional ‘Linguistic’ Observations without Quotation
SMT XI.450 K. On spelling (χυλός/χυμός)
HVA XV.455 K. Comic poets using the word χόνδρος
 (= comm. 1.17 CMG V 9.1)
Alim. Fac. 3.15.11 (CMG V 4.2) Comic poets using the word πυριάτη
 (= VI.694 K.) 
Hipp. Art. XVIIIa.385 K. Explanation of τιμωρεούσας using the
  title of a play by Menander
  (Αὑτὸν τιμωρούμενος test. ii K-A)
1.3 Reports of Jokes and Other Observations without Quotation
Hipp. Epid. XVIIb.263 K. Mockery of Socrates in Aristophanes’
 (= comm. VI, 5.11 CMG V 10.2.2)  Clouds
Hipp. Epid. XVIIa.819 K. Comic poets joking about the size of
 (= comm. VI, 1.3 CMG V 10.2.2)  Pericles’ head
QAM IV.784 K. Hippocrates’ sons as exemplars of
   foolishness
HVA XV. 424 K. Example from Eupolis, Αὐτόλυκος β
 (=comm. 1.4 CMG V 9.1) (Eupolis, Autolycus test. ii K-A)
Nat. Fac. II.67 K. Menander as a writer of comedy
  (Menander test. 115 K-A)
   (passage below, pp. 74–5)
The most immediate feature of this collection is its paucity; even if one allows 
for citations which have not been captured by these electronic searches, such 
as those labelled with playwright names or play titles not searched for, rela-
tive to the size of the Galenic corpus this collection of examples is very small. 
Perhaps this indicates that Galen restricted his discussion of comedy relatively 
strictly to those treatises explicitly on comedy, or rather that Galen just does 
not give a reference for quotations when used: this may be the case with the 
as yet unidentified line from On Critical Days (Di. Dec. IX.814–5 K., last item of 
[1.11]) which has at least the benefit of being tagged as “comic”.38
As can be seen, comic material is used widely in the commentaries on 
Hippocrates,39 echoing Nutton’s comments on Galen’s use of Classical litera-
38   This suggests the tantalising possibility that there are other unidentified snippets of an-
cient literature still hidden in the Galenic corpus.
39   As well as several times in Diff. Puls., a work in which according to Hankinson (2008) 173, 
“irritations over language are a constant refrain”; metaphor is also discussed at length 
in this work, see von Staden (1995), esp. 500–13. On the commentaries in general, see 
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ture in general to elucidate Hippocratic texts.40 Note too that in the Peri alu-
pias passage, the problem given as an example of what Galen’s work on Old 
Comedy could help solve is also Hippocratic in nature: were groats (χόνδρος, 
whole grains) in use in Hippocrates (the answer being yes, so the ‘respected 
doctor in Rome’ is wrong).41
In the Hippocratic commentaries, and elsewhere, comic material is some-
times used to make points about language, but not always. As can be seen from 
the lists of citations which do not include quotations (1.2, 1.3), some do talk 
about language but many have rather an anecdotal quality, and refer to an-
cient jokes or sayings as opposed to commenting on any philological content. 
Likewise, many of the direct quotations are given by Galen for their encyclope-
dic or gnomic quality: we find for example Menander cited as part of a discus-
sion on the loss of reason (PHP 4.6.34), Plato (the comic playwright) alongside 
the cautery of abscesses (Hipp. Aph. XVIII a.149 K), and Aristophanes’ Birds 
in a discussion on larks (SMT XII.360 K., Περὶ κορύδων).42 When it comes to 
linguistic matters, we find texts quoted to illustrate matters of spelling (Alim. 
Fac. 1.27.1 on the spelling of the name of ἄρακος, ‘wild chickling’), vocabulary 
(words for left-handedness at Hipp. Aph. XVIIIa.148 K., the difference between 
λαλεῖν and λέγειν at Diff. Puls. VIII.653 K.) and on the invention of new words 
(Gloss. XIX.65–7 K.); at Hipp. Art. XVIIIa.385 K., the title of a play by Menander 
is adduced to explain the meaning of a tricky participle in Hippocrates (on 
which more shortly).
As to the material from which Galen was drawing these examples, the state-
ment in Med. Nom. that Aristophanes is the best model is corroborated by the 
predominance of quotations from, and references to, this playwright in the ex-
tant works. We could expect from the preservation of the titles of lost works by 
Galen on Cratinus, Aristophanes and Eupolis (see n. 14) that the first and last 
of these playwrights would also figure, and we do indeed find three quotations 
from Eupolis – but three only – and none from Cratinus. There is one quotation 
from Plato (comicus). Two of the Eupolis quotations are from Δῆμοι (Demes), 
Manetti & Roselli (1994), esp. 1571–1575, and Hanson (1998) passim on what they reveal 
about Galen’s attitude to authorship.
40   Nutton (2009) 29.
41   In the edition of BJP, and Nutton’s translation as reproduced here, Galen gives the use of 
χόνδρος in Old Comedy as a witness to this problem; Polemis’ repunctuation (see p. 63, 
n. 2) on the contrary construes ‘from Old Comedy’ with the description of the treatise 
which follows. Either way, Galen mentions this word as used in comedy (again) at HVA 
XV.455 K.
42   In a similar vein we have an Αἰσώπειος μῦθος at Hipp. Prorrh. XVI.614 K. and an Αἰσώπου 
λόγος at Adv. Jul. XVIIIa.291 K.; stories from Aesop also appear alongside the quotation 
from Aristophanes’ Birds.
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and while one of these is attached to the name of Eupolis ( fr. *105 K-A), the 
other is introduced only by ὁ Κωμικός ( fr. *116 K-A).43 Does this suggest that 
for Galen Eupolis had a kind of pre-eminence, the same way that Homer is 
often simply “The Poet”? If this is the case, does this in turn imply that the line 
quoted at Diff. Puls. VIII.656 K. (= Adespota fr. 229 K-A) and introduced by “the 
Comic” should also be attributed to Eupolis? Even more speculatively, does 
it follow that there is an unseen quotation of Eupolis in the passage from On 
Critical Days (Di. Dec. IX.814–5 K.)?:
ἔστι δ’ ὅτε καὶ ἐξόχως καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν ἔνια τὴν τοῦ γένους ὅλου προσηγορίαν 
σφετερίζεται, ὥσπερ καὶ παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ λέγεσθαί φαμεν τόδε τι, οὐκ ἂν οὐ-
δενὸς | ἄλλου παρὰ τὸν Ὅμηρον ἀκουομένου, καίτοι μυρίοι γ’ εἰσὶν ἄλλοι ποι-
ηταί. τοιοῦτον δ’ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῷ Κωμικῷ· καὶ σπάνιόν ἐστ’ ἄνθρωπος ὅτ’ 
ἄνθρωπος. 
Sometimes a thing appropriates through its prominence the name of a 
whole class, just as when we say that something is said in the work of 
‘a poet’, we understand only that it is in Homer and no-one else, even 
though there are countless other poets. This sort of thing is found in the 
Comic: ‘a man who is just a man is a rare thing’.
If the final words of this passage are indeed a quotation, as printed in Kühn 
they are almost a trimeter, with one syllable missing. Alternatively – and 
more likely – is that “The Comic” in this passage of On Critical Days is in fact 
Aristophanes, which would seem more likely on the basis of the prestige given 
him elsewhere by Galen, meaning that fr. *116 from Δῆμοι (Demes) is misattrib-
uted by Galen, if we assume that he uses the label ὁ Κωμικός with any consis-
tency. Have we caught Galen making a mistake? So too, Galen quotes a line he 
attributes to Aristophanes at Hipp. Art. XVIIIa. 530–1 K.:
[…] τελευτῶσι δέ τοι οὗτοι δεσμοὶ, καθάπερ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ νωτιαῖος ἄχρι τοῦ κατὰ 
τὴν | ῥάχιν πέρατος. ὠνόμασε δὲ αὐτὸς ὁ Ἱπποκράτης τὸ τελευτῶσιν ὁμοίως τῷ 
ποιητῇ Ἀριστοφάνει
εἴπερ δὴ κρανέω γε καὶ εἰ τετελεσμένον ἔσται.44
43   Capital as Kühn. Both Plutarch (Alcib. 13.2) and Aulus Gellius (1.15.12) attribute the words 
of this fragment ( fr. *116) to Eupolis.
44   The closest parallels I have been able to find is found are the Homeric line ὧδε γὰρ ἐξερέω, 
τὸ δὲ καὶ τετελεσμένον ἔσται ‘for thus will I speak, and this thing shall be brought to pass’ 
(found several times, with some initial variation e.g. Iliad 1.212, 8.401, 23.410, etc.) and a 
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This line does not appear among the fragments of Aristophanes in PCG, but 
nonetheless Galen thought it was Aristophanic. If there is misattribution in 
Galen in either of these examples (especially Eupolis, fr. *116), is this Galen 
slipping up, or his source? Or, more simply, does the use of the tag κωμικός 
imply Galen does not know from which poet this quotation comes? (And 
did he ever know?) This raises the question of the nature of Galen’s sources 
for these quotations, and whether he is reading plays in full, or drawing only 
from compilations or lexica, as his reference to Didymus in the Peri alupias 
suggests.45 There are similar examples of such misattribution in Latin texts 
of the late Republican and Imperial period which appear to indicate the use 
of anthologies, or similar sources, of ancient Greek comic plays, rather than 
engagement with complete texts.46 It should be noted that most of the quota-
tions are not introduced by Galen with anything approaching a modern-style 
reference, and in some examples are not obviously quotations: play names are 
given rarely,47 and as we have seen poets are not always named in association 
with quoted words or lines.48 Similarly, sometimes we find simply phrases 
such as παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς κωμικοῖς οὕτως εὑρίσκεται (SMT XI.450 K.) or καλεῖν 
δ᾽ ἐοίκασιν οἱ παλαιοὶ κωμικοὶ (Alim. Fac. VI.694 K.), which apparently draw on 
Galen’s knowledge of Old Comedy, but yet are unsubstantiated by examples. 
Galen’s characteristically confident statements about wide reading of Classical 
texts should be treated with some considerable caution.49 Before moving on to 
these questions of sources, a few words on Menander.
quotation at Plutarch Mor. 62e (How to tell a flatterer from a friend) εἰ δύναμαι τελέσαι γε 
καὶ εἰ τετελεσμένον ἐστί.
45   von Staden (1998) 68 n. 12 notes for example that some of Galen’s quotations are probably 
at second hand.
46   See for example the misattributions collected by Ruffell (2014) 304 from Cicero, Valerius 
Maximus and Vitruvius; in Cicero (Att. 12.6a), a quotation from Eupolis mistakenly attrib-
uted to Aristophanes’ Acharnians is corrected, see ibid p. 292, n. 64 on this example.
47   I found only Gloss. XIX.66 K. Banqueters (twice) and at 113 Acharnians; SMT XII.360 
K. Birds; Hipp. Aph. XVIIIa.148 K. Fry Cooks; Alim. Fac. VI.541 K. Merchant Ships; Hipp. Epid. 
XVIIb.263 K. Clouds; and HVA XV.424 K. Autolycus. None of these play names recur else-
where in Galen.
48   The names of playwrights are associated with quotations for example at Aff. Dig. V.38 K. 
(Eupolis), Hipp. Fract. XVIIIb.347 K. (Aristophanes) and Hipp. Aph. XVIIIa.149 K. (Plato 
comicus). Excluding Galen’s catalogues of his own works, Aristophanes is named eight 
times in the extant Greek works, Eupolis twice.
49   We find such confidence in the rhetoric of control over his material at for example 
Med. Nom. (Meyerhof-Schacht 1931, 33 = 103r–104v): “Ich könnte dir nachweisen, daß 
alle Komödiendichter den Namen”Fieber” | in ihrer Redeweise ebenso anwenden, mit 
zahlreichen zum Beweise dienenden Belegstellen aus ihren Worten, mit denen man, 
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So far the discussion has centred around Old Comedy, since this makes up 
the bulk of the material in Galen, and indeed it is a work on ἡ παλαιά κωμῳδία 
specifically which Galen talks about in the Peri alupias.50 However, there are 
a few references to Menander, a playwright of New Comedy.51 This is perhaps 
surprising, especially the philological point on the meaning of τιμωρεούσας 
noted at Hipp. Art. XVIIIa.385 K since Menander’s Greek was not univer-
sally accepted as a model for ‘good Attic’ in the first few centuries AD.52 For 
Galen, Menander perhaps still represented a Greek usage which was widely 
 intelligible – because of its use in mass entertainment – and thus preferable 
to other forms. Whatever Galen’s view of Menander’s Greek, the significance 
of this Μενάνδρειον lies in the fact that it is the title of a play ‘Self-Tormentor’ 
which is quoted, rather than anything from the text of the play itself. Given that 
verbal voice was a concern in Greek lexicographers53 (on whom more shortly), 
what we have here is a solid and eminently quotable – and perhaps thus even 
widely used? – authoritative example of a verb in the middle (τιμωρέομαι) tak-
ing an accusative. The inclusion of the play name in Galen is not then indica-
tive of a close attachment to Menader’s language as such, but rather can only 
be interpreted as a superficial nod to his plays. This is not to say that Galen did 
not know – and indeed enjoy – Menander; assuming the tone of the following 
passage is sincere, Galen himself displays a degree of fondness for Menander 
in On the Natural Faculties, even if he does not speak as an advocate for his 
works as models of good style:54
Now such of the younger men as have dignified themselves with the 
names of these two authorities by taking the appellations ‘Erasistrateans’ 
wenn man wollte, dickere Bücher füllen könnte als die Bücher des Menedotos und des 
Menemachos.”
50   ἡ παλαιά κωμῳδία in Galen is taken in this chapter to mean ‘Old Comedy’ in the sense 
of the plays ancient Athens broadly termed, not in the modern technical sense which 
often differentiates strictly between Old and Middle Comedy; the fact that the labels Old, 
Middle and New were not used in antiquity consistently does not alter the conclusions 
reached in this chapter. A note on the terminology is conveniently found at Nervegna 
(2014) 388–89.
51   The title of a recipe given as ‘an enema against dysentery from Nicostratus, which 
Menander employed’ (ἔνεμα πρὸς δυσεντερικοὺς ὡς Νικόστρατος, ᾧ Μένανδρος ἐχρήσατο) at 
SMT XIII.299 K. is unlikely (I think) to refer to the comic playwright. Karavas & Vix 2014, 
184–185 also collect and discuss references to Menander in Galen.
52   On which see Tribulato (2014), who rehabilitates Menander’s authoritative status for 
some lexicographers of the period.
53   Tribulato (2014) 208–209.
54   Nat.Fac. II.67 K., trans. Brock (1916).
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or ‘Asclepiadeans’ are like the Davi and Getae – the slaves introduced by 
the excellent Menander (τοῦ βελτίστου Μενάνδρου) into his comedies.
2 Sources, Working Practices & Format
The questions of Galen’s choices of what to use of Old Comedy rest partly upon 
which texts were extant in his lifetime, and available at Rome, Pergamum or 
other centres of Classical learning.55 What this section argues is that the body 
of material to which Galen had access when it comes to Comedy was shared 
with his contemporaries – as was the attitude he took to that material.
It is reasonably safe to assume that, in contrast to the more popular New 
Comedy, a relatively small number of complete plays of Old Comedy from fifth 
century BC Athens had been preserved, alongside compilatory texts with a 
basis in Alexandrian scholarship.56 By Galen’s time at least, and most likely sub-
stantially earlier, the extant canon of Old Comedy had shrunk almost entirely 
to works by Cratinus, Aristophanes and Eupolis, and of these Aristophanes was 
pre-eminent.57 Galen himself in fact notes that texts written by well-known 
comic (and tragic) playwrights have been lost by his day, implying that he had 
knowledge of the names of playwrights, but no access to the texts of their 
plays.58 In Latin poets of the late Republic and first two centuries AD, this triad 
55   As posed by Nutton (2009) 33–34. See Nicholls (2011) for libraries in Rome in Galen’s life-
time, based on the new evidence of the Ind., and König et al. for libraries in general, esp. 
Zadorojnyi’s contribution, pp. 389–398; Hanson (1998) 39 notes that if Galen did visit the 
library at Alexandria during his time in the city, he makes no mention of it.
56   Wilson (2014) gives a short introductory sketch of the afterlife of the texts of the plays of 
Old Comedy, and Quadlbauer (1960) the detail of comedy in literary criticism, covering 
some similar ground to Ruffell (2014); Le Guen (2014) considers the evidence for perfor-
mance in the Hellenistic East and West, see esp. 369 on the choice of plays. It seems likely 
that only a few manuscripts of the plays of Old Comedy made it even to Alexandria – if a 
large number of plays did survive intact in Rome or in the Greek East, it seems likely their 
readership was very limited.
57   See Pfeiffer (1968) 160, 204–5 on the selection of the canonical poets. Rusten (2011) 81–2 
collects some sources on the triad, Plato comicus sometimes being added, see e.g. Storey 
(2003) 40–41. On the basis of papyrus fragments, Sommerstein (2010) 410f. suggests a dra-
matic change around 300 BC whereby Eupolis, Cratinus and other comic dramatists stop 
being read. For Eupolis’ reception in antiquity, see Storey (2003) chapter 1, esp. 34–40, who 
notes that knowledge of Eupolis exists primarily in the scholarly tradition (p. 34). Bakola 
(2010) 4 claims Cratinus was read until at least the second or mid third century AD, on the 
basis of the likely date of the papyrus hypothesis of Dionysalexandros.
58   HNH XV.24 K. (= comm. 1.2): καὶ τί θαυμαστὸν ἀπολέσθαι τὰ βιβλία τῶν ἀλλοκότους δόξας 
γραψάντων, ὅπου γε καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις εὑρίσκονταί τινες εὐδοκίμως ἠγωνισμένοι κωμικοί 
τε καὶ τραγικοὶ ποιηταὶ δράμασιν οὐκέτι διασῳζομένοις; Trans. Hanson 1998, 38: ‘So why is it 
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stands for the genre as a whole (for example as expressed at the beginning of 
Horace, Sat. 1.4.1–2),59 and the same pattern of quotation, in its paucity and 
preferences, appears to obtain for many Greek authors of this period, although 
with some obvious exceptions, such as Athenaeus.60 Even those few who may 
be experiencing complete plays directly are almost certainly doing so through 
reading, rather than performance.61
The scattered statements in the extant Galenic corpus, and Galen’s cata-
logue of his own treatises on the subject, suggest therefore that the familiar ‘big 
three’ playwrights of Old Comedy for Galen appear to have been what broadly 
speaking constituted “the entire of Old Comedy” (Ind. 23b), as in many of his 
contemporaries. The collection of quotations and mentions of comic texts pre-
sented above shows us that Galen’s preferences above all were for Aristophanes: 
Eupolis barely features, and Cratinus not at all.62 Galen tells us that his work 
on Cratinus comprised only two books, as opposed to five on Aristophanes. 
This suggests that Cratinus’ works were already by the second century AD less-
well known, or less well-preserved, than those of Aristophanes.63 If we com-
pare for example the scant material in Galen with the vast collection of comic 
fragments in Athenaeus’ Deipnosophistae, the tale of a fictional symposium at 
which a fictionalised Galen in fact appears as a guest (he speaks about types 
of wine at 1.26c–27d, and bread at 3.115c–116a) and which is most likely almost 
contemporaneous with the Peri alupias, Galen’s range of comic material looks 
surprising that the books of those who wrote down their various opinions perish, when 
even at Athens well-reputed comic and tragic playwrights are found with their dramas no 
longer surviving?’.
59   Eupolis atque Cratinus Aristophanesque poetae | atque alii, quorum comoedia prisca viro-
rum est; see also Quintilian, Inst. 10.1.66.
60   This is a central concern in the essays collected by Marshall & Hawkins (2016), which 
stands as a state-of-the-art report. On collections of quotations of Old Comedy in par-
ticular, see Sidwell (2000) 142–152 (in Athenaeus, and Lucian) and Bowie (2007) (in Dio of 
Prusa fl. c. 70–120 AD; Aelius Aristides ?117–181 AD, and Maximus of Tyre fl. c. 180–192 AD, 
and others), also including Menander. Lucian ( fl. c. AD 120–180) seems to display deeper 
knowledge, see the more extended studies by Storey (2016), esp. 163–164 and Rosen (2016). 
On quotations of Menander across a range of Imperial authors, see Karavas & Vix (2014). 
Nutton (2009) 24 also notes some overlap between Galen’s reading and Gellius’.
61   Evidence for performance remains sketchy, although there may have been some private 
revivals at Rome under Hadrian, perhaps involving the the artist known as ‘Attic Partridge’ 
(Ἀττικοπέρδιξ); see Jones (1993) for discussion.
62   Notwithstanding any unnoticed quotations, given our own paucity of knowledge about 
Eupolis and Cratinus.
63   This echoes Ruffell’s observation (2014) 303 on Latin authors that “(k)nowledge of 
Cratinus in particular seems less than that of his younger rivals”.
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very limited indeed, and is rather on the slighter end of the scale.64 My impres-
sion is that the same can most probably also be said of the Atticist lexicogra-
phers of this period, with a focus on the canonical triad, rather than other play-
wrights.65 We know from literature written in Latin that, with rare exceptions 
and perhaps only Aulus Gellius, any engagement with Old Comedy appears 
to be through anecdotes in the biographical tradition or through Hellenistic 
scholarship, rather than first-hand knowledge.66
All this suggests that Galen is basing his work only on pre-existing com-
pendia and lexica, and can be supported by strong echoes of quotations used 
by him in common with other authors.67 Eupolis’ Demes, from which Galen 
quotes, was likely one of the best known non-Aristophanic play of Old Comedy 
in antiquity,68 again pointing to Galen as a more average reader of Old Comedy 
than we might think from his magisterial self portrayal. Storey suggests that 
the inclusion of the name of the speaker of the quotation of fr. *105 in Aff. 
Dig. relies upon direct consultation of the play text – but concedes that this 
may be by Galen’s source;69 Nutton likewise notes that the long quotation from 
Plato comicus indicates Galen likely had a copy in his own library, but similarly 
there is no reason to think that these lines did not already exist as an excerpt.70 
Vegetti also observes that while in PHP Galen is working directly from a large 
number of texts of the works of philosophers and doctors, many of the quota-
tions from poetry come via Chrysippus, i.e. an intermediary source.71
All this is not to say that Galen never read a play of Aristophanes in full, 
but that such reading may be more limited than it would appear at first sight. 
This is perhaps as a result of what was available as a full play text, but also 
64   Even though Athenaeus is more important as a source for Middle Comedy, this work still 
preserves a great range of material from Old Comedy.
65   Searching the texts of Aelius Dionysius, Phrynichus, Pollux and Pausanias (Att.) via the 
TLG shows 461 examples of the name Aristophanes, 128 Cratinus and 112 Eupolis (again 
echoing Galen’s 5 books on the first of these poets, versus 2 and 3 for the other two re-
spectively); in contrast, in these same authors there are for example only 11 examples of 
Philippides and 12 of Amipsias (two other comic playwrights), neither of whom are found 
in Galen.
66   Ruffell (2014) 302–4, in line with an interest in Old Comedy for its historical, not philologi-
cal, interest; Cucchiarelli (2006) covers a slightly different range of Latin authors, and is 
more sympathetic as to the depth of familiarity with Aristophanes granted to some.
67   As intimated by Ruffell (2014) 304.
68   Storey (2003) 34 and 111. Eupolis, fr. *116 is quoted by Gellius and Galen (and by Plutarch), 
and both also quote from Aristophanes, Merchant Ships, although different lines (Gell. 
19.13.3 = fr. 447)
69   Storey (2003) 37.
70   Nutton (2009) 30.
71   Vegetti (1999) 339–340.
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perhaps because alternative sources were available – it is after all easier to 
recycle an existing lexical collection than it is to start from scratch. Galen 
is indeed clear about his working practices on this point, telling us upfront 
that he has produced an epitome of Didymus on Old Comedy, and is there-
fore using just such a pre- existing source.72 Examples of misattribution – if 
these are  misattributions – do also support the case that he is working with 
anthologies or lexica, in which excerpted lines have already gone astray from 
their original author. We can only say for certain how far Galen was reading the 
complete plays of Old Comedy, and excerpting what he thought was useful, 
through a study of the notes and vocabulary he employs which do not feature 
in the lexicographical works of his near contemporaries, and through better 
knowledge of which plays were likely wholly extant in this period, both desid-
erata of future work.73 For the time being, what follows flags Galen’s reuse of 
earlier material, albeit perhaps at the expense of downplaying his own contri-
bution which remains to some extent unknown. It should be noted that this is 
not a negative judgement of Galen’s work, nor anything of which he himself 
was ashamed. Wilkins’ words ring just as true for Galen’s lexicography as of 
his medical works: ‘Compiling is not a term of abuse (as it is often applied to 
Athenaeus), in the mind of Galen at least, since he, the cataloguer with utility 
in mind, clearly sees it as vital for medical practice.’74
Despite the scorn which Galen often pours on those Atticisers who are 
concerned with linguistic ‘quibbling’, it is striking that there is a small but 
significant overlap between Galen’s own works and the surviving contempo-
rary Atticising lexica,75 particularly in the choice of words discussed.76 This 
includes a number of words which are very rarely found in the extant corpus 
72   As Galen similarly relied on digests of some medical and other materials, used at sec-
ondhand, see e.g. Roselli (1999) on medical digests and Hanson (1998) 35–7 for collected 
bibliography on earlier commentaries and lexica relating to Hippocrates.
73   Manetti (2009) 161–1 indeed argues that the lack lexicographical analogue to the fragment 
of Aristophanes quoted at Hipp. Fract. indicates Galen’s own ‘careful studies’ of the lan-
guage of comic poets.
74   Wilkins (2007) 85.
75   Strobel (2009) is a convenient introduction to some of the major Atticist lexica.
76   Both this scorn for Atticists, and engagement with their material, can be seen for example 
in Alim. Fac. 2.29.3 (= VI.612 K.; trans. Powell 2003, 94 adapted): “Some of those who call 
themselves Atticisers, who have practiced no skill of value for life, think it right to refer to 
this fruit in the feminine amygdalē (ἀμυγδάλη) ‘almond’, but others of them in the neuter 
amygdalon (ἀμύγδαλον), not realizing about this very matter that they take so seriously, 
that the Athenians wrote both names”. This word and its gender also features in Moeris 
(Lexicon Atticum α 15) and Athenaeus 2.52f (= 2.39–40 Kaibel); other such examples of 
comments on the gender of Classical words which co-occur across different lexica from 
this period, and in Galen, are collected in Appendix A of Coker (2010).
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of Greek texts up to and including Galen, but yet feature frequently – some-
times more frequently – in the lexicographical tradition. To give just two ex-
amples for starters, πυριάτη given by LSJ (s.v.) as ‘beestings curdled by heating 
over embers’77 and its synonym πυρίεφθον, are found only a handful of times 
in texts from Classical antiquity (Eubulus fr. 74 (K-A) (Ὀλβία), Aristophanes, 
Wasps 710, Cratinus fr. 149 (K-A (Ὀδυσσῆς), Philippides fr. 10 KA (Αὐλοί)), but ap-
pear in Aelius Dionysius π 77 (Erbse),78 Pausanias π 43 (Erbse),79 Pollux 1.248 
(Bethe),80 Galen, Alim. Fac. VI.694 K.,81 and elsewhere in the later lexicographi-
cal tradition, all in relatively similar formulations. This strongly suggests that 
Galen is reading and replying to one or more live lexicographical traditions 
(represented here by Aelius Dionysius et al.) which draw at least indirectly on 
Hellenistic and Alexandrian scholarship. Put differently – and more pejora-
tively – we might say that Galen has a close connection with contemporary 
‘sophistical’ work.
This is supported further by the mention of a work by Didymus at Ind. 
24a. Assuming Galen’s Didymus is the famous Alexandrian scholar Didymus 
Chalcenterus (“bronze-guts”) of the first century BC,82 then the work from 
which Galen composed his own epitome is one of the 3,500–4,000 works he al-
legedly composed, or a version of one of them. Writing almost at the end of the 
great Alexandrian tradition of scholarship, Chalcenterus’ works are generally 
characterised as derivative, based in turn mostly on the works of earlier lexi-
cographers and commentators such as Aristophanes of Byzantium.83 Pfeiffer 
77   Meaning a type of cheese made from cow colostrum; such a cheese is made in Tamil Nadu 
and Ukraine.
78   πυριάτη· θηλυκῶς τὸ πυρίεφθον· οὐχὶ πυρίατος οὐδὲ πυριατὴ ὀξυτόνως οὐδὲ πυρίεφθος. “Puriatē: 
Feminine, and means puriephthon. There is no word puriatos or puriatē (accented on the 
final syllable), nor puriephthos.”
79   πυόν· τὸ πυρίεφθον· τινὲς δὲ πᾶν γάλα νέον ἢ ὃ ἂν μετὰ γάλακτος ἑψηθῇ χθεσινοῦ. “puon (‘co-
lostrum’): (means) puriephthon. Some people use this to mean any milk, either fresh or 
whatever is boiled with yesterday’s milk.”
80   πυριάτη τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν λεγόμενον πυρίεφθον. “puriatē, called puriephthon by many peo-
ple.” πυριάτη is also found at Pollux 6.54, where Philippides is quoted.
81   καλεῖν δ’ ἐοίκασιν οἱ παλαιοὶ κωμικοὶ τὸ οὕτω παγὲν γάλα πυριάτην· οἱ δὲ παρ’ ἡμῖν ἐν Ἀσίᾳ 
πυρίεφθον ὀνομάζουσιν αὐτό. “Writers of Old Comedy were accustomed to call milk curdled 
in this way puriatē; we in Asia name the same thing puriephthon.”
82   BJP ad Ind. 24a (= p. 81) identifies this Didymus as Chalcenterus, but there are other can-
didates, notably a Δίδυμος ὁ νεώτερος, placed at Rome in the 1st century AD. The Suda 
lists three Didymi as grammarians (δ 872–4), who may not all be discrete individuals. See 
Dickey (2007) 7, n. 18 as an entry into the debate.
83   West (1970) has a rather poor view of the quality of Didymus’ historical and philological 
scholarship; Pfeiffer (1968) 279 is altogether more positive, seeing Didymus’ vast output 
as only possible (he was only “enabled to become the most efficient servant of an ancient 
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notes that after Homer, this scholar’s prime focus was Attic comedy: he col-
lected a vast amount of information on “literary, historical, biographical and 
prosopographical” matters, and we know he compiled a work on comic words 
(sometimes labelled Λέξεις κωμικαί).84
If Galen is indeed using a text circulating under the name of Didymus’ 
Comic Words, it is just possible that there are traces of this work at the end 
of the passage from the περὶ ἀλυπίας with which this chapter started (26–7). 
A convincing emendation by Polemis (above p. 63, n. 2) conjectures two words 
given by Galen as examples of the sorts of unclear vocabulary items which 
his treatise helped to explicate: ἀβυδοκόμης and ἀβυρτάκη. The first of these 
appears a handful of times in the lexicographical tradition – and only in this 
tradition – as a nickname for a sycophant85 and the second, only marginally 
more common, is a type of sauce (LSJ s.v. “sour sauce of leeks, cress, and pome-
granate-seeds”).86 Nutton has already suggested that these two words, both be-
ginning with αβ-, may well have stood at the beginning of Galen’s own treatise 
on Old Comedy – if it was arranged alphabetically.87 Some evidence however 
for both words as coming directly from a pre-existing lexicographical tradition 
is also found in Pausanias’ lexicon, (mid/late 2nd century AD), which in its sur-
viving form (ed. Erbse 1950) contains Ἄβυδος (another name for a sycophant, 
with ἀβυδοκόμης in the lemma) and ἀβυρτάκη as the third and fourth words of 
Alpha.88 It seems unlikely that such organisational similarities would appear 
across different texts if both Galen and Pausanias were independently alpha-
betising a non-alphabetical source, or were using no source text at all.
intellectual community”, in Pfeiffer’s own words) because of the peace brought about by 
Augustus. Manetti (2009) 165 flags the role played by work by Aristophanes of Byzantium 
in some of Galen’s lexicographical material: Didmyus may thus be the intermediary 
source.
84   Pfeiffer (1968) 276. Scant fragments of a work given the title Λέξις κωμική are collected at 
Schmidt (1854/1964) 27–82; Didymus also compiled a Λέξις Ἱπποκράτους (pp. 24–27), but 
whether this was available to Galen must remain speculation.
85   e.g. Hesychius α 225 (Latte): ἀβυδοκόμας· ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ συκοφαντεῖν κομῶν.
86   Found for example at Pherecrates, fr. 185 K-A, Theopompus fr. 18 (Θησεύς) K-A, Antiphanes 
fr. 140 (Λευκάδιος) K-A, Alexis fr. 145 (Μανδραγοριζομένη) K-A.
87   Nutton (2013) 86 n. 57.
88   α 3 Ἄβυδος· ἐπὶ συκοφάντου τάττεται ἡ λέξις διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν συκοφάντας εἶναι τοὺς Ἀβυδηνούς· 
καὶ Ἀβυδοκόμαι οἱ ἐπὶ τῷ συκοφαντεῖν κομῶντες. τίθεται δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰκαίου καὶ μηδενὸς 
ἀξίου. κωμῳδοῦνται δὲ <οἱ> Ἀβυδηνοὶ καὶ εἰς ἀκολασίαν, καὶ [ἡ] παροιμία· ‘μὴ εἰκῆ τὴν Ἄβυδον’, 
ᾗ ἐχρῶντο ἐπὶ τῶν εἰκαίων καὶ οὐδαμινῶν.
   α 4 ἀβυρτάκη· ὑπότριμμα βαρβαρικὸν ἐκ δριμέων σκευαζόμενον, ἐκ καρδάμων καὶ σκορόδων 
καὶ σινάπεως καὶ σταφίδων, ᾧ πρὸς κοιλιολυσίαν ἐχρῶντο.
   For the use of the town name Abydos as an abusive epithet, see Kajava (2007) 25–28.
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It is not unreasonable to assume that Galen maintained this alphabetical 
order in his own work, which is why these two words appear as they do in the 
Peri alupias, standing as the first two of his now-lost epitome, and recalled from 
memory. Galen is often in favour of alphabetisation (order κατὰ στοιχεῖον), al-
though he also used other arrangements of material.89 Alphabetical order is 
used for example in some of the books of SMT (e.g. 6, 7 and 8, all on plants), 
where Galen explicitly tells his reader he is imitating the order of an ear-
lier work by Pamphilus, On Plants (6, proem = XI.793–4 K.);90 the Glossary 
of Hippocratic Terms (Gloss.) is in addition fully alphabetical, in contrast to 
other contemporary lexica which are only broadly so.91 It seems likely too 
that Galen’s forty-eight book work on Attic prose was also alphabetical: just 
before the passage from Lib. Prop. quoted earlier in this chapter on p. 65 Galen 
tells us about another πραγματεία of his, identified with this work on prose, 
ἐν ᾗ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς συγγραφεῦσιν ὀνόματα κατὰ τὴν τῶν πρώτων ἐν αὐτοῖς 
γραμμάτων ἤθροισται τάξιν.92
There are however traces of an alternative, thematic pattern of arrangement 
in this passage from the Ind.. If lexical collections such as that by Didymus, or 
versions of it, represent one body of knowledge from which Galen was drawing 
(in common with Atticist lexicographers, Pollux, Lucian etc.) there may be an 
additional body of work also evident. At Ind. 27 (repeated below from the be-
ginning of this chapter), Galen gives what looks like a list of contents, although 
it is not immediately clear whether this list refers to the mentioned work by 
Didymus, or to Galen’s own epitome:
ὄλυραι καὶ λάθυροι καὶ ὄροβοι καὶ χόνδρος τά τε ἄλλα Δημήτρια σπέρματα καὶ 
λάχανα καὶ ὀπῶραι καὶ θάμναι καὶ δευτερίαι καὶ θάμνοι καὶ καρποὶ καὶ βοτάνοι 
καὶ ζῷα καὶ ἄρμενα καὶ σκεύη καὶ ὄργανα καὶ τἄλλα πολιτικὰ πράγματα καὶ 
ὀνόματα πάντα.
89   On the various methods of presentation of material used by Galen, see Flemming (2007) 
247–58, and passim, and the comments below.
90   Wilkins (2007) 81: ‘Galen appears to find Pamphilus to be a bad botanist, but a good lexi-
cographer.’ Does Ind. 27 Δίδυμος ἔφθασεν ἐξηγήσασθαι καλῶς suggest Galen passes the same 
judgement on Didymus? This Pamphilus and his 95 volume Περὶ γλωσσῶν καὶ ὀνομάτων of 
the 1st century AD is sometimes seen as an intermediary between Didymus’ work and 
grammarians of the second century AD.
91   Dickey (2007) 45. Purely alphabetical arrangements of material was not the rule, although 
there were for example earlier texts of medical interest arranged κατὰ στοιχεῖον, see 
Flemming (2007) 254; compare Pollux’ Onomasticon as an example of the encyclopedic 
or thesaurus format, as Tosi (2007) 3–5. Οn alphabetisation in antiquity, see Daly (1967) 
9–69.
92   Ord. Lib. Prop 5.1–2 (= XIX.60 K.).
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emmer, chick peas, vetch, groats and the other cereals, vegetables and 
late-summer fruits, wines made from the marc of grapes, with or with-
out the addition of water, bushes, fruits, plants, animals, instruments, 
equipment, tools, and everything else in daily life, and their names.
Rosen sees this list as an allusion to catalogues of foodstuffs in Old Comedy,93 
but two strong echoes are found much closer to lexicographical home. The 
list – and in particular the order in which items appear – bears more than a 
passing resemblance to a passage in Pollux 1.247–8 (the text is untranslated 
because of the large number of synonyms):
καὶ ἀπὸ μὲν κριθῶν πτισάνη καὶ ἄλφιτα, ἀπὸ δὲ σίτου χόνδρος καὶ σε|μίδαλις. 
ζειαί, σήσαμα, κέγχροι, μήκων, λίνος. ἄμυλος ἄρτος, καχρυδίας ἄρτος, κεγχρίας, 
ὀβελίας ἄρτος καὶ ὀβελίτης. καὶ ἄρτους κολλάβους. ἀθάρη ἐκ καγχρυδίου, 
πανοσπρία, πῦος, πυριάτη τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν λεγόμενον πυρίεφθον. εἶτα 
κρίμνα, μᾶζα, κόλλυρα, στέμφυλα, κυρήβια· τὰ γὰρ φαυλότερα τῶν πυρῶν 
κυρήβια καλεῖται. οἶνος γλυκύς, ἡδύς, ἐπαγωγός, πότιμος, ἀνθοσμίας· ὁ δ’ 
ἄλλος δευτερίας, ἐξεστηκώς, τροπίας, ἐκτροπίας, ὀξίνης.
First in Pollux are listed grains and cereals (including χόνδρος, the word used by 
the ‘respected doctor’ whose opinion Galen debunks in Ind. 26) – equivalent to 
the Δημήτρια σπέρματα of Ind. 27 – and then wines of various kinds, including 
δευτερίας in both passages. To find this rare word for a type of wine (see BJP ad 
Ind. 27, = pp. 90–2) reinforces the idea that the similarities between these two 
passages are more than chance. πυριάτη – given above as an example of the 
strength of grammatical tradition – also appears here. The second passage for 
comparison is from Galen’s Med. Nom.:94
Nun haben jene Leute, wenn sie dies behaupten, doch nicht nur keine 
Kenntnis von der Natur und dem Wesen des Blutes oder vom Wesen 
der heißen Schwellung, welche auf griechisch φλεγμονή heißt, oder vom 
Wesen der Augenentzündung (Ophthalmie), sondern es entgeht ihnen 
die Kenntnis vom Wesen des Weizens, von dem Wesen der Gerste, dem 
Wesen der Kichererbse, dem Wesen der Pferdebohne, dem Wesen des 
Öls und dem Wesen des Weines: außerdem kennen sie ja auch nicht rich-
tig das Wesen von irgendwelchen Pflanzen oder Tieren, wie sie (selbst) 
ihr eigenes Wesen nicht kennen.
93   Rosen (2014) 169.
94   Meyerhof & Schacht (1931) 27 = 99v.
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Now those people, when they say this, are not only unaware of the nature 
and the essence of blood or of the nature of the hot swelling which is 
called φλεγμονή in Greek, or of the nature of inflammation of the eye 
(ophthalmia), but they are also lacking in knowledge of the nature of 
wheat, barley, chickpea, horsebean, oil and wine: in addition they do 
not really know about the nature of any plants or animals, just as they do 
not even know their own nature.
Even though we are several stages here removed from Galen’s Greek (through 
the German translation of the Arabic text, which is in turn a translation of the 
Greek), again we have a list (corresponding to the emboldened words) com-
prised of wheat, barley, chickpea, horsebean (= Ind. τὰ Δημήτρια σπέρματα), 
and wine (= Ind. θάμναι καὶ δευτερίαι), followed up by plants and animals (= 
Ind. βοτάνοι καὶ ζῷα).
This arrangement of substances – and in the order grains, plants and ani-
mals is also used by Galen in Alim. Fac., and indeed specifically outlined there 
as a ranking of the relative values of foodstuffs.95 There were various ways of 
organising edible substances and their subsets in dietetic treatises in antiquity, 
often sophisticated and complex, but some sets of similar principles appear to 
have operated.96 More work needs to be done on outlining such organisational 
principles before Galen, but it seems likely that the lists we find here are in 
some way a reflection of an earlier tradition.
There are also echoes of the vocabulary in Alim. Fac. of this list in Ind.: the 
Δημήτρια σπέρματα again appear (Alim. Fac. 2.1 = VI.554–5 K., and elsewhere in 
Galen), as does δευτερίας (Alim. Fac. 2.9 = VI.580 K.) to give just two examples. 
The only places that this latter word appears in Galen are here in the Alim. Fac., 
and in the Ind.. It may be significant that in the first of these treatises Galen 
gives it as a word used specifically by οἱ Ἀττικίζοντες – yet still choses to use it.
There are a number of possible explanations of these two sets of correspond-
ences, none of which however can be proved conclusively. It is on the face of 
it impossible to posit a single source text for Galen’s treatise on Old Comedy 
which is both alphabetical and thematic: are there then rather multiple texts 
from which Galen is compiling his new work, one alphabetical collection of 
words also used by some Atticist lexica, and one thematic used by Galen and 
95   Book 1 is the grains, with legumes and pulses; Book 2 vegetables and fruits and Book 3 ani-
mal products. See Wilkins’ foreword (p. ix) to Powell’s translation (2003); Galen outlines 
and justifies his order at Alim. Fac. 2.1 (= VI.554–5 K.).
96   For plants, for example, either based around appearance, or effect on the body. Hardy & 
Totelin (2016) 63–92 sketch some of the wider taxonomic landscape, with pp. 75–88 on 
various ancient systems of classification.
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Pollux? Or, does the correspondence with Pollux indicate only a close relation-
ship between these two authors, and Pollux is influenced by Galen, rather than 
any prior text which both share?97 On balance – and however Pollux fits into 
this picture – it seems more likely on the basis of the limited evidence present-
ed here that Galen’s own text on Old Comedy was arranged alphabetically, and 
that the list of topics given at Ind. 27 represented his own ideas about arrange-
ment, perhaps a list which automatically came to mind at the very mention 
of foodstuffs. If a written text with thematic arrangement does however lie 
behind the list – and even goes back to some work of Didymus, if the list at Ind. 
27 does indeed outline ἃ Δίδυμος ἔφθασεν ἐξηγήσασθαι καλῶς – then the alpha-
betical coincidences highlighted above must however still be accounted for.
3 Galen the Sophist?
This chapter has sought to think in more concrete terms about the shape and 
contents of a lost work of Galen described in the περὶ ἀλυπίας, and in doing so 
to place Galen within the literary and lexicographical culture of the Roman 
empire of the late second century AD.
In structural terms, Galen’s epitome of Didymus on Comedy may have 
been alphabetical (starting with abudokomas and aburtakē), but there are also 
striking indications of the presence of a thematic organisational principle: it 
remains unclear however whether Galen in alluding to these two systems is 
referring to his own collection of words, or Didymus’. As to contents, from look-
ing at Galen’s use of Old Comedy elsewhere in his works his preferences can 
be seen to be very similar to those educated men who either passed judgement 
on, or sought to emulate or to play with, Atticist usage. In common with some 
other works of the period, Galen’s lost treatise similarly drew on Didymus and 
a longer scholastic tradition on Attic Old Comedy, so we might speculatively 
ponder that a set of words similar to those preserved in other ancient works on 
comedy was also at the core of Galen’s work. While this perhaps underplays the 
breadth of Galen’s reading, there are nevertheless strong indications that he is 
engaging closely with lexical collections circulating at Rome and other cen-
tres of learning at the period – and even their authors. Correspondences with 
97   Zecchini (2007) 22–4 outlines Pollux’s use of a wide range of non-canonical treatises. 
More work is certainly needed on the relationships between the works of Galen and 
Pollux, and as noted in the review of a recent work on Pollux (Rance 2008), also on the 
setting of Pollux’s lexicon in ‘the vast output of grammarians and lexicographers of the 
Antonine period’ in general.
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Lucian are perhaps most curious: note also that Galen’s very rare ἀβυρτάκη is 
used in Lucian’s satirical Lexiphanes 6 among a list of foodstuffs (as well as at 
Pollux 6.56), a work which rejoices in particular in its handling of the vocabu-
lary of Old Comedy – and indeed some have suggested that the doctor charac-
ter in this work is a mockery of Galen himself.98 We can thus align Galen very 
closely with other members of the literary élite of the second century AD who 
are also looking back to comic exemplars of the fifth century BC, and see the 
extent to which he was likewise deeply entrenched in Atticising cultures.
While we see Galen using these already seven-hundred-year-old texts to 
make linguistic points, they are sometimes deployed simply to demonstrate 
his education. This verges on the use of words as ornaments – the very thing 
Galen argues should be guarded against. It is not surprising however that 
Galen, imbued with the paideia of the period, should draw on his ‘internalisa-
tion’ of classical literature for its rhetorical power,99 but the manner in which 
he does so places him somewhat closer to those he criticises than he has pre-
viously been seen to be. In the judgement of history it is a fine – and often 
 subjective – line which separates a positively-viewed Galen, imbued with wide 
and earnest learning, aptly demonstrated to good purpose, from the schoolish100 
or  reductive Galen who slavishly reproduces as fripperies those examples ac-
quired and collected in common with the rest of the educated elite. Galen him-
self certainly sought to distance himself from elements of the latter and those 
he would label as ‘sophists’, composing a strongly militaristic polemic against 
them at the end of the first book of On Medical Names.101 In this fight over good 
Greek however, Galen’s weapons are remarkably similar to those used by his 
sophistical foes.
98   See the bibliography at Storey (2016) 176, n. 32, who argues for a different identification. 
Perhaps it is significant that the words put into the fictional Galen’s mouth by Athenaeus 
are on wine (1.26c–27d) and bread, grains and their nutritiousness (3.115c–116a) – was 
Galen known to his contemporaries to be particularly vociferous on such topics? See 
Wilkins (2007) 78–9 on these two passages and the ‘reality’ of Athenaeus’ Galen passim.
99   Rosen (2013) 188.
100   As Karavas & Vix 2014, 185.
101   Meyerhof-Schacht (1931) 37 = 107v: “Ich habe dieses mein ganzes Buch um jener Sophisten 
willen verfaßt; es ist ein Buch, das, wenn es in der Welt keine Streitfrage über diese 
Angelegenheit gäbe, ein nutzloses Gefasel und eine Sinnlosigkeit wäre; so wie der Mensch 
genötigt ist, die Waffe zu ergreifen und zu seiner Ausrüstung zu machen, nur wegen der 
schlechten Menschen – nur wenn in der Welt nicht ein einziger von den Menschen 
schlecht wäre, wäre es überflüssig, sie zu ergreifen und bereitzuhalten –, so ist meine 
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chapter 4
New Light and Old Texts: Galen on His Own Books
P. N. Singer
My aim in this chapter is to show how the new material from the περὶ ἀλυπίας 
(Ind.) contributes to our understanding of Galen’s attitude, practices and in-
tentions in relation to the composition and distribution of his own books. The 
new text, I suggest, not only provides fresh perspectives but, perhaps more 
importantly, assists us to evaluate and see more clearly the evidence which 
was already available in the other most relevant texts in this area, especial-
ly My Own Books (Lib. Prop.) and The Order of My Own Books (Ord. Lib. Prop.) 
The ‘new light’ is thus shed in a process of mutual illumination between περὶ 
ἀλυπίας and other texts, rather than by the sudden availability of radically new 
and divergent information.
1 Galen’s Losses
A good starting-point for this discussion might be: which of Galen’s own writ-
ings did he actually lose in the fire which is the subject of περὶ ἀλυπίας? The 
answer turns out to be surprisingly elusive. Let us consider Galen’s account 
of his losses overall. They are summarized in brief at sections 4–6. Galen lists: 
items made of precious metals; financial documents; drugs (both simple and 
compound) medical instruments; books (both copies of classical writings cor-
rected in his own hand his own compositions); antidotes. The list is then elabo-
rated, with, in particular, a lot more detail about the books, between this point 
and section 30, and with a further category, that of pharmacological recipes, 
added and discussed in some detail at 31–36.
For simplicity, then, Galen’s losses may thus be listed under two main heads: 
books and other possessions.1 The books can again be divided: into books by 
other people and Galen’s own compositions. Now, we would probably think 
1   The category of pharmacological recipes, which in a sense could be thought of as books, is 
interesting here: they seem in fact to be considered by Galen as valuable commodities, rather 
like the materia medica itself, not as texts in any normal sense. This relationship of such 
unique, collectible, recipes to Galen’s own pharmacological writings presents an interesting 
problem, though it cannot be explored here.
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that the loss of his own compositions would be what Galen – or any author – 
would find most agonizing (or, as Galen has it, would create the greatest chal-
lenge for his absence of distress). Certainly, as we shall see, there are some 
specific books of his own composition that do fall into that category. But Galen 
begins his discussion with a different category of works, and it is the irreplace-
ability of these, in particular, that he emphasizes: items in his personal library 
of other authors.2 At section 5, Galen distinguishes three sub-categories of 
these:
(i) rare works in his collection, which are irreplaceable because the only 
other copies would have been in the Palatine library, destroyed at the 
same time as his (12–13);
(ii) copies of works which are not themselves rare, but represent particularly 
accurate editions of the text in question, because they were prepared by 
a particular author or scholar (an example is Panaetius’ copy of the works 
of Plato), or because they were, in some sense, autograph copies3 (14);
(iii) copies of works which do not represent good editions in this way, but 
where Galen has himself marked corrections to scribal errors – right 
down to details of punctuation – so as to ‘provide almost a new edition’ of 
the work in question; and this includes also some texts of which there is 
no copy elsewhere. This third category includes works of Aristotle, Theo-
phrastus, Chrysippus and ‘all the ancient doctors’ (15–17).
The first thing that emerges from all this is the extraordinary level of Galen’s 
scholarly activity: collecting, finding good editions, and correcting and prepar-
ing new editions, of a whole range of texts. Texts which include not just those 
of authors like Plato and Hippocrates, who, as we know, are central to his own 
intellectual output, but also a whole range of others of much less central philo-
sophical interest, or in some cases just of linguistic interest – Theophrastus, 
Eudemus, Chrysippus, the orators.4
The impression is radically reinforced when we turn (20) to the first explicit 
mention of a work by Galen himself which was lost: a work on ‘words in Attic 
2   See above, ‘Note on MS Vlatadon 14’ (henceforth: ‘Note’), text (b): if one were to read 
σεσωρευμένων, rather than συγγεγραμμένων (though I argue against that emendation), then 
Galen would not be mentioning his own writings until some way down the list of losses.
3   On the differences in interpretation on this point, see ‘Note’, text (c). On the interpretation of 
‘Panaetius’ Plato’, see Gourinat, J.-B. (2008). ‘Le Platon de Panétius: à propos d’un témoignage 
inédit de Galien’, Philosophie Antique 8, 139–51.
4   As discussed in the ‘Note’, there is some uncertainty as to which specific texts or manuscripts 
are being discussed; but the text certainly gives evidence not just for Galen’s intense scholarly 
activity, especially but not only on works in the Aristotelian tradition, but also for the avail-
ability to him of a far greater range of works (and or different manuscript traditions) than 
was previously known.
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Greek and everyday language … in two parts, one drawn from Old Comedy, 
one from prose-writers’.5 The work seems to have taken the form of a glossary, 
explaining to a contemporary audience the usage of the old Attic authors in 
relation to a whole range of selected words, especially those of significance to 
medicine and diet (24–27). This, too, then, was a manifestation of his scholarly 
activity, and a very considerable one, if we are to take seriously the ‘forty-eight 
large books’ mentioned, on prose writers alone (28);6 and indeed, it is perhaps 
significant that Galen, in making this transition to discuss his own work as 
opposed to the editions of others just discussed, seems to make no very clear 
distinction in his syntax: the lost work on Old Comedy appears almost as a 
continuation of the previous category. And further light on this categorization 
follows at 29: Galen says that none of the above losses caused him distress … 
‘any more than the loss of my own notes (hupomnēmata)’; these latter, he goes 
on to say (29), were of two sorts: some which had been written up so as to be 
useful to others, some for a ‘reminding’ purpose (eis anamnēsin) which was 
just for his own use.
We shall return to that discussion of hupomnēmata, with its distinction 
of categories, in due course. At this particular point (29) he gives no further 
elaboration, but rather proceeds immediately to two other categories: first – 
again a distinctly scholarly kind of product – that of the ‘very many summa-
ries by heading of a very large number of works on medicine and philosophy’; 
secondly, the recipe collection (which we have already mentioned above). We 
shall also return in due course to these notes and summaries, as well as to the 
further remarks on the losses in the fire, especially in Lib. Prop. But only one 
further work is mentioned by name in the course of Ind. as having been lost in 
the fire, in addition to that on Old Comedy: his ‘treatise on the composition of 
drugs’ (37). But that, surely, is not all. There is, indeed, another characterization 
of the lost works, though without any titles, in the passage immediately pre-
ceding the mention of the work on Old Comedy, at 21–23a: there Galen refers 
to the loss of copies of ‘all his works for distribution’ (panta ta pros ekdosin). 
Before addressing the question of the specific reference of that phrase in its 
context here, it will be helpful to consider the broader question of Galen’s book 
production and book distribution as evidenced elsewhere in Galen’s writings, 
in particular in Lib. Prop. We might start from what at first blush appears a 
5   The second part, he goes on to say (20), does survive (though it has not come down to us), 
because a copy was taken and transferred to his country home in Campania.
6   The length indeed seems enormous, although an explanation has been offered in terms of 
the glossary-style layout: each lexical item would have a fresh line. See del Mastro, G. (2012). 
‘Μέγα βιβλίον: Galeno e la lunghezza dei libri’, in Manetti, D. (ed.) Studi sul De indolentia di 
Galeno, 33–62.
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puzzling conundrum: why, given the loss of what Galen describes at one point 
as ‘all my books’ (50), do the extant works of Galen occupy a shelf or more in 
the modern library? How, given the disaster of the fire, is he still the most volu-
minous author we possess from antiquity?
Of course, the answer, in broad terms, is fairly simple. A work destroyed 
in the fire was only lost if it had not already been copied and if such a copy – 
or copies – did not survive elsewhere. This simple answer, though, conceals a 
rather complex variety of possibilities – possibilities contained or concealed 
in a number of brief remarks Galen makes in relation to the practice and pro-
cess of book distribution, or ekdosis. Since (a) there has been a considerable 
volume of recent scholarship on this subject, much of it based on the evidence 
of Galen, (b) I believe the conclusions of much of this scholarship to be mis-
leading in certain key respects and (c) the new text, περὶ ἀλυπίας, sheds further 
significant further light in this area, a detailed account of the problem may be 
of value.
2 Galen and Ekdosis
There is a conceptual distinction in ancient discussions of books and their 
destination audiences, between an apparently private or closed transaction, 
carried out between friends or within a circle of students or associates, and an 
apparently wider, more formal kind of distribution or ‘publication’ of a text; 
and typically the verb didonai and cognates are used for the former, and the 
verb ekdidonai and cognates – especially the noun ekdosis – for the latter.7 In a 
well-known passage of My Own Books (to which we shall return) Galen himself 
describes a situation whereby works intended to be read only within such an 
intimate circle, or in some cases only by students at a particular level in their 
development – works which he typically describes as having been written in 
response to specific requests from these sources – have been copied and circu-
lated without the author’s consent, and thus gained a wider distribution. Such 
works are explicitly or implicitly characterized as lacking the completeness 
which one would expect for a work intended for a larger audience. In some 
cases, a work circulating in this ‘bootleg’ form, with errors, finds its way back to 
the author, and is corrected by him before further distribution takes place. An 
7   Classic studies of the question of ekdosis and book circulation in the ancient world are van 
Groningen, B. A. (1963). ‘Ἔκδοσις’, Mnemosyne 4:16, 1–17 and Starr, R. J. (1987). ‘The Circulation 
of Literary Texts in the Ancient World’, CQ 37, 213–23.
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important element of the process of ekdosis, as we shall see that the new evi-
dence from περὶ ἀλυπίας makes clear, is the depositing of a copy of one’s work 
in a public library; this – in a process also described by Galen in the new text – 
 enables interested readers not only to consult the work in situ, but to have fur-
ther copies made for their private use. It should also be noted that ekdosis is 
also the term used for an ‘edition’, or particular version, of a text, especially in 
the sense of the scholarly edition of a classical author by a particular scholar – 
e.g. Bacchius’ ekdosis of Hippocrates – without any reference to a destination 
audience or process of distribution.
Now, it should always be borne in mind that the process of publication, or 
distribution, referred to in such discussions has very little in common with 
those familiar from the modern period. There is no multiple production by the 
author, or by some ‘publisher’, of copies for circulation: both the act of ‘giving’ 
a work to a friend and that of ‘giving-out’ a work to a wider public consist, from 
the author’s point of view, of the handing over, or making available, of a single 
copy, from which further copies may be made. Differences in manner of distri-
bution depend on how many people are given access, and how many further 
copies are made. This in turn may, of course, depend in some way upon the 
work’s initial manner of composition, its genre and the author’s intentions; in 
this area, however, it is, as we shall see, very difficult to make clear statements 
or arrive at clear distinctions of type.
But let us look at this process of distribution, and what Galen tells us about 
it, in a little more detail, beginning with the evidence of My Own Books and 
The Order of My Own Books. A clear bipartite distinction has been made by 
some scholars, following the conceptual distinction given above, between 
works written for wide circulation or ‘publication’, on the one hand, and those 
intended for private use, or circulation within a small circle of friends or col-
leagues, on the other; and certain passages of Galen’s My Own Books have pro-
vided an important part of the evidence for this supposed pros ekdosin/ou pros 
ekdosin distinction.8 Let us look at what Galen actually says in this regard. We 
8   See in particular Dorandi, T. (2000). Le stylet et la tablette: dans le secret des auteurs antiques 
and (2007). Nell’ officina dei classici: come lavorano gli autori antichi (Dorandi’s analysis is 
not confined to Galen, but uses the Galenic material as an important part of his argument; 
other relevant composition practices are those mentioned by Iamblichus, Vit. Pyth. 23,104, 
talking of hupmnēmastismoi kai huposēmeiōseis; and of Neoplatonist commentators on Aris-
totle who divide his work into hupomnēmatika and suntagmatika); Gurd, S. (2011). ‘Galen on 
ἔκδοσις’, in Schmidt, T. and Fleury, P., Perceptions of the Second Sophistic and its Times: Regards 
sur la seconde sophistique et son époque, 169–84. The bipartite distinction seems to have be-
come widely accepted by scholars working on Galen’s literary activity and self-presentation; 
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shall start with a passage fairly late in My Own Books, in which Galen is listing 
his works on logical demonstration.
ἔγραψα δ’ ἄλλα πολλὰ γυμνάζων ἐμαυτόν, ὧν ἔνια μὲν ἀπώλετο κατὰ τὴν 
γενομένην πυρκαϊάν, ἡνίκα τὸ τῆς Εἰρήνης τέμενος ἐκαύθη, τινὰ δὲ φίλοις 
δεδομένα διασωθέντα παρὰ πολλοῖς ἐστι νῦν, ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα τὰ ἡμέτερα. καὶ 
μέντοι καὶ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων ὧν ἔγραψα τὰ μὲν ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ δοθέντα φίλοις, τὰ δ’ 
ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκετῶν κλεψάντων ἐκδοθέντα παρ’ ἄλλων ἔλαβον ὕστερον … τούτων 
τῶν ὑπομνημάτων ἁπάντων οὐδὲν πρὸς ἔκδοσιν ἐγράφη …
I wrote many others as an exercise for myself, some of which perished in 
the fire in which the Temple of Peace was destroyed, but some had been 
given to friends and now survive in copies in many people’s possession, 
just like our other works. Even of the hupomnēmata that I wrote, some 
were given by me to friends, while others, which had been stolen and 
distributed by servants, I later received back from other persons … None 
of these hupomnēmata were written for distribution (pros ekdosin) …
Lib. Prop. 14 [11] (XIX.41 K. = 166,1–8 Boudon-Millot; XIX.42 K. = 166,18–19 
Boudon-Millot)9
This text does indeed seem to follow our terminological distinction: Galen 
himself ‘gives’ (dedomena) works to friends; his household staff steal works 
and ‘give them out’ or distribute (ekdothenta) them more widely. Two other 
things, however, are striking in this passage. One is that although Galen identi-
fies a category of works as ‘for his own exercise’ (gumnazōn emauton – we shall 
consider this description further below), he then adds that he gave such works 
to his friends. Such a slippage, whereby a type of work which is claimed to be 
for private use is in fact given to others, gives us an early warning of the dif-
ficulty that we shall have in identifying clear categories of works for different 
destinatees in Galen’s accounts.10 Even more revealing, though, is that though 
  see also Boudon-Millot, V. (2007). Galien, Tome 1; Mansfeld, J. (1994). ‘Galen’s Autobiblio-
graphies and Hippocratic Commentaries’, in Prolegomena: Questions to be Settled Before 
the Study of an Author, or a Text; Vegetti, M. (2013). Galeno: nuovi scritti autobiografici.
9    Translations are my own unless otherwise stated. The chapter numbers of Lib. Prop. were 
altered by the discovery of the Vlatadon MS: in references here the new number is fol-
lowed by the old in square brackets.
10   Even more strikingly – and even more problematically from the point of view of the liter-
alness with which the terminology can be taken – Galen elsewhere uses exactly the same 
phrase in a general characterization of his motivation in writing: he always used to write 
either ‘as a favour to friends or gumnazōn emauton’, MM 7.1 (X.456 K.).
97New Light and Old Texts
these ‘private’ works were given only to friends, they are now preserved and in 
the hands of many. Galen here not only sheds light on a process whereby ‘giv-
ing’ a book to friends will lead to its wide (παρὰ πολλοῖς) distribution; he also 
makes clear implicitly that (in spite of the explicit dismay expressed, as we 
shall see, elsewhere at such unauthorized distribution) such wider distribu-
tion was to be expected and, in the case of an unexpected loss of his own copy, 
might even be relied upon to fill the gap.
The phrase ‘just like our other works’ (hōsper kai talla ta hēmetera) is tanta-
lizing here, and again we shall see similar phrases elsewhere: it is, by implica-
tion, certainly, the term opposed to ‘as an exercise for myself ’, and so seems to 
suggest a non-private category – the works that Galen did intend for distribu-
tion. But this is not stated. What, then, of the category of hupomnēmata, which 
is introduced immediately after these other two categories (the sequence is: 
works of ‘self-exercise’; ‘our other works’; hupomnēmata)? This term, as we 
shall discuss further below, has a potentially very broad reference in Galen,11 
although it is also true that at some point it became the standard Greek word 
for ‘commentaries’. Whatever the term refers to, Galen asserts that none of the 
works in that category – though some achieved circulation through having 
been given to friends, and some through theft by his servants – was intended 
for ekdosis. Given the context – Galen goes on to list a number of works on 
specific classical texts of logic – it seems that the translation ‘commentaries’ 
is appropriate here. This would mean that Galen is stating that none of his 
commentaries on works of logic was intended for ekdosis; and this, as we shall 
see, directly mirrors what he says about his commentaries on Hippocrates in 
ch. 9 [6]. To sum up: Galen has here identified three categories: about two of 
them he has made clear that they were not intended for distribution, though 
distribution in many cases in fact took place; the reference of the third, talla 
ta hēmetera, is quite vague. We should, finally, consider the context of this pas-
sage, beginning as it does with a mention of ‘many other works’: what are the 
previously-mentioned works with which these ‘private’ works are contrasted? 
One might think that the phrase must follow on a list of works which definitely 
are for ekdosis. The truth is rather more complicated. In fact, after a lengthy 
preamble about his own formation in logic and the shortcomings of certain 
teachers and philosophers, the chapter has so far mentioned one other work by 
name, before moving to the ‘private’ categories of the above passage. Certainly, 
11   On this point see von Staden, H. (1998). ‘Gattung und Gedächtnis: Galen über Wahrheit 
und Lehrdichtung’, in Kullmann, W., Althoff, J. and Asper, M. (eds), Gattungen wissen-
schaftlicher Literatur in der Antike, 65–94, pointing to lack of any clear distinction be-
tween the different nouns which Galen uses in reference to his works.
98 Singer
it is a work – his De demonstratione – which he strongly recommends to the 
serious student at the beginning of his studies; clearly, then, he must both be-
lieve and intend it to have a fairly wide distribution, at least amongst serious 
students. Yet there is, it should be emphasized, no explicit mention of a pros 
ekdosin category, to contrast with the term ouden pros ekdosin which we have 
noted. Indeed, as we shall see, Galen’s own deliberate act of distribution, of 
ekdosis, in this text is extremely elusive.
A converse example to the above one of works not ‘given out’, but neverthe-
less extant is provided by the major pharmacological treatise, De compositione 
medicamentorum per genera: here, Galen gives an account of books which have 
been distributed (ἐκδοθέντων, προεκδοθέντων), but are not extant. Ιn the proem 
to the now extant version of this work, Galen claims that he is rewriting the 
first two books, which were lost in the fire, and that he is doing so even though 
they had previously been distributed:
Ἤδη μοι καὶ πρόσθεν ἐγέγραπτο πραγματεία, δυοῖν μὲν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῶν πρώτων 
βιβλίων ἐκδοθέντων, ἐγκαταλειφθέντων δὲ ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἱερὰν ὁδὸν ἀποθήκῃ 
μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἡνίκα τὸ τῆς Εἰρήνης τέμενος ὅλον ἐκαύθη, καὶ κατὰ τὸ 
παλάτιον αἱ μεγάλαι βιβλιοθῆκαι. τηνικαῦτα γὰρ ἑτέρων τε πολλῶν ἀπώλοντο 
βιβλία καὶ τῶν ἐμῶν ὅσα κατὰ τὴν ἀποθήκην ἐκείνην ἔκειτο, μηδενὸς τῶν ἐν 
Ῥώμῃ φίλων ἔχειν ὁμολογοῦντος ἀντίγραφα τῶν πρώτων δυοῖν. ἐγκειμένων 
οὖν τῶν ἑταίρων αὖθίς με γράψαι τὴν αὐτὴν πραγματείαν, ἀναγκαῖον ἔδοξέ μοι 
δηλῶσαι περὶ τῶν προεκδοθέντων, ὅπως μή τις προεντυχὼν αὐτοῖς ποτε ζητοίη 
τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ δίς με περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πραγματεύσασθαι.
I had written a treatise previously, too, of which the first two books had 
been distributed, and also deposited in my storehouse alongside the 
others, when the whole of the Temple of Peace was destroyed by fire, 
as well as the great libraries on the Palatine. The books of many others 
perished at that time, as did all those of mine which were located in that 
storehouse; and none of my friends in Rome admitted to having copies of 
the first two books. Since, then, my followers prevailed upon me to write 
the same treatise again, I thought that I should give this explanation re-
garding the previously distributed books, in case anyone in the future 
finds them and wonders why I should have written a treatise twice on the 
same subject.
Comp. Med. Gen. 1.1 (XIII.362–3 K.)12
12   Cf. the vaguer reference to the loss in Ind. 37, on which more below.
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By contrast with the previous case, where informal ‘giving’ leads to wi-
despread copying and distribution, here books were ‘given out’ (as well as being 
deposited in Galen’s storehouse) but, after the fire of 192, cannot be found, even 
amongst friends in Rome. The specific phrase ‘in Rome’, combined with the im-
plied expectation that the lost books may after all turn up again, suggest that 
Galen may have grounds to believe that the ekdosis has led to the preservation 
of copies elsewhere, perhaps in a library in Asia.13 But another point should be 
made here: elsewhere in this very same work Galen makes clear that its expli-
citly intended readership is his followers or students: καὶ ταῦθ᾽ ὑμῖν τοῖς ἑταίροις 
ὑπομνήματα γράφω, ‘I write these hupomnēmata too for you, my followers’.14 At 
least formally, this is a work for a group of intimates; already here, then, we see 
that the term ekdosis may be used in relation to works which are not, formally, 
intended for a wide audience. (And note that in the above text, again, Galen 
refers to a process of distribution that has taken place without explicitly ad-
mitting any personal role in it.) But let us return to My Own Books, and to the 
preface of that work – a central text on which scholarship identifying the pros 
ekdosin / ou pros ekdosin distinction has based itself.
τοῦ μὲν δὴ πολλοὺς ἀναγιγνώσκειν ὡς ἴδια τὰ ἐμὰ τὴν αἰτίαν αὐτὸς οἶσθα … 
φίλοις γὰρ ἢ μαθήταις ἐδίδοτο χωρὶς ἐπιγραφῆς ὡς ἂν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἔκδοσιν ἀλλ᾽ 
αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις γεγονότα δεηθεῖσιν ὧν ἤκουσαν ἔχειν ὑπομνήματα.
Well, as for the fact of my works being passed off by many people under 
their own name you know the reason yourself: ... it is that they were given 
without inscription to friends or pupils, since they had been written in no 
way for distribution, but simply at the request of those individuals, who 
had desired a written record of lectures they had heard.
Lib. Prop. praef. (XIX.10 K. = 135,11–20 Boudon-Millot)
13   On this process see Ind. 21 and the discussion of that passage below.
14   Comp. Med. Gen. 3.1 (XIII.562 K.). Galen repeatedly uses the term ἑταῖροι in reference to 
the intended audience of his major medical works. It seems to me, pace Mattern, S. P. 
(2008). Galen and the Rhetoric of Healing, 14–16, that ἑταῖροι for Galen has a specific sense, 
essentially referring to his pupils, or close followers of his medical instruction (a claim 
which I hope to support in detail in a forthcoming article). But even if this specific in-
terpretation is not accepted, the term ἑταῖροι undoubtedly suggests a fairly small set of 
associates, not a wider audience. For an important recent discussion of the intellectual 
community implied by or addressed in Galen’s medical works see van der Eijk, P. ‘Galen 
and the Scientific Treatise: A Case Study of Mixtures’, in Asper, M. (2013). Writing Science: 
Medical and Mathematical Authorship in Ancient Greece, 145–75.
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Again, the action which Galen is claiming as his own is didonai, not ekdido-
nai: that is, he himself gives books to his friends or pupils; other people have 
been responsible for the wider distribution. But note that what Galen is very 
definitely not doing, here, is identifying two categories of books, one for distri-
bution and one not; rather, he is making a general statement about his writings 
(even if quite how general is not perfectly clear15), and putting this forward as 
a reason for people having appropriated his works as their own. The notion of 
an opposite implied by the negative οὐ(δὲν) πρὸς ἔκδοσιν, that is to say an actual 
category of books which definitely were πρὸς ἔκδοσιν, is something imported 
into the text – if we choose to import it. Nothing of that sort is stated here, and 
without support from other contexts this passage would be taken as referring 
to his books in quite general terms.
What, then, of those other contexts? A few lines later, Galen continues:
γεγραμμένων οὖν, ὡς ἔφην, οὐ πρὸς ἔκδοσιν αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τῶν δεηθέντων 
ἕξιν τε καὶ χρείαν εἰκὸς δήπου τὰ μὲν ἐκτετάσθαι, τὰ δὲ συνεστάλθαι καὶ τὴν 
ἑρμηνείαν αὐτήν τε τῶν θεωρημάτων τὴν διδασκαλίαν ἢ τελείαν ὑπάρχειν ἢ 
ἐλλιπῆ. τὰ γοῦν τοῖς εἰσαγομένοις γεγραμμένα πρόδηλον δήπου μήτε τὸ τέλειον 
τῆς διδασκαλίας ἔχειν μήτε τὸ διηκριβωμένον, ὡς ἂν οὔτε δεομένων αὐτῶν οὔτε 
δυναμένων ἀκριβῶς μανθάνειν πάντα, πρὶν ἕξιν τινὰ σχεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις.
Since, then, as I have stated above, they were written not for distribution 
but to fit the particular level and needs of those who had requested them, 
it follows naturally that some of them are rather extended, while others 
are compressed; and that their manner of communication, and indeed 
the actual exposition of theoretical material, vary in their completeness. 
Those works which were written for beginners would, quite evidently, be 
neither complete nor perfectly accurate in their teaching. That was not 
their requirement – nor would such individuals have been able to learn 
the whole subject matter accurately, until they had first reached a certain 
basic level in the fundamentals.
Lib. Prop. praef. (XIX.10–11 K. = 136,4–13 Boudon-Millot)
15   It would, perhaps, be possible to take ouden in this sentence not adverbially (as above, 
cf. the 1997 translator, ‘with no thought for’, similarly Boudon-Millot: ‘aucunement’) but 
pronominally (albeit with a mild anacolouthon, shifting from the plural of ta ema and 
gegonota to the singular): ‘none [of them was] written for distribution’; that would make 
the usage directly parallel to that already observed in the passage from ch. 14 [11].
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He then proceeds to explain that certain works intended purely ‘for begin-
ners’ circulated more widely, because they had not been explicitly so labelled. 
The subject of the whole paragraph, however, that referred to by gegrammenōn 
at the beginning of this extract, is exactly the same as that of the previous ex-
tract: it is the general ‘my books’. Galen is still telling a story about his writings 
in general, not a sub-category of them; indeed, he is analysing a problem which 
arises precisely from the very wide differences that exist across all his writings 
(because of their different original destinatees).
Let us turn to the final passage of My Own Books which sheds light on Galen’s 
own account of his attitude to ekdosis – again a passage which has been central 
to constructions of a distinction of ‘private’ and ‘public’ works in the output of 
Galen, and indeed of other ancient authors. It comes in the chapter where he 
makes the transition to discussion of his works of Hippocratic commentary. 
The passage has been interpreted as stating that Galen wrote such works in 
two distinct styles, with two distinct sets of recipient in mind, and at two dis-
tinct periods. That is, after a period in which he had written commentaries 
purely for his own use or for that of his close associates, he made an abrupt 
transition, in response to a particular event, to the writing of works intended 
for a wider audience and engaging in detail with rival commentators. In the 
former category, then, are the commentaries on Aphorisms, Fractures, Joints, 
Prognosticon, Regimen in Acute Diseases, Wounds to the Head and Epidemics I, 
in the latter those on Epidemics II, III and VI, Humours, Nutriment, Prorrhetic, 
Nature of Man, De officina medici and Airs, Water, Places. But this, we shall see, 
is not what Galen actually says; moreover, even if it could, on a simplistic read-
ing, be taken to be what he says, such an account is substantially undermined 
by the much fuller, more detailed, chronological account of the same subject 
which he gives elsewhere in his writing.
Before coming to the precise words in which Galen distinguishes and lists 
his different Hippocratic commentaries, let us look at the preamble to that. 
This passage itself contains some problems, both textual and interpretive, 
which are in need of elucidation; it will therefore be worth our while to con-
sider it in some detail, and with the assistance of an apparatus criticus for the 
problematic passages.
οὔτ’ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ δοθέντων φίλοις ἤλπισα πολλοὺς ἕξειν οὔτε τὰ τῶν 
Ἱπποκρατείων συγγραμμάτων ἐξηγητικά· τὴν ἀρχὴν γὰρ <οὐδ᾽> ἐμαυτὸν 
γυμνάζων ἐγεγράφην εἰς αὐτά ποθ’ ὑπομνήματα, καθάπερ ἐποίησα τῆς ἰατρικῆς 
θεωρίας ἁπάσης καθ’ ἕκαστον μέρος ἐμαυτῷ παρασκευάσας οἷς ἅπαντα τὰ κατὰ 
τὴν ἰατρικὴν τέχνην ὑφ’ Ἱπποκράτους εἰρημένα περιέχεται διδασκαλίαν ἔχοντα 
σαφῆ θ’ ἅμα καὶ παντοίως ἐξειργασμένην· ἰδίᾳ μὲν γὰρ περὶ κρισίμων ἡμερῶν 
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ἔγραψα κατὰ τὴν Ἱπποκράτους γνώμην, ἰδίᾳ δὲ περὶ κρίσεων, ἰδίᾳ δὲ περὶ 
δυσπνοίας ἑκάστου τε τῶν ἄλλων ὅλην τε τὴν θεραπευτικὴν μέθοδον ὡσαύτως 
ἐν τέσσαρσι καὶ δέκα βιβλίοις ἐποιησάμην, ἅπαντα [δὲ] τὰ θεραπευτικὰ καὶ 
πρὸς αὐτοῖς [ταύτην], ἃ κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου γνώμην …
2 αὐτὸν οὐδὲν A οὐδὲν αὐτὸν Vlat. ἐμαυτὸν Corn. Ar. BM οὐδὲν πρὸς ἔκδοσιν ἀλλ᾽ 
ἐμαυτὸν Müller οὐδ᾽ ἐμαυτὸν scripsi 9 δὲ add. Corn. 9–10 ἅπαντα … γνώμην secl. 
Müller 10 ἃ κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου γνώμην om. Ar. ταύτην secl. BM
Before proceeding we must consider some textual uncertainties. In line 2, 
ἐμαυτὸν was Cornarius’ emendation: it is supported by the Arabic translation, 
whereas both Greek MSS have instead a negative expression (αὐτὸν οὐδὲν A, 
οὐδὲν αὐτὸν Vlat.); Müller also felt it necessary to add a further ‘not for distribu-
tion’ comment to make sense of the passage. But one should consider whether 
the negative, supported by all the Greek MSS, may after all be preserved: if we 
read οὐδ᾽ ἐμαυτὸν – a minimal emendation of the Vlat. οὐδὲν αὐτὸν – we have 
a solution which makes sense of the Greek MS tradition while also preserving 
the ἐμαυτὸν suggested by the Latin and Arabic ones; it also fits better syntacti-
cally with ποθ᾽ in the next line. The sense would then be: ‘To begin with I did not 
ever write notes/commentaries on them even as an exercise for myself, as I did 
in each individual part of the whole art of medicine …’; and this in fact would 
be perfectly consistent with the explanation that he goes on to give: he did not 
need to write commentaries on Hippocrates because Hippocrates’ views were 
already contained in Galen’s individual medical works. The difference, on this 
reading, is that Galen is claiming not even to have made ‘private’ commentar-
ies at an earlier stage, whereas according to both Müller’s and Boudon-Millot’s 
readings he is saying that at that time he wrote only private commentaries. My 
emendation would of course make the present discussion even less relevant to 
the chronological ‘private–public’ distinction that has been perceived: Galen 
is not writing (commentary-style) private notes early on, and moving to works 
for publication later, because he was not writing such notes early on at all. Such 
a chronological distinction of types of commentary activity is not in play. This 
also seems consistent with what is said in Hipp. Epid. III (see n. 25 below): at 
the earliest stage he is simply not writing commentary on Hippocrates.
The above emendation will not seem convincing to all; nor is it essential 
to my argument in what follows. It should, however, be noted that two quite 
substantial interpretive difficulties remain, if we do not adopt that negative. 
On such a (non-negative) reading, Galen identifies a personal-exercise cat-
egory (let us call it ‘A’) of Hippocratic commentaries which he wrote at an 
early stage, and sets it alongside another category or writings (‘B’), also termed 
hupomnēmata, introduced by the phrase καθάπερ ἐποίησα. The first problem, 
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then, on this reading, is that it is quite difficult to make sense of the opposition 
between categories A and B. B must now be hupomnēmata on the whole of 
medicine, considered subject by subject as opposed to by Hippocratic trea-
tise. Such an opposition makes sense; but what relationship between category 
B and the Hippocratic texts is Galen then making in the phrase that follows, 
οἷς … ἐξειργασμένην, which must mean something like ‘in which are contained 
all things stated by Hippocrates in relation to the art of medicine, things 
which have an exposition16 which is both clear and completely elaborated’? 
Having made the distinction between categories A (private-exercise notes 
on Hippocrates) and B (similar notes on each branch of medicine), Galen is 
immediately insisting on the close relationship of the latter set of notes to 
Hippocratic texts – a relationship then further insisted upon by the descrip-
tion of these medical works as ‘according to the opinion of Hippocrates’ κατὰ 
τὴν Ἱπποκράτους γνώμην … κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου γνώμην. If, as this reading requires, 
Galen is identifying two parallel sets of ‘exercise’ works, the first on works of 
Hippocrates, the second on branches of medicine, the distinction between 
them seems to collapse as he insists on the essentially Hippocratic nature of 
the latter.
The second, related, problem is that category B includes the works Critical 
Days, Crises and The Therapeutic Method. These major medical works – so far 
from being for ‘distribution’ in any sense – are, on this reading, claimed by 
Galen to have been written as a private intellectual exercise: ‘I made notes for 
my own exercise, as I did in the individual parts of medicine [and then the 
reference to those works]’. The adoption of the negative makes the associa-
tion less close: rather than considering two parallel sets of ‘exercise’ notes, it 
is then at least possible to take the καθάπερ ἐποίησα clause, more loosely, as 
referring simply to the writing of hupomnēmata, rather than as picking up the 
whole phrase including ἐμαυτὸν γυμνάζων. So: ‘I did not even make notes on 
Hippocratic works for my own exercise; I did [by contrast] make notes on the 
individual parts …’
16   The phrase raises a further interpretive problem: does the participle ἔχοντα refer to the 
statements of Hippocrates or to those statements as mediated by Galen; in other words, 
is the ‘clear exposition’ that of Galen in his explication or that of the master? Either inter-
pretation brings problems. On the one hand, talk of clarity and fulness of Galen’s exposi-
tion, as opposed to Hippocratic concision, would seem consistent with what Galen says 
elsewhere about the relationship between his writing and Hippocrates’ and about the 
function of commentary; it might seem odd, indeed, for him to refer to Hippocrates’ own 
writings in such terms. On the other hand, such a reading is grammatically difficult: it is 
quite hard to take the participle phrase διδασκαλίαν ἔχοντα, appearing without any adver-
sative particle, as suddenly introducing Galen’s, not Hippocrates’, contribution.
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The end of the passage brings more textual and interpretive uncertain-
ties. Müller secluded the whole of the phrase ἅπαντα to γνώμην, thus remov-
ing the second statement of the double function of Galen’s texts as medical 
and Hippocratic; yet it seems no more challenging that what has already been 
said, and is supported by both Greek MSS and (as far as αὐτοῖς), by the Arabic. 
However, the phrase makes better sense without Cornarius’ δὲ, for then it can 
be taken in apposition to ὅλην τε τὴν θεραπευτικὴν μέθοδον. That is, Galen is 
glossing ‘the whole of The Therapeutic Method’ with the phrase ‘all the thera-
peutics and also what is in accordance with Hippocrates’ view’; and this agrees 
perfectly with the sense of the argument so far. Although the words from καὶ 
πρὸς αὐτοῖς might seem to suggest a separate work, Boudon-Millot’s removal 
of the ungrammatical ταύτην assists us in seeing that this is not the intention; 
in any case (see further below), to what additional work could Galen possibly 
be referring? On balance, this whole last phrase from ἅπαντα must be taken 
appositionally: again, Galen is presenting his own works of therapeutics as si-
multaneously works on Hippocrates.
To summarize: Galen is about to say that he did not, in an earlier phase, 
write line-by-line commentaries of Hippocratic works, because he found that 
unnecessary. The present passage is laying the foundations for this claim by 
making the point that all Galen’s own works on specific medical topics ‘contain 
all things stated by Hippocrates in relation to the art of medicine, things which 
have a form of exposition which is both clear and completely elaborated’. This 
is, indeed, a remarkable claim. The interpretive focus on the apparent ‘private–
public’ distinction, and on the classification of the Hippocratic commentar-
ies that follows has, perhaps, taken attention away from how remarkable it 
is. Galen is saying that his own works on medical topics – central works like 
Critical Days, Crises and The Therapeutic Method – in fact perform the func-
tion of commentaries on Hippocrates: they are in a sense proto-commentaries, 
or adequate commentary-substitutes; and he is stating this as his reason for 
his having carried out no direct commentary work on Hippocrates until a late 
stage in his career. The only way of resisting this interpretation is by taking 
the whole phrase περὶ κρισίμων ἡμερῶν ἔγραψα κατὰ τὴν Ἱπποκράτους γνώμην 
to refer to the composition of a specific work ‘On Critical Days According 
to Hippocrates’ – which is indeed what the phrase seems most naturally to 
mean – and therefore taking this whole passage to refer to works specifically 
on Hippocrates’ views. Yet the context, amid the known works Crises and The 
Therapeutic Method – especially with the specific reference to The Therapeutic 
Method as having fourteen books, which makes it clear that this is the extant 
The Therapeutic Method – and the absence of any reference elsewhere to these 
separate ‘According to Hippocrates’ works, makes this clearly impossible.
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And we should note that this very striking claim, in the latter part of the pas-
sage quoted, remains whether or not we adopt my proposed reading in the first 
lines. My suggestion, however, is that doing so gives us a progression of thought 
which is more consistent with this claim: Galen is explaining his non-writing 
of direct commentaries on Hippocrates (even for personal use) by the fact that 
his other works at this stage were, in a sense, commentaries on Hippocrates. A 
couple of points of clarification, however, should be made before we proceed. 
One is that the term idiai in this passage must, indeed, be taken to mean ‘spe-
cifically’, not ‘privately’.17 In such contexts Galen uses the term in the former 
sense quite regularly. The distinction at this point is not between ‘for private 
use’ and the (unstated) opposite, ‘for publication’, but between an organization 
of his own literary output according to specific medical subject (while simulta-
neously clarifying Hippocrates’ views), and the alternative activity of writing 
line-by-line Hippocratic commentaries. Galen is not here outlining a private–
public distinction within his own works. What he is doing is either – on any 
of the previously accepted readings of the above passage – explicitly insisting 
on the private character of even his most central works of medicine, which 
he claims to have been written in a process of intellectual self-exercise, or at 
least – on my reading – associating them quite closely with that intellectual 
activity.
Let us then offer a translation of this whole introductory passage, before 
proceeding to that in which Galen does, apparently, mention an ekdosis of his 
own Hippocratic commentaries.
As with my other works given to friends, so especially with the works of 
Hippocratic commentary, I had no expectation that they would reach a 
wider audience. In the first instance, indeed, I did not ever write notes on 
those works even as an exercise for myself – as I did [on the other hand], 
preparing them for myself, in each individual area of medical theory – 
notes by means of which is contained all that Hippocrates had said of 
relevance to the art of medicine, having a clear and fully elaborated ex-
position. For I wrote specifically on critical days, in accordance with Hip-
pocrates’ views, but also specifically on crises, specifically on difficulty in 
breathing, and on all the other subjects; and in the same way I produced 
the whole therapeutic method, in fourteen books: [that is to say,] all of 
therapeutics, and in addition those things which are in accordance with 
his views.
Lib. Prop. 9 [6] (XIX.33–4 K. = 159,10–160,1 Boudon-Millot)
17   As Boudon-Millot ad loc.: ‘à usage privé’.
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That status of The Therapeutic Method as – not, to be sure, for personal exer-
cise, but – ‘purely for a friend’, is, indeed, asserted within the work itself.18 And 
this same idea, that Galen ‘gave to friends’ many of his central medical works – 
with the further claim that he would not have done so if he had known that they 
would be distributed (ekdothēsesthai) to the unworthy – is asserted also in the 
autobiographical work, Prognosis.19 In the latter case, the works mentioned 
include not only Crises but also the major treatises in the pulse, all of which, 
again, feature prominently in the curriculum of study in My Own Books.
The fact that a work as central to his own corpus as The Therapeutic Method 
can be referred to in the category ‘given to friends’ and ‘with no expectation 
that it would reach a wider audience’ suggests two rather important things. 
The first is that the ‘giving’ in question here can include formal literary dedi-
cation to a named addressee (as indeed appears in The Therapeutic Method), 
rather than some private transaction; the second is the disingenuous nature 
of the ‘not-for-distribution’ claim itself. The claim that works were never, in 
the first place, intended for a wider audience, and not written with a view to 
reputation, is indeed a repeated one throughout Galen’s work;20 it is undoubt-
edly, at least at some level, a literary trope, whereby the author anticipates or 
defends himself against criticisms based on a work’s apparent incompleteness 
or other shortcomings.21 This is not, however, to deny the historical reality be-
hind such claims. There is no reason to doubt, either that the dedicatees of The 
18   See MM 7.1 (X.456–7 K.).
19   πάντι τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ πολλὰς πραγματείας ἔγραψα φιλοσόφους τε καὶ ἰατρικάς, ἃς 
ὑποστρέψαντος εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην τοῦ βασιλέως αἰτήσασι τοῖς φίλοις ἔδωκα, παρὰ μόνοις ἐκεί-
νοις ἐλπίσας αὐτὰς ἔσεσθαι· ὡς εἴ γ᾽ἠπιστάμην ἐκδοθήσεσθαι τοῖς ἀναξίοις οὐκ ἂν οὐδ᾽ἐκείνοις 
ἔδωκα, Praen. 9 (XIV.650–1 K. = 120,1–4 Nutton): the period referred to is the same one 
mentioned in Lib. Prop. as that in which he ‘wrote up’ his main medical and scientific 
works, on which see pp. 122–3, with n. 45, below.
20   Above we saw the example of MM, and below we shall see the same claim with regard to 
the Hippocratic commentaries. Note further that within the preamble to the former work, 
MM 1.1 (X.1–2 K.), Galen laments the current intellectual climate and the likely fate – in 
terms of its reputation – of a work of intellectual value, thus at least implicitly and nega-
tively acknowledging his ambition for his own works with a broader public.
21   For analysis of Galen’s techniques of self-presentation see Boudon, V. (2000). ‘Galien par 
lui-même: les traités bio-bibliographiques (De ordine librorum suorum et De libris pro-
priis)’, in Manetti, D. (ed.) Studi su Galeno: scienza, filosofia, retorica e filologia. Atti del 
seminario, Firenze, 13 novembre 1998, 119–33, as well as Boudon-Millot’s ‘Introduction 
générale’ to Galien, Tome 1; Gleason, M. W. (1995). Making Men: Sophists and Self-
Presentation in Ancient Rome; von Staden, H. (2009). ‘Staging the Past, Staging Oneself: 
Galen on Hellenistic Exegetical Traditions’, in Gill, C., Whitmarsh, T. and Wilkins, J. (eds), 
Galen and the World of Knowledge, 132–56; Boudon-Millot, V. ‘Galen’s Bios and Methodos: 
From Ways of Life to Path of Knowledge’, in ibid., 175–89; more explicitly on such literary 
tropes in Galen, and their relatives elsewhere, König, J. (2009). ‘Conventions of Prefatory 
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Therapeutic Method were Hiero and Eugenianus, in the sense that the text was 
in some way formally presented to them, or that the Hippocratic commentar-
ies were for the use of – or even in response to the requests of – students and 
friends, and were given to them in that context. The point is that such a dedi-
cation, or such a transaction, is made in the clear expectation that the works 
will be further circulated and, in at least some cases, with a reliance on this 
procedure for the dissemination of one’s views and the development of one’s 
reputation. The public reception, and criticism, of a work is being anticipated 
at precisely the same time that its original destination for an inner circle of 
students is asserted. A good example is the preface to Galen’s commentary on 
the Hippocratic Epidemics VI. Here Galen simultaneously anticipates the criti-
cisms of a wider audience who will be impatient with a long exposition which 
engages in detail with previous commentators, admits that he has compro-
mised with such expectations in the composition of the work, and reasserts 
the fundamental nature and origin or the commentary as a work for his own 
hetairoi (he also seems to imply that the main concession that he is making 
to the wider public is the very writing of this preface which explains the situ-
ation; on this point see further below).22 Or consider, as a particularly striking 
example of the non-contradiction of private ‘giving’ and public dissemina-
tion, the magna opera De usu partium and De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis. 
These were, at least formally, written in response to the request of a patron, 
Flavius Boethus, not for ekdosis. The first book (at least) of the former, and 
the first six of the latter, were presented to him, as indeed were early drafts of 
Anatomical Procedures.23 But no serious student of Galen can doubt that is on 
precisely these works that Galen in fact built his early reputation in Rome. The 
Self-Presentation in Galen’s On the Order of My Own Books’, in ibid., 35–58. See also 
Mattern, Rhetoric of Healing.
22   … εἰ μὲν τῷ μήκει τῶν ὑπομνημάτων οὐδεὶς ἔμελλε <τῶν> ἀναγνωσομένων αὐτὰ δυσχεραίνειν, 
ἁπάντων μεμνῆσθαι κάλλιον εἶναι, μεμφομένων δὲ πολλῶν οὐ τούτοις μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς 
συμμέτρως ἔχουσι καὶ μόνα σπουδαζόντων τὰ χρήσιμα, μέσην τινὰ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων 
ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἐξήγησιν καὶ τοῦτο εὐθέως ἐν ἀρχῇ προειπεῖν, ὅπως ἀπαλλάττωνται τῶνδε 
τῶν ὑπομνημάτων οἱ μὴ χαίροντες τούτοις. ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ, ὥσπερ καὶ τἄλλα πάντα πολλοῖς τῶν 
δεηθέντων ἑταίρων χαριζόμενος ἐποίησα, καὶ τὰς ἐξηγήσεις ταύτας ἐκείνων ἕνεκα συνέθηκα. 
θεωρῶν δ’ εἰς πολλοὺς ἐκπίπτοντα τὰ γραφόμενα προοιμίων τοιούτων ἐδεήθην, Hipp. Epid. VI 
praef. (XVIIA.795–6 K. = 4,19–5,3 Wenkebach).
23   See Lib. Prop. 1 (XIX.15–16 K. = 139–40 Boudon-Millot); cf. AA 1.1 (II.215–17 K.), which also 
mentions a number of other anatomical works given to Boethus. Note also that the ac-
count in AA clearly states that the entire seventeen books of UP were sent to Boethus 
during his lifetime (ἔτι ζῶντι τῷ Βοηθῷ), although he had left Rome (II.217 K.), whereas the 
Lib. Prop. account speaks of one being written before his departure, but then is less clear 
about the process of the work’s subsequent completion (with the above passage cf. Lib. 
Prop. 2, XIX.20 K. = 143,7–12 Boudon-Millot).
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further books, and further fortunes, of De usu partium are also highly relevant 
here: Galen speaks very clearly of the text’s wide dissemination and influence 
amongst doctors, and again it was clearly a major work in the formation of his 
reputation. He does not, however, ever state (pace Vegetti) that he wrote or re-
wrote it for ekdosis.
A further complication should be considered here, which is the relationship 
of written-up accounts to public lectures or demonstrations. Galen does not 
deny the competitive and public nature of his activities in this area, especially 
in the field of anatomy: indeed, he gives us a very clear picture of the social 
and intellectual climate within which this persuasive and rhetorical activity 
takes place; he also claims to have ceased such activity at a particular historical 
moment. In many cases, the texts we have are prefaced as being the written 
version of such public lecturing. The anatomical works just mentioned are one 
such example; The Therapeutic Method and De locis affectis are also so present-
ed; so too is the short philosophical work Affections and Errors of the Soul. But 
we note, again, that such prefaces describe this writing-up as being for par-
ticular individuals, or for hetairoi more generally, even though the original oral 
context may have been a more public one. There is potentially a complex dy-
namic in play here: it may indeed be true, for example, that a work like De locis 
affectis, or even The Therapeutic Method, can best be read, not as a stand-alone 
text but in conjunction with the oral exposition of which it claims to be a re-
cord or reminder. Still, the same point already made will apply: the writing-up, 
though officially defined as being for an individual, is a way of putting the work 
in the (or at least some) public domain, of ensuring a further dissemination, 
even if we have no way of being specific about the extent or precise nature of 
that dissemination.
But we should return to chapter 9 [6] of My Own Books and read a little 
further, because it is here at last that we get, apparently, a positive mention of 
Galen’s own role in ekdosis (all the other mentions in My Own Books were de-
nials). It is in fact the only place in Galen’s work – before the discovery of περὶ 
ἀλυπίας, that is – where we get such a positive admission; it will therefore be 
important to consider what is actually being stated here.
ἐξηγήσεις δὲ καθ’ ἑκάστην αὐτοῦ λέξιν ἤδη πολλοῖς τῶν πρὸ ἐμοῦ γεγραμμένας 
οὐ φαύλως εἰδώς, εἴ τι μοι μὴ καλῶς ἐδόκουν εἰρηκέναι, περιττὸν ἡγούμην 
ἐλέγχειν· ἐνεδειξάμην δὲ τοῦτο δι’ ὧν πρῴην ἔδωκα τοῖς παρακαλέσασι, 
σπανιάκις ἐν αὐτοῖς εἰπών τι πρὸς τοὺς ἐξηγουμένους αὐτάς … πάντα κατὰ τὴν 
ἐμαυτοῦ γνώμην εἶπον ἄνευ τοῦ μνημονεῦσαι τῶν ἄλλως ἐξηγουμένων … μετὰ 
ταῦτα δέ τινος ἀκούσας ἐξήγησιν ἀφορισμοῦ μοχθηρὰν ἐπαινοῦντος ὅσα τοῦ 
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λοιποῦ τισιν ἔδωκα, πρὸς κοινὴν ἔκδοσιν ἀποβλέπων, οὐκ ἰδίαν ἕξιν ἐκείνων 
μόνων τῶν λαβόντων, οὕτως συνέθηκα …
Line-by-line commentaries had already been written by many before 
me, which I knew perfectly well; and I considered it superfluous to re-
fute anything in those which appeared to me incorrect; I had indicated 
this previously in what I gave to those who made requests to me, where I 
seldom made reference to other commentators … I stated everything in 
accordance with my own opinion, without mention of those who gave 
other interpretations … but after this I heard someone praising a bad in-
terpretation of one of the aphorisms, and then whatever I gave to people 
I composed with an eye to general distribution, not to the level of those 
people alone who were the recipients …
Lib. Prop. 9 [6] (XIX.34–5 K. = 160,1–21 Boudon-Millot)
This, then, is the passage that has led to the clear distinction, in modern schol-
arship, between two actually distinct categories of Galenic commentaries 
on Hippocrates: the first, intended for limited circulation, and not engaging 
with the commentaries of others, the second for a wider public and engaging 
in such argument.24 But again, let us consider what Galen actually says. The 
phrase on which this intention to publish, or to engage in wider distribution, 
has been based, is πρὸς κοινὴν ἔκδοσιν ἀποβλέπων – that is, ‘with an eye to’ or 
‘with consideration of ’ a more general distribution. And it must be taken with 
the following phrase, οὐκ ἰδίαν ἕξιν ἐκείνων μόνων τῶν λαβόντων. The claim is, 
still, that there is a specific group of individuals (Galen’s own followers; see 
further below) who are the works’ actual recipients; it is just that in writing 
works for them, after a certain point, Galen takes into account that they will, 
as a matter of fact, reach a wider audience. This is entirely consistent with the 
picture that emerges throughout this book and elsewhere – the picture, in-
deed, which Galen wishes to give us – that he is writing for individuals, and 
that ekdosis is something that he is aware will happen, not something which 
24   The classic work on Galen’s Hippocratic commentary activity (and classic statement of 
this distinction) is Manetti, D. and Roselli, A. (1994). ‘Galeno commentatore di Ippocrate’, 
in ANRW II.37.2, 1529–1635. But see von Staden, ‘Staging the Past’, 140–50, who while in 
broad terms accepting the private–public distinction, also draws attention to a number of 
specific ways in which such a distinction is not borne out – at least not  straightforwardly – 
by the actual content of the texts. This seems to me extremely significant: the clear di-
vision of Galen’s commentaries into two categories is frequently stated, while detailed 
analysis of the commentaries themselves is a much less common enterprise.
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he initiates. In this text, he is indeed admitting that in the composition of the 
later Hippocratic commentaries he ‘had an eye’ to ekdosis. He does not claim 
to have carried out the ekdosis, nor does he give us any information about the 
broader group that this, as opposed to earlier commentaries, was intended to 
reach. Certainly, the reason for the reference to ekdosis is (at least implicitly) 
that he believes that his works can be of some public benefit: they can refute 
errors which are current because of other people’s Hippocratic commentaries. 
But he has stopped short of admitting his own role in self-distribution.
But there is much stronger evidence for Galen’s own account of his own dis-
tribution – or rather non-distribution – of his works, specifically in the more 
detailed account of the genesis and progress of his Hippocratic commentar-
ies given in his commentary on Epidemics III; let us therefore now turn aside 
from the rather summary, we might say flitting, account of My Own Books – an 
account which is, as we have seen, not devoid of both interpretive and tex-
tual difficulties – to that more detailed and informative one. What is in fact 
stated, very clearly, in this longer version is that all Galen’s commentaries were 
written in response to individual requests, in particular those of his hetairoi. 
If the account of the genesis of the commentaries in My Own Books has three 
stages – those treatises which covered Hippocrates’ thought and so were qua-
si-commentaries; line-by-line commentaries written in response to requests; 
commentaries responding directly to other commentaries – then that in the 
commentary to Epidemics III has fully seven, each presented as a response to 
requests, either of hetairoi or of a wider group.25 First (i), we have the stage of 
writing nothing except at the request of hetairoi who want notes of previous 
oral instruction; then (ii), the writing of works on ‘all parts’ of medicine, in re-
sponse to the fact that these previous works have been distributed more widely 
and found useful by others too. Next comes (iii) the writing of specific works 
on Hippocrates in response to hetairoi, which is followed by (iv) the writing of 
commentaries on Regimen in Acute Diseases and Humours in response to spe-
cific, urgent requests, (v) the urgings of both hetairoi and other friendly doctors 
to write commentaries on all Hippocrates’ works and (vi) a begging request 
to write a commentary on Prorrhetic. This was a pressing need because of the 
problems that arise from failure to understand the status and limitations of 
that work – an enterprise which in the process leads to the refutation of false 
exegetes. Related to this last point, there then came (vii) the urgings of hetairoi 
which caused Galen, in moving from the commentary on Epidemics II to that 
on Epidemics III, to address false interpretations so precisely that a whole book 
of the commentary is dedicated to three case-histories.
25   Hipp. Epid. III 2, praef. (XVIIA.576–84 K. = 60–66 Wenkebach).
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The account seems almost self-parodic in its repetition and elaboration of 
the theme of the reluctant writer, giving way by stages to the importunings of 
his followers and of other interested persons. But the essential point is that 
here, once again – and as typically throughout the Galenic corpus – it is per-
sonal requests that have been responsible for every fresh development – and in 
particular every new prolixity – in Galen’s writings. Note in particular that the 
very last phase of this progress – part of the public distribution project accord-
ing to the traditional view – is here again a phase carried out at the request of 
Galen’s own hetairoi. Now, it is true that Galen is here indeed describing a rela-
tionship between the author and his intended audiences; but it is undeniable, 
also, that any reference to some larger group, as opposed to the close circle of 
his own hetairoi, is extremely limited. Certainly nothing as straightforward as 
an opposition between works ‘for ekdosis’ and ‘not for ekdosis’ emerges from 
this text. Most strikingly of all – and crucially for our understanding of what is 
going on here – it is Galen’s response to individual, private requests which are, 
time and again, presented as the occasion for his most prolific literary outputs 
as well as those which would on other grounds have the strongest claim to 
be seen as ‘for distribution’ (The Therapeutic Method, De placitis Hippocratis et 
Platonis,26 the later Hippocratic commentaries).
We have seen, then, that Galen in My Own Books does not identify a category 
of books ‘for ekdosis’ contrasted with another, ‘not for ekdosis’; and we have 
seen, further, that he has a consistent policy of denying or concealing his own 
role in ekdosis. He does not with any clarity identify two audiences, a closer 
and a wider group;27 he admits to writing works only (or almost only) at the 
request of friends, patrons or students; he writes and gives works – including 
and especially those with the largest public impact – for and to those persons; 
either as a result of that or through some other clandestine activities they end 
up in the hands of ‘many’; it is also clear that this wider distribution – whatever 
his protests – is something that he expects to happen.
3 Ekdosis and Galen’s Oeuvre: the New Evidence of περὶ ἀλυπίας
The text of περὶ ἀλυπίας contains some striking new information on Galen’s at-
titude to ekdosis. Before turning to that, let us conclude our survey of Galen’s 
26   See PHP 7.1 (V.586–7 K. = 428,4–17 De Lacy) for its own internal account of its compo-
sition – in a very public, competitive context – in response to the urgings of his own 
hetairoi.
27   But on this point see further below.
112 Singer
attitude to ekdosis as evidenced elsewhere in the corpus. Outside περὶ ἀλυπίας, 
the term is in fact used by Galen between twenty-six and twenty-eight times 
(depending on textual readings in Lib. Prop.). In six of the instances, he is 
using the term in the specific sense of a particular edition of a previous au-
thor’s work – the author in question being usually Hippocrates.28 There is then 
a usage whereby Galen refers to an author’s ekdosis – or non-ekdosis – of his 
own works. One such case involves a philosopher producing a ‘second ekdo-
sis’ of his book in response to criticism;29 but by far the most frequent use is 
to refer to Hippocrates’ attitude to his own works, in particular the different 
books of Epidemics.30 Here Galen is justifying the interpretive approach that 
he has towards Epidemics I and III, on the one hand, and Epidemics II and 
VI, on the other. The backward projection by Galen on to Hippocrates of his 
own attitudes and compositional practices is in itself interesting. It is notewor-
thy, here, that although Galen does attribute some kind of ekdosis activity to 
Hippocrates, here too the preponderance of the references is in the negative: 
the fact that works were not for ekdosis explains their incomplete or elliptical 
nature. Finally, we have the four (five if we follow Müller’s reading for the ch. 
9 [6] text) cases which we have already considered in My Own Books, to which 
we may add one instance in Anatomical Procedures – again, a general denial 
that his works were written pros ekdosin.31 It is also worth noting that in only 
two of all these cases is the phrase pros ekdosin coupled with an article, e.g. tois 
28   The ‘Attican’ edition of Plato (In Plat. Tim. frag. 2); Artemidorus Capito’s edition of 
Hippocrates (HNH 1.2, XV.21 K. = 13,19–20 Mewaldt); that of Bacchius (Hipp. Epid. III 2.8, 
XVIIA.619 K. = 87,11 Wenkebach); Dioscorides’ edition of Hippocrates (Hipp. Epid. III 3.74, 
XVIIA.732 K. = 158,8–9 Wenkebach; ibid. 1.18, XVIIA.559 K. = 47,2 Wenkebach; cf. Hipp. Off. 
Med. 1 praef. XVIIIB.631 K.).
29   De marcore 2 (VII.670 K.).
30   Epidemics II and VI were not for ekdosis, as were books I and III: Hipp. Epid. III 3.1 
(XVIIA.648 K. = 109,8–10 Wenkebach); similarly: Hipp. Epid. VI 1 praef. (XVIIA.796 K. 
= 5,4–7 Wenkebach); ibid. 2.15 (XVIIA.922 K. = 75,25 and 76,4–5 Wenkebach); ibid. 2.46 
(XVIIA.1001 K. = 118,24–5 Wenkebach); ibid. 3.3 (XVIIB.12–13 K. = 130,12–14 Wenkebach); 
ibid. 3.17 (XVIIB.52 K. = 151,9 Wenkebach); ibid. 4.11 (XVIIB.153 K. = 208,2 Wenkebach); ibid. 
4.20 (XVIIB.183 K. = 227,28 Wenkebach); ibid. 5.3 (XVIIB.241 K. = 264,14 Wenkebach); simi-
larly (only the first and the third were written hōs pros ekdosin): Hipp. Art., XVIIIA.530 K.; 
cf. Hipp. Off. Med. 2.26 (XVIIIB.790 K.; ibid. 3,29, XVIIIB.879 K.).
31   AA 1.1 (II.217 K.) There is one further possible case in Lib. Prop., though it has been deleted 
by both modern editors. In ch. 16 [13], in his account of Platonic works, the reference to 
Quod animi mores in both Greek MSS (but not in the Arabic) contains the phrase: β´· καὶ 
ἄλλο καθ᾽ἑτέραν ἔκδοσιν (XIX.46 K. = 171,3–4 Boudon-Millot). The suggestion that QAM 
had a two-book version, or indeed that it circulated in two versions, is intriguing, though 
unsupported by other evidence. It is, however, worth remarking that if this phrase were 
genuine, it would constitute the only explicit reference by Galen, using this terminology, 
to two different ekdoseis of his own works.
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pros ekdosin, thus indicating a distinct category of works so intended; and both 
these cases refer to Hippocrates, not to Galen himself.32 That is, in no case – 
before the discovery of the περὶ ἀλυπίας – does Galen use the phrase ta pros 
ekdosin, ‘works for distribution’, in relation to any category of his own work.
Which makes the material in περὶ ἀλυπίας all the more interesting. For here 
Galen does indeed use precisely such an expression. The uniqueness, within 
the Galenic corpus, of both that formulation and the information contained in 
it, has not, I think, been properly noticed. It will, then, be of some importance 
to understand what is actually being stated here.
The crucial passage, which follows on from the mention of his work on Old 
Comedy, is as follows:
… ἀλλὰ κατὰ τύχην γε τῆς ἑτέρας εἰς Καμπανίαν ἐκεκόμιστο τἀντίγραφα. 
καὶ εἴ γε μετὰ δύο μήνας ἐνεπέπρηστο τὰ κατὰ τἠν Ῥώμην, ἔφθανον ἂν οὖν 
εἰς Καμπανίαν πασῶν τῶν ἡμετερῶν πραγματειῶν τὰ ἀντίγραφα. διπλᾶ γὰρ 
ἐγέγραπτο πάντα τὰ πρὸς ἔκδοσιν ἤδη, χωρὶς τῶν ἐν Ῥώμῃ μελλόντων μένειν, 
ἀξιούντων μὲν καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πατρίδι φίλων ἁπάσας αὐτοῖς πεμφθῆναι τὰς 
ὑπ᾽ἐμοῦ γεγονυίας πραγματείας ὅπως ἐν βιβλιοηήκῃ δημοσίᾳ στῶσι, καθάπερ 
καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἤδη πολλὰ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἐν ἄλλαις πόλεσιν ἔθηκαν, ἐννοοῦντος 
δὲ κἀμοῦ πάντων ἔχειν ἀντίγραφα κατὰ τὴν Καμπανίαν. ἦν οὖν διὰ τοῦτο διπλᾶ 
πάντα τὰ ἡμετερὰ χωρὶς τῶν ἐν Ῥώμῃ μελλόντων μένειν ὡς ἔφην. ἡ μὲν οὖν 
πυρκαϊὰ τελευτῶντος ἐγένετο τοῦ χειμῶνος, ἐγὼ δὲ ἐνόουν ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ θέρους 
εἰς τὴν Καμπανίαν κομίσαι τά τε αὐτόθι μέλλοντα κεῖσθαι καὶ τὰ πεμφθησόμενα 
τῶν ἐτησίων πνεόντων εἰς Ἀσίαν. ἐνήδρευσεν δὲ ἡμᾶς ἡ τύχη πολλὰ … τῶν 
ἡμετέρων ἀφελομένη βιβλίων …
… but by chance the copies of the second [sc. part of my work on Attic 
terms] had already been transported to Campania. And if the buildings 
destroyed by fire at Rome had been destroyed two months later, by then 
there would already have been copies of all our treatises in Campania. 
For all those for distribution had already been written in two copies, 
apart from those which were to remain in Rome, since my friends in my 
homeland, too, asked for all the treatises produced by me to be sent to 
them so that they might be put in a public library, in the same way that 
certain others, in other cities, had already deposited many of our works, 
and I, too, planned to have copies of them all in Campania. This, then, 
32   At Hipp. Epid. VI 2.15 (XVIIA.922 K. = 75,25 Wenkebach) and Hipp. Off. Med. 3.29 (XVIIIB.879 
K.), though the latter is a reference to hypothetical work which might have been distrib-
uted to give the fuller account.
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is why all our works had been done in two copies, apart from those that 
were to remain in Rome, as I said. Now, the fire happened towards the 
end of winter, whereas I planned that at the beginning of the summer 
I would send to Campania both those works that were to stay there and 
those that would be sent to Asia once the Etesian winds had started. But 
chance waylaid me, taking away many … of our books …
Ind. 20–23b (8,15–9,13 BJP)33
Three phrases here seem to me particularly worthy of note, and of analysis. 
First, the expression panta ta pros ekdosin. In the light of our previous survey, 
we now see that this is an almost unique case of Galen acknowledging (at least 
implicitly) his own role in an ekdosis process of his own works, and a com-
pletely unique case of his use of the phrase pros ekdosin with the article, again 
in relation to his own (rather than Hippocrates’) works – thus denoting a spe-
cific category of works so intended. To which works is Galen so referring, and 
what is the nature of the ekdosis in question? We must also simultaneously 
deal with a related problem of interpretation: what is meant by chōris tōn en 
Rōmēi mellontōn menein (8,20–21 BJP)? Thirdly, what is the reference of panta 
ta hēmetera (9,6 BJP)?
To take the last phrase first: we noted above, in the passage from ch. 14 [11] 
of My Own Books, that the similar formulation, talla ta hēmetera, seems to refer 
to a category implicitly separate from the ‘private’ one for his own exercise 
(some of which were also informally circulated). The fact that the phrase here 
clearly functions as the equivalent of panta ta pros ekdosin – it substitutes for 
that earlier phrase in a recapitulation of the identical information a few lines 
later – strengthens that interpretation. Both phrases, it seems, may be taken to 
refer to some formal, ‘official’ group of Galen’s own works. Although (as already 
remarked), Galen’s choice of nouns in reference to his own writings is notori-
ously fluid, this group seems – in the present passage at least – also to be co-
extensive with pragmateiai, treatises. Thus, it seems, at least on a fairly natural 
reading of the present passage, that Galen is here – in apparent contradiction 
of the picture that I have been painting – suggesting a distinct list of those 
works which constituted his public output: works for ekdosis. This set, he fur-
ther suggests, would be preserved both by his making of a ‘backup’ copy for his 
33   My translation. Note that I have used one-to-one correspondences to reflect the distinc-
tion between terms used by Galen in each of the references to his own works (even if the 
distinction of terms may not in fact correspond to a significant conceptual distinction): 
‘treatise’ renders pragmateia, ‘book’ renders biblion and ‘works’ is used where Galen sim-
ply has a neuter plural adjective without noun. (See further below on the significance (or 
not) of the use of the term hupomnēmata for certain works.).
115New Light and Old Texts
house in Campania and by their being deposited in public libraries. This, then, 
seems also to make natural sense of the phrase chōris tōn en Rōmēi mellontōn 
menein, which in itself might admit of a number of interpretations. The official 
catalogue of his oeuvre, Galen is (on this interpretation) suggesting, exists in a 
single copy deposited in his storehouse in Rome, to which further copies may 
be added, to be held elsewhere.34
This new picture, then, of the official oeuvre which is both deposited in the 
storehouse and simultaneously pros ekdosin, reminds us rather strikingly of 
the passage which we have already considered from De compositione medica-
mentorum per genera. There, we saw, there is an explicit pairing of precisely 
these two concepts: ‘having been distributed and deposited in the apothēkē’ 
(ἐκδοθέντων, ἐγκαταλειφθέντων δὲ ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἱερὰν ὁδὸν ἀποθήκῃ). But that 
passage, in conjunction with the present one and other usages which we have 
seen, suggests another important dimension of ekdosis and its cognates, name-
ly that what is referred to in these terms is not, or not only or primarily, a pro-
cess of distribution, but includes crucially the notions of editing, writing-up or 
completion of a pre-existing text.
This, of course, is quite consistent with the process which previous scholars 
have identified: works previously existing in note or outline form (for private 
use or informal circulation) are written up for ekdosis for a wider audience.35 
But two crucial points need to be made in qualification of such a picture. The 
first is that – as we have already seen – such a formal list of ‘public’ works will, 
in fact, include works which Galen explicitly describes as having been written 
for his own hetairoi; in fact, it seems impossible – at least as far as Galen’s main 
medical output, including the Hippocratic commentaries, is concerned – to 
identify any works in the ‘public’ list which are not officially so intended. The 
second, related, point is that what is at stake in the ‘private–public’ distinction 
is then a difference in editions of the same work, not a distinction between 
different works.
34   The interpretation is consistent with the translation of BJP (‘… tous mes livres qui étaient 
destinés à la publication … sans compter les exemplaires qui devaient rester’), i.e. there 
are three copies in all. A more literal grammatical reading would want chōris, etc. to be an 
exclusion clause, so referring to a subset of those for distribution, i.e. ‘all those for ekdosis 
had been written in two copies, except for those which were to remain in Rome [which 
had not been so copied]’; the chōris clause would thus introduce a new category. One 
might in that case further suppose that the chōris phrase is applied rather loosely, and 
what is meant is not ‘all works for ekdosis had been copied, except for those for Rome …’ 
but ‘all works for ekdosis had been copied, except that some [not for ekdosis], which were 
for Rome, had not been copied’. On balance, our first interpretation seems both the most 
natural and that which will best assist us with the categories of works which then follow.
35   See the literature already cited in n. 8, especially the discussions of Dorandi.
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In this context, we should consider also the other two occurrences of the 
word ekdosis in περὶ ἀλυπίας. One clearly falls in the category of scholarly ‘edi-
tion’ or ‘version’, which, as we already saw, is a common usage, especially in 
relation to commentators on Hippocrates; the interesting variation here is that 
it is Galen himself who has produced an ekdosis of another author.36 The other 
is a mention, in relation to drugs or drug recipes, of τὰς περὶ αὐτῶν ἐκδόσεις 
γεγονυίας (Ind. 50b, 16,13–14 BJP); here Galen is referring to his own composi-
tions; and the context, which is that of a recapitulation of items already men-
tioned, makes it clear – consistently with what we have just observed – that the 
term ekdoseis here corresponds to what was earlier referred to (at 37, 12,22–3 
BJP) as a pragmateia. The work in question is, in fact, that on the composi-
tion of drugs, already discussed. The term ekdoseis here can, indeed, be seen as 
related to the reference which we saw to that work as ekdothenta (a reference 
which, as we also saw, is for Galen quite consistent with the claim that it was 
written for hetairoi). But this interpretation, or focus on the sense of ekdosis as 
referring to an editorial process or version, raises further problems. In princip-
le, the notion of a later, more formal, writing-up of works which had previously 
circulated in a smaller circle, seems an eminently plausible one. Yet, as has 
been pointed out by others,37 Galen very seldom in fact acknowledges that he 
has produced more than one version of the same work. If he had done so, one 
might, indeed, expect that more than one version of the same work would be 
in circulation. Galen does, indeed, acknowledge the problem of the circulation 
of faulty, or superseded, versions of his writings; but this seems to be a problem 
confined to an early phase of his writing, and one which he regards as largely 
resolved early on in his career.38 If more than one version – an earlier, informal 
one and a later, official one – of a range of his mature works were in circula-
tion, one would surely expect some discussion by Galen of the problems that 
would inevitably ensue. In one case, that of AA, where Galen does explicitly 
state that he wrote a subsequent version of an earlier text (see n. 23 above), the 
overdetermined nature of his explanation seems revealing. That is, while he 
claims that the earlier – not-for-ekdosis – version is lost, he gives an additional 
reason for rewriting, namely that he had acquired more accurate anatomical 
knowledge.
Crucially, indeed, Galen does not describe processes of rewriting or re-
vision of the same text, but rather – precisely to the contrary – uses his original 
36   Ind. 14 (6,11 BJP).
37   See Gurd, ‘Galen on ἔκδοσις’.
38   The phenomenon of books of his own composition in need of correction being returned 
to him, after his first visit to Rome, is discussed in ch. 2 of Lib. Prop.
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authorial intent as an explanation of the content of the final version of the text 
which is in the public domain. We have seen, for example, how the changing 
demands and requests of his own hetairoi are used to provide an account of 
the process of development of his own Hippocratic output: those individual 
demands and requests, that is, explain the content of the last commentaries – 
those which were written ‘with an eye to wider ekdosis’ and are ‘works for pub-
lication’ if any are. What, then, can be made of the process of ‘editing’ which I 
have suggested gives at least a partial account of what is meant by pros ekdosin 
in this passage from περὶ ἀλυπίας? What, if anything, would be the substantial 
difference between a pros ekdosin version and the original which has circulat-
ed informally? As has been noted, the accounts of his own works in My Own 
Books and elsewhere represent a retrospective creation by Galen of an oeuvre, 
the establishment of a curriculum and canon of his own works by an author 
who claims to have been reluctant to put any of them in the public domain in 
the first place.39 But this process or organization and canonization involves 
not just the listing and categorization of his works in these autobibliographical 
books. There are also – as very clearly seen above, in the example of Hipp. Epid. 
III – explanatory, apologetic and orientating remarks within the texts them-
selves, especially in their prefaces. Consider the preface to the first book of the 
commentary on Hippocrates’ Epidemics VI.
ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ, ὥσπερ καὶ τἄλλα πάντα πολλοῖς τῶν δεηθέντων ἑταίρων 
χαριζόμενος ἐποίησα, καὶ τὰς ἐξηγήσεις ταύτας ἐκείνων ἕνεκα συνέθηκα. 
θεωρῶν δ’ εἰς πολλοὺς ἐκπίπτοντα τὰ γραφόμενα προοιμίων τοιούτων ἐδεήθην.
Just as I composed all the rest for the benefit of many of my followers, 
who had asked for them, I put together these commentaries for their 
sake too. But observing that what was being written fell into the hands of 
many, I needed such prefaces.
Hipp. Epid. VI 1, praef. (XVIIA.795–6 K. = 4,25–5,3 Wenkebach)
The passage incidentally gives yet another affirmation of Galen’s claim – which 
we have now seen many times – to have written all such works for his followers. 
Our main concern here, however, is with the reference to prefaces. Of course, 
a preface containing such information on the previous history of the text is, by 
its very presence, an explicit acknowledgement that this version – the ekdosis, 
if one will – is not identical with that which has previously circulated. By the 
39   The point is well made by Boudon-Millot, ‘Galien par lui-même’; cf. also Vegetti, Nuovi 
scritti.
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same token, however, and as we saw very clearly in the example of Hipp. Epid. 
III, it functions as an apologetic for the extent to which the two forms of the 
text are the same.
Could it be that to produce the ekdosis of a previously circulated work con-
sists in little more than in adding a preface to it? Such framing – such self- 
positioning – is, as we have seen, of enormous importance to Galen. There 
would, doubtless, be other processes involved: checking and correction, 
perhaps the writing eis katharon edaphos, the production of a clean copy 
which, again in the context of editions of other authors, is mentioned else-
where in περὶ ἀλυπίας.40 But the fact that such apologetics as are found in the 
prefaces speak to the substantial identity of the previous, circulated version 
with the final, written-up article is highly significant, though easily ignored. A 
work may – as indeed Galen essentially claims for his works in general – have 
not originally been intended for ekdosis (and of course how seriously one takes 
that claim may be a matter of individual interpretation); but in principle any 
work, whatever its origin, could end up in the pros ekdosin list; and that destiny, 
one might suppose (though we will return to this question in due course), may 
correspond also to its ultimate inclusion in the list in My Own Books.
We should proceed to enquire what – in the specific context of the passa-
ge from περὶ ἀλυπίας which we are now considering – is the opposed term to 
the panta ta pros ekdosin category. Before doing so, we should consider a little 
more closely what else this particular passage is telling us about ekdosis. For in 
the immediately preceding paragraphs I have focussed on ekdosis as process 
of edition; but our passage tells us something about ekdosis as process of dis-
tribution, too. Here, let us again emphasize the point: this is by far the clearest 
account Galen gives us of his own role in the ekdosis of his own works; it is a 
unique admission in the corpus. His clearest account, however, is still very far 
from clear. He does not tell us either which works the panta ta pros ekdosin 
were, nor what was involved in the process of preparation or editing; and we 
have to engage in an intricate, not to say speculative, process of analysis to 
arrive at the answer to this. And the context of Galen’s admission of his own 
ekdosis activity is surely relevant here: he is making as vivid as possible the 
account of his own losses, and he can hardly do that without mentioning the 
full extent of the texts that were lost. It is only in such a rhetorical context that 
Galen has allowed himself to be forced into the admission – still reluctantly, 
and of course only in the passive voice – that he had works of his own copied 
for distribution. The loss of these copies – so soon before they would have been 
safe – makes the events all the more dramatic. Moreover, and still consistently 
40   Ind. 14 (6,9 BJP).
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with what we saw above, where Galen only explicitly admits that he intended 
to give books to friends, rather than giving them out to a public – the only actual 
process of ekdosis he admits as his own remains that of giving his works to fri-
ends back home, at their request. (It happens that they have made this request 
because they want the works to exist in a public library – but such a provision 
is, of course, their act and not his.)
One final point on the actual ekdosis process. It seems possible, as already 
suggested, that the term panta ta pros ekdosin does indeed correspond to 
Galen’s ‘back-catalogue’ – to the set of his works which he regards as his canon, 
and which have been written up at a certain level, so that they may be consult-
ed by others. The peculiar historical accident and atrocious timing to which 
Galen refers, however, require a little more attention. If Galen indeed had such 
a central repository of his own writings in his storehouse in Rome, then the 
destruction of the whole collection in the fire was indeed a monumental loss. 
It is, as I have already suggested, remarkable in this context that Galen makes 
so little of it, in terms of the extent of his own works lost, focussing rather on 
a couple of his own works and devoting more attention to editions of other 
authors, not to mention drug collections and other valuables. That focus is, 
as I have also suggested, explicable precisely in terms of the actual networks 
of distribution that functioned in relation to a successful author’s work: put 
simply, he could be confident that the vast majority of his works were, in fact, 
extant in other collections.
But there is another detail worth considering here. Granted that Galen may 
have had such a comprehensive collection of his own writings in their pros 
ekdosin form, is it plausible that he had just now, at this precise historical mo-
ment, had two further copies made, of the entire set? If one pauses for a mo-
ment to consider the situation, one soon realizes that such a possibility would, 
indeed, beggar belief, from three points of view. First, the coincidence in that 
case – the fire came at the precise point when Galen had just decided to make 
two additional copies of all his works, constituting his lifetime’s oeuvre, and 
take them out of Rome, for distribution and safe-keeping – would be truly stag-
gering; secondly, this would imply that Galen had just made a decision, in his 
mid-sixties, radically to change his longstanding practices in relation to ekdo-
sis, both producing a back-up and instigating a particular form of  distribution – 
to libraries via friends in Pergamum – never previously contemplated; thirdly, 
the copying, twice, of his entire output – even if we take that output by 192 to 
have run to only about three-quarters of its final extent (a very conservative 
estimate) – would have entailed the writing of about seven-and-a-half million 
words by his scribes in a single phase. If the accident of timing had involved 
such a truly massive loss, Galen would surely have made more of it than the 
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few phrases contained in the passage above; as for the second hypothesis, that 
Galen has suddenly now revolutionized the distribution practices of a lifetime, 
that is something that could hardly have been passed over without discus-
sion: indeed, it would mean that the ekdosis referred to here was, in a sense, a 
completely new project. And as for the seven-and-a-half million words – such 
an undertaking, even by the standards of Galen’s undoubtedly hard-worked 
teams of scribes, would have been more than prodigious.
A far more plausible interpretation of what Galen means, I submit, is that 
two copies had been made of those works which were intended for ekdosis at 
this particular time. The reference to sending works to Asia once the weather 
turns is, surely, a reference to a regular, very probably yearly, practice; Galen’s 
friends back home (even if one takes this story at face value) have not, on 
any plausible account, suddenly requested his whole oeuvre; and the notion 
that a successful author, conscious of his reputation and keen to secure his 
Nachleben, would, on a regular basis, in batches, both make a backup copy and 
send his works to libraries in Asia, is a wholly reasonable and likely one. Such 
a process, again, helps explain Galen’s – in the circumstances – comparatively 
relaxed attitude to the losses: previous batches of work, once they reached 
the pros ekdosin state, have already been sent to Asia (and possibly also to the 
house in Campania); it is only the latest batch which causes concern. And that, 
indeed, is precisely why the only two mentioned by name are the commentary 
on Old Comedy – just written – and the work on the composition of drugs – 
apparently written earlier, but by whatever quirk of fate not extant (or at least 
not locatable in Rome). We thus have, in conclusion, two distinct, but I suggest 
complementary, interpretations of the phrase pros ekdosin in this particular 
passage, referring both to a phase of completion or edited form, and to an in-
tention to initiate wider circulation of works which have reached this form.
4 Pros Ekdosin; Hupomnēmata and Notes; Non-Surviving Works
I turn, then, finally, to the identity of the ‘other’ implied by the term ta pros 
ekdosin in this passage, and to the distinctions made between different types 
or levels of work, amongst those lost in the fire. For we do here get discussion 
of something like a ‘private’ category, and an attempt to identify it will be of 
some value to our enquiry.
τούτων οὖν οὐδὲν ἠνίασέ με … ὡς οὐδὲ ἡ τῶν ἡμετέρων ὑπομνημάτων ἀπώλεια, 
διττῶν κατ᾽εἶδος ὄντων· ἔνια μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐγεγόνει σύμμετρα ὡς καὶ τοῖς ἄλ-
λοις εἶναι χρήσιμα, τινὰ δὲ ἐμοὶ μόνῳ καίτοι τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχοντα παρασκευὴν εἰς 
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ἀνάμνησιν, ἐπειτὰ αἱ κεφαλαιώδεις πλεῖσται συνόψεις πολλῶν πάνυ βιβλίων 
ἰατρικῶν τε καὶ φιλοσόφων41· ἀλλ᾽οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἐλύπησαν.
None of these things, then, grieved me … nor did the loss of my notes, 
which were of two kinds: some had been produced in such a well-bal-
anced way as to be useful to others, too, while others, although they had 
the same form of preparation as those, for reminding, were for myself 
alone; then there was the very large number of summaries by main head-
ing, of an extensive list of medical and philosophical books.
Ind. 29–30 (10,24–11,7 BJP)
The passage comes at the climax of the account of the loss of his books, 
just after the discussion of his work on words in Old Comedy. The term 
hupomnēmata here seems to introduce a fresh category – although at some 
distance in the text – in addition to the pros ekdosin works and pragmatei-
ai already  mentioned.42 For that reason, as well as to point up the relation-
ship between this characterization of works and the term ‘for reminding’, εἰς 
ἀνάμνησιν, I have here used the admittedly not unproblematic translation 
‘notes’, rather than the more neutral ‘writings’ or ‘works’. It should be under-
stood that the term hupomnēmata, although it has an etymological and indeed 
apparently, for Galen, a conceptual relationship with the idea of notes, of an 
original oral context or of usefulness for delivering lectures, is used by him 
with a very broad and fluid application, and no clear distinction can be made 
consistently across his works between his use and application of this term and 
that of the terms ‘treatises’ (pragmateiai), ‘compositions’ (sungrammata) or 
‘books’ (biblia).43 It seems, however, that in this context we here have a coun-
terpart to ta pros ekdosin.
The hupomnēmata themselves are immediately subdivided into two kinds – 
produced in such a well-balanced way as to be useful to others, and for him-
self alone; and then there is added a further, definitely private, category of 
41   Although the form seems odd here, and BJP emend to φιλοσοφικῶν, I print the phrase 
in this form because of the identical pairing of adjectives at both Praen. 9 (XIV.650 K. = 
120,1 Nutton) and Lib. Prop. 3 (XIX.19 = 143,2 Boudon-Millot): it seems that Galen may use 
φιλοσοφός as an adjective applied to books, discussions or problems – a usage for which 
there is perfectly good precedent, e.g. Plato, Phaedrus 257b.
42   It is also a possible, in view of Galen’s fluidity of use of the term hupomnēmata, already 
noted, as well as his frequently repetitive manner in this text, that he is here simply giving 
another recapitulation of the works already lost (cf. 20–23b), with slightly different termi-
nology; but the parallels which we shall see with the similar passage about hupomnēmata 
in Lib. Prop. speak against this.
43   On this point see n. 11 above.
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‘summaries by main heading’ of works of doctors and philosophers.44 But 
what precisely does Galen mean by hupomnēmata here? Some were just for 
his own use, some distributed, but none (implicitly) were intended for ekdosis. 
The primary reference of hupomnēmata may be similar to that of a group of 
lost and unidentified works in ch. 3 of My Own Books, namely commentary-
style notes on other authors or specific problems. Or, the reference here may 
be a broader one: hupomnēmata are, quite simply, those works of his own com-
position which have not reached the pros ekdosin state. But I note that there 
are – if we take it that this whole passage is intended as in contradistinction 
to ta pros ekdosin – three categories identified: ta pros ekdosin; hupomnēmata 
which might be shared; purely private hupomnēmata (together with which we 
may group the purely private ‘summaries’). It is indeed tempting to map this 
on to the passage from ch. 3 of My Own Books, which we have already consid-
ered, where the term was gumnazōn emauton rather than hupomnēmata, but 
where a similar three-way division seems to be in play; and we shall return to 
that passage shortly.
First, it is worth pointing out that some such ‘private’ categories of notes 
would, plausibly, have been the main victims of the fire, in terms of irrecov-
erable losses. Certainly, no such synopseis survive (with the apparent excep-
tion of a summary of Plato’s Timaeus, extant in Arabic); on the other hand we 
would probably not expect them to: some kinds of scholarly writing are too 
note-like and ephemeral to be expected to survive, even without a fire. But 
this consideration leads us to our final two questions: (a) can one identify any 
specific extant, or indeed non-extant but listed, works of Galen’s as belonging 
to this ‘for himself ’ category? (b) does belonging to this private category give 
an explanation, at least in some cases, of the loss of a specific work of which 
we know the title? Let us return to the passage from My Own Books which, we 
have suggested, quite closely parallels this reference to lost hupomnēmata in 
sections 29 and 30 of Ind.
κατὰ τοῦτον οὖν τὸν χρόνον συνελεξάμην τε καὶ εἰς ἕξιν ἤγαγον μόνιμον ἅ τε 
παρὰ τῶν διδασκάλων ἐμεμαθήκειν ἅ τ᾽αὐτὸς εὑρήκειν, ἔτι τε ζητῶν ἔνια <ἃ> 
44   I have preferred the translation ‘summaries by main heading’, rather than ‘chapter sum-
maries’, for kephalaiōdeis synopseis: certainly, the term kephalaion can mean chapter in 
Galen, but he also specifically mentions the scholarly or intellectual practice of collecting 
all an author says on a topic, and uses the term kephalaion in that context. Such sets of 
notes accumulating, with quotations and references, all an author says on a particular 
topic (rather than strictly linear chapter summaries) would then have constituted a valu-
able database to be drawn upon in the composition of one’s own works. Cf. Ammonius, 
In Cat. 4, 3–13 Busse, where there is a description of note composition, including the term 
kephalaia.
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περὶ τὴν εὕρεσιν αὐτῶν εἶχον ἔγραψα πολλὰ γυμνάζων ἐμαυτὸν ἐν πολλοῖς 
προβλήμασιν ἰατρικοῖς τε καὶ φιλοσόφοις, ὧν τὰ πλεῖστα διεφθάρη κατὰ τὴν 
μεγάλην πυρκαϊάν, ἐν ᾗ τὸ τῆς Εἰρήνης τέμενος ἅμα καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἐκαύθη.
During this time, then, I collected together and brought into permanent 
form both what I had learned from my teachers and what I had discov-
ered myself; I was also still engaged in research on some topics, and wrote 
down a lot that I had which was relevant to those enquiries, training my-
self in many medical and philosophical problems. But most of this mate-
rial was lost in the great fire in which the Temple of Peace was consumed 
along with many other buildings.
Lib. Prop. 3 (XIX.19 K. = 142,25–143,4 Boudon-Millot)
Galen here makes a swift transition, from the first part of the sentence (up to 
εὑρήκειν), in which he seems to be talking of the final writing-up (eis hexin … 
monimon), at a critical time in his career, of a core body of his works, to a cat-
egory related to ongoing research and self-training (eti … zētōn … gumnazōn 
emauton).45 Though the speed of the transition – from a clause summing up 
most of his core works to one referring to a whole different category of now 
lost ones – is confusing, it does seem clear that it is indeed the latter, ‘ongoing 
research and private exercise’ writings that are referred to as having been lost 
in the fire. There is another place where Galen mentions the losses in the fire – 
a passage which we have already considered in a different context.
I also wrote a large number of other works as an exercise for myself; of 
these some were lost in the fire which consumed the Temple of Peace, 
 
45   The period in question is 169–76, to which, it seems, a majority of Galen’s extant scientific 
and medical works may be dated (not including the bulk of the pharmacological works 
or most of the Hippocratic commentaries). Great caution must be exercised in assign-
ing clear dates to Galenic works: there were clearly drafts and – as indeed the present 
text makes clear – subsequent writings-up, and in some cases later revised versions; it is 
also clear, simply from a consideration of the totality of cross-references between works, 
and the inconsistent chronological picture that emerges from them, that material can be 
added to texts at different phases. A useful overview of relative dates is nonetheless still 
that of Bardong, K. (1942). ‘Beiträge zur Hippokrates- und Galenforschung’, Nachrichten 
von der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Philologisch-Historische Klasse, Nr. 
7, 577–640 (who is not insensitive to these complexities). He assigns 23 treatises to this 
period. See also Peterson, D. W. (1977). ‘Observations on the Chronology of the Galenic 
Corpus’, Bulletin of the History of Medicine 51, 484–95; and Boudon-Millot, Galien, Tome I, 
‘Introduction’ and ad loc.
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others had been given to friends and are now extant in many private col-
lections, as is the case with my other works.
Lib. Prop. 14 [11] (XIX.41 K. = 166,1–5 Boudon-Millot)
It is true that we have seen considerable fluidity, even unreliability, in Galen’s 
use of the phrase gumnazōn emauton. But the context here may be informa-
tive. As we saw earlier, the discussion of ‘personal-exercise’ works here leads 
into a discussion of hupomnēmata, and a long list of commentaries and works 
on individual philosophical problems. Broadly speaking, again, it seems that 
a similar category of note-like, private-use writings on individual philosophi-
cal texts or questions, is being referred to here and in Ind. 29–30, as discussed 
above. But we are left with the following puzzle. In the later course of ch. 14 
[11] of My Own Books Galen goes on to list literally dozens of such works on in-
dividual texts and questions in the area of logic and demonstration.46 If these 
correspond to the large group of gumnazōn emauton and hupomnēmata works 
which, Galen says, were lost in the fire, that would give us an at least partial 
answer to our initial question, and a neat account of why so many works on 
these particular issues are lost to us. But are we to imagine that Galen is, in fact, 
listing works which he knows to be lost? The earlier passage, in ch. 3, seems at 
least to imply that he is refraining from listing works in that category (and this 
would be consistent, too, with the suggestion that he has omitted mention of 
Prognosis in My Own Books because he believed that work to be lost). If, on 
the other hand, he has made a decision to list his lost works too, it is odd, to 
say the least, that he lists them without mentioning whether they are extant 
or not.
If, on the other, most or all of these works are extant at the time of the writ-
ing of My Own Books, then we have to accept that a fairly vast number of works 
of Galen have been lost to us, but in a way which has nothing to do with the 
fire at the Temple of Peace. Of course, many works by ancient authors are lost, 
and one does not perhaps need any explanation for the partial nature of the 
transmission other than the central authority role that Galen came to have, in 
later antiquity and the middle ages, in medical curricula, as against his much 
less exalted role in logic or philosophy.
46   To these we may add some of those mentioned also in chs 16 [13], 17 [14] and 18 [15], with 
which, however, there is some overlap: those latter chapters list works under the head-
ings Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and thus (especially in the case of Plato) include works of 
broader philosophical interest; this chapter concentrates on works of a highly technical, 
logical bent.
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Still, returning to the former hypothesis, there are, I suppose, two possible 
explanations for the presence in My Own Books of a number of works which 
had already been lost at the date of that work’s composition. One is that – as 
we have seen in other contexts – Galen may hope that someone else has a copy 
of a work, even if he does not. That possibility would, admittedly, be in literal 
contradiction with the characterization of the works as for his own use alone; 
on the other hand, we have already seen Galen committing this contradiction. 
Another explanation, however, may lie in a closer consideration of this very 
concept: the date of composition of My Own Books.
This text, it seems to me, is likely to have been composed provisionally as a 
list and added to over years. Even if works composed after the early 190s are, in 
general, absent from it, and in that sense such a date is to be seen as that of its 
completion, it could still have undergone revision and updating at later times. 
It may be that the sentences mentioning the fire of 192 belong to such a later 
updating – an updating which nonetheless did not extend to the deletion of all 
references to works lost in the fire. Such non-deletion may seem odd; but the 
matter could be explained by some uncertainty – of a kind, I suppose, familiar 
to most scholars in relation to the organization of their most informal or pri-
vate sets of notes – in Galen’s own mind as to precisely what he still had, and 
where. At any rate, I think we may say that – if my account of My Own Books as 
a work which was composed over a period of time is correct – it is also possible 
that its revision was partial and incomplete. Or it may be that the vast body of 
works mentioned in ch. 14 [11] were indeed more ‘note-like’, sketchy and private 
in their use than others, and that this smaller circulation, or non- circulation, 
accounts for their loss – even though they were extant after the fire. On this 
interpretation, we are given no further information about the gumnazōn em-
auton category in which Galen claims to have lost so many books, and can in 
no way map it on to any existing list. We would also, on this view, have solved 
the problem of identifying a genuinely ‘not for publication’ category, within 
Galen’s explicit list of his own works; but would still be left with the puzzle as 
to the precise identity of the gumnazōn emauton works which were lost (and it 
might also seem strange that this vast set of listed works, if they genuinely were 
for private use and not copied, did survive the fire). Some puzzles, certainly, 
remain; but I hope that the above has shown with greater clarity what we 
learn from περὶ ἀλυπίας, taken in conjunction with Galen’s ‘autobibliographical’ 
remarks elsewhere, about book composition and distribution in the Graeco-
Roman world, about Galen’s own practices in particular, and about what can 




We should add, finally, that the above analysis should not be taken as denying 
that Galen does, indeed, intend certain of his works for different audiences, 
or that some such distinctions can be discovered.47 Rather, my claim is that 
such a distinction, within the extant works, cannot be mapped on to a theo-
retical one between works for ekdosis and works not for ekdosis – a distinction 
which Galen does not in fact make in this form – and further that those works 
which we do possess are, typically, both not for ekdosis (in the sense that this 
is Galen’s claim about his intention when writing them) and for ekdosis (in the 
sense that these same works are subsequently made available in an edition 
for distribution, with minimal if any differences between that ekdosis and the 
previous version, indeed with so complete an overlap between the original and 
the ekdosis that the author feels obliged to explain features of the final version 
on the basis of their original composition).
There are, however, other kinds of distinction in audience and intent, though 
these are seldom clear-cut. There is, to be sure, the distinct category of works 
for beginners. There are also works which can be understood, on the basis of 
what Galen himself says, as intended for a broader audience than the usual 
medical one consisting of his hetairoi. For example, Galen uses the phrase ‘for 
all’ to characterize his intention in writing De sanitate tuenda – a work which 
on other grounds too can be identified as aimed at a non-medical, or broader, 
readership.48 It is interesting to place this ‘for all’ alongside a similar formula-
tion in My Own Doctrines, in relation to his shorter ethical writings: ethical 
philosophy, he says there, is something both useful and possible for all to train 
themselves in, and he in this context mentions his composition of two books 
on the subject (presumably Affections and Errors).49 These are available for all 
47   In relation to this discussion see also the bibliography cited at n. 14 above.
48   ‘The function [I so translate here dunamis] of them [sc. the short works De optima corpo-
ris nostri constitutione, De bono habitu and De inaequali intemperie] is contained also in 
the work on Matters of Health, in which the different types of constitution of our body are 
stated for all (πᾶσιν)’, Ord. Lib. Prop. 2 (94,12–14 Boudon-Millot; n.b. not in the pre-Vlata-
don text); within the work itself he makes the distinction that it is for philiatroi, people 
interested in or friendly to medicine, as opposed to The Therapeutic Method which is ‘only 
for doctors’ (ἐν ἐκείνῃ… μόνοις διαλἐγομαι τοῖς ἰατροῖς, ἐνταυθοῖ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν, οὓς 
ὀνόματι κοινῷ προσαγορεύουσιν ἔνιοι φιλιάτρους, San. Tu. 4.5, VI.269 K. = 118,31–3 Koch).
49   Prop. Plac. 14 (188,17–19 Boudon-Millot and Pietrobelli): τὴν ἠθικὴν φιλοσοφίαν… χρησίμην 
τε ἅμα καὶ δυνατὴν… πᾶσι τοῖς βουλομένοις ἀσκῆσαι. The same text, incidentally, has a ref-
erence (if we trust the Greek MS rather than the Arabo-Latin tradition) to De naturali-
bus facultatibus as having been written ‘for all’ - an interesting notion in relation to the 
following point about De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis and De usu partium and their 
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to train towards virtue. And this may apply also to a range of other ‘occasional’ 
works on ethical and more popular themes (without their being extant, it is 
difficult to judge); indeed, the listing of such works in a series of separate chap-
ters towards the end of My Own Books seems to highlight their separate status; 
certainly they stand outside the main curriculum of scientific, anatomic al and 
medical works recommended for his students. And, as we have seen, there is a 
range of commentary-style works on specific philosophical texts and themes, 
mainly lost, which it seems that Galen does not intend for the majority of 
his readers, or even for the majority of his medical students, and which (al-
though, as we have seen, certainty in these areas is impossible) probably never 
achieved a wide circulation.
There are also, of course, considerable variations, within the central list 
of Galen’s work presented to us with an order for reading in My Own Books 
and The Order of My Own Books, as to how directly relevant they are to medic-
al training or practice. Indeed, the latter work explicitly states two different 
possible starting-points, or courses, for readers, within that central list. The 
only substantial difference made explicit is whether one starts with the great 
work (also lost), De demonstratione, or omits this – that is to say, whether 
one’s medic al training or knowledge will be based on the understanding of 
what constitutes a logically secure demonstration, and on the ability to pro-
duce such. But apart from that explicit distinction, there are others. Galen 
does not himself present the sliding scale of the course, from more theoretical 
areas – element theory, physiology – to the more practical, clinical ones, as 
a difference based on audience; that is, he does not explicitly suggest that a 
more practically, less theoretically, inclined student should cut to a later point 
in the curriculum. On the other hand, there are certain works which clearly 
belong both to an early phase in Galen’s clear and to the project of establish-
ing his intellectual reputation, in anatomy and related theoretical areas, in a 
highly competitive and public context, amongst the intellectuals of Rome. We 
have seen that on both internal grounds and the basis of what Galen tells us 
about the circumstances leading to their composition, both De usu partium 
and De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis – or, to be more precise, these works in 
a certain phase of their  composition – belong to that phase. These works are 
in that sense more ‘public’, and it is also true that their content, theoretical 
and scientific in nature –  indeed, laying out the most central of Galen’s views 
on the functioning and structure of the body – is less closely tied to medical 
usefulness.
broader, theoretical content: ἅπασι τοῖς ἰατροῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις, Prop. 
Plac. 3 (174,22–3 Boudon-Millot and Pietrobelli).
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On the other hand, such differences of original intent are occluded by Galen 
by the very fact of his listing, all together, of a central body of works in terms of 
suggested order of reading. This is, we have seen, a retrospective construction, 
which to a considerable extent tends to obscure those questions of original 
audience and argumentative context. And, as we have also seen, Galen repeat-
edly claims that his central body of works – including also the Hippocratic 
commentaries – is aimed at, and written at the request of, his hetairoi, stu-
dents, people with serious medical interests. Dual intent runs throughout this 
corpus. The claim that works were written for this specific group – or even for 
one member of it – is, for Galen, in no way in contradiction with the ambition 
to gain for them a wide distribution which will both enhance his reputation 
and disseminate his views throughout the intellectual world.
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chapter 5
Galen’s Περὶ Ἀλυπίας as Philosophical Therapy: 
How Coherent is It?
Christopher Gill
In this discussion, I consider Galen’s περὶ ἀλυπίας as an exercise in philosophi-
cal therapy of the emotions. I focus on the question how far it is a coherent 
work, when taken in this context. Overall, I conclude that it is largely coherent; 
but it also raises some significant questions in this respect, and consideration 
of these questions helps us to define the distinctive character of the work and 
its contribution to the genre.1
1 Galen’s Two Therapeutic Works: The Question of Coherence
By Galen’s time, Hellenistic-Roman writing on the therapy of the emotions 
formed a well-established genre. Although there are some earlier precursors 
(especially Plato),2 the genre was decisively shaped by Stoic and Epicurean 
thinkers.3 It was also adopted by Academic or Platonic thinkers, notably 
Cicero and Plutarch. Galen contributed to the genre in two surviving works, 
Avoiding Distress (περὶ ἀλυπίας = De Indolentia, or Ind.) and the first book of The 
1   See also, on περὶ ἀλυπίας, as philosophical therapy, Gill, C. (2010), Naturalistic Psychology in 
Galen and Stoicism, 262–68; Galien tome IV: Ne pas se chagriner, eds. V. Boudon-Millot et al. 
(2010) (=BJP), xxxix–lviii; Nutton, in Galen, Psychological Writings, ed. Singer (2013), 61–68; 
Kaufman, D. H., ‘Galen on the Therapy of Distress and the Limits of Emotional Therapy’, 
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 47, 2014, 275–96; Xenophontos, S., ‘Psychotherapy and 
Moralising Rhetoric in Galen’s Newly Discovered Peri Alypias’, Medical History 58.4, 2014, 
585–603. The present discussion focuses on the question of coherence more than these other 
treatments, with the exception of Kaufman, ‘Therapy’, who discusses this question in 276–89. 
On interpretation of Ind., see also the essays in Rothschild, C. K. Thompson, T. W. (eds.), 
Galen’s De Indolentia, 2014.
2   On the earlier history of the genre, see Laín Entralgo, P., The Therapy of the Word in Classical 
Antiquity, 1970; Gill, C., ‘Ancient psychotherapy’, Journal of the History of Ideas 46.3, 1985, 307–
25, esp. 320–25.
3   See Gill, Naturalistic Psychology, 246–300, on Galen’s two works in the context of the genre; 
also, on Hellenistic-Roman philosophical therapy, Hadot, I. (1994) Seneca und die griechische-
römische Tradition der Seelenleitung; Nussbaum, M. C. (1994). The Therapy of Desire; Sorabji, R. 
(2000). Emotion and Peace of Mind, esp. chs. 11–17.
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Diagnosis and Treatment of the Affections and Errors Peculiar to Each Person’s 
Soul (Aff. Pecc. Dig.; first book is Aff. Dig.).4 Galen was the only ancient medical 
writer to do so, as far as we know; and this reflects his exceptional ambition to 
combine medicine and philosophy. His two writings in this genre are not, in 
any obvious way, influenced by his work as doctor, and reflect, to a large extent, 
the characteristic themes of philosophical therapy.5 Among earlier works of 
this kind, Galen certainly knew what was probably the key founding text in 
the genre, Chrysippus’ (lost) ‘therapeutic’ book (Book 4 of On Passions = peri 
pathōn), and criticised it extensively in The Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato 
(PHP).6 However, he seems to have been more directly influenced by works 
such as Plutarch’s On Contentment (peri euthumias) and On Avoidance of Anger 
(peri aorgēsias). These are shorter and more practically oriented writings; they 
are also philosophically eclectic, or at least less uniformly shaped by a single 
intellectual approach than Chrysippus’ ‘therapeutic’ book or subsequent Stoic 
or Epicurean works in the genre.7 Even so, all these writings, including Galen’s 
two works, express certain broad conceptual patterns which go back, at least, 
to the Stoic-Epicurean roots of the genre. They do not only discuss the manage-
ment or control of emotions (either emotions in generally or a specific emo-
tion), especially negative, disturbing or distressing emotions, and recommend 
methods for promoting this process. They also reflect the claim, accepted in 
varying degrees by all the philosophical schools, that the roots of our happi-
ness or well-being (including our emotional state) are ‘up to us’ or fall within 
our power as psychological agents. The overall project of philosophical therapy 
is to find ways of ‘curing’ painful or ‘diseased’ emotional states by exercising 
this agency. This depends, typically, on activating our capacity to develop the 
virtues, or to do so more fully; this process of development not only rids us 
4   English titles as in Galen, Psychological Writings. Abbreviations of Latin titles of Galen’s 
works as in Hankinson, R. J. (2008). The Cambridge Companion to Galen, 399–403.
5   On Galen as author of both medical and ethical writings (though not combining the two ap-
proaches), see Singer, general introduction in Galen, Psychological Writings, 10–15, 26–30; also 
Gill, Naturalistic Psychology, 300–29. See also Gill, C. ‘Philosophical psychological therapy – 
did it have any impact on medical practice?’ in Thumiger, C. and Singer, P. N. (eds) (2018), 
Mental Illness in Ancient Medicine, 365–80.
6   For a reconstruction of Chrysippus’ therapeutikon, see Tieleman, T. (2003). Chrysippus’ On 
Affections: Reconstruction and Interpretation, 140–97, 326; also Gill, Naturalistic Psychology, 
280–95.
7   On links between Plutarch’s peri euthumias and Gal. Ind., see BJP, x–xi, xl–xli. On the phil-
osophical approach of Plutarch’s essays, see Gill, C. ‘Peace of Mind and Being Yourself: 
Panaetius to Plutarch’, in Haase, W. and Temporini, H. (1994). Aufstieg und Niedergang der 
römischen Welt II.36.7, 4599–4640, esp. 4624–31, Naturalistic Psychology, 250–1; Van Hoof, L. 
(2010). Plutarch’s Practical Ethics, ch. 4.
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of vices of character but also of negative or misguided emotions linked with 
those vices.8
Why is the question of coherence an important one to raise in connection 
with Galen’s works in this genre? Both of them offer some grounds for con-
cern in this respect, regarding the choice and organisation of themes and also 
the conceptual framework applied. Aff. Dig., the longer work, can be seen as 
breaking down into two halves. The first half (Aff. Dig. V.1–27 K. = 3–19 DB), on 
emotions in general, is rather generic in its approach, and employs themes and 
methods of emotional management characteristic of a wide range of writings 
in this genre. The second half (V.27–57 K. = 19–37 DB), increasingly, focuses on 
a single vice, ‘insatiability’ (aplēstia), presented as underlying a wide range of 
emotional disturbances (V.45–52 K. = 31–35 DB). This theme is also handled 
in a more individual way, including a section on Galen’s upbringing and his 
father’s influence and the lessons learnt in that way, a section which is similar 
in content to the latter part of Ind (V.40–45 K = 27–30 DB).9 This contrast be-
tween the two parts of Aff. Dig. corresponds to the use of two distinct address-
ees, characterised in significantly different ways.10 The question of coherence 
also arises as regards the philosophical framework informing the approach to 
therapy. As I have argued elsewhere, Aff. Dig. displays an uneasy combination 
of Stoic-Epicurean and Platonic-Aristotelian approaches, marked by two main 
points of contrast. Stoicism and Epicureanism assume a unified conception of 
human psychology, in which emotions and desires are shaped by beliefs and 
reasoning, whereas the Platonic-Aristotelian framework, as understood in this 
period, assumes a substantive division between rational and non-rational parts 
of the psyche. Second, Stoicism and Epicureanism presuppose that human be-
ings are all naturally capable of developing towards virtue and happiness. By 
contrast, the Platonic-Aristotelian view is that ethical development depends 
on a combination of the appropriate kind of inborn nature, family or commu-
nal upbringing, and intellectual education. Elsewhere in his writings (notably 
in PHP and QAM., ch. 11), Galen underlines these points of contrast and argues 
strongly for a Platonic-Aristotelian approach on both topics.11 However, in Aff. 
Dig., Galen’s discussion reflects both approaches, without acknowledging the 
rather different implications they have for the management of emotions, the 
scope for change at different points in one’s life and for methods of therapy. 
8    See Gill, C. ‘Philosophical Therapy as Preventive Psychological Medicine’, in Harris, W. 
(ed) (2013). Mental Disorders in the Classical World, 339–60, and refs. in n. 3.
9    See text to nn. 18–21.
10   Gal. Aff. Dig. V.1, 13–14; 37, 48–51 K. = 3, 11; 25, 32–34 DB. See also Singer, introduction to Aff. 
Dig., in Galen, Psychological Works, 218–19.
11   See Gill, Naturalistic Psychology, 214–29.
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Although, in the first part, the Stoic-Epicurean influence is more marked, and 
in the second part, the Platonic-Aristotelian approach is more evident,12 the 
distinction is not systematically maintained. For instance, the therapeutic 
method consistently recommended is rational self-monitoring and conscious 
self-correction, a method that matches the Stoic-Epicurean approach rather 
than the Platonic-Aristotelian.13 So, when examined closely, Aff. Dig. exhibits 
problems of cohesion both in structure and philosophical consistency, despite 
presenting itself as a unified study of the management of emotions.
On the face of it, Ind. also exhibits problems of structure or organisation 
of themes, and raises questions about its philosophical coherence. As regards 
structure, there is an obvious division between the first half, cataloguing 
Galen’s many losses in the great fire in Rome of AD 162 (1–37) and the second 
half, which presents themes characteristic of the therapy of emotions (38–84).14 
Of course, the two halves are explicitly linked: the overall aim, signalled in the 
initial address and underlined subsequently, is to explain why Galen was not 
distressed by losses, detailed in the first half, which would be expected to cause 
distress, and which caused distress to others.15 Even so, the scale and detailed 
elaboration of the catalogue of Galen’s losses is quite exceptional, within 
the genre of philosophical therapy, and it is not obvious why this degree and 
kind of detail is needed for this purpose. Also, the second half seems to break 
down, into a number of distinct sections or phases, and the rationale for the 
ordering of these sections is not immediately clear. The first and last sections 
(39–48 and 79–84) are centred on a critique of insatiability (aplēstia), the first 
of which is rather generic (typical of the genre of philosophical therapy of 
emotions). Another element, rather puzzlingly repeated, is a quotation from 
Euripides, which was often cited in connection with a well-known method of 
therapeutic training, the ‘preparation for future evils’, alluded to in Ind. 52–57, 
12   See e.g. V. 4–5, 7, 16–17, 24 K. = 5, 7, 12–13, 17 DB) (Stoic-Epicurean view: all or most emo-
tions/passions, pathē, are psychological sicknesses or forms of ‘madness’ to be cured or 
extirpated, and ethical progress can be correlated with this process); V. 27–34 K. = 19–23 
DB (Platonic-Aristotelian view: distinction between ‘education’, paideusis, and ‘disciplin-
ing’, kolasis, and stress on ‘habituation’, coupled with distinction between rational and 
non-rational parts of psyche).
13   Methods recommended are sustained self-scrutiny, using a critical adviser, adjusting your 
ideas about what you really need: see e.g. V.6–7, 8–14, 20–21, 51–3, 55–6 K. = 6, 7–11, 15, 
34–35, 36–37 DB. See Gill, Naturalistic Psychology, 252–62; also Singer, introduction to 
Aff. Dig., in Galen, Psychological Writings, 220–28. However, Hankinson, R. ‘Actions and 
passions’, in Brunschwig, J. and Nussbaum, M. C. (eds), Passions and Perceptions, 1993, 
198–204, sees Galen’s approach in Aff. Dig. as more coherent.
14   Numbers of sections in Ind. as in BJP (2010) and Galen, Psychological Writings, 2013.
15   See text to n. 25.
139Galen’s Περὶ Ἀλυπίας as Philosophical Therapy
76–7.16 Along with these more standard features of philosophical therapy, we 
also have, as well as the recollection of the horrors of Commodus’ rule (54–5), 
the more personal reminiscence of the psychological and ethical influence of 
Galen’s father (54–68). This incorporates a series of philosophical or quasi-
philosophical reflections, presented as underlying Galen’s equanimity in the 
face of losses (61–68). Another section seems to offer a more pragmatic or 
qualified version of the philosophical principles just outlined, setting out the 
minimum standards needed, in Galen’s view, for an endurable form of human 
life (69–78). Although I think there is an underlying rationale for this set of 
topics and for their linkage with the opening catalogue of losses, it is easy to 
form the impression of a rather miscellaneous, even ramshackle, structure.17
One can also question whether there is a coherent philosophical, or at least 
conceptual, framework. The most densely philosophical section is the resu-
mé of ideas in 61–68, which hovers, rather awkwardly, between reportage of 
Galen’s father’s advice and Galen’s own, philosophically informed, conclusions. 
Although this section seems to evoke the ethical positions of various philo-
sophical schools, it is less clear which theories are being evoked and whether 
the section as a whole hangs together and adds up to an overall framework 
for maintaining equanimity. The dominant note has sometimes been seen as 
Aristotelian; but there is a strong case for seeing it as Stoic. However, exactly, 
we interpret this resumé, we need also to correlate it with the following section 
in which Galen explicitly distances himself from Stoic and Epicurean ideals of 
emotional invulnerability from disaster, 69–75. Further, though less obviously, 
there is the question how the two middle sections in the second half (61–8, 
69–78) relate to Galen’s advice on avoiding insatiability, which comes earlier 
and later (39–48, 79–84).
The difficulty of gauging the structure and conceptual framework just high-
lighted emerges more strongly if we compare the second part of Ind. with the 
closely analogous section of Aff. Dig. (V.37 K.–52 K. =25–34 DB). In Aff. Dig., we 
find similar motifs to those just noted in the second half of Ind.: (1) explanation 
why Galen shows exceptional equanimity (V.37–38 K. = 25–26 DB); (2) clarifi-
cation of the respective roles of inborn nature (V.38–40 K. = 26–27 DB), fam-
ily upbringing (V.41 K. =28 DB), and intellectual education, combined with his 
father’s advice (V.41–43 K. =28–29 DB); (3) the personal impact of these factors 
16   Euripides fr. 814 Mette = fr. 94 Nauck; also cited in Gal. PHP V.418 K. = De Lacy 282.17–23, 
[Plu.] Consol. Ad Apoll. (Moralia) 112 D, and (in Latin), Cic. Tusc. 3.29. It was regularly cited 
in connection with the therapeutic strategy of ‘preparation for future evils’, recommend-
ed by both Cyrenaics and Stoics; see Cic. Tusc. 3.28–31, 52; also Tieleman, Chrysippus, 
311–14, Gill, Naturalistic Psychology, 290, BJP, 139–42.
17   On this whole sequence of topics, see BJP, xxix–lviii.
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on Galen and his view of the minimum conditions for an endurable human 
life (V.43–5 K =29–30 DB); (4) a sustained critique of insatiability and corre-
lated commendation of self-sufficiency (autarkeia) (V.46–52 K. =31–34 DB).18 
Although the themes themselves are highly comparable in both works, the am-
pler scale and fuller explication in Aff. Dig. make it easier to discern the overall 
line of thought. Galen’s main point is that a proper realisation of the misguid-
ed character of the emotional force of insatiability, and its corrosive effect on 
human happiness, is crucial for achieving both self-sufficiency and equanimity 
in the face or prospect of material losses (V.51–52 K. = 34 DB). However, a cru-
cial prerequisite for grasping this point properly and making it genuinely part 
of one’s character is the kind of nature, upbringing and education that Galen 
had. This, presumably, explains the difference emphasised between Galen and 
his addressee. Although they are both wealthy members of their society, Galen 
is more ready to spend his income and to do so in a way that benefits others, 
and is also not worried about money. The addressee is much richer, but also 
less willing to spend on himself or others, and is also much more anxious, be-
cause he is gripped by the insatiable desire to have more money than others, 
without any need to do so (V.47–51 K. = 32–34 DB). This may also explain the 
points made subsequently that Galen’s advice to others has been generally in-
effective and that in people more advanced in years this vice is too ingrained 
to be removed (V.53–54 K. =35–36 DB).
Another feature that is clearer in Aff. Dig. is the precise content of the ad-
vice offered by Galen’s father (which is cited as direct quotation in V.42–43 K. 
= 29 DB). In Ind., by contrast, it is less evident what is and is not being ascribed 
to Galen’s father. The quotation of his father’s view in Aff. Dig. also makes it 
plain that the paternal advice is neutral between philosophical theories, and is 
presented as a kind of ‘consensus-position’, shared also by non-philosophers. 
It is also more apparent in Aff. Dig. that the intellectual eclecticism or indepen-
dence which is also implied, I think, in Ind. 61–8 (and which is Galen’s typical 
stance) is the product of his father’s advice.19 Also, Galen here ascribes to his 
father the account of the minimum level of possessions needed for a life free 
from distress, namely what is enough to keep one from hunger, thirst or cold, 
which is presented in Ind. as Galen’s own opinion.20
18   On these similarities, see also BJP xlv–xlix, lv–lviii; Nutton, introduction to Ind. in Galen, 
Psychological Writings, 65–66; Xenophontos, ‘Psychotherapy’, 2014, 598–600.
19   See para. including n. 46. See also Hankinson, R.J. ‘Galen’s Philosophical Eclecticism’, in 
Haase, W, and Temporini, H. eds, Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, II.36.5, 
1992, 3502–22. On Galen’s philosophical eclecticism in Ind., see also Kaufman, ‘Therapy’, 
286–7, and the appeal to his father’s authority, ‘Therapy’, 291.
20   Aff. Dig. V.44 K. = 30 DB: Ind. 78.
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In the light of the fuller articulation of themes and the clearer specification 
of the father’s influence, I am inclined to see Aff. Dig. as the later work, and as 
a reworking (at least in the sections discussed) of similar themes. This dating 
matches some of the other evidence bearing on this question. The main obsta-
cle to this view of their relative dates is the curious omission of any reference 
in Aff. Dig. V.44 K. = 30 DB, where more minor losses are noted, to the substan-
tial losses so fully emphasised in Ind (1–37). However, the losses in the fire of 
192, even if they had been mentioned, were not enough to cause Galen any real 
material discomfort or loss of social standing, let alone leaving him hungry or 
cold (the levels of loss he specifies as really significant in Aff. Dig. V.44 K. =30 
DB). Also, although Galen presents himself as exemplary in both works, it is 
on rather different grounds. In Ind. Galen’s equanimity in the face of his losses 
is central for the whole work and the therapeutic strategy. In Aff. Dig., shortly 
after this passage, Galen sets up a contrast between himself and the addressee, 
in which both are presented as wealthy people, but Galen is willing to use his 
resources for himself and others, whereas the other man hoards his resources 
because of the insatiable desire to accumulate property for its own sake (V.48–
49 K = 32–33 DB). It may be that Galen de-emphasises his earlier losses in Aff. 
Dig. because they are not relevant for this specific contrast.21
2 Galen’s De Indolentia: Underlying Cohesion
In the light of this analysis of the latter part of Aff. Dig., I return to Ind., taking 
up the question whether there is more underlying cohesion than is initially 
obvious. In fact, I think that the pattern of thought just outlined in Aff. Dig. 
also forms the organising framework for Ind., both for the second half and also, 
though less obviously, for the work as a whole. The aim of the quasi-philosoph-
ical reflections in 61–68 remains rather puzzling; but the opening catalogue 
of losses makes good sense in this framework. The core theme emerges most 
clearly towards the end of the work. The key prerequisite for gaining freedom 
from distress (alupia) is freeing yourself from ‘insatiability’ (aplēstia), the rest-
less desire for more (especially more material possessions) that afflicts many 
21   On the dating question, see Nutton, introduction to Ind. in Galen, Psychological Writings, 
2013, 45–48, which I follow, by contrast with BJP, lviii–lxi, which places Aff. Dig. before 
Ind. The fact that Galen presents himself in Therapeutic Method, probably written in 
the late 190s (i.e. later than Ind. or Aff. Dig.) as intensely distressed for long periods (MM 
X.456–457 K.) (cf. Nutton, ibid. 67) suggests that Galen’s self-presentation is often shaped 
for the needs of the context of writing. On Galen’s self-presentation and authority, see 
Xenophontos, ‘Psychotherapy’, 2014, 590–93.
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people, but especially the rich (79–84). A correlative of this advice is recognis-
ing what is really needed to make a human life that is free from distress – more 
precisely, recognising how little is needed to achieve this. Galen spells out sev-
eral times what is required: namely, an adequate level of bodily and psycho-
logical health, combined with enough material possessions to avoid physical 
discomfort (71–6, 78). However, this minimum level needs to be accompanied 
by the right mental attitude, which enables one to regard this standard of liv-
ing as acceptable. Achieving this attitude depends on psychological training, 
formulated here (77, cf. 52) in terms of a Euripidean passage frequently cited 
in support of the philosophical therapeutic method of ‘preparation for future 
evils’.22 As brought out earlier in the work, the effectiveness of this training 
depends, in turn, on nature, upbringing and education.23 Although this overall 
line of thought is spelled out most clearly here (in what seems to be signalled 
earlier as Galen’s ‘second’ explanation for equanimity),24 it also makes sense 
of the previous part of the second half and also, in a different way, of the cata-
logue of losses in the first half of the work.
To some extent, the function of the catalogue of losses is made apparent 
from the start. The work is presented as a letter in response to an invitation 
‘to show you what kind of training, what arguments or what considerations 
had prepared me never to be distressed’ (1).25 Galen’s equanimity in the face 
of the very extensive losses experienced in the great fire at Rome in AD 162 
represents the most striking expression of a fortitude shown by him in earlier 
losses (1–2). The losses are outlined in 4–6, together with a pointed contrast be-
tween Galen’s equanimity and the terminal or funereal despair of others in the 
same situation (7). This prepares the ground for the promised explanation for 
Galen’s absence of distress (1) in the latter half of the work (38–84). However, 
this rationale is not quite sufficient, at least, if we are interpreting the work as a 
contribution to the philosophical therapy of emotions. The main relevant fea-
tures of the situation are set out in 1–7. Why then do we need, for this purpose, 
another 30 chapters cataloguing Galen’s losses in such detail? Admittedly, 
Galen does not only list losses. He also underlines features that made the 
losses particularly severe, notably the impossibility of replacing Galen’s, often 
22   See n. 16.
23   See Ind. 79, also 51, 57, 65. In these passages, by contrast with Aff. Dig. V.48–52 = 32–4 DB, 
Galen stresses the similarity of character between himself and the addressee. See also on 
this point Kaufman, Therapy, 2014, 292–3.
24   I take it that Ind. 70–83 amplifies the explanation said to be complete in 69, and thus 
provides the ‘second’ explanation signalled in 39.
25   Translations taken from Galen, Psychological Writings, 2013. For an alternative English 
translation, see Rothschild, C. K., Thompson, T. W. (eds.), Galen’s De Indolentia, 2014.
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personally annotated, books (12b–19), losses intensified by the timing, just be-
fore Galen sent a substantial number of copied works to Campania (20–29). 
Galen also concludes the catalogue (30–37) by enumerating a unique collec-
tion of drug recipes, of immense value for his medical work, along with many 
other medical items lost in the fire. While accentuating these very substantial 
losses, which were items hugely valuable as support for Galen’s intellectual life 
and his mission as a medical writer and practitioner, Galen stresses, repeatedly, 
that he was not distressed by their loss (11–12a, 29–30, 37). So it might seem 
that, even for therapeutic purposes (setting aside any purely autobiographical 
objectives), the catalogue of losses is fully explained.
However, I think we can see one further salient objective, if we bear in mind 
the aim of counteracting ‘insatiability’ (aplēstia), apparent at the close of the 
work (78–84, esp. 80–81). Galen, here and in Aff. Dig., does not simply identify 
this vice in general terms. He also spells out, often in precise numerical terms, 
the scale of the desires and ambitions of those afflicted by this vice. He speci-
fies in the same numerical terms the attitudes of those, such as Aristippus, 
who endured significant losses without distress.26 By the end of the work, we 
are also in a position to recognise the sharp contrast between these extrava-
gant desires and the minimum level that human beings actually need for a life 
free from distress (78–84). Galen’s particularised catalogue of his losses (1–37), 
like the much briefer sketch of Aristippus’ response to his losses (40–42), thus 
serves as a powerful contrast to those extravagant desires. Whereas insatiabil-
ity yearns for an ever-increasing amount and plurality of possessions, Galen’s 
catalogue spells out in graphic detail all that one can live without – while still 
remaining un-distressed. The catalogue of losses can thus be seen as a comple-
ment to the later specification of the minimal conditions needed for a human 
life free from distress: Galen is saying, ‘look at how much one can live with-
out’, as well as ‘look at how little one can manage with’. From this standpoint, 
the scale and particularity of Galen’s catalogue serves a therapeutic function 
(whatever autobiographical function it may also have). The fact that Galen’s 
list of losses focuses on the destruction of resources for intellectual activity 
and medical practice, rather than more standard examples of precious objects, 
is not, perhaps, directly relevant for this broad, moralising point. However, 
it does illustrate that ‘insatiability’ can take many different forms, not all of 
which are obviously moral defects. Also, of course, it takes us to the heart of 
the significance of these losses for Galen. Although this is, on the face of it, a 
26   Ind. 41–48, esp. 42–43, 45, 47, also 83; Aff. Dig. V.46–47, 49 K. (=31–32, 33 DB); see also BJP 
lv–lviii.
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purely personal point, it has significant implications for his therapeutic mes-
sage explored in the final section of this discussion.
How far does the linkage between aplēstia and alupia, made at the end of 
the work, together with the parallel with the relevant section of Aff. Dig., help 
us to make sense of the earlier sections in the second part (38–68) and the 
overall sequence of thought? The relevance for the opening section of Galen’s 
explanation for not being distressed (39–48) is clear. Galen’s use of stock an-
ecdotes and exemplars from the therapeutic tradition (especially Aristippus) 
illustrates the contrast between insatiability and taking a realistic view of what 
one has, and thus not being distressed by loss, which is articulated more fully 
later.27 However, Galen also underlines the limitations of this initial, and rath-
er generic, set of exemplars for his purposes. He acknowledges, first of all, the 
difference between his financial situation and that of some of the philosophi-
cal exemplars he refers to (notably, the Cynics Crates and Diogenes and the 
Stoic Zeno, 45, 48). What was left for Galen was ‘much more than sufficient’ 
(46). Also, what Galen accentuates was not just his lack of distress at the loss of 
money or standardly valuable items, but rather the drugs and writings central 
for his mission in life (50). It was his lack of distress at this loss which consti-
tuted ‘a prime display of nobility and nigh on magnanimity’ (50) that needs to 
be explained. So the opening illustration of the difference between insatiabil-
ity and realism is marked as only a preliminary move in Galen’s explanation, 
and his therapeutic strategy.
How is the explanation developed? First, Galen has recourse to another 
rather standard feature of the philosophical genre, the strategy of preparing 
for misfortune by anticipating it in your mind, illustrated by the Euripides 
passage also cited later (52–3, 76).28 He gives this stock item a more personal 
force – and one which would have resonated strongly with his contemporary 
readers – by presenting it as his way of coping with the horrors and unpredict-
ability of the rule of Commodus, only just ended (54–6). However, more sig-
nificant is his next move, a qualification of the usefulness of this method, or, by 
implication, of the earlier recommendation to avoid insatiability, taken on its 
own. ‘This prescription cannot be given to those with no natural aptitude for 
courage or without an excellent education, which a generous fate vouchsafed 
to me’ (57). This point is developed by reference to Galen’s father, who was 
naturally exceptional for his ‘justice and self-control’ (58) and who had in turn 
27   Ind. 43, 45, cf. 80–2 (also 71–5, 78). The Aristippus anecdotes appear also in Diog. Laert. 
2.77, Plut. peri euthumias (Mor.) 469 C–D.
28   See n. 16. Kaufman, ‘Therapy’, 2014, 281–4, stresses the importance of this theme in Galen’s 
therapeutic strategy in Ind.
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been ‘trained from childhood in virtue’ (59). Galen spells out the inference: ‘So 
you may suppose that I am naturally like my forebears because I was born like 
this and, moreover, because I had an identical upbringing, I have a similar dis-
position of soul to them’ (60). At this point, as in the comparable section of Aff 
Dig., Galen signals his adherence to the Platonic-Aristotelian, rather than Stoic 
or Epicurean, pattern of thinking about ethical development.29 Philosophical 
strategies, such as ‘preparation for future evils’, and indeed philosophical ad-
vice generally, are not enough by themselves to shape character and reactions. 
They are only effective if grounded on the right kind of inborn nature and 
childhood habituation, a point underlined by reference to the addressee, who 
is presented as someone who shares these advantages (51, 57, 79).
However, Galen goes on to outline a number of philosophical principles, 
and to say that these were (presumably, in conjunction with his nature and up-
bringing) influential on his state of mind: ‘Brought up in this way of thinking, 
I always consider these things of little value, so how could I suppose leisure, 
instruments, drugs, books, reputation and riches to be precious?’ (65) This out-
line of philosophical ideas and their effect (61–8) is the most problematic part 
of the work, generating interpretative problems of various kinds. It is difficult, 
first, to determine whether Galen is reporting his father’s ethical principles or 
offering his own account of them (or of his own ideas). He begins by reporting 
them (61–2) and implies in 65 that these were the parental ideals that shaped 
his upbringing. But in 63–4 he seems to be thinking the ideas out for himself. 
In 64, he refers to his own views or at least his reflections on certain received 
views, and in 67 he cites his own opinions and, indeed, ‘logical proof’ of the 
claims made (67, also 68). A further complication is that, although the pas-
sage evokes specific themes in philosophical ethics, Galen says that his father 
‘did not consort with philosophers in his youth’ and that his father’s principles 
were based on his being ‘trained from childhood in virtue’ (59). Hence, the 
philosophical connotations of the passage, whether presented as reportage of 
his father’s views or not, must be Galen’s addition. As noted earlier, the compa-
rable Aff. Dig. passage is much clearer in this respect, explicitly quoting Galen’s 
father’s advice, as well as reporting his commendation of a kind of ‘consen-
sus-position’, shared by many philosophers and ordinary people.30 Although 
we may think that a similar view is implied here, emerging out of the various 
29   See text to nn. 11, 18. Kaufman, ‘Therapy, 292–3, also underlines this point.
30   See text to nn. 19–20. As noted there, in Aff. Dig., the specification of a minimum level of 
life is presented as part of Galen’s father’s advice (V.44 K. = 30 DB), whereas in Ind., this ap-
pears as a subsequent qualification by Galen of the philosophical ideas, which are linked 
(though loosely) with his father (71–5, 78).
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 allusions to philosophical positions in 61–8, this is not actually explicit, leaving 
the overall significance rather unclear.
A second problem lies in establishing which philosophical theories are 
being evoked in the passage, as well as how far these evocations add up to a 
single line of thought. The most unequivocal allusion is the rejection, first, of 
vulgar hedonism, and then of the subtler Epicurean view of pleasure (that of 
‘being merely free from pain and distress’) as a plausible candidate for being 
the goal of human life (or the good) in 62. This is reinforced by the subsequent 
dismissal of the idea ‘that remaining undisturbed’ (aochlēsia) is the good, along 
with Galen’s reference to his own Against (or On) Epicurus (68).31 The review 
of principles begins with the striking claim that ‘my father despised human af-
fairs as of little worth, and this is exactly the same for me in my old age’ (61). The 
rather lofty, ‘god’s-eye’, stance of this passage, may evoke two striking Platonic 
passages in the Republic (a work Galen knew well), bearing in mind that the 
whole passage is designed to explain the ‘magnanimity’ (megalopsuchia) with 
which Galen bore his losses.32 A later passage, referring to Galen as writing, not 
‘with zealous enthusiasm or as something tremendous, but simply as a kind of 
hobby’ (67) seems also to allude to a well-marked Platonic comment on the rel-
atively low value of writing in the Phaedrus.33 In 63–4, Galen gives a prominent 
place to the idea that the good (or goal of human life) is ‘knowledge of mat-
ters human and divine’. Although some commentators have seen this phrase 
as Aristotelian in provenance,34 Teun Tieleman, writing in this volume, argues 
strongly that the allusion is to Stoic ideas, since this phrase was a standard 
31   For the Epicurean ideal, see Long, A. A. and Sedley, D. N., The Hellenistic Philosophers 1987 
(= LS) (refs. to sections and passages), 21 A–B. The ideal of ‘remaining undisturbed’ is 
also associated with other thinkers, including the Peripatetic Hieronymus of Rhodes (BJP, 
162), but Epicurus seems to be meant here.
32   See Republic 486a: the world-view of the ‘philosophical nature’ is characterised as includ-
ing the kind of ‘magnificence’ (megaloprepeia) that makes one regard human life as noth-
ing great (mega); 604b–c: the rational response to misfortune includes seeing human life 
as not ‘worth great seriousness’ (axion … megalēs spoudēs).
33   Phaedrus 276c–e, philosophical writing (as opposed to oral dialectic) should not be done 
as something worthy of seriousness (spoudē) but as a ‘hobby’ (paidia), 276c7, d3, e1, 5. 
Galen refers to both Platonic works (esp. Republic) a good deal, esp. in PHP: see Galen, 
PHP, ed. P. De Lacy, vol. 3, 831 (index locorum). The comment is sometimes taken (BJP, 
161) as referring to Galen’s writing specifically about ethics (‘each of these things’, 67), 
as opposed to medicine; but, bearing in mind his previous dismissal of the importance 
of ‘instruments, drugs, books’ in 65, his comments, like Plato’s, may apply to writing in 
general.
34   Nutton, in Galen, Psychological Writings, 94, n. 104, cites Arist. Met. VI.1, 1026a18–32, XI.7, 
1064b1–4; BJP, 156–7, also see Aristotelian influence but offers no refs.
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formulation for wisdom (the ideal human state) in Stoicism.35 Tieleman links 
this phrase with the ‘magnanimity’ accentuated in 50–51, pointing out that the 
relevant sense of this term, namely facing adversities in a courageous spirit, 
has clear Stoic, rather than Aristotelian, connotations.36 However, Aristotle’s 
stress on the idea that the goal of life must be an activity not a state may be 
alluded to in the final comment in the passage, criticising the Epicurean ideal 
of ‘remaining undisturbed’ (68).37
Even if we are confident about charting these allusions, there remains the 
problem of making sense of the overall line of thought in the passage, taken in 
the context of the work as a whole. One approach worth considering is a broad-
ly Stoic reading, building on Tieleman’s interpretation of the connotations of 
the terms. The underlying line of thought would be some version of the Stoic 
claim that happiness depends wholly on virtue, and that ‘external things’ such 
as material goods and reputation are, relatively, ‘matters of indifference’.38 The 
Stoic conception of magnanimity as fortitude in the face of disaster reflects 
this general view, as does their belief that possession of virtue brings with it 
inner peace of mind, regardless of external circumstances (ideas that figure 
prominently in Stoic or Stoic-influenced therapeutic writings).39 On this read-
ing, Galen interprets his father’s adherence to virtue (‘justice and self-control’, 
58) primarily in Stoic terms. This would explain Galen’s conclusion that ‘exter-
nal things’ such as ‘leisure, instruments, drugs, books, reputation and riches’ 
are ‘of little value’, that is, in more technical Stoic terms, they are only, at most, 
‘preferred indifferents’ (65).40 In support of this view is the prominent role 
played elsewhere by the Euripidean passage linked with the strategy of ‘prepa-
ration for future evils’, which was recognised as a Stoic, rather than Epicurean, 
method, though it was not peculiar to them.41 As so interpreted, Galen’s excep-
tional equanimity concerning his great losses in the fire would be explained, 
primarily, in Stoic terms.
Although this interpretation is coherent, and matches some points in the 
text, I do not think it is, in the end, tenable. A rather obvious problem is that 
35   See e.g. SVF 2.35, 36, also 3.362. See also Brouwer, R. (2014), The Stoic Sage, 8–41.
36   See e.g. Cic. Off. 1.15, also SVF 3.264, 265; contrast Arist. Eth. Nic. 4.3.
37   Arist. Eth. Nic. 1098a5–18, 1098b30–1099a7. On this theme in later Peripatetic thought, see 
Inwood, B., Ethics after Aristotle, 2014, 69–70, 109–10; see e.g. Cic. Fin. 5.55–57 (based on 
Antiochus, an Academic influenced by Peripatetic ideas).
38   LS 58 and 63.
39   See e.g. Cic. Off. 1.66–69, Cic. Tusc. 5.40–1, 81–2, Sen. Tranq. 11, 14, 16; see Gill, ‘Peace of 
mind’, 4609–10, 4615–16, 4621–2.
40   See LS 58; also Xenophontos, ‘Psychotherapy’, 2014, 596.
41   See n. 16. According to Cic. Tusc. 3.32–3, Epicureans favoured, rather, averting the mind 
from bad things.
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in 63–64, Galen adopts a very guarded or cautious attitude towards this ideal, 
or at least towards putting it into practice. Galen’s wording and line of thought 
is particularly murky here.42 But the main point seems to be that it is very dif-
ficult to gain ‘knowledge of human and divine affairs’ (the Stoic account of the 
human good) with sufficient understanding to put it into practice. In fact, the 
Stoics do believe that wisdom, the human ideal state, is very hard, even virtu-
ally impossible, to achieve fully, though they also maintain it is the appropriate 
target for everyone; and this combination of ideas was often cited by critics of 
Stoicism as self-contradictory or at least problematic.43 Galen perhaps has that 
criticism in view here. He connects this point with a guarded attitude towards 
engaging in politics, because of its inherent difficulty and the fact that most 
people are not in fact helped even by genuine efforts in their behalf (64). The 
link between the two ideas in 63–4 is not obvious. But it may be significant that 
the Stoics were well-known for maintaining that the wise man (the paradigm 
for all of us) should, in principle, engage in political life, by contrast with the 
negative Epicurean attitude towards political involvement.44 So Galen may be 
dissenting at this point from two standard features of the Stoic ethical ideal. 
A further problem for taking 61–8 as marking Galen’s adoption of a Stoic ap-
proach is that this would run counter to the explicit repudiation of the Stoic 
(or Epicurean) ideal of invulnerability in 71–75, and the earlier presentation of 
Zeno’s response to misfortune as ‘amazing’ and well beyond Galen’s own (48, 
cf. 46).45
How, then, does 61–68 contribute to Galen’s therapeutic strategy in Ind. as a 
whole? Overall in Ind., Galen explains his exceptional equanimity in the face 
of his losses (his alupia) by his having counteracted any tendency towards in-
satiability (aplēstia). Crucial in this respect is forming a realistic picture of the 
minimum needed to maintain a human life free from distress, namely an ad-
equate level of physical and psychological health supported by enough mate-
rial possessions to avoid pain and discomfort. Galen has also prepared himself 
for any such eventuality by dwelling on this prospect in advance, especially 
42   See BJP, 156–7.
43   See Brouwer, Stoic Sage, ch. 3.
44   See e.g. Cic. Fin. 3.66, 68, LS 67 W(3); for the Epicurean view, see LS 22 D(1), S.
45   See Gill, Naturalistic Psychology, 264–65. This rejection of an extreme standard of in-
vulnerability may also have philosophical echoes: there is a strong vein in Platonic-
Aristotelian thought underlining the importance of bodily health and (some) external 
goods for happiness, often linked with dissent from the Stoic position; see Sharples, 
R. Peripatetic Philosophy 200 BC to 200 AD, ch. 18. BJP, liv–lv, links Ind. 73 with Crantor 
(4th/3rd BC Academic), referred to in Cic. Tusc. 3.12, whose position was often cited as 
part of this strand of thought. However, Galen presents this as his own view.
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during the reign of Commodus, when exile and loss of all one’s possessions 
were daily prospects (54–55) – that is, situations much worse than he actu-
ally experienced. There remains the question how Galen mustered the inner, 
psychological or ethical, resources (the ‘magnanimity’, 50–51) to embrace this 
tough-minded approach to life. This is explained primarily in terms of his in-
born nature and upbringing, and the adoption of the (un-theorised) ethical 
principles of his father and forefathers (59). Although these principles are ex-
pressed (or ‘glossed’) in terms that evoke specific philosophical ideals, Galen 
does not identify the principles adopted in terms of any one philosophical 
framework. Indeed, he explicitly rejects some philosophical ideals (Epicurean 
ones, 62, 68) and is guarded regarding the achievability of others (Stoic ones, 
63–4). The positive element, which is not qualified, is a kind of high-minded 
indifference to circumstances (or indeed ‘human life’, 61) that Galen sees as en-
abling him to regard the things lost as ‘of little value’ (65) and hence to be free 
from distress at their loss. What emerges, overall, is not the conception of vir-
tue or the good life (happiness or eudaimonia) espoused by any specific theory 
but, rather, a broadly, ‘philosophical’ view of life that can support the quality 
of character, the virtue (‘magnanimity’) that enables Galen to maintain a real-
istic view of the scale and importance of his losses. On this view, the resumé 
of philosophical ideas in 61–68 makes a relatively modest contribution to the 
overall line of thought, compared with the contribution made by the theoreti-
cal framework in more doctrinally focused works of ancient (especially Stoic 
and Epicurean) therapy of the emotions.46 But the contribution is one that is 
consistent with the overall shaping and line of thought of the work: and this 
helps us to recognise that Ind., taken as a whole and closely examined, has its 
own coherence and distinctiveness, exceptional though it is in the genre in 
which it figures.
3 Was This the Whole Truth?
I end this discussion by raising a different, though related, question. Was 
Galen’s explanation for his equanimity actually true – or at least, was it the 
whole truth? Assuming that he did indeed show exceptional equanimity in 
46   For a broadly similar interpretation of Galen’s line of thought in Ind., see also Kaufman, 
‘Therapy’, 276–89. Contrast Chrysippus’ ‘therapeutic’ book, on which see Tieleman, 
Chrysippus, ch. 4. But works such as Plut. peri euthumias are more comparable; see also 
Gill, Naturalistic Psychology, 250–1.
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this situation (of course, we only have his word for this),47 does this explana-
tion ring true in the light of what we know about him from other sources?
Let us briefly call to mind what most of our evidence suggests about Galen’s 
character. He was an utterly driven, obsessive, hugely ambitious, medical prac-
titioner, thinker and writer whose core project in life was to become, and re-
main, the world-leader in his field.48 In the first half of Ind., his account vividly 
underlines the threat to this aim from the losses of medical handbooks, reci-
pes, collections and so on in the great fire (5–6, 12a, 29–37). I strongly suspect 
that what enabled his equanimity in the face of these losses was the confi-
dence that he still had the resources, energy and determination (despite his 
age, about sixty-three) to maintain and take further this core project. If this 
was what he felt, he was right, as it turned out; he did rewrite lost works, gather 
missing resources, and produce more medical writings, though not perhaps 
on the same scale as before, until his death about seventeen years later.49 Of 
course, in 193, when he seems to have written the work,50 he could not have 
known that he would be able to continue his career in this way. But he had rea-
sonable grounds for thinking he could do so; and this was, I guess, a key factor, 
and perhaps the key factor, underlying his absence of distress.
However, if I am right in suggesting this, the obvious further question is this: 
why did he not say so in Ind., which claims to offer the explanation for his 
equanimity? It is also perhaps surprising, from this standpoint, that, in the sec-
tion of Aff. Dig. (V.44 K = 30 DB) dealing with his response to losses (though 
not his losses in the fire of 192), he also does not cite this factor explicitly.51 
However, here he comes closer to bringing out this side of his motivation. He 
makes it clear that at all stages of his life so far he has had ample financial 
resources and that he feels committed to using these to benefit others, follow-
ing his father’s advice and example. This can plausibly be taken as an allu-
sion to his exceptional social contribution as a medical practitioner and writer, 
which depended on using his considerable personal wealth for this purpose. 
47   See n. 21.
48   This comes out clearly in Mattern, S., The Prince of Medicine, 2013, esp. chs. 2, 5, 7. See 
also Hankinson, R. J. ‘The man and his work’, in Hankinson, R. J. (ed), The Cambridge 
Companion to Galen, 2008, 23–4; Boudon-Millot, V. ‘Galen’s Bios and Methodos’, in Gill, C. 
et al. (eds) Galen and the World of Knowledge, 2009, 175–89, on Galen’s view of his medical 
mission in life.
49   On his medical writings after the fire, see Hankinson, ‘Man and work’, 22–3; Mattern, 
Prince, 274–7.
50   See Galen, Psychological Writings: Singer, general introduction, 39–41; Nutton, introduc-
tion to Ind., 45–8.
51   Also, of course, since Galen does not cite his losses in the fire in Aff. Dig., it would be inap-
propriate to refer to this explanation for not being distressed by the losses.
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As suggested earlier, Galen’s self-presentation in this passage forms part of his 
therapeutic guidance, showing how his characteristic freedom from distress is 
linked with his freedom from insatiability.52 However, if this passage at least 
allows the possibility of the kind of explanation I am suggesting, this raises 
still more acutely the question why this explanation is entirely missing in Ind.
In considering this question, it is worth noting that this explanation is not 
only absent from Ind., but is actually ruled out by the line of thought presented 
there. The catalogue of losses, as noted earlier, gives special attention to the 
loss of medical books and resources, as factors which might have made Galen 
especially distressed – but which did not in fact do so.53 Also, the philosophi-
cal section in 61–8 excludes this option in two ways. In 64 Galen discounts 
the idea that aiming to help many people by one’s earnest endeavours can, on 
a realistic view, provide the basis of a human life free from distress (because 
most people cannot reliably be helped in this way). In 65, he stresses that his 
upbringing made it inconceivable that he could regard ‘drugs, books, and repu-
tation’ as precious, although these are things that we might well suppose were 
precious to Galen in his role as world-famous doctor. Also, while acknowledg-
ing in 46 that even after the losses, ‘what was left was more than sufficient’, 
and thus, by inference that this allowed the renewal of his medical role, his 
account of the minimal conditions for a life free from distress falls far short of 
this level. Indeed, Galen there presents himself as happy ‘to talk with a friend 
and to follow what is being read by someone to me’ (78). He presents himself 
as an amiable, if slightly doddery, old man: a picture very different from that 
of the still active and forceful individual we might reasonably reconstruct from 
Galen’s medical and other writings in the later part of his life.54 This is also a 
self-presentation which runs counter to the view I am proposing, that Galen 
was heartened in his losses by the prospect of engaging fully again in his medi-
cal objectives.
To put the point more generally, the therapeutic strategy Galen adopts in 
Ind, rules out reference to the explanation which I am suggesting may have 
underpinned his equanimity. In focusing on the idea that the key to alupia 
lies in counteracting aplēstia, especially by recognising the minimum needed 
52   See text to nn. 18, 21.
53   Ind. 5–6, 10–12a, 31–8.
54   On his writings after the fire, see n. 49. Kaufman, ‘Therapy’, 284–6, reads this passage (78) 
as having more positive content, and evoking Epicurus’ famous death-bed letter (D. L. 
10.22) and the Epicurean therapeutic strategy of avoiding pain by redirecting one’s atten-
tion to more pleasant things (Cic. Tusc. 3.32–3); but I am not persuaded that this short and 
unemphatic passage carries these larger connotations.
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for a pain-free life,55 Galen set up a framework in which the retention of a 
specific life-mission had little room. Indeed, it would have run counter to this 
therapeutic approach, since it would have placed weight on factors (material 
resources, medical supplies and books, intellectual energy and stamina) that 
Galen here insists are not prerequisites for a life free from distress. So I think 
this explanation does not appear for this reason – which is not to say it was 
not, in reality, part of his response at this time. A further question, then, is why 
he adopted a therapeutic strategy which ruled this possibility out. Galen could 
have found, for instance, in Stoic thought, support for the idea that one can be 
sustained in one’s losses, which can include loss of loved ones as well as posses-
sions or even your own life, by renewing or continuing one’s commitment to a 
life-project. This set of ideas figures as part of a therapeutic strategy in Seneca’s 
On Peace of Mind, for instance, and appears also in Epictetus’ Discourses and 
Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations.56 Of course, Galen might not have been aware 
of this line of thought, though he seems to have a good knowledge of the phil-
osophical therapeutic tradition. He might also have had reservations about 
adopting a strategy that was so closely linked with Stoicism, although Aff. Dig. 
shows a good deal of influence from Stoic therapeutic writings.57 In any case, 
this was not the strategy he chose to adopt, in Ind. or in the comparable part 
of Aff. Dig.; and the explanation for his equanimity that I am proposing did not 
fit the strategy he did adopt. However, this does not mean it was not part of his 
actual experience – though we may never be able to prove this.58
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chapter 6
Galen and the Sceptics (and the Epicureans) on the 
Unavoidability of Distress
R. J. Hankinson
I will be flesh and blood;
For there was never yet philosopher
That could endure the toothache patiently.
Much Ado About Nothing, v i
...
For he was not sprung from some ancient oak, nor from a rock
<But from the race of men>.1
Odyssey 19.163+, quoted by Sextus, Against the Professors [M] 11.161
...
For this reason, we say that while in the case of matters of opinion, the 
end for the sceptic is tranquillity, in the case of what is forced upon us it 
is moderation in affection.
Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism [PH] 1.30
⸪
One of the most extraordinary scholarly events of recent years was Antoine 
Pietrobelli’s discovery in 2005 of a hitherto unknown manuscript containing, 
among other things, a previously lost work of Galen, περὶ ἀλυπίας: Avoiding 
Distress (Ind.). Since then, it has been edited and translated several times,2 and 
1   This half-line is not in our MSS. of Homer, but it is metrical and may well derive from a lost 
alternative tradition known to Sextus: see Bett, 1997, 166.
2   Notably in Boudon-Millot et al., 2010, to which edition subsequent references will be keyed. 
An English translation, by Vivian Nutton, appears in Singer, 2013. The text is sometimes also 
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provoked a flurry of articles. It contains invaluable biographical information, 
in particular concerning the disastrous fire of 192, in which Galen lost many 
unique exemplars of his own writings, as well as a vast store of materia medi-
ca (some of it decades old and very valuable), and a large number of surgical 
instruments, several of his own devising. His experience of the loss, and his 
observation of that of others, prompted him to write this short treatise on the 
subject of how to deal with distress, motivated, or so he says, by his colleagues’ 
astonishment at the equanimity with which he dealt with the catastrophe. The 
treatise falls recognizably into the category of consolation literature, as well as 
into that of the ancient anticipations of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT). 
It thus bears comparison with Cicero and Seneca’s Consolations, and also with 
Galen’s own surviving treatise on the Diagnosis and Cure of the Passions of the 
Soul.3 This latter is aimed against a particular Epicurean, and also retails some 
anecdotes from Galen’s life illustrating his own stoicism (with a lower-case ‘s’) 
in the face of adversity, as well as his attempts to help people deal with their 
anger issues, which again connects with both ancient and modern concerns 
(cf. Seneca’s and Plutarch’s treatises On Anger).
The fire, which began at the Temple of Peace and spread rapidly to neigh-
bouring parts of central Rome, destroying a variety of buildings, including a 
depository in which Galen stored much of his important professional equip-
ment and library,4 was a shattering event for many people. Galen himself men-
tions it, and his loss, in a number of places; and he contrasts his own attitude of 
quiet resignation with the more extreme reactions of others, such as the gram-
marian Callistus, who died of a fever caused by insomnia brought on by grief 
at his losses (Hipp.Epid. VI, 486,19–24 Pfaff; see Hankinson, ‘The man and his 
referred to as Freedom from Distress, which is perhaps a more accurate rendering of the title, 
although arguably less appropriate to the actual content of the treatise.
3   Aff.Dig. V 1–57; its companion piece, Diagnosis and Cure of the Errors of the Soul (Pecc.Dig.: 
V 58–103), is also relevant and important, not least because it is a separate treatise – errors, 
failures of the rational part, are to be rigorously distinguished from the irrational passions, 
or affections (pathê). Both are edited in Marquardt,1884, and De Boer, 1937, and translated in 
Singer, 1997 (revised in Singer, 2014). In general, on a first reference to a text of Galen, I give a 
full English title, followed by an abbreviation if it is referred to again, followed by a reference 
to the Kühn edition, followed by references to later, better editions (if any).
4   Among the works he took to be irretrievably lost (wrongly, as it turned out) was his own On 
Prognosis: “I wrote about these prognoses in one book of the same title. But shortly after its 
publication this book was consumed in the great fire that burnt down the so-called Temple 
of Peace, along with many other books which were also burnt” (On Hippocrates’ ‘Epidemics’ 
(Hipp.Epid.) VI, CMG V 10,2,2, 495,2–12, Pfaff, 1956. Galen also refers to his losses in the fire at 
My Own Books (Lib.Prop.) XIX 19, 41, = 143,2–4, 166,1–5 Boudon-Millot, 2007 (Lib.Prop. is also 
edited in Müller, 1891); see Boudon-Millot, 2007, 198 n 2.
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work’, in Hankinson ed., The Cambridge Companion to Galen, 2008, pp. 21–2). 
This was not the right sort of response at all, and Galen wrote Ind. to under-
score this fact, and to explain how it was that he managed to avoid such self-
destructive excesses, or even lesser versions of them, such as a decline into 
melancholic apathy.5
My main concern here, however, is not with Galen’s response to this, or with 
the advice he gives to those in danger of being so afflicted. Rather I want to ex-
plore a possible, and at first sight surprising, connection between Galen’s self-
expressed attitude in Peri Alupias and that of a group of philosophers to whom 
he is invariably implacably (indeed frequently offensively) hostile: the scep-
tics, especially Pyrrhonian sceptics; and, to a lesser extent, with another philo-
sophic persuasion with which he has almost as little sympathy:  atomism.6 But 
let’s start by sketching the relevant parts of Galen’s text.
1 Avoiding Distress: the Philosophical Examples and Galen’s Own 
Story
Galen begins by drawing attention to some relevant philosophical examples, 
starting with the story of the founding Cyrenaic Aristippus’s indifference to 
wealth, exemplified by has calm acceptance of the loss of one of his four fields 
(Ind. 41–2, 13,21–14,7 BJP).7 He draws the following morals:
(i) Those unsatisfied with moderate means will be insatiably greedy, and as 
a result always poor (42–3, 14,7–18)
5   A curious inconsistency is worth pointing out here: at the beginning of the second part of 
Therapeutic Method (MM X 456–7), which Galen took up again after a lengthy interruption 
in the 190s, he writes of his own tendency (well known, apparently, to his addressee) to fall 
into despondency about such matters. On this, and other Galenic inconsistencies, see Vivian 
Nutton’s Introduction to his translation of Ind., in Singer, 2014, 66–8.
6   Attacks on atomism figure at Nat.Fac. II 44–51, = 133,16–138,14 Helmreich, 1893 (on magne-
tism); Elements according to Hippocrates I 416–26, = 58,16–68,24 De Lacy, 1996 (on the inade-
quacy of a physics that denies genuine alteration to account for such obvious phenomena as 
pain). He is also relentlessly hostile to the atomist denial of teleology; see Functionality of the 
Parts, passim (Helmreich, 1907–9; May, 1968). On Galen’s willingness to countenance some 
Epicurean approaches to psychotherapy, see now, in the context of Ind., Kaufman, D. H., 
‘Galen on the therapy of distress and the limits of emotional therapy’, Oxford Studies in 
Ancient Philosophy 47, 2014, 275–96 (p. 287–9).
7   Elsewhere Galen recounts another well-known story concerning Aristippus; when asked by 
people on their way to his hometown of Cyrene if he had any message for his relatives, he 
replied “tell them to acquire only those goods which can survive a shipwreck”, i.e. intellectual 
ones: Protrepticus I 8–9, = Boudon, 2002, 90,4–18.
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(ii) Someone who isn’t envious of others’ wealth will bear any loss, as long as 
they still have enough left to live (44, 14,18–15,2)
(iii) But if someone loses everything, they will “be justifiably distressed” (45, 
15,2–4)
This is a perfect anticipation of Galen’s own view. The self-defeating nature of 
avarice is an ancient commonplace, one often linked with a contempt for the 
love of monetary gain for its own sake, and the advocacy of true wealth as con-
sisting in satisfaction with a modest provision of necessary and advantageous 
possessions. Aristotle expresses the idea trenchantly at Politics 1.8–9, 1256b26–
58a18; pursuit of wealth for its own sake is both pointless, and, since wealth 
has no natural limit, intrinsically unsatisfiable. Similar views are expressed by 
Epicureans (Lucretius 3.59 ff.), and others. But the position outlined in (i)–(iii) 
is not without its problems, primarily in the interpretation of “enough still left 
to live”; how much is enough? And to live how? Presumably not as a pauper, a 
beggar, or a day-labourer, a fact suggested by his attitude to the Cynic Crates: it 
is indeed remarkable that he was satisfied with no possessions, and even more 
so Diogenes, who didn’t even have a proper house8 (45, 15,4–10). So Galen’s 
own alupia is nothing special, since he was left with more than sufficient, pre-
sumably for a decently comfortable life (46, 15,10–13).
Still, it is people’s greed and insatiability that are responsible for thinking, 
wrongly, that fortitude in the face of bearable losses remarkable. What really is 
remarkable is the indifference to complete loss, as supposedly exemplified by 
Zeno after losing all his possessions in a shipwreck, when he praised fate for 
reducing his worldly goods to a coat and a Porch (48, 15,18–16,2).9
Galen then turns to his own case, saying that it was no harder for him to 
shrug off his own losses than it was to adopt the same attitude towards his 
(mis)treatment by the Imperial court, which, or so he says, he had never 
8   Galen doesn’t really think that the Cynics are praiseworthy exemplars of superhuman 
moral fortitude; rather the succeeding paragraphs suggest that their indifference is extreme, 
amounting to an unreasonable, undesirable, and unattainable, apatheia, of which more 
below. Elsewhere, he is acerbically hostile, at least to contemporary adherents of the school: 
Pecc.Dig. V 71–2, = 49,1–22 De Boer (1937) – Cynicism “is a quick route, by way of ignorance, 
to self-regard”. However, he does commend Diogenes for his no-nonsense, Johnsonian refuta-
tion of philosophical arguments against motion (Antecedent Causes ix 116–17), and for reliev-
ing his lust by masturbating, rather than seeking out a prostitute (Affected Parts VIII 419). On 
these passages in Ind., see Boudon-Millot et al., 2010, 124–30.
9   Cf. Plutarch, Tranquillity of the Soul 467d; the Porch is a reference to the Stoa itself (hence 
my capitalization of it); it is probably also intended to recall Cynicism, the porch standing in 
for Diogenes’ kennel (the ‘cloak’ too may be metaphorical). Zeno was supposedly a pupil of 
Crates (DL 7.1–5); Diogenes retails several different versions of the shipwreck story (DL 7.5), 
one of which seems to make it merely metaphorical: see Boudon-Millot et al., 2010, 131.
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aspired to be part of in any case (49–50a, 16,3–10).10 His experience of living 
in constant apprehension of being unjustly exiled to a desert island (or worse) 
as a result of slander and the capricious and tyrannical, not to say sociopathic, 
temperament of the emperor helped inure him against possible loss (54–6, 
18,1–13). It was also responsible for his ‘magnanimity’ when loss, the extent of 
which he emphasizes in 50b (16,10–18), finally came. He attributes his fortitude 
not only to this experience of living in unsettled and unpredictable times (he 
recommends visualizing and preparing for the worst that might happen to you 
as a way of minimizing the impact of the blows of fate: 56, 18,13–16),11 but also, 
characteristically, to his own character and upbringing, particularly to the in-
fluence and example of his revered father (57–62, 18,17–20,2).12
Here, as elsewhere, the legacy of Galen’s father is multifaceted. He is an 
exemplar not just of moral excellence, but also of the engagé life: “he never 
praised those who despise such [sc. disreputable] pleasures, and who are sim-
ply satisfied that their soul is never pained or distressed, proclaiming that the 
good was in its nature something bigger and better than this” (62, 19,19–20,2). 
Here too Galen parts company with some of his philosophical contempo-
raries, notably the Epicureans, but to some extent also the Stoics (not to men-
tion the Cynics). An untroubled life, ataraxia, the common goal of a variety 
of Hellenistic schools, including (but only up to a point, as we shall see) the 
Pyrrhonists, is sometimes equated with a sort of quietistic withdrawal from 
the world. This is not something Galen, as a busy and committed professional, 
has any time for, any more than he has for the unrealizable (indeed inhumane) 
goal of apatheia, lack of affection (or feeling) of any kind.
10   The reference seems to be to some slight or slights he underwent during the reign of 
Commodus, about whom he is generally tight-lipped (although he opens up a little in 
what follows: 54–7, 18,1–20); elsewhere he emphasizes his reluctance to enter imperial 
service even under the benign Marcus: Lib.Prop. XIX 17–19, = 141,17–142,25 Boudon-Millot, 
as well as the dangers of being too publicly successful (Praen. XIV 599–605, = CMG V 8,1, 
68,3–74,13 Nutton); Quintus, “the best doctor of his time”, was forced into exile from Rome 
on trumped-up charges by jealous inferior practitioners. See Boudon-Millot et al., 2010, 
132–3. The title of a lost text he describes as containing autobiographical material is rel-
evant: On Slander: Lib.Prop. XIX 46, = 170,8 Boudon-Millot.
11   On visualization of unpleasant possibilities as a means of drawing their sting, see The 
Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato (PHP) V 417–8, = 282,7–16 De Lacy, 1978, on Posidonius; 
Kaufman, D. H., ‘Galen on the therapy of distress and the limits of emotional therapy’, 
2014, pp. 281–3, offers a good discussion of this aspect of Galen’s account, in the course of 
stressing the eclecticism of Galen’s general approach. He makes no mention of the scep-
tics, however.
12   Cf. Aff.Dig. V 40–3; for more on human insatiability and its malign effects, see ib. 45–8.
160 Hankinson
2 Ataraxia and Its Antecedents: the Atomists
Let us turn, then, to consider the ideal of ataraxia, freedom from disturbance, 
or tranquillity.13 As David Sedley (‘The motivation of Greek skepticism’, in 
Burnyeat, 1983, 9–29) notes, it is common property to the major Hellenistic 
schools, Stoic, Epicurean and Sceptic, even if rejected by Peripatetics and 
Platonists. As such it is supposed to be the appropriate way of understanding 
eudaimonia, happiness or human flourishing, which everybody (at least ver-
bally: see Sextus, PH 3.175; M 11.35–6), following Aristotle, agrees to be the fun-
damental human goal, even if they differ as to what it consists in. It amounts, 
crudely, to the claim that we do best when we are undisturbed by anything, or 
at least anything which we are capable of controlling, including our emotional, 
affective reactions to things. The last two riders indicate just how differently 
the notion may be construed.
The ideal of the undisturbed life had a long philosophical history, stretching 
back at least to Democritus, who advocated athambia, freedom from wonder-
ment: Fr. 68 B 4 DK;14 as well as the presumably equivalent euthumia (B 191).15 
The term ataraxia itself was attributed to him, and while that is probably an 
anachronism,16 what matters is not the terminology but the attitude and ideal 
it indicates. In Democritus’s case, this seems to amount to an avoidance of ex-
cessive states of emotion, indeed of sensations in general. His attitude to sex 
was at best equivocal, indeed tending towards the disapprovingly prudish, if 
not without a certain wit: male orgasm “is a mild form of madness – for a man 
rushes out of a man” (B 32), while the pleasure of sex is not really different from 
that derived from scratching oneself (B 127). Of the large number of fragments 
and testimonia attributed to Democritus concerning the good life, pleasure, 
duty, and so on, many are of disputed authenticity; but the overall picture is 
clear enough. For Democritus, excessive preoccupation with physical pleasure 
is self-defeating:
13   The literature on the issue is large; see classically, on Timon Fr. 842 (68 Diels, 1901), 
Burnyeat, M. F., ‘Tranquillity without a stop: Timon Frag. 68’ The Classical Quarterly, 30.1., 
1980, 86–93; Striker, G., ‘Ataraxia: happiness as tranquillity’, The Monist 73.1, Hellenistic 
Ethics, 1990, 97–110; and in general Hankinson, R. J., The Sceptics, 1995, chs. 17–18.
14   Presocratic Fragments are referred to, standardly, by way of Diels/Kranz, 1952.
15   Cf. Cicero, Fin. 5.87: “he calls the highest good euthumia and also frequently athambia, 
that is, a mind free from terror. But though what he says is all very fine, it is still not very 
polished, for he has little to say, and that not very articulately, about virtue”.
16   On the terminological issues, see Striker, G., ‘Ataraxia: happiness as tranquillity’, The 
Monist 73.1, Hellenistic Ethics, 1990, 97–110 (p. 97–8).
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All those who get pleasure from their bellies, exceeding the measure in 
food, drink and sex, find the pleasures slight and short-lived … But the 
pains are many. For they always desire the same things, and when they 
obtain what they desire, the pleasure swiftly goes, and they find nothing 
but a brief joy, and the desire for such pleasures again. (B 235)
Unrestrained desire brings misery, and also injustice, as men are driven to seek 
to acquire the goods of others, as well as ruining their own health (B 219–24); 
justice is something that should be welcomed for its own sake (B 62), and its 
“glory is confidence of judgement and imperturbability” (B 215).
None the less, properly construed as moderate contentment, pleasure is 
indeed the end: “Joy and the absence of joy are the boundaries of advantage 
and disadvantage” (B 4, 188); where people go wrong is in their understand-
ing of what pleasure really is. Anticipating Epicurus’ distinction between static 
and kinetic pleasure, “He calls happiness contentment, well-being, harmony, 
orderliness and tranquillity. It is constituted by distinguishing and discrimi-
nating among pleasures” (Stobaeus, 2.7.31). A proper education should involve 
instilling, by habituation and persuasion, a desire for healthy moderation and 
avoidance of excess (B 178–83). The desired way of living “with as much con-
tentment and as little distress as possible … will come about if he does not 
take his pleasure in mortal things” (B 189), which is another way of exalting the 
claims of the soul over those of the body (cf. e.g. B 36–7). A recurring theme is 
satisfaction with what one has. “The man of sound judgement is not distressed 
by what he does not possess, but rejoices in what he does” (B 231). On the other 
hand ‘fools’ who always want more are never satisfied, and terrified of death: 
“Fools get no pleasure in the whole of their lives” (B 204; cf. 197–206); yet “with 
self-sufficiency in upbringing, the night is never long” (B 209).
I have outlined Democritus’s position at some length because, initial im-
pressions aside, it is not one of unalloyed asceticism. Just as Epicurus was 
to think that pleasure was the end, and that pleasure was primarily physical 
(Cicero, Tusc. 3.41, = 21L Long and Sedley, 1987 [‘LS’]; below, 163), and that no 
pleasure was wrong per se, but only unchoiceworthy if it entailed countervail-
ing pains (Men. 127–32, = 21 B LS), Democritus, for all his apparent distaste for 
the pursuit (the excessive pursuit) of some pleasures, does not simply advocate 
trying to get rid of all desire. Desire is a necessary part of human existence, 
but it requires careful moderation if it is not to be allowed to take over and 
ruin a life. Balance is everything, as the perennial truism has it; but properly 
interpreted it does not entail asceticism and the avoidance of all indulgence.17 
17   Compare B 229: “thrift and hunger are good – but so too on occasion is extravagance; it 
is the mark of a good man to recognize the occasion”; and B 230: “A life without a feast 
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The key is self-mastery: “Men pray to the gods for health, not knowing that 
they how the power to attain it within themselves; lacking self-control, they 
act contrary to it, and sacrifice health to their desires” (B 234; cf. B 69–74). This 
is underlined by fragment 191:
Men gain contentment from moderation in joy and a measured life … 
Thus you must set your judgement on the possible and be satisfied with 
what you have, giving little thought to those who are envied or admired … 
Consider those who are badly off, so that what you have … may seem 
great and enviable and so that you may no longer suffer in your soul by 
desiring more … If you hold fast to this judgement, you will live in greater 
contentment and drive away those not inconsiderable plagues of life, 
jealousy, envy and malice. 
Stobaeus, 3.1.210; cf. B 219–24 on the destructiveness of avarice; B 88 on the pains 
of envy
Money itself is not itself evil, although acquiring it unjustly is “the worst of all 
things” (B 78); in fact, “when used with thought promotes generosity and char-
ity” (B 282). Indeed, “If you do not desire a great deal, a little will seem a great 
deal to you; for a small appetite makes poverty as powerful as wealth” (B 284). 
Properly considered, “Poverty and wealth are names for want and satisfaction, 
so that one who is in want is not wealthy, while one who is not in want is not 
poor” (B 283). Resting content with “moderate goods”, and being aware of and 
prepared for life’s inevitable disappointments, is critical (B 285–6; cf. 3, 42, 46, 
58, 287–92), as is the lack of distress, envy, at what one does not own (B 231, 
above). Finally, two remarks about courage: “A courageous man not only con-
quers his enemies, but also … his pleasures” (B 214); and perhaps most signifi-
cantly for our purposes: “Courage makes disasters small” (B 213). Many of these 
attitudes will find their echoes in Galen’s own approach to distress.
Epicurus adopts a very similar position, albeit one given a greater theoretical 
density by his explicit distinction between static and kinetic pleasures, and his 
elevation of the former at the expense of the latter: all real and enduring plea-
sure is the static enjoyment of the absence of pain (Sovereign Maxims [KD] 3, = 
21C LS). Equally important is his distinction between desires which are natural 
and necessary (sc. for the preservation of one’s life), natural but unnecessary 
(fine dining, and certain kinds of sex, perhaps all sex),18 and ‘empty’ pleasures, 
is a long road without an inn” (cf. B 232–3); note also B 271: “if a woman is loved, then no 
blame attaches to lust”.
18   “You say that the movement of your flesh is too inclined to sex; but as long as you do 
not break the laws or disturb proper and established conventions or distress any of your 
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which are neither (such as the desire for crowns or honorific statues: sch. to KD 
29, = 21I LS). The latter are empty because they rest on the mistaken opinion 
that not satisfying them will cause pain (KD 30, = 21E LS). His hedonism, then, 
is very much in the restrained, Democritean mould: “When we say that plea-
sure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of the dissipated19 … but free-
dom from pain in the body and disturbance in the soul” (Letter to Menoeceus 
132, = 21B(5) LS). Even so, he says, “I cannot conceive of anything as good if I re-
move the pleasures perceived by taste, and sex, and listening to music, and the 
pleasant motions felt by the eyes through beautiful sights”; but this is because 
mental delight consists in remembering and anticipating them, rather than 
necessarily experiencing them (Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 3.41, = 21L(1) LS).
Still, mental pleasures outweigh physical ones, even though they are depen-
dent upon them. The wise man will be comforted in painful circumstances, 
and his pain thereby alleviated, by reflecting on past pleasures and anticipat-
ing future ones; and this what it is to be untroubled. Epicurus himself alleg-
edly exemplified this attitude on his death-bed: “Strangury and dysentery had 
set in, with all the extreme intensity of which they are capable; but the joy in 
my soul at the memory of our past discussions was enough to outweigh all of 
this” (DL 10.22, = 24D LS). Perhaps most importantly from our point of view, 
“ataraxia and alupia are static pleasures”: DL 10.136, = 21R LS.
So Epicurus’s hedonism is, paradoxically, ascetic – indeed, the central claim 
of his death-bed letter (which is of extremely doubtful authenticity) may seem 
as extravagantly implausible as the notorious contention that the wise man 
can remain untroubled even on the rack (DL 10.118). Even so, a weaker and 
hence more plausible version of the thought is readily constructible, consis-
tently with another unimpeachably genuine feature of Epicureanism, namely 
the idea that error (typically regarding perceptual judgements, but the idea 
is readily extendible) involves prosdoxazomena, unfounded additional beliefs 
(this term will become important later on: §5). Physical pain may well in cer-
tain cases, such as Epicurus’s death, be unavoidable; but it can be mitigated by 
cultivating certain mental attitudes, and made worse by other suppositions, 
paradigmatically the idea that death is in itself something to be feared.20 How 
neighbours or ravage your body or squander the necessities of life, act in any way you like. 
But it is impossible not to be constricted by any of these. For sex is never advantageous, 
and one should be pleased if it does no harm”. Vatican Sayings [VS] 51, = 21 G LS.
19   Among which Epicurus singles out ‘the enjoyment of women, small boys, and fish”.
20   Fear of death is, for Epicureans, the most pernicious and destructive of all irrational fears; 
the centrality of the attempt to eradicate it is exemplified by the famous slogan “Death 
is nothing to us”: Letter to Menoeceus [Men.] 124, = 24A(1)–(4) LS; cf. Lucretius 3.830 ff. 
(= 24E LS).
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plausible that might be is another (still much-controverted)21 issue; but how-
ever that may be, the Epicurean prescription does not amount to recommend-
ing complete freedom from affective states, or apatheia. Painful and damaging 
mental conditions can be mitigated, but not eradicated. Even so, freedom from 
distress, alupia, is at least something to be aimed at, and secured insofar as that 
is possible; and is clearly related, as DL 10.136 shows, to the fundamental goal 
of tranquillity itself.
3 Ataraxia and Its Antecedents: Pyrrho and the Sceptics
There are important points of contact between atomism and scepticism, both 
genetic and (to some extent) doctrinal22 (insofar as it makes sense to speak of 
sceptical ‘doctrine’: PH 1.13–17; cf. 21–4).23 Anaxarchus, a pupil of the atomist 
Metrodorus, is a transitional figure, who anticipates some standard sceptical 
contentions regarding the veridicality of perception.24 More important from 
our point of view is the following: “Anaxarchus was called ho eudaimonikos 
(the happy one) because of the apatheia and contentment of his life; he was 
able to induce moderation in the easiest possible way” (DL 9.60, = 1E LS). His 
apatheia, however, was apparently of a superhuman nature; while being beat-
en to death in a large mortar at the behest of an enraged tyrant, he is said 
to have remarked: “You may pound the envelope containing Anaxarchus, but 
not Anaxarchus himself” (DL 9.58). Such heroic apatheia anticipates rather the 
attitude later attributed to the Stoics, and implicitly characterized by Galen 
as being beyond the capacity of mere humankind. Another, no doubt equally 
apocryphal, story links him directly with Pyrrho, the eponymous founder of 
the sceptical way (who was said to have been his pupil: DL 9.61, = 1A(1) LS). 
One day, as philosophers will, Pyrrho stumbled abstractedly into a dungheap, 
and Anaxarchus passed by without helping him out; while others present 
21   For an influential modern discussion, see Nagel, T., ‘Death’, Nous 4.1, 1970, 73–80; repr. in 
Nagel, 1979, Mortal Questions, Cambridge, CUP, 1979, 1–10.
22   The collection of individual sceptical essays against the practitioners of the various lib-
eral arts (M 1–6) contains some arguments explicitly attributed to the Epicureans, against 
the arts’ utility; see Hankinson, R. J., The Sceptics, 1995, ch 15; Barnes, J. ‘Scepticism and the 
arts’, in R.J.Hankinson (ed.), Method, Medicine and Metaphysics: Apeiron 21.2, Supp. Vol. 19 
(Edmonton, Alberta: Academic Printing and Publishing), 1988, 53–77.
23   On this issue, see Hankinson, R. J., The Sceptics, 1995, ch 17.
24   On Anaxarchus’s epistemology, see now Burnyeat, ‘”All the world’s a stage-painting”: scen-
ery, optics, and Greek epistemology’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 52, 2017, 33–7.
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condemned him for failing to render assistance, Pyrrho himself praised him 
for his indifference, adiaphoria (DL 9.63).
As for Pyrrho himself, Timon, his satirical amanuensis, made him into a 
paradigm of ataraxia (2B–D LS): “This, Pyrrho, my heart yearns to hear: how 
can you, human though you are, act most easily and calmly, never taking 
thought and consistently undisturbed (atarachos)?” (DL 9.65, = Fr 841, = 2D 
LD). He is said to have demonstrated his adiaphoria by washing pigs (how-
ever that was supposed to work: see below, §7), and to have endured surgery 
“without so much as a frown” (DL 9.66). In the most important testimonium to 
his philosophical ‘position’, albeit one that survives only at fourth hand and is 
multiply controversial, Timon (according to Aristocles, ap Eusebius 18,18,1–5, 
= 1F LS) says that Pyrrho held that being ‘unopinionated’, ‘uncommitted’, and 
‘unswayed’ (adoxastoi, aklineis, akradantoi) leads first to aphasia,25 and thence 
to ataraxia. Even so, Pyrrho’s version of ataraxia strays close to a more severe 
apatheia; and Cicero, pairing Pyrrho with the extreme Stoic Aristo, as he often 
does (cf. 2G–H LS), explicitly describes it as such (Academica, 2.130, = 2F LS; cf. 
Fin. 3.11–12), in contrast with Aristo’s mere adiaphoria.26
It is worth emphasizing at this point that apatheia comes in different forms, 
partly corresponding to the varying semantic range of the root-term pathos. 
Galen himself takes care to distinguish the latter’s various senses in order to 
guard against potential fallacies of ambiguity, and to clarify its relation with 
the various meanings of energeia (PHP V 506–13, = 360,15–366,30 De Lacy). 
Thus a pathos may simply be something that happens to something (as op-
posed to something it does); but it may also be an abnormal affection of some-
thing, something in some sense contrary to its nature. In fact:
In this way both anger and desire will be called both pathê and energeiai; 
for since they are certain immoderate and unnatural motions of the soul’s 
intrinsic powers, they are energeiai of those powers, because the powers 
have their motions from themselves; but because they are immoderate 
motions, they are pathê. And these motions of the whole soul of the two 
powers that are themselves set in motion are contrary to nature. This is 
25   Not literally speechlessness, but the refusal to make dogmatic assertions, positive or nega-
tive; the whole fragment is the subject of much dispute, not least as to the appropriate 
reading of the Greek; see Hankinson, R. J., The Sceptics, 1995, 59–64.
26   Here not in the sense of being indifferent to one’s circumstances, but rather in supposing 
that all the things that Stoics considered neither actually good (virtue) nor actually bad 
(vice), such as health, were not merely technically ‘indifferent’, but not even the object of 
rational preference (or dispreference), as the orthodox view, rather paradoxically, held: 
see 58 A–J LS, esp. (for Aristo) F, G and I.
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so for the irrational powers because of their lack of measure, and for the 
whole soul because we say that it is in accordance with nature for our life 
to be governed by the rational part, not by the motions of the affective 
(pathêtikos) part. 
PHP V 511–12, = 364,31–366,4 De Lacy
All of this is, obviously enough, Platonic in inspiration (it immediately fol-
lows a discussion of the charioteer image of the Phaedrus), and as such is 
part and parcel of Galen’s anti-Chrysippean project of a large part of PHP 
(effectively the bulk of Books II–VI). This need concern us only insofar as it 
is relevant to Galen’s understanding of the proper roles of emotion and de-
sire in the well-ordered human soul (and consequently the well-managed 
human life). Emotions and desires can get out of hand, and usurp the prop-
erly-governing role of reason; and they are intrinsically non-rational. But for 
all that, if properly constrained by reason, they need not render the animal 
itself irrational (for Galen’s detailed, if polemical, examination of the senses 
of alogos, see PHP V 370–2, 383–5, = 242,12–244,9, 252,20–254,12 De Lacy). 
Indeed, so constrained, they are essential components of the overall perfor-
mance of the complex economy of parts and functions that is the human 
soul.
Here Galen’s account leans towards the Peripatetic; it is central to the 
Aristotelian tradition that anger (for example), provided that it meets the ap-
propriate criteria of appropriateness, is not only unavoidable: it is actually a 
good thing (NE 4.5, 1125b27–26b10, esp. 1125b31–26a2). It is not clear whether 
Galen would actually endorse this position – certainly he wants to restrict the 
terms for anger (orgê, etc.) to the excessive, blameworthy (indeed from his 
perspective pathological: Aff.Dig. V 7–8) conditions. Still, he praises modera-
tion, while admitting that “No-one is free from the pathê or errors, not even 
the person with best natural endowments, brought up to the best of practices. 
Always there will be some failures, especially when one is young” (Aff.Dig. V 
14). Becoming as good as humanly possible, which in this context means rid-
ding oneself as far as is possible of the tendency of being swayed by irrational 
emotions, is a lifelong project (14–16). After much practice, “one may eventu-
ally reach the goal of getting only slightly angry even over the greatest matters” 
(17), which implies that the goal is that of eliminating all angry impulses, but 
only as far as is humanly possible. This is backed up in what follows (17–27): 
one must be constantly aware of the ugliness and bestiality of anger indulged, 
and keep one’s eyes constantly on the prize of freedom from enslavement to 
unreason: “If you act in this manner, you may succeed in taming and soften-
ing the irrational power of the spirited part of your soul” (26–7). The Platonic 
language is deliberate and unmistakable:
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Is not anger a sickness of the soul? Or do you deny the wisdom of the an-
cients who gave the name of “affections of the soul” to the following five: 
distress, rage, anger, desire and fear? The following seems to me to be the 
best course of action for one who wants to rid himself as far as possible 
of these affections. 
Aff.Dig. V 24, = 17,7–12 De Boer
Desire figures here simply among the irrational affections. Galen thus elides 
the Platonic distinction between the spirited and the desiderative (although 
later he re-introduces it: 27–34); he is operating, at least provisionally, with a 
straightforward distinction between the rational and the non-rational, which 
again might be owed to Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [NE]1.13, 1102a16–
1103a10), although Aristotle too subdivides the irrational part of the soul.
So where does this leave Galen’s confrontation with Stoicism? That is an ex-
tremely complex question, and one whose details lie beyond the remit of this 
study; but ultimately, perhaps, there may be less to the dispute than initially 
meets the eye. Galen does indeed think that the outright elimination of the 
pathê, even the destructive ones, is not something which is humanly possible; 
but then Stoic total apatheia is something only achievable by the sage, and 
notoriously they were in extremely short supply. Quite a lot also turns on the 
precise nature of the Stoics’ eupatheiai, the desirable counterparts of (at least 
some) of the normal human affections (DL 7.115, = 65F LS): joy (chara), cor-
responding to pleasure, in being “a well-reasoned swelling”, caution (eulabeia: 
“a well-reasoned contraction”) to fear, and wish (boulêsis) to desire. There is no 
eupathetic counterpart to lupê, perhaps because it is (or is at least consequent 
upon) a false judgement concerning a present evil, and there can be no corre-
sponding true judgement for the sage, since for the Stoics true happiness is al-
ways within one’s grasp. So while the Stoic Sage may be no more than an ideal, 
this is exactly the sort of high-minded fantasy which Galen has no time for.
4 Galen and Scepticism
So let us turn at last to Scepticism. In a well-known passage, Galen tells us that, 
as a young student of logic, he was so disheartened with the apparently unde-
cidable and interminable (as well as practically useless) disputes among the 
representatives of the schools, that he might have succumbed to a Pyrrhonian 
despair concerning the attainability of truth, had he not reflected on the un-
assailable certainty of mathematical demonstration (Lib.Prop. XIX 39–40, 
= 164,2–165,2 Boudon-Millot). He often makes little distinction between the 
Pyrrhonian and Academic forms of skepticism in the course of his polemics, 
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lumping them both together as equally hopeless. Both schools, for example, 
reject the possibility of distinguishing between veridical perception and 
delusion:
There are some things which we think we see, hear, or in general perceive, 
such as in dreams or delusions, while there are other things which we not 
only think we see, or in general perceive, but actually do so. In the case of 
the second class everybody, other than the Academics and Pyrrhonists, 
thinks that they have arrived at secure knowledge, while they consider 
everything of which the soul produces images while asleep or delirious 
to be false. 
The Best Method of Teach. (Opt.Doct.) I 42, = 94,14–18 Barigazzi, 1991
And, in the case of ethical argument,
Academics and Pyrrhonists, who do not accept that we have scientific 
demonstration of the matters at issue, believe that any assent is hasty, 
and may also be false. 
Pecc.Dig. V 60, = 42,16–18 De Boer
Of course, it is not just in these matters where they (perhaps reasonably) reject 
the possibility of apodeixis epistêmonikê; they do so quite generally. But else-
where Galen distinguishes between the sceptical schools, and while frequently 
hostile to what he takes to be Academic excesses (such as Carneades’ alleged 
rejection of the Euclidian equality axiom (cn 1): Opt.Doct. I 45, = 96,20–98,9 
Barigazzi),27 none the less he believes that the dispute between Academics 
and others regarding epistemological justification is largely verbal:
27   Galen is sarcastically dismissive of this; reports of this Carneadean ‘refutation’ as well 
as “of many others which are evidently and persuasively valid” are attributed to ‘his 
own pupils”, pre-eminent among whom was his amanuensis Clitomachus (Carneades, 
in good Socratic – and subsequently sceptic – tradition left nothing in writing himself). 
This was almost certainly discussed in Galen’s lost Clitomachus and his Refutations of 
Demonstration (Lib.Prop. XIX 44, = 168,8–9 Boudon-Millot). This seems the most likely 
translation of the title; Boudon-Millot renders it ‘Sur Clitomaque et ses solutions de la 
démonstration’, which hints at a general ‘proof against proof’, and could be right; Morison 
(2008, 67) translates ‘On Clitomachus and his solutions to demonstrations’, which would 
require a (very minor) emendation, and suggests a more piecemeal approach. Certainly 
the denial of the axiomatic status of cn. 1 hints at a general argument against the pos-
sibility of discovering unimpeachable axioms, freestanding, certain and necessarily-true 
fundamental premises; and if there are no such things (or we can’t recognize them) then 
there are no demonstrations (at least none that we can recognize).
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Discrimination between these things28 is reduced to an impression 
(phantasia) which, as the philosophers from the New Academy say, is not 
only ‘persuasive’ (pithanê), but ‘tested’ (periôdeumenê) and ‘unshaken’ 
(aperispastos); or which as Chrysippus and his followers put it is appre-
hensive (katalêptikê); or as all men believe in common, it is reduced to 
evident (enargês) perception (aisthêsis) and intellection (noêsis). These 
expressions are thought to differ in meaning from one another, but if one 
examines them more carefully they have the same import; just as, indeed, 
when someone says that they begin from common notions (koinai en-
noiai), and sets them up as the primary criterion of all things which is 
trustworthy in itself (ex heautou piston). That the first criterion must be 
trustworthy without proof is admitted by everyone, although not every-
one supposes that it must be natural and common to all men. 
PHP V 778, = 586,16–25 De Lacy
I have assessed the plausibility of this claim elsewhere.29 I think there is some-
thing to it; but that need not detain us. What matters is that Galen never shows 
any such respect, grudging as it might be, to Pyrrhonists, at least when they are 
considered on their own. Mostly they simply serve as suitable targets for insult. 
The following is typical:
If you are looking for logical demonstrations in the area of perceptible 
fact, perhaps you would like to embark on an investigation of snow. 
Should we think it white (following the way it appears to all men), or not 
white (following the ‘proof’ of Anaxagoras)?30 We could make similar in-
quiries on the subject of pitch, ravens, or indeed anything else … Swans 
should not said to be white without first being subjected to logical inves-
tigation … At this point, we may realize we are faced with a Pyrrhonian 
aporia; or rather with a complete load of bollocks. 
Mixtures I 589, = 50,25–51,10 Helmreich, 1904; trans. after – quite a long way after – 
Singer, 1997
Aporia is indeed a Pyrrhonian technical term (drawn ultimately of course 
from Plato’s Socrates); an impasse from which there is no exit, the result of 
28   I.e. between the plausible but false and the true, and cases where plausible and implau-
sible are very similar and hard to distinguish: PHP V 777–8, = 586,9–16 De Lacy.
29   Hankinson, R. J., ‘A purely verbal dispute? Galen on Stoic and Academic epistemology’, in 
A.-J.Voelke (ed.) Le Stoïcisme: Revue internationale de philosophie 45.3, 1992, 267–300.
30   Reported at PH 1.33 (= 59 A 97): “snow is frozen water and water is black; so snow is black” 
(or perhaps rather ‘dark’); cf. Cicero, Acad. 2.100.
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endemic, undecidable dispute: PH 1.26, 165. For Galen, while there are such 
hopeless cases (in the useless parts of logical theory, but also in ‘speculative 
philosophy’: issues such as the eternity of the world, the essence of the divine 
or of the soul, the existence of an extra-mundane void),31 resolution of them 
is of no practical importance. In the practical cases, we have ‘natural criteria’ 
(senses and reason),32 by the practice and refinement of which we can come 
to legitimate and grounded understanding of the world and its functioning. 
It is simply a gross, indeed jejune, error to look for demonstration in matters 
of perceptual clarity (and intellectual clarity as well, such as in the case of the 
axioms of equality).
Galen’s animus against what he takes to be pointless Pyrrhonian resistance 
to the obvious is particularly apparent in his dismissive language; on numerous 
occasions he refers to agroikoi Purrhôneioi, peasant Pyrrhonists, for instance at 
Differences of Pulses VIII 711; Blood in the Arteries IV 727; and Distinctions of 
Pulses (Dig.Puls.) VIII 780–3. In the latter passage, Galen allows that you can, if 
you are so inclined, adopt an extreme phenomenalist language. Instead of say-
ing things like “excessive rain caused the river to rise in flood and wash away 
the bridge”, you may talk of ‘the apparent rain’, ‘the seeming river’, ‘the osten-
sible flood’. and so on; but this doesn’t (or shouldn’t) make any practical differ-
ence whatsoever to the way you behave. Any individual of any degree of sanity 
will still take rapid and unsceptical evasive action.33 This is pointedly directed 
towards Pyrrhonists like Sextus, who insists that the Pyrrhonian is perfectly 
capable of living (indeed of practising an art), by following the ‘criterion’ of the 
appearances (PH 1.21–4) It is simply idle and disingenuous, Galen thinks, not 
to take evident perceptual facts as being true.34 When he asks the Peripatetic 
Alexander of Damascus to adjudicate his demonstration of the nerves re-
sponsible for vocalization by vivisectional experiments on pigs and goats, and 
31   See e.g. PHP V 766, 779–82, = 576,27–578,2, 588,7–590,11 de Lacy; Prop.Plac 2, 56,12–24; 3, 
58,22–60,6 Nutton; Pecc.Dig. V 67, = 52,13–18 Marquardt; see Hankinson, ‘Epistemology’, 
in Hankinson ed., The Cambridge Companion to Galen, 2008, 178–80; eiusd. ‘Philosophy of 
nature’, in Hankinson ed., The Cambridge Companion to Galen, 2008, 233–6.
32   On the natural criteria, see Opt.Doct. I 48–9, = 102,10–104,2 Barigazzi. 1991.
33   On this passage, see Hankinson, R. J., ‘A purely verbal dispute? Galen on Stoic and 
Academic epistemology’, in A.-J.Voelke (ed.) Le Stoïcisme: Revue internationale de phi-
losophie 45.3, 1992, 267–300. Relevant here are the ancient characterizations of Pyrrho as 
being so indifferent to possible physical suffering that his associates had to prevent him 
from walking over cliffs and in front of oncoming traffic, as we’ll as into dungheaps; but 
they are canards, as Aenesidemus said (DL 9.62, = 1A LS).
34   He is following a tradition here: see Hankinson, 1997; on his refutation of scepticism, 
Hankinson, ‘Epistemology’, in Hankinson ed., The Cambridge Companion to Galen, 2008, 
162–5; see also SMT XI 462.
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Alexander inquires whether we are supposed to rely on the evidence of our 
senses, Galen takes characteristic umbrage and walks out, saying that there is 
no point continuing the discussion if we are to be reduced to such a peasant 
Pyrrhonism as to fail to credit the clear evidence of the senses (Prognosis XIV 
626–8, = 96,4–98,8 Nutton, 1979).
So Galen is unequivocally hostile to Pyrrhonian scepticism, and not much 
friendlier to the Academic variety. At first sight, then, it might seem absurdly 
quixotic to suggest any serious point of contact between them.
5 Tranquillity and Moderation in Affection
Sceptics – like many other Hellenistic philosophers – aimed (in a sense) at 
ataraxia. Pyrrho, allegedly, managed it in a pretty heroic fashion. However, his 
later eponymous followers moderated (in a very real sense) this position:
We do not think that the sceptic is in every respect untroubled (aochlê-
tos); rather he is distressed by what is forced upon him, for we concede 
that he is sometimes cold and thirsty, and is affected by things of this sort. 
But whereas in these cases ordinary people are afflicted by two condi-
tions, namely by the affections themselves and by the belief that these 
conditions are by nature evil, the sceptic, by doing away with the addi-
tional belief (prosdoxazomenon) that each of these things is evil in its 
actual nature, gets off more moderately in these cases as well. For this 
reason, then, we say that tranquillity (ataraxia) is the end in matters 
of opinion, and moderation in affection (metriopatheia) in the case of 
things forced upon us. 
Sextus, PH 1 29–30
The “things forced upon us” are the unavoidable sources of distress that any 
human life entails, the thousand natural shocks that flesh is heir to. This rep-
resents an obvious, and self-conscious, retreat from the pretence of heroic de-
tachment from the travails of the physical which we have seen characterizing 
a variety of otherwise quite distinct earlier philosophies. Towards the end of 
Outlines, Sextus sums up his sceptical attitude to ethics. The sceptic
Suspends judgement as to the existence of anything good or bad by na-
ture, or generally which should or should not be done, and in this way 
distances himself from dogmatic precipitancy and follows the dictates 
of ordinary life (hê biôtikê têrêsis). Because of this he remains unaffected 
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(apathês) in matters of opinion, while in the case of things forced upon 
him his affections are moderate (metriopathei). Being human, he is af-
fected perceptibly (aisthêtikôs paschei); but since he does not also believe 
in addition (prosdoxazôn) that what he is affected by is bad by nature, his 
affections are moderate. For the additional belief that something is actu-
ally bad is worse than the suffering itself, just as sometimes those under-
going surgery or something similar put up with it, while those observing 
it faint away because of their belief that what is happening is appalling. 
PH 3.235–6
That latter claim has not commanded universal assent, at least in the stark 
form in which it is put here; but there is surely something to it. My extreme 
cowardice makes the anticipation of a visit to the dentist deeply distressing 
(perhaps not actually as distressing as the visit itself, but at the very least a 
supplementary source of pain); to the extent I could rid myself of that, no 
doubt my life would be more tranquil, and as such preferable. But more impor-
tant is the nature of the “things forced upon” us. There are certain things we 
can’t avoid experiencing, and some of those experiences are unpleasant, some 
of them extremely so. Philosophy, as Shakespeare’s Leonato so rightly said in 
my epigraph, can’t do anything about that. In other words, in Sextus’s mature 
scepticism, the pretence of heroic philosophical indifference has been explic-
itly abandoned. The example of the surgical operation is pointed, given that 
Pyrrho supposedly underwent surgery with total equanimity (DL 9.66). But as 
Sextus says at the end of his programmatic prologue, “We do not think that the 
sceptic is in every way untroubled; we do say he is troubled by what is forced 
upon him; for we allow that he is sometimes cold and thirsty and is affected by 
things of that sort” (PH 1.29).
Sextus expands on what he has in mind in his longer treatment of ethics 
in M 11. He again makes the distinction between affections induced by belief, 
and those forced by necessity. The general injunction to total suspension of 
judgement only applies to matters of judgement: “In the case of sensory and 
non-rational judgements, one yields” (148); you can’t reason your way out of 
being troubled by hunger and thirst (149). But for all that, the sceptic is bet-
ter able to bear distress in presence of the inevitable (150). The unavoidable 
pains are “not excessively disturbing”; serious pain is not long-lasting (153–5); 
the tarachê which disturbs the sceptic is moderate and not so fearful (155). We 
are not responsible for unavoidable pains: nature is (156–7). But the additional 
belief that this is bad by nature, or in itself, is up to us and is the cause of fur-
ther suffering. Someone who suspends judgement about all things dependent 
on belief reaps the fullest well-being, and when disturbed by involuntary and 
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non-rational movements, he is affected only moderately (metriopathôs); we 
are not sprung from oak and rock, after all (158–61).35
The invocation – and recommendation – of metriopatheia has something of 
a history. It is attributed to the early Platonist Crantor, where the context seems 
to be that of putting up with physical ailments. According to Chrysippus, the 
theôrêtikos will be apathês, while the spoudaios will be metriopathês. Philo of 
Alexandria uses the term in the context of Moses and Aaron. There are five 
occurrences in Plutarch, two of them in the Consolation to Apollonius 102cd, 
where Plutarch stresses that it is normal to feel distress at the death of a son; 
in fact not to do so would be harsh and callous, a case of fundamentally inhu-
man apatheia: for “metriopatheia of grief is not to be censured”.36 Congruently, 
Alcinous (Handbook 30.5) contends that it is not metriopathês to feel no grief 
at all at the death of, or at violence done towards, one’s parents, but rather ap-
athês, which is clearly here an unreasonable response.37 Metriopatheia is also 
contrasted with apatheia in Clement; while Diogenes says that for Aristotle 
the wise man not apathês but metriopathês (DL 5.31); and this is surely right 
(for Aristotle). Finally Iamblichus, in his Life of Pythagoras 27.131, says that his 
hero cultivated metriopatheia. The general tendency among such sources is 
unmistakable. Not all experience of pathê, and specifically of distress, should 
be avoided, even if such avoidance were humanly possible, which it isn’t.
6 Galen and Metriopatheia
Galen himself never deploys the actually terminology of metriopatheia; but he 
is, for all that, clearly in the camp of the moderately affected:
35   The Epicurean echoes in all of this are unmistakable: cf. KD 4, 33, 59 (= 21C, G LS), Men. 
133 (= 20A LS).
36   See also adv Col. 1119c, where Plutarch attacks Stilpo, a man known among other things 
and in other contexts for metriopatheia. In Restraining Anger 458c, he recalls the advice 
given to Philip of Macedon when attacking Olynthus not to exact too harsh a retribution 
from the city, since restraint is the way of mildness, pity and metriopatheia. These latter 
cases are not of course technical; indeed they recall several similar usages in Appian con-
cerning Philip’s more famous son. But they are significant in the general context of the 
disapproval of actions performed in the grip of rage, and the corresponding exaltation of 
the contrasting mildness of disposition.
37   See Dillon, J. M., Alcinous. The Handbook of Platonism, 1993, 188; eiusd., ‘Metriopatheia and 
apatheia: some reflections on a controversy in later Greek ethics’, in J. Anton ad A. Preus 
(eds.) Essays in Ancient Philosophy, New York, 1983.
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Since you say you have never seen me distressed, you may possibly imag-
ine that I am going to make the same pronouncement as some of the 
philosophers who hold that the sage will never suffer distress. 
Ind. 70, 21,13–17 BJP
But of course he isn’t, at least in his own case. His own restraint is not superhu-
man. Moreover, the implication is pretty clearly that such moral heroism is a 
chimerical fantasy:
I cannot say if there is anyone so wise that he is entirely free of affec-
tions; but I have a precise knowledge of the degree to which I am such. 
I do not care about the loss of possessions, as long as I am not deprived 
of all of them and sent to a desert island, or of bodily pain, without quite 
making light of being placed in the bull of Phalaris. What will distress me 
is the ruination of my homeland, or a friend being punished by a tyrant, 
and other similar things … So since nothing like this has happened to me 
until now, you thus have never seen me distressed (71–2, 21,17–22,7).
Not for him the Stoic sagely ideal, even if it is merely an ideal, or Epicurus’ 
claim that the wise man will be happy even on the rack, even while scream-
ing and groaning (DL 10.118, = 22Q(4) LS). Equally, he will not actually wel-
come material disaster, unlike Stoics such as Musonius (cf. the story of Zeno: 
above, §1). He prays for health, mental and physical, while trying to prepare 
himself to meet disaster with moderation. He himself is not superhuman: he 
could not maintain his equanimity in the face of total destitution, or in the 
case of pain severe enough to render conversations with friends an impossibil-
ity (73–6, 22,7–23,1).38
Finally, it is worth quoting the following:
If someone regards all of these things as of little value, why should he 
worry about them or be worried by them? … Someone who supposes that 
he has been deprived of something big must always be distressed and 
38   This looks like another dig at the Epicureans, for whom the pleasures of friendship were 
the primary good: VS 23, 28, 34, 39, 62, 66, 58, 66, 78 (= 22D, F LS); KD 27–8 (= 22D LS); 
cf. 22G, H, O, Q LS. Epicurus allegedly claimed in his last letter that it was recollection 
of philosophical conversations that assuaged his agony; Galen pointedly retorts that too 
much agony makes such things impossible. But see also Kaufman, D. H., ‘Galen on the 
therapy of distress and the limits of emotional therapy’, 2014, pp. 284–6, esp. n 33, who 
stresses the non-heroic aspects of the Epicurean attitude which would appeal to Galen.
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fret, unlike the person who thinks them small and continues to despise 
them. (65–6, 20,17–22)
That is the summation of Galen’s metriopatheia. Let us finally see how congru-
ent it is with Sextus’s.
7 Galen and Pyrrhonism: Comparisons and Conclusions
We may begin with Pyrrho himself. Largely legendary though his legacy no 
doubt is, the legends are themselves instructive insofar as they illustrate the 
lessons which later reporters, friendly as well as hostile, sought to derive from 
his example:
They say he showed his indifference by washing a pig. Once he got en-
raged on his sister’s behalf (her name was Philista), and he told the man 
who chided him for it that it was not over a weak woman that one should 
display indifference. When a dog rushed at him and terrified him, he re-
sponded to one who censured him for it that it was not easy entirely to 
strip oneself of one’s humanity (ekdunai ton anthrôpon); but one could 
struggle against one’s circumstances, at first by actions, and if they failed, 
by reason. 
DL 9. 66, = 1C LS [part]
So it seems that Pyrrho was not entirely successful in cultivating the sort of 
indifference manifested by his pig-laundering. Some things, apparently, de-
mand an emotive response; and some things provoke it willy-nilly. The phrase 
ekdunai ton anthrôpon is striking, since it vividly expresses what is apparently 
an ideal, and yet in a sense a self-stultifying one, and one which someone of 
Galen’s stripe would reject even as an ideal, although the Stoics (and perhaps 
also the Epicureans) would not.
The Sextan sceptic is in a similar case. Not believing pain to be really bad, 
he will suffer less than the normal person who does; but he will still suffer. 
Equally, Galen thinks that some distress is unavoidable; and he too places a 
comparable (albeit differently oriented) emphasis upon the importance of not 
thinking that certain apparent goods really are goods.
Galen is a busy, engaged man; and so too, albeit presumably less freneti-
cally so, is the Sextan sceptic. Properly understood, scepticism does not induce 
apraxia, since the sceptic is free to follow the ‘criterion’ of the phainomena (PH 
1.22):
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We follow a sort of doctrine (logos) which, in accordance with what ap-
pears, directs us to live in accordance with our inherited customs and 
laws and ways of life, and our own pathê. 
PH 1.17
Sceptics do not do away with appearances, in spite of what their opponents al-
lege. They are swayed, albeit involuntarily, by the “affective impression (phan-
tasia pathêtikê)” (19), even if on occasion they will argue against appearances 
as a counterweight to ‘dogmatic precipitancy’ (20):
Adhering to the phainomena, we live in accordance with the dictates 
of ordinary life (hê biôtikê têrêsis: cf. 3.235, quoted above), but without 
opinion, since we cannot remain wholly inactive. And the dictates of 
ordinary life are apparently four in number, the direction of nature; the 
constraint of the pathê, as when hunger drives us to food and thirst to 
drink; the tradition of the customs and laws; … and the instruction of the 
arts (technai). 
PH 1.23–4
That last matters. Sextus, after all, was, like Galen, a doctor; a man of action, 
and a benefactor of humanity (philanthrôpos: PH 3.279–80). And Galen’s views 
on these issues are closer in some respects to Sextan Pyrrhonism than he might 
have been willing to allow. But then Sextan Pyrrhonism is not ‘rustic’,39 and 
Galen could easily have thought that in many important respects it was simply 
a version of the sensible, non-heroic view of life,40 albeit one couched in a 
pointlessly phenomenalist language (Dig.Puls. VIII 780–3: above, §4), although 
he would no doubt also have accused them of denying the appearances, pre-
cisely because it does appear that pain, for example, is actually bad. Galen 
often elides the differences between the contemporary representatives of the 
schools he attacks, and earlier, and perhaps caricatured, versions of their views 
39   At least I don’t think so; but the issue is controversial. For a forceful expression of the 
view that, Sextus’s own protestations notwithstanding, it must be, see Barnes, J., ‘Sextan 
scepticism’ in D. Scott (ed.)(2007) Maieusis: Essays in Ancient Philosophy in Honour of 
Myles Burnyeat (Oxford: OUP), 2007, 322–34 (he derived his own term ‘rustic’ from Galen’s 
‘agroikos’). Compare his earlier views of 1982 and 1988; and those of Frede, M. (‘Des skep-
tikers Meinungen’, Neue Hefte für Philosophie 15/16, 1979, 102–129), and Burnyeat, M. ‘Can 
the sceptic live his scepticism?’, in J. Barnes, M. F. Burnyeat, and M. Schofield (eds.) Doubt 
and Dogmatism (Oxford: OUP), 1980, 20–53; all are collected in Burnyeat and Frede 1997.
40   Cf. his assimilation of Academic to Stoic – and indeed his own – epistemology: see 
Hankinson, R. J., ‘A purely verbal dispute? Galen on Stoic and Academic epistemology’, in 
A.-J. Voelke (ed.) Le Stoïcisme: Revue internationale de philosophie 45.3, 1992, 267–300.
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(this is clearly the case in regard to his treatment of Methodism); and in so 
doing, he is no more than a representative (admittedly a flamboyant one) of 
the traducive tendencies of his time.
One might still object that the connection I have sketched between Galen 
and his sceptical rivals is a tenuous one. I have stressed the sceptical empha-
sis on the unavoidability of the pathê; but these pathê are apparently physical 
pains, rather than excessive emotional states (such as anger and grief). One 
minimizes their unpleasant reality not by cultivating an indifference to them, 
but by ridding oneself of the additional painful belief that such things are real-
ly, essentially, bad. By contrast, Galen’s cognitive behavioural approach stresses 
the importance of reflecting on the intrinsic hideousness of the manifesta-
tions of rage, as well as its self-defeating consequences, as a means of gradually 
curing oneself of an addiction to it. Metriopatheia in this sense (again it should 
be stressed that Galen himself does not employ the term) is something to be 
cultivated, rather than simply the best one may humanly hope for.
All of these differences (and some others) are genuine. But for all that, par-
ticularly in the case of distress, lupê, and the appropriate response to loss of 
any kind, the convergences of Galen’s programme and that of the Pyrrhonists 
are clear. Some of the prescriptions are certainly different – there appears to be 
no sceptical counterpart to the injunction to visualize bad possible outcomes 
in order to immunize yourself (partially at least) against their eventuality, and 
by extension against less severe setbacks. Indeed there are obvious and well-
known problems with the idea of sceptics issuing injunctions of any kind. 
But the appeal to persuasion certainly strikes a chord; scepticism is a therapy 
founded centrally on the practice of argument. What goes wrong in both cases 
involves false (or at least toxic) beliefs, beliefs which we would be much bet-
ter off without, even though ridding ourselves of them (or at least minimizing 
them) will not (and perhaps for Galen at least should not) involve the con-
struction of the wholly unaffected individual as some sort of ideal, even as one 
which is practically unattainable, as most Stoics believed it to be. Neither for 
Galen nor the sceptics are emotions simply reducible to beliefs, and mistaken 
ones at that; they are the compulsions of a fundamentally non-rational, reac-
tive part of the soul. Even if we are essentially rational animals, there is still a 
humanity there is no point in trying to strip ourselves of.41
41   This is a very considerably altered, written version of a talk I gave at the Warwick confer-
ence splendidly organized by Caroline Petit, on July 1st, 2014. I am grateful to the partici-
pants, many of whom were old friends, and some of whom have since become so, for their 
engagement with my ideas, both during the session and less formally afterwards.
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chapter 7
A New Distress: Galen’s Ethics in Περὶ Ἀλυπίας and 
Beyond
P. N. Singer
In this chapter I consider how the new material from the περὶ ἀλυπίας (Ind.) 
contributes to our understanding of Galen’s ethics. As is the case with Galen’s 
discussions of his own books, I here suggest that helpful results are derived 
from the laying of the new text alongside the most relevant previously-known 
ones.
1 Position in Galen’s Oeuvre
Where does περὶ ἀλυπίας sit within Galen’s writings on ethics and moral psy-
chology, and what does it add to the picture? Galen’s contribution to moral 
psychology and ethics was previously known mainly from Affections and Errors 
(Aff. Pecc. Dig. 1 and 2). There is also highly relevant information in the ad-
mittedly problematic (because both abridged and to some extent distorted in 
the Arabic version) Character Traits (Mor.), and in some passages from The 
Soul’s Dependence on the Body (QAM) and De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis 
(PHP). The latter two, however (to simplify two highly complex texts), are con-
cerned mainly with certain theoretical propositions, and in particular with as-
pects of the relationship of soul to body. Affections and Errors and Character 
Traits, meanwhile – both of which he lists, in his own account of his writings, 
alongside περὶ ἀλυπίας in the category of works giving his views on ethical 
 philosophy1 – bear a much clearer affinity to that work. All three belong within 
a genre of practical or popularizing works of moral philosophy intended for 
a non-specialist audience; they offer both theory and practical advice in the 
areas of ethics, education and personal development.
1   Lib. Prop. 15 [12] (XIX.45 K. = 169,13–17 Boudon-Millot; for references to Lib. Prop. I print the 
new chapter number, resulting from the full text now available from Vlatadon 14, followed by 
the previous chapter number in square brackets). The three works, as well as a considerable 
number of others which are now lost, are introduced with the phrase περὶ τῶν τῆς ἠθικῆς 
φιλοσοφίας ἐζητημένων ὅσα μοι δοκεῖ (although an actual chapter heading, Περὶ τῶν τῆς ἠθικῆς 
φιλοσοφίας βιβλίων, was an addition of Müller’s).
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The closest similarity that περὶ ἀλυπίας has with another work in the Galenic 
corpus is, indeed, with Affections; and I should like now to spend a little time 
exploring both that similarity and what, specifically, Peri alupias adds to the 
other work. Both works are designed to help the reader or listener on the path 
to ethical improvement. According to ancient distinctions both of genre and of 
stage of personal development, works of ‘protreptic’ – encouraging the reader 
or listener to embark on the process of virtue acquisition in the first place – 
may precede a subsequent phase of instruction in which detailed guidance 
is given about the actual process.2 Employing that broad categorization, one 
would have to situate Peri alupias in this subsequent phase too.
Affections and Errors has as its topic or aim the control of affections (pathē) 
and errors (hamartēmata) in general; περὶ ἀλυπίας has the specific focus of the 
elimination of distress (lupē). Some have linked περὶ ἀλυπίας to the genre of 
consolatio; and other recent work has explored both the philosophical and the 
literary relatives of the work, and aspects of Galen’s self-presentation within 
it. There are similarities between the text and others in the tradition of popu-
lar ethical writing; it has been suggested that Plutarch’s De tranquillitate animi 
provides the closest parallel.3
2   Galen explicitly puts Aff. Pecc. Dig. in the latter class: ‘For it [sc. the present argument] is 
not one designed to convert people (προτρεπτικός) to virtue, but rather to show (ὑφηγητικός) 
those who are already converted the way by which it may be achieved’, Aff. Pecc. Dig. 1.6 (V.34 
K. = 23,14–16 DB). There may be a relevance here of a threefold scheme, ‘protretpic, thera-
py, advice’, which had been outlined by Philo of Larissa (Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.39.20–41.25); see 
Singer, P. N. (ed.) (2013). Galen: Psychological Writings, 206–7 and 240 n. 13 for discussion of 
this distinction and further references.
3   See especially Gill, C. (2010). Naturalistic Psychology in Galen and Stoicism, who draws out the 
similarities between each of these ethical opuscula and other works of practical ethics in the 
Graeco-Roman tradition; also Singer, Galen: Psychological Writings, esp. 205–32, for discus-
sion of Galen in his ethical context. For περὶ ἀλυπίας as a consolatio see the introduction to 
Boudon-Millot, V. and Jouanna, J. (2010). Galien, Oeuvres, 4: Ne pas se chagriner, and contra 
Kotzia, P. (2012). ‘Galen Peri alupias: Title, Genre and Two Cruces’, in Manetti, D. (ed.) Studi 
sul De indolentia di Galeno, 69–91, pointing out specific differences between the content of 
Peri alupias and other ancient consolationes and drawing attention to a specific category 
of works, now lost to us, entitled περὶ ἀλυπίας. See also Rosen, R. (2012). ‘Philology and the 
Rhetoric of Catastrophe in Galen’s De indolentia’, in, Rothschild, C. K. and Thompson, T. W. 
(eds) Galen’s De indolentia, 159–74.; Asmis, E. (2012). ‘Galen’s De indolentia and the Creation 
of a Personal Philosophy’, in ibid., 127–42; Kaufman, D. H. (2014). ‘Galen on the Therapy of 
Distress and the Limits of Emotional Therapy’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 47, 275–
96, highlighting features in Galen’s therapy of distress which he considers to be taken directly 
from Stoic and Epicurean sources. Kaufman’s paper appeared too late to be taken into con-
sideration in the original version of the present chapter; but, without space to engage with all 
his interesting suggestions, a couple of points may be made. First, as well discussed by Gill, 
both Stoic and Epicurean therapeutic approaches may be seen as part of a shared repertory 
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There is, I believe, more to be said, both about the interesting overlaps and 
differences between Affections and Errors and περὶ ἀλυπίας and about the dis-
tinctive understanding of lupē that arises from a consideration of both texts in 
conjunction. Such an approach is attractive both because Affections and Errors 
is a fascinating but in many ways frustrating text, unclear in a number of as-
pects of its organization and in particular giving a quite uneven discussion, 
and no clear typological categorization, of the different pathē of the soul;4 and 
also because it does, however, have quite a lot to say about lupē which may 
usefully be placed alongside the new material from περὶ ἀλυπίας.
2 Lupē in Affections and Errors
There are, in fact, passages in Affections and Errors which seem to present lupē 
as, not just as one pathos amongst many, but in some sense an overarching cat-
egory. In chapter 7 of Affections, in what it is admittedly a not unproblematic 
passage textually, it is suggested that there are subspecies of distress, of which 
envy is one.
ὀνομάζω δὲ φθόνον, ὅταν τις ἐπ᾽ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς λυπῆται. πάθος μέν ἐστι 
καὶ λύπη πᾶσα, χειρίστη δὲ ὁ φθόνος ἐστίν, εἴτε ἓν τῶν παθῶν εἴτε λυπῆς ἐστὶν 
εἶδος πλησιάζον δέ πως αὐτῇ,
By envy I mean becoming distressed at what others enjoy. All distress is 
an affection, but envy is the worst distress, whether it is an affection in 
itself or a subspecies of distress, somehow approximate to it …
Aff. Pecc. Dig. 1.7 (V.35 K. = 24,13–16 De Boer)5
of techniques, also incorporated in this period by a Platonist author such as Plutarch; and 
such an analysis seems to me more convincing than that of a strong direct influence from 
Epicureanism. Secondly, while Kaufman’s point (282) about the input from Posidonius, espe-
cially on Galen’s view of the praemeditatio malorum, is well taken (on the passage in question 
see further n. 19 below), the relevance of the ‘belief-based methods associated ... with the 
early Stoics’ (283) seems less clear, since the importance of the rational component (cor-
responding to correct beliefs) alongside non-rational ones is well justified by Galen’s own 
explicitly proposed Platonist theory of the soul. My own argument in what follows also sug-
gests a clear connection with the Stoic and Epicurean philosophical alternatives, but in a 
somewhat different sense.
4   There are two short lists of pathē, which however do not seem to aim at exhaustiveness, and 
within them no clear principle of classification. The point is discussed at greater length by 
Singer, Galen: Psychological Writings, 220–1.
5   The translation of this text (here and subsequently) is that of Singer, Galen: Psychological 
Writings, who also discusses the problems of the text ad loc.
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Moreover, distress or grief assumes a central role for a major part of the text, 
chapters 7–9.
I digress for a moment to clarify a point of terminology. For the sake of con-
sistency, I translate ania and cognates with ‘grief ’ and cognates, and similarly 
lupē with ‘distress’; however, the two sets of terms seem, in the ethical context, 
to be regarded as virtual synonyms. Though it is arguable that the former gives, 
at times, a slightly intensified sense, it seems wrong to insist on a clear distinc-
tion. The verbal form ἀνιώμενος is used, for example, of the young man at Aff. 
Pecc. Dig. 1.7 (V.37 K. = 25,15 de Boer), and the verb is also used of Galen’s own 
mother who ‘would suffer grief at the smallest occurrence’ (ἀνιωμένην … ἐπὶ 
σμικροτάτοις, 1.8, V.41 K. = 28,6 de Boer). But the progress of the discussion, in 
1.8 (from V.43 K. = 29,15 de Boer), makes it clear that lupē is regarded as the 
relevant overall heading.6 In what follows I shall therefore treat Galen’s discus-
sion of cases of ania and lupē as referring to the same psychological–ethical 
phenomenon.
In chapters 7–9, then, we gain the impression that the eradication or less-
ening of lupē is an absolutely central strand in the fight against the affections. 
The discussion revolves around anecdotal reference to, quotation of and di-
rect address to individuals amongst Galen’s most intimate circle of friends and 
family. First, at Aff. Pecc. Dig. 1.7 (V.37 K. = 25,15 de Boer), Galen introduces the 
character of a young man who came to him because of the excessive grief he 
suffered over small matters. The argument continues to be addressed to this 
individual’s problem up to the end of chapter 9 – albeit with some major di-
gressions, in particular on the relationship between nature and nurture and on 
the ethical model offered by Galen’s own parents, and his own philosophical 
upbringing. But both the digressions and the material directly related to the 
young man serve to bring out the importance, and multifarious ramifications, 
of distress. First, Galen attributes to his father a contrast between universally 
admired  virtues – justice, self-control, courage and discernment – on the one 
6   A further note of caution should be sounded in relation to the temptation to see such words 
as ‘technical terms’, and so ignore their potential fluidity: it seems to me (pace Nutton) that 
Galen uses the verb anian in a passage of De methodo medendi (MM) in a completely differ-
ent, non-technical sense. At MM 7.1 (X.456–7 K.) Galen is – in line with the ‘reluctant author’ 
persona discussed in my ‘New Light and Old Books’, in this volume –  giving reasons for his 
not having written the work earlier. To his standard argument, that he never wrote to advance 
his reputation, he adds another: he was too busy. The words there, ἡμᾶς … πολλάκις ἀνιωμένους 
ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐνοχλοῦσιν οὕτω συνεχῶς ἐνίοτε χρόνον ἐφεξῆς πόλυν, ὡς μηδ᾽ἅψασθαι συνηθῆναι βιβλίου, 
in this context demand the interpretation that Galen is too pressed upon by urgent duties to 
be able to engage in literary activity as he would like, not that he is too depressed to read. One 
might here translate ‘troubled’, ‘bothered’, or even ‘irritated’ or ‘annoyed’; but surely the term 
carries none of the ‘technical’ sense of ania or lupē, with their problematic and dangerous 
ethical dimension, in περὶ ἀλυπίας and Affections.
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hand, and freedom from distress, on the other. The point is that people wish 
to appear to have the former virtues, but they want actually to be free from 
distress:
… φαίνεσθαί γε πειρῶνται τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ σώφρονες καὶ φρόνιμοι 
καὶ δίκαιοι, ἄλυποι μέντοι κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, κἆν μὴ φαίνωνται τοῖς πέλας· 
ὥστε τοῦτο μέν σοι πρῶτον ἁπάντων ἀσκητέον ἐστὶ τὸ σπουδαζόμενον ἅπασιν 
ἀνθρώποις μᾶλλον τῶν ἀρετῶν.
… they wish to appear to others brave, self-controlled, discerning and 
just, while they actually want to be free from distress, even if it is not 
apparent to those around them. And this should therefore be what you 
cultivate first of all, since it is sought after by all people in preference to 
the virtues.
Aff. Pecc. Dig. 1.8 (V.43 K. = 29,8–12 de Boer)
The practice of freeing oneself from lupē is here presented as the practical, 
chronological starting-point of one’s ethical progress, on the commonsense 
grounds that this absence of suffering is something that all people actually 
seek. We shall see how this perception of Galen’s father’s surfaces again in Peri 
alupias. Galen also talks of the model his parents provided specifically in terms 
of their experience of distress. His father ‘never appeared distressed at any 
setback’, while his mother ‘would suffer grief at the smallest occurrence’. The 
terms ‘distress’ and ‘grief ’ are here clearly being used to apply to one’s reactions 
to a very wide range of everyday events which are liable to upset one: thus, 
lupē (or ania) here can be seen as to some extent co-extensive with irritation 
or anger, even though this, in its more violent manifestations, was dealt with 
explicitly earlier in the work.
In the part of the text addressed more closely to the young man who wishes 
to be freed from distress, too, the term turns out to have a very broad reference. 
One may, for example, suffer lupē not just as a result of personal loss, but in the 
anxiety over possible future loss, including not just of possessions but of status. 
Although, as mentioned, Galen does not explicitly give us any categorization 
of the pathē or account of which are the most fundamental, we are reminded 
of the fact that lupē is, indeed, an overarching category, an ‘Über-pathos’, in 
some Stoic sources.7 Getting rid of lupē, then, begins to look rather like the 
Stoic drive for apatheia. Reference to the Stoic relatives of Galen’s thought in 
7   There is a Stoic division of pathē into four broad categories: distress (lupē), fear (phobos), 
desire (epithumia), pleasure (hēdonē); see Diogenes Laertius, Vit. Phil. 7.110, Stobaeus, Ecl. 
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this area leads us to another relevant consideration: the absence of the tripar-
tite soul at this point in the discussion. The earlier phase of discussion, based 
strongly on that Platonic distinction of the drives of the non-rational soul into 
those of spirited (thumoeides) and desiderative (epithumētikon), clearly im-
plies that any pathos will be a pathos of one of these two – that this distinction 
will be of fundamental significance throughout. And, as already suggested, the 
examples that the text dwells on at length seem to be chosen as examples of 
the malfunction of the spirited – that is to say, of uncontrolled rage.
Yet the discussion of lupē which we have just been considering is interesting 
precisely because it seems to follow from this broader conception of lupē that 
it cuts across the spirited–desiderative distinction.8 This is supported both by 
the range of examples of lupē – distress at financial loss, distress caused by 
fear of loss, distress at perceived lack of status – and by the subsequent argu-
ment that the cause of all susceptibility to lupē is – an even more over-arching 
category – acquisitiveness (pleonexia). For such acquisitiveness or greed may 
be directed at personal possessions or luxury (surely, in Platonic terms, aims 
of the desiderative soul), but also at status and perceived position in society 
(those of the spirited).
3 Lupē and Its Control in περὶ ἀλυπίας
The discussion in περὶ ἀλυπίας contributes to the same picture. Here the 
Platonic tripartite soul does not, in fact, appear at all. Rather, removing or re-
ducing one’s susceptibility to lupē appears as a procedure which is absolutely 
fundamental to ethical well-being. Much of the argument proceeds through 
models: the positive ones of Aristippus and of Galen’s own father, the negative 
ones of his mother and of the literary man whose distress led to his ultimate 
demise. Again, alupia seems to amount to something very similar to what a 
Stoic might call being unaffected by externals – or at least, to being affected by 
them as little as possible (we shall return to this point).
We might like to say that the two works are complementary: περὶ ἀλυπίας 
continues, and develops in more detail, particular themes outlined in Affections 
and Errors.9 But in drawing attention to this complementarity, it is important 
2.7.10, Cicero, Fin. 3.35. Cf. also the detailed categorization of the probably Stoic text, pseudo-
Andronicus, Peri pathōn, which lists 24 species of lupē.
8   On this point see also Singer, Galen: Psychological Writings, esp. 220–1.
9   This formulation is not intended to imply anything about the relative dates of the two works, 
for discussion of which see Nutton in Singer, Galen: Psychological Writings, 45–47, arguing 
(against Jouanna) for a dating of Aff. Pecc. Dig., as well as Mor., after περὶ ἀλυπίας. (But see 
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to re-emphasize the point: the more general work Affections and Errors is, to 
a considerable extent, itself a work about the reduction or elimination of dis-
tress. On the other hand, περὶ ἀλυπίας introduces perspectives on lupē that are 
not to be found in Affections and Errors, or found there much less clearly; and I 
turn to two of these now, before returning to a consideration of their comple-
mentarity and attempting to summarize the findings that accrue from consid-
ering the texts conjointly.
The first such ‘new’ feature of lupē in περὶ ἀλυπίας is its potentially severe 
physical consequences.
… Φιλίδης μὲν ὁ γραμματικὸς ἀπολλυμένων αὐτῷ τῶν βιβλίων κατὰ πυρκαϊὰν 
ἀπὸ δυσθυμίας καὶ λύπης διέφθαρη συντακείς
… Philides the literary man, when his books were destroyed in the fire, 
wasted away as a result of low spirits and distress, and died.
Ind. 7 (4,6–8 BJP)10
In fact, this Galenic aspect of lupē is not by any means a finding new to Peri 
alupias, even if it is not mentioned in Affections and Errors. The medical, in-
cluding potentially fatal, consequences of distress (as also of worry, phrontis 
and agōnia), as part of a disease pattern involving the connected phenomena 
of sleeplessness, dryness, heat and fever, is attested in a wide range of pas-
sages in Galen’s medical writings.11 Indeed, the specific anecdote that Galen 
brings forward here about the literary man whose distress over losses similar 
to Galen’s did indeed prove fatal appears elsewhere, in Galen’s Commentary on 
Hippocrates’ ‘Epidemics VI’.
Such medical consequences are not the direct subject matter of Peri alu-
pias, which is concerned rather with its prevention. The medical understand-
ing of lupē, however, should be borne in mind as an important element in the 
  also Singer, Galen: Psychological Writings, 34–41, as well as ‘New Light and Old Books’, 
p. 123 n. 45 and p. 125, for methodological caution on the dating of Galen’s works.).
10   Translations from Peri alupias are my own. On the identity between the person mentioned 
here and that referred to in Hipp. Epid. VI (discussed below), on the problem of the form 
of his name, and on the chronological relationship between Peri alupias and Hipp. Epid. 
VI, see Nutton in Singer, Galen: Psychological Writings, 79 n. 15. I translate γραμματικός 
with the vague term ‘literary man’; the term has a semantic range which includes a kind of 
secondary-level teacher and a person with broad expertise in the analysis of literary texts.
11   See now Singer, P. N. (2017). ‘The Essence of Rage: Galen on Emotional Disturbances and 
their Physical Correlates’, in Seaford, R., Wilkins, J. and Wright, M. (eds). Selfhood and the 
Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill, 161–96, draw-
ing attention to a range of such texts.
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intellectual background. For the medical context provides a framework with-
in which lupē is, for Galen, a distinct and observable physical phenomenon. 
Whether someone is suffering from lupē is thus, in a sense, an objective fact – 
an affection of the psuchē which – just like those well-known affections of the 
psuchē in Galen’s anecdotes in Prognosis – is accessible to medical diagnosis.12 
It is not irrelevant here, either, to consider the criterion of a pathological state 
given in De sanitate tuenda: so long as the person is not distressed by an im-
perfect physical state, that state still counts as healthy.13 For Galen lupē is a 
concrete, distinct – and potentially a medical – state. It is not a vague charac-
terization of the phenomenon of becoming slightly upset at events.
Another area in which περὶ ἀλυπίας seems to depart from Affections and 
Errors, or at least to give greater clarity, is in relation to the question – already 
touched on – of how complete an elimination of pathē is required or desirable. 
As a number of previous discussions have highlighted, Affections seems prac-
tically to align itself with a Stoic approach whereby pathē are in their nature 
purely negative, and something very close to their complete elimination is the 
aim. It has also been pointed out that this appears to conflict with his Platonism, 
or to be more precise with what one might expect at this period from an author 
indebted strongly to both Plato and Aristotle in his ethical thinking, and in 
particular that the term metriopatheia – the ‘moderation of the pathē’ – which 
appears in some ‘Middle Platonist’ authors is not mentioned by Galen.14
It is, of course, true that, within the Platonic tripartite model which is of 
such importance to Galen, including in Affections, anger – the righteous indig-
nation of the thumoeides which checks the wild desires of the epithumētikon – 
has a positive, indeed an important, role, in a way which is quite contrary to 
Stoic thinking. For Galen, however, though this internal dynamic within the 
soul is important to his analysis, anger when functioning in this way appar-
ently does not come under the heading of pathos. Pathos, for Galen, seems, 
in the ethical context, to be a purely negative term: that much he has taken 
over from Stoic usage, however bitterly he opposes the broader intellectual 
framework within which that usage arose. That is to say: there is, for Galen, a 
legitimate role for the non-rational parts of the soul, but pathos arises only in 
these non-rational parts and only when they are not behaving legitimately; for 
12   Relevant here is the analysis of Mattern, S. P. (2006). ‘Galen’s Anxious Patients: Lypē as 
Anxiety Disorder’, in Petridou, G. and Thumiger, C. (eds) Homo Patiens – Approaches to 
the Patient in the Ancient World, 203–23, which however in my view over-emphasizes one 
particular, medicalized interpretation of lupē throughout the corpus.
13   San. Tu. 1.5 (VI.13 K. = 8,19–20, Koch; VI.19 K. = 10,29–34 Koch).
14   On this point see Donini, P. L. (2008). ‘Psychology’, in Hankinson, R. J. (ed.) The Cambridge 
Companion to Galen, 194; Singer, Galen: Psychological Writings, 208–9.
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the Stoics, meanwhile, there is no such positive role for the non-rational parts 
of the soul, which indeed, properly speaking, do not exist: it is rather errors of 
rationality which lead to or constitute behaviour in pathos. Thus, Galen shares 
with Stoic thought the negative definition of pathos, while having a different 
understanding, not only of how pathos comes about and where it is located in 
the soul, but also of where pathos fits into the broader scheme of non-rational 
drives.
So we might say that even if Galen does acknowledge a positive role for 
some of (what the Stoics would call) pathē, this would not mean that he is ad-
vocating metriopatheia: for Galen, pathē are in their nature negative, and when 
anger (say) is functioning positively on behalf of the person that is not a case 
of pathos, not even of moderated pathos. Thus, an Aristotelian understanding 
of proper ethical/emotional response as consisting in some mean between op-
posites – that is, the exactly correct sort of pathos – seems to be absent from 
Galen’s thinking in his ethical writings.15
But there is a further question, or complication. Even if Galen (a) takes there 
to be a positive role for some emotions, but (b) does not refer to positive man-
ifestations of emotions as pathē, and therefore (c) does not advocate the con-
cept of metriopatheia, there remains a further question: is the total elimination 
of those emotions which are regarded as purely negative – those ones which 
Galen and the Stoics would both call pathē – required? Galen’s ‘official’ answer 
seems to be no – again, in keeping with a fundamentally Platonic–Aristotelian 
model (albeit one without the terminology of metriopatheia) – although, as 
discussed above, one can certainly gain the impression, throughout much of 
Affections and Peri alupias, that total elimination is indeed what is being advo-
cated. In this context, it is also relevant to consider that Galen at least arguably 
(if one accepts a particular emendation of the text) allows also a moderate 
level of emotional attachment to societal status and political power, and even 
wealth. As elsewhere in Galen’s work, excessive preoccupation with status or 
reputation is, to be sure, considered a great evil. But on Garofalo’s emendation 
15   A version of a theory of virtues as means does, however, appear in Mixtures, where the 
context is the assertion that a person with the best bodily mixture – conceived as a bal-
ance between extremes – will also have the right balance between ethical extremes: τῷ 
μὲν σώματι τοιοῦτος ὁ εὐκρατότατος ἄνθρωπος· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ μέσος ἀκριβῶς ἐστι 
θρασύτητός τε καὶ δειλίας, μελλησμοῦ τε καὶ προπετείας, ἐλέου τε καὶ φθόνου. εἴη δ᾽ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος 
εὔθυμος, φιλόστοργος, φιλάνθρωπος, συνετός (Temp. 2.1, I.576 K. = 42,16–20 Helmreich). This 
seems to be clearly in line with Aristotle’s approach to virtues in Eth. Nic.; but such an 
analysis of ethical response in terms of a mean is not followed through in his ethical 
work, except in the sense that there is emphasis on the diet, training and the best physical 
nature as preconditions for ethics (esp. in QAM and Mor.); certainly individual virtues are 
not, on the Aristotelian model, so analysed.
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of sections 80–81 (see further below), freedom from distress is equated with 
the possession of only a moderate level of attachment to these aims.
The desirability of elimination of lupē again points to its special status. 
Unlike thumos or epithumia, for example, it has no positive role. One might 
indeed be tempted, following the analysis outlined above, to suggest that this 
is precisely what lupē is for Galen: the negative or pathological manifestation of 
non-rational drives which (as we have seen) are not in themselves necessarily 
pathē. Lupē, then, like pathos in general, has no positive role for Galen. Does 
that mean that we should aim for or require its complete removal? In spite of 
what I have referred to as hints of a Stoic-style apatheia, Peri alupias gives us 
something the other text does not, or at least gives us much less explicitly: a 
specific affirmation that one cannot always be unaffected by circumstances.
Addressing the issue directly (in sections 70–76), Galen explicitly denies the 
proposition that a person – or at least that he personally – can remain free 
from distress in every eventuality. In contradistinction to the extreme Stoic 
and Epicurean claims on unaffectedness, Galen prefers a more common-sense 
position. He knows his own limitations; he does not, like Musonius the Stoic, 
ask to be tested by every possible adversity; he does not accept that one can 
be happy inside that notorious philosophical example of torture, the bull of 
Phalaris; and he mentions specific circumstances that he knows would cause 
him distress (the destruction of his home city, the persecution of a friend by 
a tyrant). So, the text of περὶ ἀλυπίας makes it clearer and more explicit than 
that of Affections that, in spite of the desirability of freeing oneself from lupē 
as much as one can, total indifference to, or unaffectedness by, externals can-
not in all circumstances be expected. It is just that we should aim for much 
higher expectations and achievement in this area than are normally the case. 
Quite how high a level of achievement he expects, or (for he is more explicit on 
this point) attributes to himself, is a somewhat complex question. A very high 
level of impassivity to the vicissitudes of fate will be termed megalopsuchia;16 
and Galen does indeed attribute this quality to himself. At other points he em-
phasizes that his failure to succumb to distress, at least in response to most of 
16   Galen’s use of megalopsuchia here seems to provide another point of contact with 
Aristotle, for the understanding of the term seems importantly similar to the Aristotelian 
one. Although there are also different aspects of Aristotle’s analysis of megalopsuchia (in 
particular in regard to the level of honour enjoyed by its possessor), he takes it to be a 
virtue that involves indifference, or at least a moderate reaction, to extremes of good or 
bad fortune (Eth. Nic. 4.3, 1124a12–15) and, interestingly also one which is in some sense a 
crown or adornment to the other virtues, enhancing them but impossible without them 
(Eth. Nic. 4.3, 1124a1–2). I am grateful to Matyáš Havrda for pointing out to me this simi-
larity; see also Kotzia, P. (2014). ‘Galen, De indolentia: Commonplaces, Traditions, and 
Contexts’, in Rothschild, C. K. and Thompson, T. W. (eds), Galen’s De indolentia, 91–126.
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his losses, was ‘no big thing’. The argument of the text functions, of course, by 
constantly emphasizing the enormity of his losses in order to highlight the dis-
tinctiveness of his reaction – a reaction of refusing to consider those losses to 
be enormous.17 He is ‘not at all moved’, ‘not now distressed, cheerfully carrying 
out my usual tasks as before’, ‘bearing without distress’, ‘not distressed, even 
with all such things touching me’; ‘I bore it very easily, not moved in the least’, 
‘none of these things distressed me’, ‘I was not distressed as others, but bore 
the event very easily, after losing such a great variety of possessions, any one of 
which on its own would have been most distressing to others’.18
Before returning to a final consideration of the complementary nature of 
the text and of the overall picture of lupē that emerges, I consider one more 
specific area in which περὶ ἀλυπίας seems to diverge, or offer something distinct 
from, Affections and Errors, this time in the sphere of practical advice. First, the 
central policy recommended in the latter work – that of finding a neutral ad-
visor to monitor and report to one about one’s faults – does not appear in Peri 
alupias. Conversely, the main technique which the latter work does prescribe, 
the praemeditatio malorum – that is to say, a sustained daily practice of antic-
ipation of the worst, a practice which may include the internal or actual repe-
tition of certain texts or propositions – does not appear, at least not explicitly, 
in Affections and Errors. A regular mental practice, involving recitation – spe-
cifically, of the Pythagorean Carmen aureum – is recommended in Affections, 
along with a process of self-interrogation whose rational force will affect one’s 
ethical behaviour. This practice, however, is based rather on the daily exam-
ination of one’s previous actions. περὶ ἀλυπίας gives us a further dimension of 
the use of text recitation for ethical or psychological purposes. A quotation 
from Euripides is central to the text’s message on the praemeditatio malorum. 
(Interestingly, the same text appears in De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis, 
there in support of a theoretical argument about how to conceptualize the 
process of praemeditatio within the soul.19) It is perhaps noteworthy that there 
is no appeal here to the use of philosophical texts in one’s daily exercise – a 
fact that one may relate to Galen’s insistence that his father’s successful moral 
17   For a helpful discussion of the progress of Galen’s argument in relation to this, and 
the consistency or otherwise of his view of alupia in the text, see Rosen, ‘Rhetoric of 
Catastrophe’.
18   ἔφης αὐτὸς ἑωρακέναι με μηδὲ ἐπὶ βραχὺ κινηθέντα (2, 2,11–12 BJP); μηδὲν νῦν ἀνιαθῆναί με 
φαιδρόν τε καὶ τὰ συνήθη πράττοντα καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν… ἀλύπως ὤφθην φέρων (3–4, 3,1–6 
BJP); τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ τῶν τοιούτων πάντων ἁπτομένων ἀνιαθῆναι θαυμασιώτερον ἐδόκει σοι… 
πάνυ ῥᾳδίως ἤνεγκα τὸ πρᾶγμα, μήτε βραχὺ κινηθείς (11, 5,5–9 BJP); τούτων οὖν οὐδὲν ἠνίασέ 
με (29, 10,24–25 BJP); ἀπολέσας τοσαύτην ποικιλίαν κτημάτων ὧν ἕκαστον αὐτὸ καθ᾽ἑαυτὸ 
λυπηρότατον ἂν ἐγένετο τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, οὐκ ἠνιάθην ὡς ἕτεροί τινες, ἀλλἀ πάνυ ῥᾳδίως 
ἤνεγκα τὸ συμβᾶν (38, 13,4–8 BJP).
19   PHP 4.7 (V.417–18 K. = 282,11–23 De Lacy).
191A New Distress
education, described as similar to his own, was achieved ‘without arguments 
from philosophy’ and that he ‘did not frequent philosophers in youth’.20 One 
may, indeed, connect this with Galen’s sceptical attitude towards the discipline 
of philosophy, certainly as generally practised in his own time.21
4 Practical Ethics and Life Aims in περὶ ἀλυπίας and Affections and 
Errors
But let us consider some further aspects of the complementary nature of περὶ 
ἀλυπίας and Affections and Errors. In Peri alupias, we again meet Galen’s father, 
and in a similar context. It is not just that his father was a model in his freedom 
from distress – that is, his ability not to be affected by adverse events. Rather, 
here too a specific perception is attributed to his father, one which matches 
that reported in Affections and Errors. Let us look at the passage, which may 
be compared with that cited above. (I follow the text of BJP, and excerpt what 
seem to me the most relevant phrases from a fairly long passage.)
οὐ γὰρ ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων τις οὕτως ἀκριβῶς ὡς καὶ οὗτος ἐτίμησε δικαιοσύνην 
τε καὶ σωφροσύνην… οἶδα δέ μου τὸν πατέρα καταφρονοῦντα τῶν ἀνθρωπί-
νων πραγμάτων ὡς μικρῶν… τοὺς ἥδιστα βεβιωκότας οὐδὲν ἔσχε πλείω τῶν 
οἰωνῶν τούτων οὓς κατὰ τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων πόλιν ὁρῶμεν ὑπὸ τῶν δεσποτῶν 
περιαγομένους ἕνεκα τοῦ τὰς θηλείας ὀχεύειν ἐπὶ μισθῷ· τοὺς δὲ τῶν τοιούτων 
ἡδονῶν καταφρονοῦντας, ἀρκουμένους δὲ τῷ μήτε ἀλγεῖν μήτε λυπεῖσθαι τὴν 
ψυχήν, οὐδέποτε ἐπῄνεσεν ἀπομαντευόμενος μεῖζον τι καὶ κρεῖττον ὂν τὸ ἀγα-
θὸν ἰδίαν ἔχον φύσιν, οὔτε ἐν μόνῳ τῷ μήτε ἀλγεῖν μήτε λυπεῖσθαι περιγραφό-
μενον. ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν καὶ τούτων τις ἀποχωρήσας ἐπιστήμην θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων 
πραγμάτων ἡγήσηται τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχειν, ἐλαχίστου μορίου τούτου ὁρῶ τοὺς 
ἀνθρώπους μετέχοντας… ὁ γὰρ ἐν τῷ καθόλου μὴ γινώσκων ὁποῖα τά τε θεῖα 
καὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα πράγματά εἰσιν, οὐδ᾽ ἐν τῷ κατὰ μέρος οὐδ᾽ ἐπιστημονικῶς 
τι ἑλέσθαι καὶ φυγεῖν δύναται.
20   χωρὶς τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας λόγων. οὐ γὰρ ὡμίλησε φιλοσόφοις ἐν νεότητι, Ind. 58–9 (19,2–3 BJP).
21   On this point see further Singer, P. N. (2014). ‘Galen and the Philosophers: Philosophical 
Engagement, Shadowy Contemporaries, Aristotelian Transformations’, in Adamson, P., 
Hansberger, R. and Wilberding, J. (eds) Philosophical Themes in Galen, 7–38. Kaufman, 
‘Galen on the Therapy’, argues that διαλεχθῆναι at 78, 24,7 BJP means ‘philosophical con-
versation’, but this seems to me a considerable over-translation, supported only by the 
doubtful contention that Galen is here echoing a specific passage of Epicurus. A more 
natural reading is surely that Galen is simply referring in a general way to conversations 
with friends.
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For no other man esteemed justice and self-control as completely as he … 
I know that my father despised human affairs as trivial things … he val-
ued those who live a life devoted to pleasure no more highly than those 
birds we see being taken round Rome by their masters to service females 
for a price. But those who despise such pleasures, and are content with 
neither experiencing pain nor distress in their souls, he never praised. He 
declared that the good was something bigger and more powerful than 
that, something which possessed its own nature rather than being de-
fined only in terms of not suffering pain or distress. But if someone de-
parts from these and holds that the good is a knowledge of matters both 
human and divine, I see that human beings possess only a very small 
part of this … For someone without even general knowledge of matters 
human and divine cannot choose scientifically in individual matters, ei-
ther, what to choose and what to avoid.
Ind. 58–64 (18,22–20,10 BJP)
The refusal to praise those who are satisfied with being free from distress can 
surely be placed alongside the remark in Affections suggesting the attempt to 
attain alupia as a crucial, but not sufficient, stage in ethical progress.22 This fea-
ture of the Peri alupias argument – that it does not present a straightforward 
rejection of Epicurean aochlēsia and/or Stoic apatheia, but rather a statement 
of their insufficiency – seems to me a vital one. The two passages are, in fact, of a 
piece: both are suggesting the drive towards alupia as a practical  starting-point 
in the attempt at ethical self-improvement; and both are asserting that alupia 
is necessary, but by no means sufficient, for virtue. If we wish to talk of ends 
or goals, we must mention ‘knowledge of things human and divine’ – however 
imperfectly we may attain to that.23
As both this passage and that immediately following makes clear: (a) human 
affairs are to be despised; (b) freedom from distress is valuable; but (c) it is not 
sufficient, as there are higher human aims. These are reasserted a few lines later 
22   The caution should be made that the verb ‘praised’ in the above text represents a conjec-
ture (BJP’s ἐπῄνεσεν for the MS ἔπεισεν); it is, however, a very plausible one, and it seems 
that the text must in any case be advancing some contrast between mere satisfaction with 
alupia on the one hand and higher goals on the other.
23   The precise progress of the argument in this passage is not straightforward, and it is pos-
sible to interpret differently the attitude towards the notion of ‘knowledge of the human 
and divine’ that Galen is here presenting. I take it that Galen is expressing the extreme 
difficulty of gaining knowledge in this area, but not rejecting such knowledge altogether 
as a goal; rather, some effort in this direction will be of ethical value. See the discussions 
of this same passage in this volume by both Chris Gill and Jim Hankinson.
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in the words ‘wishing to be actively engaged in both mind and body’, πάντα … 
ἐνεργεῖν … βουλόμενα καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ ψυχήν, 68, 21,7–8 BJP. (One must 
acknowledge, here, that this is presented as not merely a human aim, but in 
fact also that of ‘all animals’, the word πάντα here referring back to οὔτε ἐμαυτὸν 
οὔτε ἄλλον ἄνθρωπον οὔτε ζῷον τι – and in doing so one must also acknowledge 
that there an anti-Epicurean rhetoric at work here which has arguably taken 
Galen to a slightly unusual place in his argument, as made clear by the pej-
orative mention of aochlēsia and, indeed, by the explicit reference to other 
writings in which he attacks Epicurus.)24 There is also a similarity between 
the two texts in the way in which these ‘higher-level’, or intellectual, aims are 
 presented – and perhaps above all in the vagueness with which they are pre-
sented. If we turn to the relevant discussion in Errors – the part of that text 
devoted to the rational soul as opposed to the non-rational – two things seem 
striking in this context. One is Galen’s apparent slipperiness when it comes 
actually to defining ‘the goal of life’;25 the other is that, whatever the precise 
answer on that, he is more interested in persuading one to engage in rational 
training and rational scientific activity than in any goal which would more ob-
viously be defined as ethical.
One might even say that rational or intellectual activity of the correct kind, 
in that text, provides an answer that seems to stand in place of the answer to 
‘the goal of life’; and that, perhaps, corresponds (at least as far as human beings 
are concerned) to what Galen describes here as ‘being actively engaged in both 
mind and body’. Galen (or his father) seems to have developed an interesting 
practical-ethics approach here. We might summarize the two-step approach 
as follows:
(i)  Ethical improvement must start with the identification of something 
that causes one actual distress, lupē. Once one has achieved that identi-
fication, the desire to make a change allows the possibility, at least, that 
one will make some progress. One is no longer in denial, at this stage, 
and may seek practical interventions to lessen one’s susceptibility. If one 
then succeeds in radically reducing one’s susceptibility to lupē, this is a 
necessary, but by no means sufficient, condition of virtue.
24   A list of nine works engaging with Epicurean philosophy is given at Lib. Prop. 19 [16]; it is, 
relatedly, interesting to speculate, though we can do no more, as to how important this 
emphasis on ‘active engagement’ may have been in these lost works.
25   On this point see the discussion of Donini, P. L. (1988). ‘Tipologia degli errori e loro 
correzione secondo Galeno’, in Manuli, P. and Vegetti, M. (eds) Le opere psicologiche di 
Galeno: Atti del terzo Colloquio Galenico internazionale, Pavia, 10–12 settembre 1986, 65–116 
and Singer, Galen: Psychological Writings, 229–32.
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(ii) While it is difficult to define precisely the goal in this higher realm – that 
of the rational soul – some things are clear. In particular, (a) the aims 
pursued by most people – political ambition, accumulation of wealth – 
are to be despised; and (b) some kind of mental engagement, or direct-
ed activity, is essential to human life. Fairly clearly, too, the type of such 
activity strongly preferred by Galen (and his father) is that aimed at the 
acquisition of knowledge, especially (as far as possible) knowledge of a 
mathematically reliable kind.
In relation to step (ii), and in particular the definition of ‘the goal’, there is, as 
already suggested, some vagueness – though we should here acknowledge the 
limitations of our sources, since a considerable list of Galen’s ethical writings 
is lost to us. But it also seems at least possible that Galen is deliberately vague 
in this context, preferring a strong argument in favour of intellectually rigorous 
and mathematically-based mental activity to a conventional definition of vir-
tue of the sort approved by any of the established philosophical schools. The 
above talk of a two-step approach should not, however, be taken to deny the 
inter connectedness of the phases. The removal, or reduction, of one’s liability 
to distress is for Galen intimately related to the adoption of appropriate life 
aims, or to which things in life we take to be valuable or not valuable. The 
early education mentioned above simultaneously instils appropriate notions 
of what counts as good and habituates one to appropriate reactions and be-
haviour: the rational (evaluative) and non-rational (habituated) responses go 
hand in hand. This connectedness is particularly reinforced, in περὶ ἀλυπίας, 
in sections 80–81, where the absence of distress is closely correlated with an 
appropriate assessment of the aims of honour, wealth, reputation and political 
power. (And especially so if we adopt the reading of this passage suggested by 
Garofalo, whereby ‘those who do not suffer distress as the many do’ are equated 
with ‘those who have a moderate attachment to honour, etc.’)26 Here again, it 
seems, the taking of the two texts, Affections and Errors and περὶ ἀλυπίας, along-
side each other, has helped to form a picture of Galenic thinking in this area.
A final point is worth our consideration: what range of emotional reactions 
is admissible within alupia? For Galen, as we have already suggested, lupē is a 
quasi-medical category. The usual context for its mention is in consideration 
of predisposing causes that can lead to physical ailments of various kinds. 
The example of the literary man dying of grief should not, perhaps, from 
this perspective, be seen as an extreme one. This, Galen seems to suggest, is 
within normal medical experience: it is the sort of thing that lupē can do, or 
rather lead to. Galen’s boast is that he was seen to be ‘not moved at all’, ‘not 
26   See in this volume Singer, ‘Note on MS Vlatadon 14’, text (t).
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distressed’, that he ‘bore it easily’; and scholars have not been slow to point to 
both the boastfulness and the apparently unrealistic nature of the claim. But 
what exactly is meant here? It seems to me that Galen is not, in fact, present-
ing some other-wordly, saint-like behaviour. The point rather is that he is able 
to go about his daily business; he does not succumb; he does not allow his life 
to be ruined.
The terms used for what does not happen to Galen – kinēthenta, aniathēnai – 
seem to me perfectly consistent with the notion that one experiences some 
negative emotional reactions; what is crucial is that they are controlled, not 
allowed to dominate. And such control is a perfectly possible – Galen quite 
plausibly argues – as a result of the right kind of training in childhood in com-
bination with ethical discipline, involving a consideration of how small such 
setbacks are in the scheme of things, in adulthood. The social aspect of one’s 
reaction, too, is relevant to this discourse. Galen uses a range of expressions to 
describe the visual or outward aspect of his behaviour: you saw that I was not 
moved, I was observed bearing it easily; the reaction is described as wonder-
ful; it is compared with that of others; the term phaidron, too (literally ‘bright’, 
‘radiant’), refers to an outward demeanour or impression. The observable, out-
ward aspect must be considered; self-control includes a competitive element: 
one is judged by one’s ability publicly to rise above the normal reaction. But 
there must, surely, be a range of negative emotions which a person may expe-
rience without being defined as falling into lupē.
By lupē, in short, Galen means something more dramatic and more  specific – 
and, in medical terms, far more dangerous – than a controllable feeling of sad-
ness or annoyance. It is a negative emotion whose control is central to the ethi-
cal project of self-improvement, and which if uncontrolled can have disastrous 
medical consequences. In both contexts, the ethical and the medical, Galen 
develops the concept in a distinctive and original way. A way which, above all, 
attempts to do justice to the realities, the challenges and the dangers of lived 
experience.
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chapter 8
Wisdom and Emotion: Galen’s Philosophical 
Position in Avoiding Distress
Teun Tieleman
1 Introduction
Soon after its recovery in 2005, Galen’s Avoiding Distress (περὶ ἀλυπίας) was rec-
ognized as an extremely important new source of information on its author’s 
life and times. Writing shortly after the murder of the emperor Commodus (192 
CE) Galen provides intriguing glimpses of the latter’s reign of terror, at least 
as experienced by members of the imperial court and the senatorial circles in 
which he moved (esp. §§ 54–57; cf. 50). In addition, scholars were intrigued 
by what Galen tells us about his collection of books and the libraries of Rome 
which had been destroyed by the great fire that struck Rome at the end of 192 
CE. This ‘cultural catastrophe’ (in Vegetti’s apt phrase)1 is presented as the im-
mediate occasion for the writing of the tract: a long-standing friend of Galen’s 
from his native Pergamum (who however remains anonymous) has sent him a 
letter asking how Galen managed to cope with this terrible blow, which not only 
involved books by himself and other authors but also drugs, recipes for drugs 
as well as medical instruments. In particular, the friend is curious to know how 
Galen had avoided succumbing to distress (λύπη). On Αvoiding Distress (hereafter 
Ind.), a ‘letter-treatise,’2 is Galen’s reply and clearly a very personal kind of docu-
ment. At the same time, it clearly stands in a literary and philosophical tradition. 
Christopher Gill3 has pointed out that it invites comparison with Plutarch’s On 
Tranquillity of Mind (Περὶ εὐθυμίας), another letter-treatise aimed at helping its 
1   Vegetti, M., Galeno. Nuovi scritti autobiografici. Introduzione, traduzione e commento di –. 
Carocci editore, 2013, p. 254.
2   On this ancient genre see Stirewalt, L.M., Studies in Ancient Greek Epistolography, SBL 
Resources for Biblical Study 27. Atlanta, GA, Scholars Press, 1993, pp. 18–19; cf. eiusd. ‘The 
Form and Function of the Greek Letter-Essay,’ in K.P. Dornfried, The Romans Debate. Revised 
and Expanded Edition, Peabody Mass., Hendrickson Publishers, 1991, pp. 147–171 (p. 152). Cf. 
Kotzia, P., ‘Galen περὶ ἀλυπίας: title, genre and two cruces,’ in Manetti, D. ed., Studi sul De 
Indolentia di Galeno, 2012, pp. 69–92 (p. 69).
3   Gill, C., Naturalistic Psychology in Galen and Stoicism, Oxford, 2010, p. 262. We may also com-
pare Cicero, Tusculans book III.
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readers avoid or at least moderate distress (465a, 465d). But in fact tracts en-
titled Περὶ λυπής and written by philosophers from various schools are attest-
ed from the Hellenistic period onwards, a line comparable to that devoted to 
other emotions such as the On Anger literature.4 Galen’s treatise, then, should 
be considered against the backdrop of ancient philosophical therapeutics with 
which it shares some of its arguments and exempla, as has been shown by oth-
ers. In fact, Galen had read and worked on Chrysippus’ celebrated Therapeutics 
(the fourth book of the latter’s On Emotions). His refutation of its moral psy-
chology in PHP books IV and V some thirty years before the writing of Ind. did 
not keep him from referring to Chrysippus’ work as a well-known and useful 
moral guide in On Affected Parts III, 1 (VIII, p. 138 K. = SVF III, 457). Just as doc-
tors belonging to different medical schools concurred in prescribing particular 
therapies of proven efficacy, so too the philosophical therapist may be prag-
matic about the arguments and exercises he recommends, regardless of their 
original provenance. This is illustrated by Galen above all.
As has been noted by Nutton, Asmis and others, Galen in Ind. shows himself 
to be both pragmatic and independent in working out his position on the basis 
of his philosophical education as well as his own experience, both personal 
and medical.5 But more can and should be done to gauge Galen’s acquaintance 
with philosophical sources and to determine how exactly he uses them to de-
velop his own point of view. Here of course different options were open to 
Galen. In fact, his position has been associated with the ideal of the modera-
tion of emotion (metriopatheia) and the Aristotelian tradition in particular.6 I 
want to redress the balance in favour of the Stoic by highlighting what I believe 
are instances of his discriminating and creative use of Stoic concepts. It is clear 
that Galen has strong doubts about the possibility of eradicating, in himself 
and others, all emotions, i.e. the Stoic ideal of complete freedom from emo-
tion, apatheia (ἀπάθεια). He also distances himself from the moral heroics of 
the kind exemplified by Stoics such as Musonius (§ 73). Yet Galen’s reminders 
4   For some examples see Kotzia, P., ‘Galen περὶ ἀλυπίας: title, genre and two cruces,’ 2012, p. 74.
5   Nutton, V., Galen, Avoiding Distress (translation and introduction) in P. N. Singer et al. (eds.) 
Galen. Psychological Writings, Cambridge, CUP, 2013, p. 66; Asmis, E. ‘Galen’s De indolen-
tia and the Creation of a Personal Philosophy,’ in Rothschild & Thompson eds., Galen’s De 
indolentia. Essays on a newly Discovered Letter, 2014, esp. 128–129 (“personal philosophy”); 
Kaufman, D. H., ‘Galen on the Therapy of Distress and the Limits of Emotional Therapy,’ 
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 47, 2014, pp. 275–296 (p. 294).
6   On the moderation vs. eradication debate in antiquity see Dillon, J., ‘ “Metriopatheia and 
Apatheia”: Some Reflections on a Controversy in later Greek ethics,’ in J.P. Anton & A. Preuss 
(eds.) Essays on Ancient Greek Philosophy, vol. II, 1983, 508–517; Sorabji, R., Emotion and Peace 
of Mind. From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, Oxford, 2000, pp. 194–210; S. Weisser, 
Eradication on modération des passions. Histoire de la controverse chez Cicéron et Philon 
d’Alexandre, Monothéismes et Philosophié, forthcoming from Brepols (Turnhout) (non vidi).
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of our human weakness and vulnerability and the limits of emotion therapy7 
should not distract us from the fact that he does find a use for several Stoic 
ideas and arguments. It is not as if the Stoics were content to hold out the 
distant ideal of the sage: they had developed a complete therapeutics address-
ing the needs of all those still very much prone to emotion.8 But Galen also 
claims that he feels no emotion whatsoever at least in regard to certain things 
that most people would experience as extremely painful. This again looks like 
apatheia rather than all-round metriopatheia. How should we explain this po-
sition and how coherent is it?
2 The Status of Philosophy
It useful first to take stock of the attitude to philosophy taken by Galen in these 
pages. The treatise opens with a reference to the letter of his friend requesting 
him to disclose which training or which arguments or which doctrines had 
caused him never to experience distress.9 Some translators show a distinct 
reluctance to render the third option (δόγματα) through a term such as ‘doc-
trines’ or ‘creeds’ let alone ‘dogmas’ as too specific and suggestive of sectarian 
affiliation.10 Although the sentence purports to give the phrasing of Galen’s old 
friend, the latter must have been aware that Galen avoided association with 
any philosophical school in particular and so did not imply any affiliation on 
Galen’s part. But this seems over-cautious. The dramatic situation implies a 
long separation between Galen and his friend, who had remained in far-off 
Pergamum, and now wonders how Galen had succeeded in responding to his 
great losses with such enviable equanimity. Apart from that, the term in the 
sense of philosophical doctrine does not commit Galen to the acceptance of all 
doctrines of any particular school, which would amount to the sectarian atti-
tude he denounces elsewhere. Of course, Galen avoids doctrines unsupported 
by experience and may use the term in rejecting dogmatism of the speculative 
7    On which see further Kaufman, D. H., ‘Galen on the Therapy of Distress and the Limits of 
Emotional Therapy,’ Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 47, 2014, pp. 275–296.
8    Stoic therapy starts from the needs and possibilities of the person in the grip of emotion; 
cf. infra, n. 45.
9    Ind. 1, p.2.3–5 BJP: Ἔλαβόν σου τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἐν ᾗ παρεκάλεις μοι δηλῶσαί σοι τίς ἄσκησις ἤ 
λόγοι τίνες ἢ δόγματα <τίνα> παρεσκεῦασαν με μηδέποτε λυπεῖσθαι.
10   Nutton renders ‘considerations’ (explained in n.3), Boudon and Jouanna’s French has 
‘conceptions,’ Lami and Garofalo, however, translate, correctly I think, ‘dottrine’ and so 
does Vegetti. Similarly λογοί is rendered ‘discours’ by Boudon and Jouanna and ‘discorsi’ 
by Lami and Garofalo and by Vegetti. Nutton here translate, more precisely, ‘arguments.’ 
See also Kotzia, P., ‘Galen, De indolentia: Commonplaces, Traditions, and Contexts,’ 2014, 
pp. 96–97.
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kind. But he freely ascribes them to his heroes Hippocrates and Plato, as in the 
title of his PHP, which pertains to doctrines in moral psychology, elementary 
theory and methodology.11 So in Galen’s case too, asking about his doctrines 
comes as a natural question, especially among educated people who look to 
philosophy for moral guidance.12 Elsewhere in Ind. and other works Galen re-
fers to education (παιδεία) and nature (φύσις) as sources of mental strength 
and of the ability to avoid distress.13 For members of his social class (as his 
own biography illustrates) this education included philosophy. By opening his 
tract in this particular way, then, Galen effectively announces that his answer 
to his friend’s question will address his relation to philosophy and philosophi-
cal schools, as indeed we find him doing later on.14
The linking of doctrines, arguments and training invites comparison with 
An. Dig. 6.7, p.25.15–19 DB (= V, p. 37 K.), where a young man who is troubled 
by small matters asks Galen how it is possible that he is not even affected by 
big ones, “either through training or particular doctrines or natural make-
up.”15 The situation clearly runs parallel to the opening passage of Ind. Here 
Galen omits mention of natural capacity – only to stress it more forcefully 
in the later parts of Ind. (§§ 57–59).16 This may be a particular emphasis of 
Galen’s. Other authors just give the pair of doctrines and training.17 Likewise 
at An. Dig. 3.14–4.1, p.12–16 De Boer (V, p.4 K.) Galen says that even the per-
son with the best natural aptitude (εὐφυεστατος)18 and finest moral education 
11   Cf. PHP 3.1.33, 4.7.23. At Loc. Aff. VIII, 191 K Galen distinguishes common notions (κοιναὶ 
ἔννοιαι) and doctrines (δόγματα), the latter forming the subject of debates among philoso-
phers and physicians.
12   For the linking found at Opt. Doct. 100, l.9 Barigazzi (I, 47 K.): ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ δόγμασι.
13   They are often linked this way: see Ind. 51, p.16.17–20; ibid. 57, p.18.17–18, 79, p. 24.12–15 BJP. 
Loc. aff. VIII, p. 301 K.
14  §§ 62–68, on which see infra, pp. 208–211.
15   An. dig. V. 37: ἡ λύπη δ’ ἅπαϲι φαίνεται κακόν, ὥϲπερ ὁ πόνοϲ ἐν τῷ ϲώματι. καί τιϲ τῶν 
ϲυνηθεϲτάτων ἐμοὶ νεανίϲκων ἐπὶ ϲμικροῖϲ ἀνιώμενοϲ, ἐϲ ἑϲπέραν ποτὲ κατανοήϲαϲ τοῦτο, 
παραγενόμενοϲ πρόϲ με <κατὰ> βαθὺν ὄρθρον ὅληϲ ἔφη τῆϲ νυκτὸϲ ἀγρυπνῶν ἐπὶ τῷδε τῷ 
πράγματι μεταξύ πωϲ εἰϲ ἀνάμνηϲιν ἀφικέϲθαι μου μηδ’ ἐπὶ <τοῖϲ> μεγίϲτοιϲ οὕτωϲ ἀνιωμένου, 
ὡϲ ἐπὶ τοῖϲ μικροῖϲ αὐτόϲ. ἠξίου <δ’ οὖν> μαθεῖν, ὅπωϲ μοι τοῦτο περιεγένετο, πότερον ἐξ 
ἀϲκήϲεωϲ ἤ τινων δογμάτων ἢ φύντι τοιούτῳ.
16   Cf. Kaufman, D. H., ‘Galen on the Therapy of Distress and the Limits of Emotional 
Therapy,’ 2014, p. 291.
17   For the linking of philosophical doctrines (δόγματα) and training (ἄσκησις) see Celsus ap. 
Origenes, Contra Celsum 1.2, l. 4; Hippolytus, Ref. 9.13.6, 9.27.2.
18   The idea of a natural aptitude of souls for virtue (εὐφυία) appears to have been a particu-
larly Stoic concern. Already Cleanthes devoted a tract to it: SVF I, 481 (p.107, l.15). Another 
testimony (SVF III, 366, from Stobaeus) aligns aptitude with being well-born or nobil-
ity (εὐγενεία) understood in a philosophically purged, moral sense (cf. Seneca, Ep. 44) 
but also refers to a debate among Stoics about the relative contributions towards virtue 
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remains fallible so that we remain in need of training (ἀσκήσις) throughout 
life. Conversely, training is useless for those with no natural aptitude or with-
out an excellent education (Ind. 57, p.18 BJP). The method of training he rec-
ommends is imagining that one’s worst fears come true, i.e. the technique of 
‘dwelling in advance’ (προενδημεῖν), which was recommended by Stoics and 
other philosophers.19 According to Galen
The wise man (σοφὸς ἀνήρ) constantly reminds himself of everything he 
might possibly suffer, but someone who is not wise (σοφός), provided that 
he does not live like an animal, is in some way also stimulated to a knowl-
edge of the human condition by the realities of daily life (§ 53, translation 
Nutton, slightly altered).20
Obviously, the wise person as the embodiment of an ideal was never meant 
to leave the non-wise any excuse for not undertaking the effort of self- 
improvement. But Galen’s point seems to be that this piece of wisdom is not 
by nature and training. Further, εὐφυία and its opposite ἀφυία are classed as preferred 
and not-preferred indifferents respectively: SVF III, 127, 135, 136. The Stoic sage will fall 
in love with young men who show their aptitude for virtue through their countenance: 
SVF III, 716. Further evidence closer in time to Galen comes from educational contexts 
in Epictetus: Diss. 1.29.35, 2.16.17, 2.24.28, 3.6.9 (= Musonius fr. 46), 3.6.10 (education rein-
forces natural aptitude), 3.23.14, 4.10.3; similarly Musonius Rufus: Frs. 46, Diss. 1, l.35, 13b, 
l.10. Passages such as the ones just listed show that the Stoics, like e.g. Aristotle before 
them, recognized that people are born with different capacities for moral virtue; hence 
this is not peculiar to Galen. Modern scholars however tend to stress the egalitarian na-
ture of Hellenistic therapy, e.g. Kaufman, D. H., ‘Galen on the Therapy of Distress and the 
Limits of Emotional Therapy,’ 2014, p. 293: “Epicurean and Stoic therapy […] are […] fully 
applicable to anyone at all, whatever their nature and upbringing.”
19   Cic. Tusc. 3.28–31 (with particular reference to distress) ascribes the idea to the Cyrenaics 
(cf. ibid. 59), but says at 3.52 that Chrysippus the Stoic was of the same opinion. Cf. also 
Seneca, Ad Marciam 9.1–10; 11.1. See Sorabji, R. Emotion and Peace of Mind, 2000, p. 236 
for discussion and further references. On the technique in Ind. See Kotzia, P., ‘Galen, De 
indolentia: Commonplaces, Traditions, and Contexts,’ 2014, p. 107–114.
20   Galen at § 52 cites a passage from an otherwise lost play by Euripides (fr. 814 Mette, fr. 964 
Nauck) in which the speaker – Theseus – says that he learned from a wise man to imagine 
constantly disasters that might hit him, so that if one were to occur it would not be novel 
and affect his soul. He cites it again at § 77. If the reading ὑπέρ (p. 23.6 BJP) is correct 
Galen takes Theseus to speak on behalf of Euripides himself, who had reportedly stud-
ied with the philosopher Anaxagoras, a tradition recorded by Cicero, Tusc. 3.30. See also 
Nutton ad loc. (n. 114). For the same quotation see PHP 4.7.10–11 (Posid. F165 EK) where he 
takes it from the Stoic Posidonius and also refers to Anaxagoras who famously said when 
he was told about his son’s dead: ‘I knew I had begotten a mortal.’
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something elevated but lies for grabs for anyone with a bit of sense and some 
experience of life.
3 Magnanimity
In Ind. the virtue, or excellence, enabling us to cope with the blows dealt by 
fate and so avoid becoming distressed is ‘greatness of soul’ or magnanimity 
(μεγαλοψυχία).21 Thus at Ind. 50–51, p.16.10–19 BJP Galen says:
Not to be distressed (μὴ λυπηθῆναι) at the loss of all my drugs, all my 
books, and, besides, the recipes of major drugs, as well as the writings on 
them I had prepared for publication along with many other treatises […], 
that is already a prime display of nobility (γενναῖον) and nigh on magna-
nimity (μεγαλοψυχίας). What led me to such magnanimity you already 
know first because you were brought up with me from the start and edu-
cated alongside me (translation Nutton’s).
Galen goes on to explain that in addition to upbringing and education he had 
profited from his observations of political life in Rome, which had driven home 
to him the need to remind oneself of everything one might possibly suffer, i.e. 
use the technique of ‘dwelling in advance’ (προενδημεῖν) as a form of training 
(§ 52–53). Once again we find the same sources of moral success which Galen 
often links and stresses: upbringing, education, training (see section 2 above). 
For our present purposes it may be observed that the magnanimity Galen has 
in mind is the mental or moral strength which results when these factors work 
to one’s advantage so that one is not, or not to the same extent, distressed be-
cause of trouble. Further, it may be noted that Galen does not claim to have 
reached the state of magnanimity but something close to it. A related passage 
On Affected Parts VIII, pp. 301–302 K. links Galen’s notion of magnanimity as 
invulnerability to distress to that of tension:
In those in whom the vital tension is weak and who experience strong 
psychic affections from lack of education, the substance of the soul is 
21   Already Gill, Naturalistic Psychology in Galen and Stoicism, 2010, p. 264 has pointed out that 
Galen characterizes magnanimity in Stoic terms rather than Aristotelian ones; he was fol-
lowed by Kotzia, P., ‘Galen, De indolentia: Commonplaces, Traditions, and Contexts,’ 2014, 
p. 107. Nutton, Galen, Avoiding Distress, 2013, p. 92 n. 94 refers to the Epicureans alongside 
the Stoics.
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easily dissoluble. Of people of this kind some have indeed died from dis-
tress, albeit not instantly […]. But no magnanimous man ever met his 
death either as a result of forms of distress or other affections stronger 
than distress, for the tension of their soul is strong and its affections 
small.22
It is interesting to note that Galen here seems to ascribe a crucial role to educa-
tion rather than natural endowment, but he may take this for granted. What 
this passage adds is the notion of the soul’s tension (τόνος), which is best 
known from Stoic moral psychology: good tension (εὐτονία) is based on the 
right balance of the psychic pneuma enabling the soul to withstand the impact 
of incoming impressions, whereas lack of tension (ἀτονία) is linked to mental 
weakness (ἀκρασία) and a soul prone to emotion.23 It is especially the second 
scholarch Cleanthes who seems to have stressed the notion of mental strength 
in relation to moral excellence.24 For him and other Stoics these notions refer 
to corporeal realities, in particular the tension of the psychic pneuma. Galen 
does not subscribe to the Stoic theory of a pneumatic soul and is reluctant to 
pronounce upon the substance (οὐσία) of the soul, to which he nonetheless 
refers in the above passages. But what may have weighed a great deal for him is 
the fact Plato too speaks of the soul’s tension (and relaxation) in Republic III, 
in a passage dealing with the impact of particular forms of education on the 
souls of the prospective guardians (411e–412a; cf. 411a), which may in fact have 
inspired the Stoics to introduce the idea in the corporealist psychology they 
developed.25
22   ὅσοις γὰρ ἀσθενής ἐστιν ὁ ζωτικὸς τόνος, ἰσχυρά τε πάθη ψυχικὰ πάσχουσιν ἐξ ἀπαιδευσίας, 
εὐδιάλυτος τούτοις ἐστὶν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσία· τῶν τοιούτων ἔνιοι καὶ διὰ λύπην ἀπέθανον, οὐ μὴν 
εὐθέως ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς προειρημένοις· ἀνὴρ δ’ οὐδεὶς μεγαλόψυχος οὔτ’ ἐπὶ λύπαις οὔτ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς 
ἄλλοις ὅσα λύπης ἰσχυρότερα θανάτῳ περιέπεσον· ὅ τε γὰρ τόνος τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῖς ἰσχυρός ἐστι 
τά τε παθήματα σμικρά.
23   On the soul’s τόνος and related terms ee esp. the verbatim fragments from Chrysippus’ On 
Affections preserved by Galen, PHP IV.6 and printed by Von Arnim as SVF III, 473.
24   See esp. Plut. Stoic. Rep. 7, p.1034d (SVF I Cleanthes 563): ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης ἐν ὑπομνήμασι 
φυσικοῖς εἰπὼν ὅτι πληγὴ πυρὸς ὁ τόνος ἐστί, κἂν ἱκανὸς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένηται πρὸς τὸ ἐπιτελεῖν 
τὰ ἐπιβάλλοντα, ἰσχὺς καλεῖται καὶ κράτος, ἐπιφέρει κατὰ λέξιν, “ἡ δ’ ἰσχὺς αὕτη καὶ τὸ κράτος, 
ὅταν μὲν ἐν τοῖς φανεῖσιν ἐμμενετέοις ἐγγένηται, ἐγκράτειά ἐστιν· ὅταν δ’ ἐν τοῖς ὑπομενετέοις, 
ἀνδρεία· περὶ τὰς ἀξίας δὲ δικαιοσύνη· περὶ τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ ἐκκλίσεις σωφροσύνη.
25   On Galen’s notion of mental tension and the Platonic and Stoic backdrop see Trompeter, J. 
‘Die gespannte Seele: Tonos bei Galen.’ Phronesis 61.1, 2016, pp. 82–109; cf. also Vegetti M., 
‘I nervi dell’anima,’ in J. Kollesch & D. Nickel (eds.) Galen und das hellenistische Erbe. 
Verhandlungen des 4. Internationalen Galen-Symposiums, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 
1993, pp. 63–77.
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Galen links magnanimity to another notion as well: contempt, viz. of posses-
sion or what he elsewhere in Ind. calls human matters. Here contempt means 
looking down on them as small or unimportant, that is to say, have the correct 
view on their true value. This fortifies the soul so that it can deal with their loss. 
The idea is also in the background of Galen’s exchange with the troubled young 
man as recounted in An. dig. (see above, p. 202): the young man is kept from 
his sleep by small things, whereas Galen is not even troubled by big ones. In 
Ind. Galen’s own father provides an example of this attitude.26 This can also be 
expressed as the ability of rising above them so that they look small. But again 
Galen makes it clear that he himself cannot rise above all forms of adversity. 
Thus he would not make light of the prospect of being roasted in the bull of 
Phalaris (as the Epicurean and Stoic varieties of the sage were supposed to 
do).27
The notion of magnanimity at issue here is Stoic rather than Aristotelian, 
even if present-day students may be more familiar with Aristotle’s magnani-
mous person as portrayed in Nicomachean Ethics IV.3: the not entirely likeable 
character who is conscious of his own worth and acts accordingly. The Stoic no-
tion, however, is not so much concerned with pride and self-esteem but closely 
related to courage. Galen in one passage from PHP seems turn the Stoic notion 
against the Stoic Chrysippus and so must have been fully conscious of its prov-
enance.28 Magnanimity (μεγαλοψυχία,) is classed as a subspecies of courage 
(ἀνδρεία) in early Stoic texts, viz. “the knowledge that makes us rise above those 
things that are of such a nature that they happen to wise and non-wise alike.”29 
This clearly refers to the fated, unavoidable events of the potentially frighten-
ing and distressing kind, depending on whether one is capable of assessing 
26   Gal. Ind. 49, p. 16.3 BJP: […] καταφρονήσαντι παντοδαπῆς ἀπωλείας κτημάτων […]; ibid. 61, 
p.19.13–15: Οἶδα δἐ μου τὀν πατέρα καταφρονοῦντα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων ὡς μικρῶν. 
Ibid. 71, 22.1–2: […] μέχρι τοῦ μἠ καταφρονεῖν […] τοῦ Φαλάριδος ταύρου. Cf. 62, 19.20, 78.24.3.
27   Gal. Ind. 78b, p. 23.14 BJP: Οὐ μὴν ὑπεράνω πασῶν [scil. ἀνιαρὰς περιστάσεις] εἰμι… Ibid. 71, 
22.1–2: […] μέχρι τοῦ μἠ καταφρονεῖν […] τοῦ Φαλάριδος ταύρου. Cf. 62, 19.20, 78.24.3.
28   PHP 3.2.18 De Lacy (cf. SVF II, 906, p. 254, 1–18): Galen sarcastically speaks of the magna-
nimity of the Stoic Chrysippus as proven from his undeterred attitude in citing poetic 
lines that actually tell against the Stoic cardiocentric doctrine of the soul he has set out to 
defend. Galen here uses a Stoic virtue to bestow mock-praise on a Stoic.
29   SVF III, 264 (Stobaeus) τὴν δὲ ἀνδρείαν περὶ τὰς ὑπομονάς· […] τῇ δὲ ἀνδρείᾳ [scil. ὑποτετάχθαι] 
καρτερίαν, θαρραλεότητα, μεγαλοψυχίαν, εὐψυχίαν, φιλοπονίαν […] μεγαλοψυχίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην 
ὑπεράνω ποιοῦσαν τῶν πεφυκότων ἐν σπουδαίοις τε γίνεσθαι καὶ φαύλοις. Identical definition 
at SVF II, 269 (ps. Andronicus). Cf. SVF III, 265 (Diog. Laert. 7.92): τὴν δὲ μεγαλοψυχίαν 
ἐπιστήμην <ἢ> ἕξιν ὑπεράνω ποιοῦσαν τῶν συμβαινόντων κοινῇ φαύλοις τε καὶ σπουδαίοις.
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their value correctly (i.e. as indifferents).30 This, then, is the notion with which 
we find Galen operating in Ind. The prominence it is given here may reflect the 
fact that well before Galen’s time magnanimity was upgraded vis-à-vis courage, 
a move that may perhaps be associated with the name Panaetius of Rhodes 
(ca. 185–109 BCE) and, at least as its status is concerned, reflect Aristotelian 
 influence.31 Thus Cicero in his On Duties, presumably drawing on Panaetius’ 
work of the same title, presents magnanimity among the four main or generic 
excellences as that which resides in the “greatness and strength of an elevated 
and invincible mind” marked by a “contempt for human matters.”32 Had the 
early Stoics already typified magnanimity as the ability of rise above human 
life’s ups and downs as inconsequential, the idea is now also expressed in terms 
of holding them in contempt or despising them, as in Galen’s text. Panaetius’ 
associate Hecato of Rhodes (who may have lived on well into the first cen-
tury BCE) made the further step of classing courage, alongside mental health, 
strength and beauty, among a new class of excellences or virtues, viz. the non- 
theoretical ones, which unlike the theoretical ones do not involve assent and, 
according to the report given by Diogenes Laertius, could even be possessed by 
the non-wise.33 Like the innate aptitude for moral progress towards excellence, 
good mental qualities of this sort had been acknowledged by the early Stoics, 
who classed them as preferred indifferents.34 Hecato’s move may have been 
motivated by his wish to integrate the qualities in question more completely 
into the Stoic ethical system.35 For our purposes suffice it to note that Hecato 
retained the link between theoretical and non-theoretical excellences, de-
scribing them as supervening on the theoretical ones: thus health is said to be 
co-extensive with and attendant upon temperance.36 This then must also have 
been the relation between magnanimity, a theoretical virtue, and courage. But 
30   As is clear from the definition of courage, the generic concept: SVF II, 262 (Stob.): ἀνδρείαν 
δὲ ἐπιστήμην δεινῶν καὶ οὐ δεινῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων. Philo, Leg. all. 67 (SVF II, 263): ἐπιστήμη γάρ 
ἐστιν ὑπομενετέων καὶ οὐχ ὑπομενετέων καὶ οὐδετέρων.
31   See Dyck, A., ‘Panaetius’ conception of μεγαλοψυχία,’ Museum Helveticum 38, 1981, 153–161.
32   Cic. Off. I, 5, 15 (= T 56 Alesse, fr. 103 vStr., part): omne quod est honestum, id quattuor par-
tium oritur ex aliqua. Aut enim in perspicientia veri sollertiaque versitur, aut in hominum 
societate tuenda tribuendoque suum cuique et rerum contractarum fide, aut in animi ex-
celsi atque invicti magnitudine et robore, aut in omnium quae fiunt und dicuntur ordine et 
modo, in quo inest modestia et temperantia. Cf. ibid. I, 13 (= T 55 Alesse, fr. 98 v.Str., part) 
magnitudo animi exsistit humanarumque rerum contemptio; cf. III, 96 and Posidonius ap. 
Sen. Ep. 87.32, 35 (magnitudo animi) = F 170 EK.
33   D.L. 7.90 = Hecato Fr. 6 Gomoll.
34   See SVF III, 127, 136.
35   For more discussion and further references see Pohlenz (1984) 240–241, (1980) 123–124.
36   D.L. 7.90 = Hecato Fr. 6.
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if theoretical  virtue entails non-theoretical virtue, non-theoretical virtue does 
not entail theoretical virtue, since non-wise persons can have non-theoretical 
virtues such as courage. But how exactly the non-theoretical qualities func-
tioned, must remain a moot point. Maybe they constituted a person’s natu-
ral aptitude for moral progress and the attainment of virtue in the theoretical 
sense but this must remain an assumption for lack of evidence. But we do pos-
sess an argument from Hecato’s second book On Goods on magnanimity as the 
basis for the Stoic thesis that virtue is sufficient in itself for happiness:
For if, he says [scil. Hecato], magnanimity is sufficient for raising us above 
everything and magnanimity is a part of virtue, then too virtue will be 
sufficient in itself for happiness, despising all things that seem trouble-
some (transl. Hicks, slightly modified).37
This fragment is not only concerned with the same notion of magnanimity 
as is used by Galen,38 but it makes magnanimity the key to the excellent per-
son’s invulnerability. Hecato no doubt reflects the prominence of the notion 
among Stoics from Panaetius onwards. This prominence itself is also reflected 
by Galen in his turn.
The idea of taking a bird’s eye view at human affairs as a way of achieving 
tranquillity is of course widespread, especially in Stoic and Cynicizing litera-
ture, and not necessarily in conjunction with the specific virtue of magnanim-
ity. There is something of this attitude in Galen too, although it neither leads to 
the degree of detachment from the comédie humaine one encounters in some 
Cynic and even Stoic texts, where laughing can be presented as the only ad-
equate response of the philosopher.39
37   Hecato ap. D.L. 7.127–128 = fr. 3 Gomoll: εἰ γὰρ, φησίν, αὐτάρκης ἐστὶν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία πρὸς τὸ 
πάντων ὑπεράνω ποιεῖν, ἕστι δὲ μέρος τῆς ἀρετῆς, αὐτάρκης ἕσται καἰ ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν 
καταφρονοῦσα καὶ τῶν δοκούντων ὀχληρῶν.
38   Cf. Gal. Ind. 78b, p. 23.14 BJP: Οὐ μὴν ὑπεράνω πασῶν [scil. ἀνιαρὰς περιστάσεις] εἰμι… 49, 
p. 16.3 BJP: […] καταφρονήσαντι παντοδαπῆς ἀπωλείας κτημάτων […]; ibid. 61, p.19.13–15: Οἶδα 
δἐ μου τὀν πατέρα καταφρονοῦντα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων ὡς μικρῶν. Ibid. 71, 22.1–2: […] 
μέχρι τοῦ μἠ καταφρονεῖν […] τοῦ Φαλάριδος ταύρου.
39   Even the Stoic Seneca can speak like this: Ep. 41.5: vis isto divina descendit; animum excel-
lentem, moderatum, omnia tamquam minora transeuntem, quidquid timemus optamus-
que ridentem … Cf. ibid. 78.18 (laughing while under torture), 80.6 (laughing in spite of 




Despising human affairs as of little value – a moral attitude Galen attributes 
to his father and says he has adopted himself in his old age (Ind. § 61; cf. 65) – 
saves one from distress: one no longer supposes that one has been deprived of 
something big (§ 66). This of course raises the question of where true value 
lies. What is the real good? In what follows at §§ 62–68 Galen considers the 
positions of two philosophical schools: Epicureanism and Stoicism. Having 
said that his father rejected common, non-philosophical hedonism, Galen 
adds that he never praised those who were satisfied with being free from pain 
or distress in their souls – a clear reference to the Epicureans (§ 62): Galen’s 
father felt that the good must be of its nature something bigger than just being 
free from something (ibid.). Here it is to be understood that Galen follows his 
father. At the end of the section (§ 68), speaking now on his own behalf, he 
adds an argument against the Epicurean ideal of remaining undisturbed: this 
goes against the observable fact human beings and indeed all animals want to 
be active in both mind and body, as he had established earlier in his work (now 
lost) Against (or On) Epicurus.
In §§ 63 and 64 he considers the position of those who take the good to be 
“knowledge of matters both human and divine:”
(63) If someone will […] hold that the good is a knowledge of matters 
both human and divine, then I see that mankind possesses only a very 
small part of this, and that, if it is so very small, we cannot have a precise 
knowledge of everything else also. (64) But someone who has not even a 
general knowledge of matters human and divine can neither make even 
in part or scientifically a decision on what to choose and what to avoid 
(translation Nutton’s).40
Commentators have been quick to identify the definition of the good as 
Aristotelian.41 However, they have been unable to produce sound textual sup-
port fort his identification. In fact we have to look elsewhere, to Stoicism. Thus 
40   Ind. 63–64, p.20.2–10: Ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν καὶ τούτων [scil. the Epicurean doctrines] τις ὰποχωρήσας 
ἐπιστήμην θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων ἡγήσηται τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχειν, ἐλάχιστου μορίου 
τούτου ὁρῶ τοὺς ὰνθρώπους μετέχοντας. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἐλάχιστον, δῆλον ὃτι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων 
ὰκριβῆ γνῶσιν οὐκ ἔχομεν· ὁ γὰρ ἐν τῷ καθόλου μὴ γινώσκων ὁποῖα τά τε θεῖα καὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα 
πράγματα εἰσὶν, οὐδ᾽ ἐν τῷ κατὰ μέρος, οὐδ᾽ ἐπιστημονικῶς τι ἑλέσθαι καὶ φυγεῖν δύναται.
41   Thus Boudon-Jouanna ad loc. (“La terminologie est clairement Aristotélicienne”), Nutton 
ad loc. (n. 104), citing Arist. Met. VI.1, 1026a18–32; XI.7, 10641–4, following Hankinson, R.J., 
Galen, On the Therapeutic Method, Books I and II, 1991, p. 82, who cites them in connection 
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we encounter the same definition with explicit attribution tot he Stoics in the 
proem to the Aëtian Placita: “The Stoics have said that wisdom is the knowl-
edge of things human and divine, whereas philosophy is the exercise of exper-
tise in utility.”42 And Sextus Empiricus borrows the same definition from his 
dogmatist opponents, who, here as elsewhere, are to be identified as the Stoics: 
“Philosophy is the pursuit of wisdom, and wisdom is the knowledge of things 
divine and human.”43
As we have seen, Galen objects to this conception of the good that it lies be-
yond the reach of mankind. Our knowledge is limited and imprecise – which 
means that we cannot makes decisions about what to choose and what to 
avoid on the basis of knowledge (ἐπιστημονικῶς). Leaving aside for a moment 
the question whether this is a fair piece of criticism of Stoicism and a strong 
argument, it is worth noting that in addition to the definition of the good we 
have here another echo of a Stoic definition, viz. that of moderation as the 
knowledge of what to choose and what to avoid, as can be attested by several 
sources.44
Having established that Galen is engaging with the Stoics, we may now take 
a closer look at his argument. As we have seen, he presents Stoicism as re-
quiring general knowledge of an impossibly broad range of subjects. This is 
unattainable so we are left empty-handed in regard to the decisions we have 
to make in particular situations also. In fact, our knowledge is very limited. 
with the same definition of philosophy as distinguished from the liberal arts used by 
Galen at MM I.2, X p. 2 K.
42   Aëtius, Placita I. Prooem. 2 (SVF II, 35): oἱ μὲν οὖν Στωϊκοὶ ἔφασαν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν εἶναι θείων 
τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων ἐπιστήμην, τὴν δὲ φιλοσοφίαν ἄσκησιν ἐπιτηδείου τέχνης· ἐπιτήδειον δὲ εἶναι 
μίαν καὶ ἀνωτάτω τὴν ἀρετήν, ἀρετὰς δὲ τὰς γενικωτάτας τρεῖς, φυσικὴν ἠθικὴν λογικήν· δι’ ἣν 
αἰτίαν καὶ τριμερής ἐστιν ἡ φιλοσοφία, ἧς τὸ (5) μὲν φυσικόν, τὸ δὲ ἠθικόν, τὸ δὲ λογικόν· καὶ 
φυσικὸν μὲν ὅταν περὶ κόσμου ζητῶμεν καὶ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ, ἠθικὸν δὲ τὸ κατησχολημένον περὶ τὸν 
ἀνθρώπινον βίον, λογικὸν δὲ τὸ περὶ τὸν λόγον, ὃ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλοῦσιν.
43   Sextus, M IX, 13 (= SVF II, 36): τὴν φιλοσοφίαν φασὶν ἐπιτήδευσιν εἶναι σοφίας, τὴν δὲ σοφίαν 
ἐπιστήμην θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων. Cf. ibid. IX 123 = SVF II, 1017.
44   Stobaeus Ecl. II 59, 4 W. (SVF III, 362): φρόνησιν δ’ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην ὧν ποιητέον καὶ οὐ ποιητέον 
καὶ οὐδετέρων ἢ ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων φύσει πολιτικοῦ ζῴου (καὶ ἐπὶ 
τῶν λοιπῶν δὲ ἀρετῶν οὕτως ἀκούειν παραγγέλλουσι). σωφροσύνην δ’ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αἱρετῶν καὶ 
φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων· δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἀπονεμητικὴν τῆς ἀξίας ἑκάστῳ· ἀνδρείαν δὲ 
ἐπιστήμην δεινῶν καὶ οὐ δεινῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων. Cf. SVF III, 263, 274. Plut. Stoic. Rep. 7, p.1034d 
(SVF I Cleanthes 563, for which fr. See also supra, n. 24): “ἡ δ’ ἰσχὺς αὕτη καὶ τὸ κράτος […] 
περὶ τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ ἐκκλίσεις σωφροσύνη.” Galen, PHP VII 2 (208. 591 M.) (= SVF I Ariston 
374): νομίσας γοῦν ὁ Ἀρίστων μίαν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμιν, ᾗ λογιζόμεθα, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς 
ψυχῆς ἔθετο μίαν, ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. ὅταν μὲν οὖν αἱρεῖσθαί τε δέῃ τἀγαθὰ καὶ φεύγειν 
τὰ κακά, τὴν ἐπιστήμην τήνδε καλεῖ σωφροσύνην· ὅταν δὲ πράττειν μὲν τἀγαθά, μὴ πράττειν δὲ τὰ 
κακά, φρόνησιν· ἀνδρείαν δὲ ὅταν τὰ μὲν θαῤῥῇ, τὰ δὲ φεύγῃ. ὅταν δὲ τὸ κατὰ ἀξίαν ἑκάστῳ νέμῃ, 
δικαιοσύνην.
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Galen goes on to explain that this realization kept him from politics and pub-
lic office, all the more so since he saw that even decent politicians could do 
little for people in need (§ 64). This point may reflect the Stoic injunction to 
take part in politics and government: so Stoicism does not equip us with work-
able principles for taking care of other people’s lives through politics as well 
as leading our own lives. He goes on (§ 65) to say that “brought up in this way 
of thinking” he always considers “all these things” (i.e. presumably the pursuit 
of social and political goals) as of little worth. So how could he suppose “lei-
sure, instruments, drugs, books, reputation and riches to be precious”? Here 
we have some of the items he had indeed lost in the great fire, adding a few 
others of what the Stoics classed as indifferents such as reputation and riches. 
Clearly, Galen is now back again at his task of explaining why the losses of the 
kind he suffered did not distress him (and nor will others in the same category 
might these occur in the future). But the logic of this passage is not very clear. 
Nutton indicates some textual uncertainties which may lie behind our difficul-
ties. Galen’s critique of Stoicism as failing to provide an attainable ideal and 
so a workable basis for morality and politics switches to his own limitations 
and difficulties when he explains why he did not enter politics. This leads to 
the biggest leap, viz. that Galen looks down on human affairs as of little worth. 
Ironically, this conclusion states what every decent Stoic would also subscribe 
to, namely that we should not make our well-being depend on external items 
such as possessions or a good reputation, for if we do we shall be distressed 
when we loose them.
After this Galen goes on to wind up his argument, saying that he believes 
that he has given a full answer to his friends question about avoiding distress 
(§69). However, he does not stop at this point, but presents a conclusion, first 
about himself (§ 69–79) and then (§ 79, end-84) mankind in general. At § 71 he 
summarizes his own relation to distress as follows:
Now I cannot say if there is anyone so wise that he is entirely free from af-
fections, but I have a precise knowledge of the degree to which I am such 
a one: I do not care about the loss of possessions without quite being 
deprived of them all and sent to a desert island, or of bodily pain without 
quite making light of being placed in the bull of Phalaris. What will dis-
tress me is the ruination of my homeland, or a friend being punished by 
a tyrant, and other similar things, and I pray to the gods that none of this 
should ever happen to me (translation Nutton’s).
First we have a reference to Stoic apatheia: Galen doubts whether anyone is so 
wise as to have attained this ideal and be entirely free of them. But speaking 
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for himself he makes it clear that he does not care about loss of possessions 
or bodily pain. The claim here is that in these cases he is free from affections, 
most notably distress. But there are exceptions. He goes on to give examples 
of extreme misfortune that will distress him: a homeland ruined, a friend pun-
ished (some of his examples surfaced earlier in connection with Commodus’ 
tyrannical rule). From the Stoic point of view these things count as indifferent 
and hence, ideally, should not be allowed to trigger an emotional response ei-
ther.45 Galen does not say that a moderate emotional response is in order here. 
Neither here, nor elsewhere in his treatise, does he say or imply that the per-
sonal catastrophe he suffered in loosing his books, drugs and recipes, elicited 
distress only to a moderate degree. This is not his personal ideal. The final part 
shows that the emphasis is different. Galen says he will fortify his soul through 
training: without ever being able to respond like the Stoic wise man he can 
hope to display endurance (καρτερία, 79a). It is striking that Galen once again 
dwells on the method of anticipating misfortune as the only training he finds 
helpful against painful bad turns (§ 76–77).
As we have seen, Galen next turns to mankind in general, attributing peo-
ple’s unhappiness to their being immoderately (ἀμέτρως) attached to esteem, 
wealth, reputation and political power. Their insatiable desires will not fail to 
make them unhappy (81). There is also a reference to those who are only mod-
erately (μετρίως) attached to these things, but the text is uncertain at this point: 
Galen probably implies that the moderate ones are best placed to avoid unhap-
piness, at least to some degree. In this connection Galen praises his friend for 
his simple lifestyle and curbing his desires.
Galen does not apply what he says here to himself, but comments on the sit-
uation in which other people find themselves. For them moderation of desire 
and emotional attachment is the best they can achieve. Does this place Galen 
in the metriopatheia camp?46 I think not. The objects in question include some 
of those which Galen had said he does not mind loosing at all, most notably 
45   As Graver points out in ‘The Weeping Wise: Stoic and Epicurean Consolations in Seneca’s 
99th Epistle,’ in T. Fögen, ed. Tears in the Graeco-Roman World, Berlin-New York, De 
Gruyter, 2009, pp. 235–252 (p. 237), Stoic authors of works of consolation such as Seneca 
regularly give some leeway to grief experienced in moderation (though not to grieve at all 
would be better): see e.g. Ep. 63.1.
46   Cf. Hankinson, R. J., ‘Actions and passions: affection, emotion and moral self-management 
in Galen’s philosophical psychology,’ in J. Brunschwig & M. Nussbaum (eds.) Passions & 
Perceptions. Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, 1993, pp. 203–204, who, writing on 
this issue long before the discovery of Ind., notes that no clear answer tot his question is to 
be found in the texts but proceeds to offer a tentative suggestion, viz. that Galen may have 
advocated extirpation only in the case of excessive and uncontrollable emotion, which is 
pathos in the sense of disease, i.e. an unnatural condition, while accepting emotion in the 
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possessions and political power. When he adds that he expects to be distressed 
by being deprived of life’s barest necessities, he is just marking off his own 
position against the moral heroics of diehard Stoics such as Musonius Rufus 
(cf. § 73, where he dismisses Musonius Rufus, who had prayed to Zeus to send 
him any eventuality). But on the other hand we have seen that Galen stresses 
his complete indifference to certain bad turns or losses, which is definitely not 
an expression of metriopatheia but rather of selective apatheia, at least as an 
ideal for himself to pursue; others may get no further than respond with mod-
erate emotion to misfortunes. One may compare Philo, Leg. Alleg. III, 129–132, 
who draws a distinction between metriopatheia as appropriate to the man of 
median virtue who is still progressing (symbolized by Aaron) and apatheia as 
proper to the accomplished sage (symbolized by Moses), as if, in John Dillon’s 
apt words, the concepts could be accommodated on a sliding scale.47
Platonists could not derive from Plato’s work clear and unequivocal guid-
ance when it came to deciding on which side they should be in this contro-
versy, which had arisen some time after Plato under the influence of Stoicism. 
Like Philo, Platonists of the Imperial period display a striking unwillingness or 
inability to keep the two competing alternatives apart.48 Galen, not an adher-
ent of the Platonist (or any other) school but a great admirer of Plato, also com-
bines the two options. An emphasis peculiar to him seems to be his doubts as 
to whether complete apatheia (which may be desirable as such) is attainable 
in real life, given our basic needs and vulnerability as human beings.
5 Conclusion
I have been highlighting a few concepts that seem central to the position de-
veloped by Galen in regard to distress. Even if he stresses the role of natural 
aptitude, family background and upbringing, he is not averse to philosophy 
but on the contrary draws on philosophical concepts, arguments and debates 
sense of the natural activity of the soul’s affective part. But instead of being a compromise 
position this would just boil down to metriopatheia.
47   Dillon, J., ‘ “Metriopatheia and Apatheia”: Some Reflections on a Controversy in later 
Greek ethics,’ 1983, p. 515. For metriopatheia and apatheia as corresponding to two differ-
ent stages of moral progress see Plotinus, Enn. 1.2.2 (14–18) and 1.2.3 (20), who links them 
to ordinary ‘civic’ virtue and what ‘purified’ virtue respectively. Cf. Sorabji, R. Emotion and 
Peace of Mind, 2000, p. 203. Contrast Seneca, Ep. 116 for a clear statement of the difference 
between moderation and eradication from a Stoic point of view.
48   Dillon, J., ‘“Metriopatheia and Apatheia”: Some Reflections on a Controversy in later 
Greek ethics,’ 1983, pp. 515–516.
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to a greater degree than sometimes has been assumed, especially in the case 
of Stoicism. There is the prominence given to the Stoic virtue of magnanim-
ity. But we have found more Stoic elements. Indeed, the distinction between 
natural aptitude, training and philosophical education is philosophical in 
itself, reflecting as it does Stoic distinctions and debates. Another recurrent 
element is the ideal of wisdom. Here Galen demarcates his position vis-a-vis 
Stoicism or at least its hardline variety that peddles a form of moral heroics 
and an unattainable ideal of complete freedom from emotion (apatheia). As 
we have seen, the alternative developed by Galen is not aimed at moderation 
of emotion. Affections are to be avoided as much as possible and with regard to 
some objects or situation it is possible to avoid them completely, as in the case 
of Galen’s response to the loss of his books, drugs and recipes. For many other 
people moderation of emotion is the most they can achieve.
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chapter 9
Galen and the Plague
Rebecca Flemming
Galen’s περὶ ἀλυπίας contains two references to the great plague which char-
acterised his times, now usually known as the ‘Antonine Plague’. Neither is 
sustained or substantial, the new information offered is slight and somewhat 
slippery; but these passages make an important point none the less. Both serve 
to emphasise what might be called the qualitative impact of the pestilence, 
as distinct from its quantitative effects on the economy and population, the 
political integrity and resilience, of the Roman Empire. These have been the 
focus of much recent debate, and there is a lot at stake in the discussions, in-
conclusive as they have been so far; but other key issues – the personal toll of 
the plague, the miasmatic way in which it touched everything, became em-
bedded in everyday life and record, even structured time – have been rather 
overlooked in the search for data, and the contest between models.1 Galen’s 
struggle against distress, in this and other areas, offers an opportunity to re-
dress the balance somewhat, put the spotlight back on questions of what it 
was like to live through repeated waves of pestilence, not just as a physician, 
but also a man with friends and household dependents, a man located at the 
centre of Empire, in close proximity to imperial power.
The first move Galen makes in setting up the main premise of the περὶ 
ἀλυπίας – that he is a man in such admirably firm control of his response to 
potentially upsetting events, to a variety of losses, that he can usefully instruct 
others in emotional management – is in reference to the plague.2 Its presence 
provides a natural frame for any such exposition, and one particular occur-
rence offers a good case of his exemplary conduct in this respect. For it was 
witnessing Galen’s imperturbability despite the death of almost all the slaves 
he had in Rome, ‘during a major outbreak of the long-lasting plague’, which 
1  Launched by R. Duncan-Jones’ key article, ‘The impact of the Antonine Plague’, JRA 9 (1996), 
108–136, the quantitative bibliography is now extensive. See e.g. E. Lo Cascio (ed.), L’impato 
dell’ ‘Peste Antonina’ (Bari: Edipuglia, 2012); and most recently, Colin P. Elliott, ‘The Antonine 
plague, climate change, and local violence in Roman Egypt’, Past and Present 231 (2016), 
3–31.
2   The introductory sequence is Gal. Ind. 1–7.
220 Flemming
had initially impressed the unknown addressee of this epistolary text.3 He had 
heard other stories of non-disturbance in the face of misfortune too, and, now, 
reports of Galen’s unchanged demeanour and behaviour after an even worse 
disaster had reached him, generating a keen desire to discover how Galen does 
it. What training and teaching kept him steady following the devastation of the 
great fire which had consumed all the possessions he kept in the alleged safety 
of the substantial storehouses on the Sacred Way? Possessions which included 
many, many valuable, valued, and even irreplaceable books and things which 
had all burned, without apparently troubling Galen.
It is, indeed, in enumerating these destroyed possessions, in providing 
exquisite detail about the worth, the meaning, of all he has lost, that Galen 
makes his second reference to the plague.4 Amongst his massive losses was 
perhaps the best collection of pharmacological recipes in the whole Roman 
world, accumulated through both active endeavour and the workings of fate. 
These workings had seen his fellow-citizen and student, Teuthras, obtain from 
another Pergemene physician – Eumenes – an outstanding compilation of 
remedies and then leave them to Galen, ‘having died in the first outbreak of 
the plague’ at Rome.5 The timing of this inheritance, ‘a little after’ (μετ’ ὀλίγον 
χρόνον) Galen first came to the imperial capital himself, may be significant in 
terms of broader pestilential chronology, but there are also more particular 
points to make, about both the casualness and the poignancy of this plague 
reference. There is a sense in which the course of this epidemic disease and 
Galen’s career share a temporal structure, and combine to produce patterns of 
meaning for him.
These references are best understood, however, as part of a larger Galenic 
package, alongside Galen’s other engagements with the ‘great plague’, and, in-
deed, against the background of more general historical descriptions of the 
disease, its profile and patterning. So, this is what follows, though necessar-
ily in a targeted rather than total way. First a rough outline of the origins and 
spread of the ‘Antonine Plague’, as reported in a range of sources, including 
Galen, will be sketched out, then there will be further discussion of the disease 
itself, a topic on which Galen also has a lot to offer. Too much, indeed to cover 
3   Gal. Ind. 1: κατὰ τινα τοῦ πολυχρονίου λοιμοῦ μεγάλην ἐμβολὴν (2, 6–7 BJP). Translations are my 
own unless noted. I have made much use of V. Nutton’s translation, notes and introduction 
to the text, however (in P. Singer (ed.), Galen: Psychological Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 43–106); as well as those in the main edition I have used: V. Boudon-
Millot, J. Jouanna and A. Pietrobelli (ed., trans. and comm.), Galien: Ne pas se chagriner (Paris: 
Les Belles Lettres, 2010).
4   This sequence is Gal. Ind. 31–35.
5   Gal. 34–5: ἀποθανὼν ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τοῦ λοιμοῦ καταβολῇ (12.15–16 BJP).
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in this essay, the main aim here is to illustrate where Galen puts the emphasis 
in this respect, what is important to him about the plague as a medical event, 
before considering the identity of the disease in modern terms. Finally, the 
focus will return to the specific contributions of περὶ ἀλυπίας to this pestilential 
story, to the question of the emotional impact of the plague, to matters of sen-
sibility and distress.
1 Profile of a Plague: Origins and Outbreaks
The accounts of the ‘Antonine Plague’ provided in surviving historical texts are 
both patchy and programmatic, and though there is some roughly contempo-
rary reporting, most are much later than the events they describe. Still, they are 
reasonably consistent in outline.6 The pestilence originated in the East, where 
Lucius Verus (co-emperor with Marcus Aurelius) was campaigning against the 
Parthians in the mid-160s AD. A moment of military indiscipline, probably of 
impiety, in a temple in Babylonia as the conflict was coming to a successful 
conclusion is evoked as the immediate cause in some sources; though others 
omit any mention of a specific trigger for disaster.7 All agree, however, that 
Verus’ troops brought disease back west with them on their victorious return. 
Rome, Italy, and the provinces were all affected, and the army was particu-
larly badly hit; a concern with Roman manpower is thematised by many of 
the authors.8 In his fourth-century summary of Roman history, for example, 
Eutropius asserts that the outbreak of plague following the Persian victory 
under Marcus Aurelius was so severe that, ‘in Rome and throughout Italy and 
the provinces most people, and almost all soldiers in the army, were afflicted 
by weakness’.9 This was especially dangerous since the empire was now fac-
ing a threat along its north-eastern frontiers, and, allegedly, had to scramble to 
6   An outline already much discussed, see e.g. Duncan-Jones (1996); A. Marcore, ‘La peste 
antonina. Testmonzianze e interpretazione’, Rivista storica italiana 15 (2002), 801–819; 
A. Marino Storchi, ‘Una rilettura della fonti storico-letterarie sulla peste di età antonina’, in 
Lo Cascio (ed: 2012), 29–61; and D. Gourevitch, Limos kai Loimos: A Study of the Galenic Plague 
(Paris: Éditions de Bocard, 2013), 77–127.
7   Ammianus Marcellinus 23.6.24 and SHA Verus 8.1.1–2 both mention a temple episode; the 
abbreviated reference at Cassius Dio, epit. 71.2.4 does not; see also Luc. Hist. Conscr. 15.
8   On the plague’s reach and military focus see e.g. Ammianus Marcellinus 23.6.24 and Orosius 
7.15.5 and 27.7.
9   Eutropius, Breviarium 8.12: Romae ac per Italiam provinciasque maxima hominum pars, mili-
tum omnes fere copiae languore defecerint.
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mobilise sufficient forces for the Marcommanic Wars which open at the end 
of the AD 160s.10
The fighting with Parthia was concluded by autumn AD 165, and Verus likely 
left in spring 166, arriving back in Rome by the end of the summer. Some of his 
army might have gone ahead of him, or, indeed, the movement of troops and 
disease might not have been quite so perfectly matched as the historical ac-
counts assert, retrospectively more closely aligned than at the time; for Galen 
seems to claim that the plague reached Rome before the emperor. He states, in 
On Prognosis, that he brought his first (roughly four-year) stay in the imperial 
capital to a clandestine close before Verus’ return from the East, since he feared 
that the emperors would then demand his attention.11 While, in On my own 
Books, Galen asserts that his departure was, ‘when the great plague began’, in 
response to that beginning.12 Hunain’s Arabic translation fills the lacuna in the 
Greek after Galen left Rome for his homeland with the claim that no drug of 
sufficient strength could be found to combat this plague, as it spread so widely 
before diminishing.13
These statements, appearing in treatises composed perhaps two decades 
apart, are, like much of Galen’s biographical self-reporting, inconsistent but 
not seriously contradictory. The events – the onset of the ‘great plague’, Verus’ 
return, and Galen’s departure – happened at around the same time, and one 
is prioritised in one account, one in the other, with some flexibility about 
the precise sequence. Still, rather frustratingly, this direct witness to the ini-
tial onset of pestilence in Rome is indecisive about its timing. A point further 
emphasised by the reference in περὶ ἀλυπίας already mentioned, to Teuthras’ 
demise in the ‘first outbreak of the great plague’ and ‘not long’ after Galen’s 
own entrance on the Roman scene. The two assertions are somewhat at odds, 
but, again, the best way to reconcile them is by recourse to the imprecision of 
Galenic memory, rather than anything more radical or determinate. Still, what 
is clear is that the ‘great plague’ did have a beginning, there was a definite first 
episode in the sequence; and that it was associated in Galen’s mind with his 
own first stay in the imperial capital, and with medical challenge.
There is also the suggestion that the episode of pestilence (νόσος λοιμώδες) 
vividly described by the orator Aelius Aristides in his Sacred Tales should be 
10   See also e.g. SHA Marcus 21.6 and Orosius 7.15.6.
11   Gal. Praen. 9.5 (118.16 CMG V 8,1). On Galen’s biography generally, see S. Mattern, The 
Prince of Medicine: Galen in the Roman Empire (Oxford: OUP, 2015), with discussion of the 
plague at 193–205.
12   Gal. Lib. Prop. 1.16: ἀρξαμένου τοῦ μεγάλου λοιμοῦ (139.24–27 BM).
13   French translation at Gal. Lib. Prop. 1.16 (139.52–62 BM), and see notes 7 and 8 (189–190 
BM).
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located in the suburbs of Smyrna in the summer of AD 165.14 If this is right, and 
regardless of whether Aristides’ own claims to have almost followed many of 
his neighbours and slaves, not to mention his livestock, to the grave are to be 
believed, then this would indicate that the plague spread ahead of any post-
war military movements.15 So, perhaps the Parthian campaign contributed to, 
exacerbated, an outbreak of pestilence which was already developing in the 
East, and would have hit Smyrna anyway; rather than being the primary cause 
and driver of the epidemic. Soldiers passing through on their way to the fight-
ing, dragging resources with them, added to some displaced civilians, would 
all have disruptive effects, increasing both the possibilities for transmission of 
and susceptibility to disease. The subsequent relocation of these troops then 
helped make this plague a more decisively and severely imperial affair than it 
would otherwise have been: both geographically and militarily.
The next outbreak of plague Galen encounters certainly fits this pattern. 
Imperial demand brought him back to Italy in late AD 168 (having spent only 
a couple of years away in Pergamum).16 He was summoned to attend on the 
emperors in their winter quarters, in Aquileia, between northern campaigns 
against various Germanic peoples (including the Marcomanni) who had 
crossed the Danube and threatened Roman territory. Two new legions had 
been raised, from Italy, but it seems likely that troops who had fought in Parthia 
were also involved, they certainly would be.17 It had been predominantly 
Danubian units which had been dispatched East, and were now back defend-
ing their previous patch. Galen’s movements were, however, again tracked by 
those of epidemic disease:
On my arrival in Aquileia the plague attacked more destructively than 
ever before, so the emperors fled immediately to Rome with a small force 
of men. For the rest of us, survival became very difficult for a long time. 
Most, indeed, died, the effects of the plague being exacerbated by the fact 
that all this was occurring in the middle of winter.18
14   Aelius Aristides, Or. 48.38–45. The chronology is provided by C. Behr, Aelius Aristides and 
the Sacred Tales (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1968), 96–97, as part of his complete account of 
Aelius life and career, and while plausible is far from certain.
15   Gourevitch is sceptical, arguing that Aristides’ eagerness to remain the centre of patho-
logical attention cannot conceal the fact that his symptoms are a poor match for those of 
the plague (2013: 62–5).
16   Gal. Lib. Prop. 3.1 (141.17–21 BM); and see Mattern (2015), 195–7.
17   To replace legions destroyed in Parthia prior to Verus’ campaign, though plague was also 
having an effect.
18   Gal. Lib. Prop. 3.3: ἐπιβάντος οὖν μου τῆς Ἀκυλίας κατέσκηψεν ὁ λοιμὸς ὡς οὒπω πρότερον, 
ὥστε τοὺς μὲν αὐτοκράτορας αὐτίκα φεύγειν εἰς Ῥώμην ἅμα στρατιώταις ὀλίγοις, ἡμᾶς δὲ τοὺς 
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Flight did not save Lucius Verus who died on the road back to Rome, re-
portedly of apoplexy, and was given full funeral honours, with apotheosis, by 
Marcus Aurelius in the imperial capital.19
The earliest outbreak of this plague recorded in Jerome’s Chronicle, the uni-
versal chronology he compiled in the late fourth-century, is listed for AD 168, 
when, ‘A plague (lues) took hold of many provinces, and affected Rome’.20 Four 
years later things were even worse, ‘There was such a great plague throughout 
the whole world that the Roman army was reduced almost to extinction’.21 It 
is tempting to move Jerome’s dating scheme forward a little, to align it with 
Galen’s first and second episodes, but outbreaks certainly continued, at local 
and more regional level, for decades thereafter. The somewhat wayward narra-
tives of the Marcommanic Wars provided by the later imperial biographies of 
the Historia Augusta interweave pestilence and campaigning up until Marcus 
Aurelius’ death on the frontier in AD 180.22 Plague is also a regular presence in 
Galen’s prolific literary output from this period, often mentioned though never 
the focus of attention; and it will remain a feature of his writing at least into the 
190s. Whether this ‘long-lasting’ plague persisted into the mid-third century AD, 
when further episodes of pestilence are recorded in Egypt and North Africa, 
Rome and the cities of Greece, or whether this was a new disease event, is open 
to debate.23 Many of these Galenic references are to pestilence in general, and, 
even if a particular case or situation is mentioned, it is often not located in 
time and space. The household depredations cited in περὶ ἀλυπίας occurred in 
Rome, for instance, but when is not specified, the addressee was there and 
need not be reminded. One other major outbreak of the plague in the impe-
rial capital is specifically described, in the historical narratives of Cassius Dio 
and Herodian, just a few years before the great fire which destroyed so many 
of Galen’s possessions in AD 192. Both authors were recording events in their 
own life-times, and provide numerous interesting details, if also emphasising 
the programmatic nature of their historical projects as they do so. Neither had 
warm feelings towards Commodus, which puts a particular spin on any disas-
ters which may have occurred in his reign; Dio, indeed, explicitly condemned 
πολλοὺς μόλις ἐν χρόνῳ πολλῷ διασωθῆναι πλείστων ἀπολλυμένων οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸν λοιμὸν ἀλλὰ 
καὶ διὰ τὸ μέσου χειμῶνος εἶναι τὰ πραττόμενα (142.5–11 BM).
19   Apoplexy: SHA Verus 9.11; apotheosis: Gal. Lib. Prop. 3.4.
20   Jerome, Chron. Helm p.287: lues multas provincias occupavit Roma ex parte vexata.
21   Jerome, Chron. Helm p.288: tanta per totum orbem pestilentia fuit ut paene usque ad 
internecionem Romanus exercitus deletus sit.
22   SHA, Marcus 13.3, 17.2 and 21.6.
23   See K. Harper, ‘Pandemics and passages to late antiquity: rethinking the plague of c.249–
270 described by Cyprian’, JRA 28 (2015), 223–260.
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him as ‘more harmful’ (χαλεπώτερος) to the Romans than any disease.24 Dio’s 
claim that this epidemic episode was the worst he had ever come across needs, 
therefore, to be read with this in mind, as also his supporting statement that 
‘two thousand often died in a single day’ in the city.25 The additional allegation 
that death by disease was supplemented by large scale poisoning, performed 
by paid criminals equipped with sharp needles and a deadly compound, is also 
there for a specific purpose. The same thing happened under Domitian, Dio 
notes, implying, of course, a broader repetition of tyrannical rule.26
That there was indeed a severe plague outbreak in Rome around AD 190 is, 
however, confirmed by Herodian.27 All Italy was affected, but especially Rome, 
on account of its populousness and openness: ‘great destruction of both men 
and livestock resulted’.28 Physicians advised Commodus to flee to a safer loca-
tion, and advised those who remained in the city to make copious use of in-
cense and other aromatics. This would either keep the corrupt air out of their 
bodies, or overcome any that did manage to enter. The tactic failed for both 
humans and the animals they shared their space with. The situation was made 
even worse by famine and a corrupt imperial freedman, Cleander, who stands 
in for an absent emperor in the narrative. Plagues are, of course, prime sites 
for moralising, and both Dio and Herodian take full advantage; but severity 
and periodicity are also emphasised, as well as a focus on Rome. In addition, 
Herodian has physicians play a role in his version of events, albeit not a partic-
ularly positive one, and, it is a more medical perspective that will be engaged 
with now. What kind of a disease was it that had such a devastating effect on 
Rome, Italy and the provinces?
2 Symptoms of a Plague
As with all the major epidemic events of antiquity, there has been much debate 
about the identity of the disease implicated in the Antonine plague.29 Though 
the literary record is rich and diverse, and includes contributions from a medi-
cal writer – Galen – the problems in such an enterprise are acute; at least in the 
absence of direct archaeological evidence for the relevant pathogens, such as 
24   Dio, epit. 73.15.1.
25   Dio, epit. 73.14.3: δισχίλιοι γοῡν πολλάκις ἡμέρας μιᾱς…ἐτελεύτησαν.
26   Dio, epit. 73.14.4.
27   Herodian 1.12.1–2.
28   Herodian 1.12.1: πολλή τέ τις φθορὰ ἐγένετο ὑποζυγίων ἅμα καὶ ἀνθρώπων.
29   Summarised at Gourevitch (2013), 67–71.
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has been forthcoming for various later outbreaks of plague, for instance.30 The 
historical accounts do not mention any symptoms, while Galen’s references 
are scattered and unsystematic, either too specific or too general to bear much 
diagnostic weight. He does not provide a complete description, nor any sus-
tained analysis, of the plague as disease anywhere in his surviving oeuvre. All 
ancient literary engagements with illness occur, moreover, on their own terms, 
shaped by both contemporary pathological interests and assumptions and the 
rhetorical project of the writing concerned.
Despite this, a scholarly consensus has, somewhat surprisingly, been estab-
lished around the identification of the Antonine plague as smallpox, based 
largely on Galen’s testimony, as most influentially interpreted by the Littmans 
in a key article of 1973.31 There are, however, real difficulties with this proposed 
match, and further complications have been introduced by the most recent 
genomic work on the variola virus, the causative agent of smallpox, as well as 
new phylogenetic studies of one of the other pestilential contenders, measles. 
These points will be developed in the next section of this essay. The main aim 
here is to show the consistencies in Galen’s own approach to the plague, to 
allow what mattered to him to come through first.
The starting point for Galen’s approach is a definitional one. Plague, loimos 
in Greek, is not a disease in itself, like phrenitis or podagra, rather, as Galen 
himself explains, it is a term applied to an epidemic (ἐπίδημον) disease event – 
that is when lots of people in a single place are stricken in the same way at the 
same time – which is particularly sustained and deadly.32 Plague is an extreme 
epidemic, caused by the condition of the air, as any illness which simultane-
ously affects so many sharing the same location must be: or, as Galen insists, 
caused by the interaction between the surrounding air and individual consti-
tutions.33 Such an aetiology can support a range of ailments. The ambient at-
30   For the initial pathogenic identifications see: K. I. Bos et al., ‘A draft genome of Yersinia 
pestis from victims of the Black Death’, Nature 478 (2011), 506–510; and M. Harbeck et al., 
‘Yersinia pestis DNA from skeletal remains from the 6th Century AD reveals insights into 
Justinianic Plague,’ PLoS Pathogens 9, no. 5 (2013): e1003349; for some wider reflections on 
the intersections of genetics and history see M. H. Green (ed.), Pandemic Disease in the 
Medieval World: Rethinking the Black Death. The Medieval Globe 1 (2014).
31   R. J. and M. L. Littman, ‘Galen and the Antonine plague’, AJP 94 (1973), 243–255; followed 
by many since, including almost all contributors to Lo Cascio (ed: 2012), and Gourevitch 
(2013), 53–75; as well as more generally. ‘It is widely agreed to have been smallpox’, says 
R. Sallares: ‘Ecology’, in W. Scheidel, I. Morris and R. Saller (eds), The Cambridge Economic 
History of the Greco-Roman World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 37.
32   Gal. Hipp. Epid. III 3.21–22 (CMG V 10.2.1 120.5–19); HVA 1.8 (CMG V 9.1 122.18–123.17).
33   Gal. Diff. Feb.1.6 (7. 289–90 K); and see J. Jouanna, ‘Air, miasma and contagion in the time 
of Hippocrates and the survival of miasmas in post-Hippocratic medicine (Rufus of 
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mosphere, what is breathed and inhabited, can disrupt somatic balance and 
functioning in a host of ways.
It is this basic understanding of loimos, very widely shared by physicians 
and patients alike, which shapes Galen’s fragmented literary engagement with 
pestilence.34 Or, to be precise, it is the combination of this abstract notion with 
the concrete advent of plague in his life and world, which spreads loimos fur-
ther, and more thickly, across his oeuvre. The pestilential presence makes his 
dealings with the phenomenon within the overall categorical architecture of 
the medical art, in its pathological, therapeutic, and prognostic spaces, more 
direct and pressing, while also forming part of his biography and practice. 
When drawing on his own experience to support his arguments about health, 
disease, and cure, the plague is unavoidably there, as the passage at the centre 
of most modern diagnostic efforts shows very clearly.
This is the most medically detailed plague episode in Galen’s extant works, 
which appears in the fifth book of the massive On the Method of Healing. This 
book provides systematic coverage of the treatment of wounds, sores, and 
ulcers; that is of a particular grouping of conditions arising from the break-
down of bodily continuity, one of Galen’s fundamental disease types in this 
text, types around which the treatise is organised. Case histories are key to 
the exposition within these larger categories, however, as they allow Galen to 
demonstrate especially vividly the therapeutic pay-off from his superior un-
derstanding of human illness and injury in all its forms.35 The particular point 
of intersection between the plague and somatic discontinuity is in respect to 
ulcers (helkoi) which occur inside the larynx, trachea, and passages into the 
lungs, an eventuality which is serious and challenging, but, crucially, treatable. 
Indeed, Galen claims to have enjoyed quite considerable success in this area, 
following a specific incident.
In particular, I discovered the cure of them, in that place, at the time of 
the great plague (would that it will at some point cease), when it first 
came upon us. At that time, a young man broke out in ulcers all over his 
whole body on the ninth day, just as did almost all the others who were 
saved. On that day there was also a slight cough. On the following day, 
Ephesus, Galen and Palladius)’, in his collected essays, Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to 
Galen, trans. N. Allies (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 122–136.
34   See also [Gal.], Def. Med. 153 (19.391–2 K); and, with some shifts of emphasis, the summary 
chapter on plague in the Greek encyclopaedic tradition, from Rufus of Ephesus: Orib. Syn. 
6.25; Aetius 5.95; Paul of Aegina 2.35.
35   On case histories in Galen see: S. Mattern, Galen and the Rhetoric of Healing (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 2008).
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immediately after he bathed, he coughed more violently and brought up 
with the cough what they call a scab …36
This indicated to Galen that the young man was ulcerated inside and out, 
including somewhere in his airways, and, though reaching those passages is 
always tricky, he prescribed treatment accordingly, in dialogue with the pa-
tient, himself not ‘inexperienced’ (ἄπειρος) in medical matters.37 After three 
more days in Rome, ‘where the plague still raged’ (ἔνθα περ ἐλοίμωξεν), the 
youth boarded a sea-ward ship, disembarking four days later at Stabiae, on the 
Bay of Naples. There he took advantage of the wondrous local milk supply, to 
good effect. For, following a lengthy explanation of why the milk produced at 
Stabiae is so outstanding, Galen concludes the case: ‘That young man who had 
a ulcer in the trachea from the pestilential disease became healthy, and others 
after him likewise.’38 It is only here, then, that the plague passes from narrative 
frame to pathological cause, from a means of situating the case in time, as well 
as space, to aetiology.
This general pestilential theme is then further developed as the sequence 
continues, for Galen understands the ulceration in these cases as part of a 
wider set of beneficial somatic responses to the plague.
Those easily restored to health from the plague seem to me to have been 
previously dried and purged in respect to the whole body, for vomiting 
occurred in some of them and the stomach was disturbed in all. And, in 
the same way, in those already purged who were going to be saved, dark 
pustules (exanthemata) appear clearly over the whole body, in most ul-
cerous, in all dry. And it was obvious to the observer that, what was left 
of the blood which had been putrefied during these fevers, had, like a 
kind of ash, been forced through the skin by nature, just like many other 
superfluities.39
36   Gal. MM 5.12 (II 84 Loeb): εὕρομεν δὲ μάλιστα τὴν θεραπείαν αὐτῶν ἐνθένδε κατὰ τὸν μέγαν 
τοῦτον λοιμόν, ὃν εἴη ποτὲ παύσεσθαι, πρῶτον εἰσβάλλοντα. τότε νεανίσκος τις ἐνναταῖος 
ἐξήνθησεν ἕλκεσιν ὅλον τὸ σῶμα, καθάπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι σχεδὸν ἅπαντες οἱ σωθέντες. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ 
καὶ ὑπέβηττε βραχέα. τῇ δ᾿ ὑστεραίᾳ λουσάμενος αὐτίκα μὲν ἔβηξε σφοδρότερον, ἀνηνέχθη δ᾿ 
αὐτῷ μετὰ τῆς βηχὸς ἣν ὀνομάζουσιν ἐφελκίδα….
37   Gal. MM 5.12 (II 86 Loeb).
38   Gal. MM 5.12 (II 92 Loeb): ἐκεῖνος μέν γε οὖν ὁ νεανίας ἐκ τῆς λοιμώδους νόσου κατὰ τὴν 
ἀρτηρίαν ἕλκος ἔχων ὑγιὴς ἐγένετο καὶ ἄλλοι μετ᾿ αὐτὸν ὁμοίως.
39   Gal. MM 5.12 (II 92–4 Loeb): οἱ δ᾿ ἐκ τοῦ λοιμοῦ ῥᾳδίως ὑγιάζεσθαί μοι δοκοῦσι τῷ προεξηράνθαι 
τε καὶ προκεκαθάρθαι σύμπαν τὸ σῶμα· καὶ γὰρ ἔμετός τισιν αὐτῶν ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ γαστὴρ ἅπασιν 
ἐταράχθη. καὶ οὕτως ἤδη κεκενωμένοις τοῖς σῴζεσθαι μέλλουσιν ἐξανθήματα μέλανα διὰ παντὸς 
τοῦ σώματος ἀθρόως ἐπεφαίνετο· τοῖς πλείστοις μὲν ἑλκώδη, πᾶσι δὲ ξηρά. καὶ ἦν εὔδηλον ἰδόντι 
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These pustules, or eruptions, required no treatment, were indeed part of the 
healing process. If ulcerous they formed scabs, which dropped off leaving the 
patient close to health, if not they were dry and itchy, then fell off like scales, 
from which all became healthy. For, in plague, drying, roughening, and scab-
bing have already occurred, that is the aim of any medicament that might be 
applied has been achieved.40
These generalisations are about those who have, or will, recover from the 
plague, rather than all afflicted, but skin eruptions feature in another sus-
tained pestilential discussion, with reference to the ‘most long-lasting plague’ 
(πολυχρονιωτάτῳ λοιμῷ) now occurring.41 Galen quotes from Thucydides’ de-
scription of the Athenian Plague which had such devastating effects during the 
Peloponnesian War in this respect:
On the outside the body was not hot to the touch, nor was there pallor; 
the skin was rather red, livid, and broke out into small blisters and ulcers 
(helkoi).42
Fever and various other gastrointestinal issues – including loss of appetite, 
loose bowels, and bloody or black stools – are also symptoms associated with 
the present loimos elsewhere in Galen’s oeuvre.43 Most frequently emphasised, 
however, is that those suffering from this pestilence did not recognise ‘them-
selves or their friends’, another Thucydidean symptom, as is explicitly noted.44 
This is not a failure of the faculty of memory itself, but rather the disease pro-
duces interference in access to that faculty, like a cataract does in the case of 
sight.
Galen worried about the predictive powers of the pulse in the present ‘great 
plague’ (μεγάλας λοιμός), indeed, he worried about the wider diagnostic and 
prognostic challenges of pestilential disease, its confounding characteristics 
for physicians and laymen alike.45 Its corrosive inner heat is deceptive, the 
τοῦ σεσηπότος ἐν τοῖς πυρετοῖς αἵματος εἶναι τοῦτο λείψανον, οἷον τέφραν τινὰ τῆς φύσεως 
ὠθούσης ἐπὶ τὸ δέρμα, καθάπερ ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν περιττῶν.
40   Gal. MM 5.12 (II 94 Loeb).
41   Gal. Hipp. Epid. VI 1.29 (CMG V 10.2.2 53.16–19).
42   Thuc. 2.49.5: καὶ τὸ μὲν ἔξωθεν ἁπτομένῳ σῶμα οὔτ᾽ ἄγαν θερμὸν ἦν οὔτε χλωρόν, ἀλλ᾽ 
ὑπέρυθρον, πελιτνόν, φλυκταίναις μικραῖς καὶ ἕλκεσιν ἐξηνθηκός. At CMG V 10.2.2 52.3–7 and 
53.19–54.1.
43   Gal. MM 10.11 (10.733 K), Hipp. Aph. 4.21 (17B.682–3 K), Hipp. Epid. III 3.59–60 (CMG V 10.2.1 
144.21–145.11).
44   Gal. QAM 5: ἀγνοῆσαι διὰ νόσημα σφᾶς τ’αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους (SM 2 49.3–11); Diff. 
Symp. 3.4 (7.62 K) and Caus. Symp. 3.2.7.1 (7.201K); Thucydides, 2.49.8.
45   Gal. Praes. Puls. 3.3 and 4 (9.341–2 and 357–9 K).
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hectic fevers it engenders are slippery and dangerous, and, of course, there is 
the sheer volume of cases, the thousands (μύριοι) affected in this ‘long-lasting 
plague’ (πολυχρόνιος λοιμός). This volume is a conceptual as well as a practical 
problem, a technical as well as a social issue, for ancient medicine is essen-
tially about individuals not populations. To be able to operate most effective-
ly, a physician needed knowledge of the patient’s specific constitution, their 
healthy base-line, in order to understand both what is wrong and how best to 
treat it, to return the sick person to their previous state of health. There are 
established short-cuts. Some generalisations can be made based on age and 
sex, for instance, in respect to geography and environment, the seasons and 
weather, but these are rough guides which require calibration in every case.46 
Plague makes that impossible.
The kind of sustained engagement Galen enjoyed with the young man with 
the pestilentially ulcerated trachea, the complex individualised therapy he is 
able to dispense, and the patient himself actively participates in, cannot be 
extended to so many sufferers. It is the process not the prescription which re-
quires repetition, and there is just not the time available to do so. The point 
had been underlined by Galen’s insistence that it is the interaction between 
individual constitutions, particular somatic states, and putrefying air which 
produces plague, which engenders disease in many people, but not all, and not 
all the same in terms of severity and symptoms. Those whose bodies are well-
balanced, unobstructed, and unburdened by excess or superfluities, especially 
moistures, are less susceptible, more likely to recover quickly, through purg-
ing and drying.47 Generalised remedies will always be touted in such circum-
stances, but there is no such thing. Those who drank a draught of Armenian 
earth in the recent plague, for instance, were either cured immediately or died; 
and Galen makes no mention of the stories about Hippocrates bringing health 
to pestilential cities by burning a range of sweet smelling substances across 
the area, designed to combat the putrid qualities of the atmosphere.48 Stabian 
milk, for example, is highly beneficial for a range of diseases, and completes, 
rather than comprises, the therapeutic package for the young man.
46   See e.g. Gal. GMM 1.1 (11.1–6 K).
47   Gal. Diff. Resp. 1.6 (7.291–2 K).
48   Gal. SMT 9.1 (12.191 K). This is taking Robert Leigh and Véronique Boudon-Millot to be cor-
rect in their recent editions, with translations (into English and French respectively) and 
commentaries, of On Theriac to Piso, Attributed to Galen (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 61, and (Paris: 
Les Belles Lettres, 2016), lii–lxxiv, that the work (which does mention Hippocrates curing 
the plague: Ther. 16) is not by Galen. On these stories more generally see J. Rubin Pinault, 
Hippocratic Lives and Legends (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 35–60.
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The situation is not as bleak as depicted by Thucydides. In the Athenian 
Plague, he claimed, physicians were useless, ignorant of how to treat the dis-
ease, and particularly vulnerable as a result, but no other human art (ἀνθρωπεία 
τέχνη) was any more help, nor were appeals to the divine; all were eventually 
abandoned by the afflicted populace, despair dominated.49 Galen has knowl-
edge and understanding, but not the necessary capacity. There is a sense in 
which pestilence, such as the one he lived through, inherently exceeded the 
medical art. But though there was some confusion amongst the profession, 
Galen does not emphasise either their errors or their susceptibility. His friend 
Teuthras is the only medical casualty he notes, and, while all his slaves in Rome 
succumbed, as also most of the men over-wintering in Aquileia, Galen him-
self seems not to have been affected. There may be reasons why he would not 
have mentioned it, however, even if he had fallen ill. Immunity from, rather 
than empathy with, others’ ailments is the preferred position of the classical 
 physician.50 Their authority was vested more in their own health and integrity 
than in any shared experience of suffering.
Still, the appeal of Thucydides here, the way his plague narrative is the 
main frame of reference for Galen’s own pestilential engagements, as also for 
others in antiquity and after, is not just about the stature of the author and 
his text.51 It is not just about the vividness and detail of Thucydides’ account, 
which Galen contrasts with a certain Hippocratic sparseness on at least one 
occasion.52 It is also, and primarily, about the way pestilence extends beyond 
medicine: is essentially a collective, communal phenomenon, a historical as 
much as a medical event. The repetition of some symptoms helps strengthen 
the connection, but should not be mistaken for any kind of assertion that the 
disease involved was the same, that is a claim which would make little sense 
to Galen; rather, the Athenian plague is the only meaningful precedent for the 
scale and severity of what he experienced overall.
49   Thuc. 2.47.4.
50   B. Holmes, ‘In strange lands: Disembodied authority and the physician role in the 
Hippocratic Corpus and beyond’, in M. Asper (ed.), Writing Science: Medical and 
Mathematical Authorship in Ancient Greece (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013), 431–472.
51   See F. Kudlien, ‘Galens Urteil über die Thukydideische Pestbeschreibung’, Episteme 5 
(1971), 132–3; other Thucydidean episodes include: Lucr. 6.1139–1286; Lucian, Hist. Conscr. 
13; and Procopius, 2.22–33.
52   Gal. Diff. Resp. 2.7 (7.850–851 K).
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3 Identifying the Plague
The Littmans do not mention the loss of memory, the loss of self and family, but 
are otherwise content that all the symptoms and signs Galen described in the 
Antonine epidemic, ‘are consistent with smallpox’.53 Putting it more strongly, 
though his account is incomplete, and serves his own purposes, it is sufficient 
‘to enable firm identification of the disease as smallpox because of the excel-
lent description of the most important diagnostic sign, the exanthema.’ It is 
the passage in On the Method of Healing which is most decisive here, rendering 
both bubonic plague and typhus, the two other possibilities they considered, 
‘unlikely’, and conforming especially closely to haemorrhagic smallpox. The 
ulceration and scabbing of the pustules in this sequence is key, characteristic 
of smallpox rather than any other acute feverish diseases involving skin erup-
tions. Bubonic plague is something of an outlier, but modern typhus, measles, 
and smallpox all begin with fevers and an assortment of aches, pains, and gen-
eral un-wellness, followed by rashes that often start on the face (may be in 
the mouth and throat, which are also otherwise affected) and spread over the 
whole body (more or less).54 Except in smallpox, these rashes tend to stay flat, 
or, at least, remain flatter; the eponymous buboes of bubonic plague are rather 
different.55
There are, of course, questions about how conclusive any historical diagno-
sis of this kind can ever be, and opinions vary on exactly how close the match 
of symptoms asserted by the Littmans really is. Much seems to rest on quite 
precise interpretations of terms often used vaguely and interchangeably, such 
as exanthema and helkoi. Two larger difficulties with the identification of the 
Antonine Plague as smallpox have also been noted, including by its supporters. 
In her recent survey of the topic, Danielle Gourevitch considers it, ‘safe to sug-
gest that this Galenic and fearful epidemic was due to a virus of the Poxviridae 
family (genus Orthopoxvirus) which are responsible for smallpox and other re-
lated diseases’, that is, it was very similar to, but not necessarily identical with, 
modern smallpox (eradicated in 1979).56 But she admits that the omission of 
any reference to the indelible scarring, the disfiguring facial pockmarks, which 
53   R. J. and M. L. Littman (1973), 252.
54   See, for example, the relevant chapters in K. F. Kiple (ed.), The Cambridge World History of 
Human Disease (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 871–5 (measles); 1008–13 
(smallpox); and 1080–4 (typhus).
55   And buboes – glandular swellings – do feature in general discussions of somatic swell-
ings and surface eruptions in classical medicine, including by Galen (e.g. MM 13.5: III 328 
Loeb), but not in his descriptions of the ‘great plague’.
56   Gourevitch (2013), 72–5.
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became the disease’s signature is problematic in this respect. She adds a fur-
ther challenge too, drawing attention to the concurrence of human and animal 
sickness and death in the plague accounts of Aelius Aristides and Herodian, 
two of the more contemporary witnesses to events, already cited. Smallpox is 
exclusively human. There are more or less closely related poxviruses which af-
fect many other species, including livestock, some of which are zoonotic – that 
is transferable to people – but these infections are generally mild, localised and 
poorly transmissible among humans; indeed, most animal poxes are not very 
virulent.57 In modern terms, therefore, there is no single poxvirus which could 
produce the Antonine plague as described in the ancient sources.
The absence of references to the scarring characteristic of modern smallpox 
has been explained in various vague and unsatisfactory ways in the scholar-
ship. Such an omission does not, of course, prove that this important feature 
was not part of the pestilential scene in the Roman Empire of the second cen-
tury AD, but there are a number of reasons to think that if it had been, the 
sources would have recorded the fact. Visibly disfiguring diseases were a popu-
lar theme among Roman writers, for instance, redolent with moral meaning, 
and remedies for removing scars and facial blemishes were standard in the 
pharmacological repertoire, a reliable earner for any physician it can be as-
sumed. Pliny the Elder makes the most of nasty ( foedus) facial, or facially fo-
cused, afflictions as markers of imperial excess with his stories of the arrival of 
lichena and elephantiasis on Italian shores in the Natural History.58 While the 
obviously punitive deaths recounted for figures such as Sulla, Herod the Great, 
and Galerius involve, amongst other unpleasant details, an inner putrefaction 
which is manifest on the surface, as the whole skin itches unbearably and flesh 
turns into lice or worms, which cannot be washed away.59 Galen himself cov-
ered recipes for a range of growths, tumours, pustules, and scars on the face 
in his voluminous collection of compound medicaments organised according 
to the somatic location affected.60 This included many compounds to treat li-
chena, some of which specify that they overcome the eruptions without ulcer-
ation or scarring, though others excoriate the skin, and should be followed by 
a restorative plaster.
It has been suggested that the variability of the virus, differences of popula-
tion and environment, might have led to less scarring in the Roman context. 
57   S. L. Haller et al., ‘Poxvirus and the evolution of host range and virulence,’ Infection, 
Genetics and Evolution 21 (2013), 15–40.
58   Plin. NH 26.1–11; and see R. Flemming, ‘Pliny and the pathologies of Empire’, Papers of the 
Langford Latin Seminar 14 (2010), 1–24.
59   Plut. Sulla 36.2–3; Josephus, BJ 1.656; Lactantius DMP 33.
60   Gal. Comp. Med. Loc. 5.3 (12 822–48 K).
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This is certainly possible. Recent genomic work on poxviruses has emphasised 
their variation and adaptability: milder, so called ‘minor’ strains of the variola 
virus, the causative agent of smallpox, have repeatedly emerged, may indeed 
be the original form in humans, though it is calculated that the more virulent 
‘major’ strain developed at least three thousand years ago, so before the period 
under scrutiny here.61 However, while severe facial pockmarks follow recovery 
from variola minor much less frequently than recovery from variola major, in 
about 7% rather than 75% of cases in the most systematic modern study, this 
accompanies a fatality rate of less than 1% (in contrast to 10%–30% for the 
major strains).62 So, to depress the scarring rates to a level where it is plausible 
that this would not be reported as part of the course of the disease would, ac-
cording to the available information, not be compatible with the heavy mor-
tality experienced during pestilential outbreaks at Rome and Aquileia. There 
is a larger methodological question at stake here too. What does it mean to 
identify the Antonine Plague as smallpox if that move is based on the historical 
variability of the disease, is reliant on the fact that pathogens and their interac-
tions with their hosts change significantly over time?
Gourevitch’s explanation for the human and animal nature of the pestilence 
is a rhetorical one. It is, she readily confesses, an argument of last resort, but 
the dying livestock have been recruited for dramatic emphasis, to increase the 
emotional impact of these accounts.63 There are precedents. The mules and 
hounds of the Achaeans are the first targets of Apollo’s pestilential arrows in 
the opening sequence of the Iliad, while the order of mortality is reversed, and 
animals play a more complex role, in Thucydides’ plague narrative.64 Though 
bodies were lying around unburied, signalling the high toll exacted by the dis-
ease on both human life and social organisation, carrion eating birds and beasts 
avoided them, or died after tasting their flesh. The absence of carrion birds was 
notable, while the presence of domestic dogs allowed these lethal results to be 
witnessed directly. This latter point was further embellished by the Epicurean 
poet Lucretius, who, towards the end of the Roman Republic reworked the 
61   Haller et al. (2014), 18–19 and 34; see also C. Smithson, J. Imbery and C. Upton. ‘Re-
assemby and analysis of an ancient variola virus genome’, Viruses 2017, 9, 253 (doi:10.3390/
v9090253).
62   Z. Jezek, W. Hardjotanojo and A. G. Rangaraj, ‘Facial scarring after varicella: A compari-
son with variola major and variola minor’, American Journal of Epidemiology 114 (1981), 
798–803.
63   Gourevitch (2013), 74–5.
64   Homer, Iliad 1.50–52; Thuc. 2.50.1–2.
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Thucydidean plague to close his epic On the Nature of Things.65 The suffering 
of man’s faithful canine companions was displayed on the streets, like the un-
buried corpses, as the power of the disease dragged the life from their limbs.66
The references to dying livestock in Aelius Aristides and Herodian seem per-
functory in comparison. They add to the destructive footprint of the loimos 
they describe, but the real emotional and political work is done elsewhere in 
these accounts. There is a closer resemblance to a couple of plague reports 
in the Roman annalistic tradition. The Augustan historian Livy records a se-
vere and sustained pestilentia, lasting for about five years from 436 BC, which 
brought death to city and countryside, killing ‘man and livestock’ (hominum 
pecorumque) alike, and while he had a plague outbreak in cattle succeeded 
by one among people in the years 175–4 BC, the later excerptor of Republican 
prodigies, Julius Obsequens, brutally compressed the whole episode.67
During a serious pestilence affecting humans and cattle, corpses lay un-
buried, for Libitina was overwhelmed, but no vultures appeared.68
The Thucydidean echoes are obvious, here and in Livy, but if the ‘man and live-
stock’ phrase had become one topos among many routinely deployed on these 
occasions, it is more sparingly used than most, and perhaps more specifically.
The possibility that pestilential outbreaks involving humans and livestock 
were a specific phenomenon in the Roman world is given some credence by 
recent genomic work on one of the other diseases referred to so far – measles – 
and by the reported recurrence of such events in the early middle ages.69 So, 
though the timing is still somewhat uncertain, new techniques and methods 
are under development, require further calibration, it has been established that 
the measles virus appeared much later than had been previously assumed.70 It, 
and its close relative the rinderpest virus, the causative agent of rinderpest, an 
epidemically very virulent and lethal disease of cattle (and other ungulates), 
until eradicated in 2011, only went their separate ways sometime between the 
65   David Sedley, Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), 160–165.
66   Lucr. 6.1222–5.
67   Livy 4.25.4 and 41.21.5–7.
68   Obs. 10: Gravi pestilentia hominum boumque cadavera non sufficiente Libitina cum ia-
cerent, vulturius non apparuit.
69   T. P. Newfield, ‘Human-bovine plagues in the early middle ages’, Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History 48 (2015), 1–38.
70   See generally on method: R. Bick et al., ‘Measurably evolving pathogens in the genomic 
era’, Trends in Ecology and Evolution 30 (2015), 306–313.
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ninth and twelfth centuries AD.71 Before that, the common ancestor morbil-
livirus could have infected humans and cattle, with the only available guide 
to its effects coming from modern measles and rinderpest respectively. The 
Antonine Plague, like its Republican predecessors and medieval successors, 
might demonstrate the point. Certainly, whatever human sickness this now 
extinct archaeovirus generated cannot, on the current state of knowledge, be 
ruled out of the pathological picture for Galen’s great loimos.
This is, of course, all pretty speculative, but so, in the circumstances, is the 
smallpox diagnosis for the Antonine Plague. Here too the relationship between 
modern smallpox and any ancient disease has been thrown into deeper un-
certainty by recent genomic studies. The variola virus genome isolated from 
a mummified child who lived in mid-seventeenth century Lithuania turned 
out to be ancestral to all twentieth century strains. Modern smallpox is, then, 
just that, the evolutionary history of the virus prior to that point, with all the 
possible variations in virulence and the wider set of interactions between 
pathogen and host, has become more distant than it once was.72 There is one 
more resource that can, and should, be brought to bear on the problem, how-
ever, that is the voluminous Arabic writings of the great Persian physician of 
the medieval Islamic world, Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Zakarīyā al-Rāzī, com-
monly known in the Anglophone world by his latinised name, Rhazes. He is 
the medical figure commonly credited with mutually distinguishing smallpox 
and measles, and providing the first ‘scientific’ description of the latter, if not 
the former, around AD 900.73 While his contribution is not nearly so straight-
forward as is often assumed or asserted, Rhazes’ engagement with Galen is 
71   Combining the estimates in A. Furuse, A. Suzuki and H. Oshitani, ‘Origin of measles virus: 
Divergence from rinderpest virus between the 11th and 12th centuries’, Virology Journal 7: 
52 (2010); and J. O. Wertheim and S. L Kosakovsky Pond, ‘Purifying selection can obscure 
the age of viral lineages’, Molecular Biology and Evolution 28 (2011), 3355–65.
72   A. T. Duggan et al, ‘17th Century variola virus reveals the recent history of samllpox’, 
Current Biology 26 (2016), 3407–412. See also: P. Pajer et al., ‘Characterization of two histor-
ic smallpox specimens from a Czech museum’, Viruses 2017, 9, 200 (doi: 10.3390/v9080200) 
with A. Porter et al., ‘Comment: Characterization of two historic smallpox specimens 
from a Czech museum’, Viruses 2017, 9, 276 (doi: 10.3390/v9080276); and Smithson, Imbery 
and Upton (2017).
73   This is often asserted in specific and general histories of disease – e.g. D. R. Hopkins, The 
Greatest Killer: Smallpox in History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 27; 
and W. H. MacNeill, Plagues and Peoples, rev. edn. (New York: Random House, 1998), 131 – 
as well as being more or less assumed in much of the genomic literature about pathogen 
evolution, e.g. A. Furuse, A. Suzuki and H. Oshitani (2010); Wertheim and Kosakovsky 
Pond (2011), 3363.
237Galen and the Plague
certainly worth discussing in this context, as also various other aspects of his 
treatment of the diseases jadari and hasbah, which have been construed as 
terms for smallpox and measles respectively.
In the preface to his short treatise dedicated to jadari and hasbah, Rhazes 
explains that his focus will be on the former.74 It is jadari which has yet to 
receive a thorough textual treatment, an omission his discourse rectifies. It is 
not, however, that the disease has been entirely overlooked by previous medi-
cal authors, rather that these discussions remain incomplete, especially in re-
spect to the causes and cure of the complaint. Indeed, Rhazes opens his dis-
quisition with a defence of Galen against charges of having failed to mention 
this affliction. He cites four passages to prove his case, from the first book of 
On Compound Drugs according to Kind, the fourteenth book of the great work 
On Pulses (that is book two of Prognosis from the Pulse), the ninth book of On 
the Usefulness of the Parts, and the fourth book of his commentary on Plato’s 
Timaeus.75 The term jadari appears in all these excerpts, taken from the Arabic 
translations of these works, in contexts which are broadly in line with Rhazes’ 
understanding of the disease.76 That it is produced by the putrefaction and fer-
mentation of the blood, which generates fever, inflammation and the eruption 
of superfluities through the skin, amongst other effects.77
William Alexander Greenhill, who carefully translated the treatise into 
English from the original Arabic in the mid-nineteenth century, did not have 
access to these Arabic versions of Galen’s works. Still, he diligently compared 
the quotes in Rhazes with the surviving Greek, as far as possible, and con-
cluded that jadari most probably renders ionthos and herpes in these passages, 
74   The Arabic text remains unedited and unpublished, so I have had to rely on the English 
translation of W. A. Greenhill – Abu Becr Mohammed ibn Zacariya Ar-Razi, A Treatise on 
the Small-Pox and Measles (London: Sydenham Society, 1847), 22–73 – with its rich an-
notations and Arabic index. References will be, therefore, to that translation. The volume 
(abbreviated here as TSM) also includes translations, from Arabic and Latin, of passages 
from other works of Rhazes which cover these diseases, with considerable consistency, 
not to say repetition.
75   Rhazes, Kitab fi al-jadari wa-al-hasbah (KJH) 1,1–2 (TSM 27–28). Galen’s many treatis-
es on the pulse were combined on the syllabus of the medical schools of late antique 
Alexandria, and thereafter.
76   Rhazes makes it clear later in the same chapter (1.2: TSM 28) that he worked with Arabic 
material, and asked those familiar with Greek and Syriac whether he had missed any-
thing. There is broader discussion about his competence in these languages, see O. Kahl, 
The Sanskrit, Syriac and Persian Sources in the Comprehensive Book of Rhazes (Leiden: 
Brill, 2015), 5–7.
77   As stated at e.g. KJH 1.6 (TSM 29–30).
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that is words for tumours and pustules themselves.78 Certainly none of these 
excerpts are at all plague related, nor does Rhazes make the connection more 
generally, for either jadari or hasbah. Though his knowledge of Galen’s oeuvre 
was very extensive, and there is indeed a lengthy plague sequence in the next 
book of Prognosis from the Pulse, as has been noted. Part of the explanation 
may be that, for Rhazes, both jadari and hasbah, the latter being essentially 
a more bilious variant of the former, are common childhood diseases, rarely 
fatal.79 This presumption was shared, moreover, by the assortment of other 
medical writers, mostly from the eighth and ninth centuries AD, whose views 
on the subject he collected in his compendious Kitab al-Hawi.80 Jadari and 
hasbah are rarely avoided on the road to adulthood, but while they can kill, 
they usually do not. These are everyday diseases, dangerous in some forms; but 
not the stuff of plagues.
The modern understanding of smallpox and measles makes sense of this 
disjunction. One of the key features of these diseases, as well as another acute 
feverish illness involving skin eruptions, that is scarlet fever, and, to a lesser 
extent typhus, is that they endow those who survive their depredations with 
immunity (as also rinderpest and animal poxes). For mortality to be as high 
as reported for the Antonine Plague, at least in Rome and various military en-
campments, and for adults to be hit as hard as Galen indicates, this has to have 
been a ‘virgin soil epidemic’ involving one of these diseases.81 In such cases, 
where smallpox or measles were previously unknown, or last encountered long 
ago, as in medieval Japan, and early modern Spanish America, for example, 
the effect on communities lacking resistance can be devastating.82 Whereas, 
78   TSM 141–150.
79   KJH 3.2: bilious nature of hasbah; 1.6: childhood diseases (TSM 35 and 29–30).
80   Rhazes noted down passages from all the medical texts he read, and organised them to-
gether with his own views on the subject and some relevant case histories under appro-
priate headings, this compilation seems to have been essentially for his own use, but was 
then published after his death, and indeed rendered into Latin (as the Continens): see e.g. 
Kahl (2015), 3–5. Greenhill translated the passages (TSM 101–130) from an Arabic manu-
script in the Bodleian (Marsh 156).
81   Though the notion of the ‘virgin soil’ is sometimes construed more broadly and problem-
atically, see e.g. D. S. Jones, ‘Virgin soils revisited’, William and Mary Quarterly 60 (2003), 
703–742.
82   On Japan see e.g. A. B. Jannetta, Epidemics and Mortality in Early Modern Japan (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1986); and W. W. Farris, Population, Disease and Land in Early 
Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985); the literature on the Americas 
is more extensive, see e.g. S. A. Alchon, A Pest in the Land: New World Epidemics in Global 
perspective (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2003); and N. D. Cook and 
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in circumstances where the environment and population allow the pathogens 
to establish a permanent presence, that is where these conditions become en-
demic, they are largely restricted to children, to the not yet immune. This then 
is the situation Rhazes and his recent predecessors described for jadari and 
hasbah, in a geographical region that includes the area in which Verus cam-
paigned. The new Abbasid capital of Baghdad was founded just a little north of 
the old Parthian and Sassanian centre of Ctesiphon, and about 80 km north of 
Babylon. Rhazes spent time in Baghdad, as did most of his sources, even if they, 
like him, often originated further east, deeper in Persia.83
This is, of course, over half a millennium after the Antonine Plague, long 
enough for a disease like smallpox to become endemic even if it had reached 
Mesopotamia at the same time as Verus did.84 This was not Rome’s first 
Parthian expedition, after all, and the eastern boundaries of the Empire were 
porous and flexible in many ways. The point, however, is a more general one 
about the patterning of the diseases under scrutiny here, that while Rhazes’ 
failure to place jadari and hasbah in a lineage which goes back to Galen’s ‘great 
plague’, his preference for vaguer, non-epidemic ancestry for at least the former 
is noteworthy, this is what might be expected if these were modern smallpox 
and measles. So how good is the fit between Rhazes descriptions of these two 
diseases and their proposed modern counterparts more broadly? Obviously 
any discrimination between, individuation of, acute feverish diseases involv-
ing skin eruptions is a move in the right direction, but there is more to it than 
that.
Three points are worth making in this regard. The first is that, amongst the 
very long, and mostly generic, list of early signs of jadari and hasbah, back 
pains are more particular to the former, whereas nausea and anxiety are more 
prevalent in the latter.85 Modern textbooks include back pain as a typical 
symptom of smallpox, but not measles, while being pretty indifferent about 
the rest.86 The second is the assertion made apparently in Rhazes’ own voice in 
the Hawi, as well as by one of the recent authorities he cites, a member of the 
Syro-Persian Nestorian family of physicians from Gondeshapur who shared 
W. G. Lowell (eds.), Secret Judgements of God: Old World Disease in Colonial Spanish 
America (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001).
83   For Rhazes’ biography see e.g. TSM 137–141; Kahl (2015), 1–2.
84   In Japan, smallpox, which probably arrived from China in the sixth century AD, but is 
more clearly identified in a massive epidemic of 735, seems to have become endemic by 
the twelfth century, while measles did not: Jannetta (1986), 65–70 and 108–117.
85   KJH 3 (TSM 34–35).
86   See e.g. Kiple (ed: 1993), 1009.
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the name Bokhtishu, that the pustules in jadari are raised, whereas the rash in 
hasbah stays flat.87 Though, otherwise, discussion of the skin eruptions occurs 
more in a prognostic than diagnostic setting, and often along similar lines in 
both diseases, though with some specific variations.88 Third is the clear divi-
sion between jadari and hasbah in respect to what happens on the somatic 
surface in the aftermath of these affections. In the treatise dedicated to them 
there is a chapter on removing the marks and scars of jadari, which includes a 
number of recipes for applications to remove marks on the eyes, face and else-
where on the body.89 It is also suggested that frequent bathing, rubbing, and 
growing fat and fleshy will help fill in and smooth over the pockmarks. Many 
of the other authors excerpted in the Hawi also offer such medicaments and 
advice, but only for jadari, hasbah is not mentioned in this context.90
It does, therefore, seem that the jadari of Rhazes and his recent predeces-
sors is a reasonably good match for modern smallpox, but that is less clearly 
the case for hasbah and measles. It is worth mentioning that, in Greenhill’s day 
(and beyond), the Arabic term hasbah mostly signified scarlet fever.91 Smallpox 
had been distinguished from other acute feverish diseases involving skin erup-
tions, with hasbah designating the rest. The Antonine Plague, as described by 
Galen and others, appears to align more with this blurred remainder than the 
more determinate jadari, however, as it crucially lacks the scarring, the facial 
marks, which are so intrinsic to the tradition.92 The consensus around small-
pox needs to be challenged and questions of identification re-opened. Further 
genomic and historical work will certainly help shed light on the matter, even 
if no appropriate ancient DNA is forthcoming.93
87   Hawi 47 and 71 (TSM 113 and 121).
88   KJH 14 (TSM 71–73).
89   KJH 11 (TSM 60–63).
90   Hawi 22, 36–39, 44, 48, 50, 53, and 76–9 (TSM 106, 110–111, 112–113, 114, 116, and 124).
91   TSM 136.
92   Pockmarks are even noted by native reporters of early outbreaks of smallpox in Mexico, 
were noticeable on initial encounter, see R. McCaa, ‘Spanish and Nahuatl views on small-
pox and demographic catastrophe in Mexico’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History 25 
(1995), 423.
93   Though the evidence of second century Roman epidemic mortality presented in 
P. Blanchard et al, ‘A mass grave from the catacomb of Saints Peter and Marcellinus in 
Rome, second-third century AD’, Antiquity 81 (2007), 989–998, may be less straightforward 
than first suggested, a DNA from the skeletons could still produce interesting results. The 
international historical smallpox project just launched by the Mütter Research Institute 
is also promising.
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4 Conclusions
To return to Galen, however, and his efforts to avoid, or at least to control, 
distress, the distress which inhered in the pestilential age he inhabited. For 
the ‘great plague’ reached Rome – the imperial capital and centre of Galen’s 
 career – not long after he did, and it met him again in Aquileia, where it tem-
porarily inserted itself between him and the persons of the emperors. It ebbed 
and flowed thereafter, but was characterised by persistence and longevity, this 
was ‘the most long-lasting plague’ (would that it would end!). Time was both 
structured by the epidemic, so that locating an event ‘in the first outbreak of 
the great plague’ became an obvious move to make, and un-structured by its 
continuity, by the uncertainty of its end.
Galen lost a whole household of slaves to the plague, though he seems to 
have considered them as possessions, not people, in his accounting of damage 
due to fire and pestilence in περὶ ἀλυπίας. He also lost his friend Teuthras. He 
claims to have witnessed the death of most of the army gathered at Aquileia, 
and saw ‘thousands’ afflicted by the epidemic in Rome. Those presented as his 
patients, however, individuals with whom he interacted, rather than the un-
differentiated masses of city dwellers and soldiers who may or may not have 
received his therapeutic attentions (he does not say), fared rather better. Galen 
identified and concentrated on the group with good prospects, who could be 
saved, with the correct approach.
The great plague was medically challenging, tricky and misleading, violent 
and dangerous, but the body was not defenceless, and medicine could align 
itself with, assist and support, its inherent purgative responses. It was also so-
cially challenging – friends and family were no longer recognised as such by 
sufferers – but there is no suggestion of a collapse of the moral order, as is 
so central to Thucydides’ plague narrative. Issues of Roman manpower and 
famine emphasised in other sources were of little concern to Galen. He re-
corded the loss of troops, but Marcus Aurelius headed north to deal with the 
Germanic incursions just a couple of sentences later, apparently untroubled by 
these depredations. The sense that loimos is not just a medical matter, exceeds 
the capacity of the art, spills over into other domains, is always present, but 
never fully articulated. This hinterland is glimpsed, sporadically, across Galen’s 
oeuvre, its painful depths revealed momentarily, as in περὶ ἀλυπίας, but rarely 
explored. What is medically manageable receives more discussion, and pushes 
back against the uncontrollable aspects of pestilence to some extent, but with-
out taming them. That Galen’s engagement with the plague is piecemeal and 
uneven, is thus an integral part of the phenomenon; the picture is patchy and 
incomplete because it has to be.
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chapter 10
Galen and the Last Days of Commodus
Matthew Nicholls
Posterity’s impression of the emperor Commodus has been almost universally 
negative. From Herodian and Dio to the lurid accounts in the 4th C Historia 
Augusta, to Machiavelli and the modern age, he is decried as a monstrous ty-
rant, enslaved to his own ungovernable passions and an enemy to all virtue.1
The chief literary sources for Commodus’ reign are not without their limita-
tions. Dio, Herodian, and the Historia Augusta present accounts that are par-
tially transmitted and/or highly dramatised, and veer towards cliché; each later 
account seems to build to some extent directly on its predecessor(s), limiting 
their collective usefulness as independent testimony.
Cassius Dio was, like Galen, a Greek contemporary of Commodus, well 
placed as a senator to observe his reign at close quarters. However, the part 
of his history which covers the reign of Commodus survives only in the 11th 
century summary of Iohannes Xiphilinus. What remains conveys an unremit-
tingly critical, if somewhat scattered, impression of Commodus; Dio’s loathing 
for the emperor is self-evident and is often attributed to his concern for the 
erosion of the senate’s prestige and dignity (including his own experience of 
Commodus’ dangerous and humiliating reign), and the personal fates of many 
of his senatorial peers. This may well be so, though it is worth remembering 
also that Dio’s work, like Tacitus’ a century earlier, was written under a new 
regime with an interest in portraying the rule of its predecessor, from whose 
violent downfall it had profited, as a period of disharmonious tyranny. There 
is also an element of historiographical convention in the work of a Dio or an 
Herodian; the age of Tacitus and Pliny had established senatorial utility and 
liberty as one important standard by which an historian might judge a reign, 
and write about it (Suetonius added other criteria including building works 
which, as we will see, also play a part in accounts of Commodus).
Herodian, a slightly later contemporary, characterises Commodus as a tyrant 
whose youthful elevation to power as the first emperor born ‘in the purple’ to 
a reigning father set an unhappy pattern for the child-emperors Herodian saw 
in the third century. The reliability of Herodian’s account is also questionable; 
1   Herodian 1.48; Dio 73.1.1, 73.4.1; SHA Comm. passim and esp. 1.7–8.
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he is obviously hostile to Commodus, portraying him as an archetypal bad, 
autocratic emperor, and his account is highly dramatised.2
The pro-senatorial agenda evident in Dio – or the emphasis of an anti-sen-
atorial stance as a short-hand for tyranny – is amplified in the Vita Commodi 
of the Historia Augusta, a late 4th C AD set of imperial biographies whose un-
reliability is so infamous that there is little need to rehearse it here, but whose 
accounts of otherwise scarcely documented reigns nonetheless draw reluctant 
historians like moths to a flame. The HA’s Commodus is a one-dimensional 
monster, a conflation of every bad-emperor trope. He is personally venal, 
susceptible to bad advisers, jealous of virtue, hostile to the entire senatorial 
order, in love with arena sports and harlots, given to driving chariots, and flirts 
outrageously with the idea of his own divinity: “saevior Domitiano, impurior 
Nerone”.3 After a while the accounts of his turpitude start to sound hollow as 
the HA author casts around for ever stranger proofs of his wickedness (“He 
displayed two misshapen hunchbacks on a silver platter after smearing them 
with mustard”);4 the only remotely positive characteristic attributed to him in 
the entire Life is an ability to dance and whistle, which is then condemned as 
unbecoming to an emperor.5
There is, then, much to suspect in the literary record. It reads at points like 
an aggregation of clichés; it is evidently shaped by its authors’ own agendas 
and is, especially in the case of the earlier two writers, the product of an age 
which had various types of interest vested in looking back critically at the end 
of the Antonine dynasty.
An account of the period from a well-placed contemporary, with interests 
that were not necessarily the same as those of Dio’s senatorial order, would 
therefore be valuable. Galen’s περὶ ἀλυπίας (or ‘On Avoidance of Grief ’; hence-
forward PA or in references ‘Ind.’, as elsewhere in this volume, for the Latin title 
De Indolentia) provides such a source, and though the direct testimony it offers 
is limited, it does offer contemporary witness to events at Rome in the last year 
of Commodus, and something of an immediate initial judgement on his reign. 
It is not an entirely disinterested account: Galen was, or had been, a member of 
the Antonine court, and I will suggest that his comments are probably intended 
2   Hekster, O. (2002). Commodus: An Emperor at the Crossroads, 6; Kolb, F. (1972). Literarische 
Beziehungen zwischen Cassius Dio, Herodian, under der Historia Augusta, 160–1; Alföldy, G. 
(1971) ‘Bellum Desertorum’, Bonner Jahrbuch 171 (1971), 367–76.
3   “More savage than Domitian, fouler than Nero”: SHA Comm. 19. All translations from Greek 
and Latin are by the author.
4   SHA Comm. 11.
5   SHA Comm. 1, which also says that he was able to fashion goblets and “play the gladiator or 
jester”.
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to be in some sense self-exculpatory. However, since Galen is emphatically not 
writing, like Dio, with the benefit of longer hindsight, or from the perspective 
and with the agenda of a senatorial historian, and unlike our other sources has 
the dubious benefit of having experienced Commodus’ reign at first hand, the 
PA does, I think, offer useful new insight into this period.6
Firstly, we can be confident that the PA was written very shortly after the 
events it describes, and is therefore considerably earlier than any other sur-
viving testimony. This does not in itself guarantee a superior insight into 
Commodus’ reign: events were still unfolding, and Galen is cautious rather 
than explicit in his account, not wanting to risk leaving himself exposed. On 
the other hand, the negative verdict of posterity on Commodus had not yet 
had time to crystallise, lending extra weight to this early testimony.
The date of the PA is reasonably well established. The text principally con-
cerns the fire at Rome in AD 192, the year on whose last day Commodus was 
assassinated. Galen discusses the fire as a very recent event. It had happened, 
he writes, “at the end of winter” and “two months” before Galen had intended 
to move some of his lost books to Campania “at the beginning of summer” 
(Ind. 23a, 20), so a date in the late winter or early spring of 192 seems right. 
However, later on the PA implies that Commodus is no longer emperor (Ind. 
54–5, discussed below, whose criticisms of Commodus would have been fatally 
indiscrete were he still alive and in power),7 which implies that Galen is writ-
ing perhaps a year or so after the fire, some time in 193. This interval of time fits 
with other details in the text: Galen tells us that he has returned to Rome from 
Campania after the fire; also, since news of the fire has reached his anonymous 
correspondent via a messenger, and a letter from him has come back to Galen, 
to which the PA is ostensibly a reply (Ind. 1–3), we also have to allow time for 
this epistolary exchange to have taken place.8
Secondly, Galen’s propinquity to the Antonine court adds to the importance 
of his account. He knew Commodus (from well before his principate) and his 
father personally; his service as an imperial physician brought him at times 
into unusual intimacy with the most powerful people in the empire, and he 
must have been able to observe elements of court life at close hand. His return 
to Italy and then to Rome was precipitated by an imperial summons to military 
service in Aquileia and the flight of the imperial court back to Rome after an 
6   As e.g. Boudon-Millot notes: “pour les historiens, ce nouveau témoinage est important. C’est 
le réquisitoire le plus ancien qu’on possède contre la tyrannie de Commode”: Boudon-Millot, 
V. and Jouanna, J., with Pietrobelli, A. (2010). Galien. Ne pas se chagriner, 145.
7   cf. Rothschild, C. K. ‘The Apocolocyntosis of Commodus’ in ead. and Thompson, T. W. (2014). 
Galen’s De Indolentia, 175–202, at 176 n.7.
8   cf. Nutton, V. (2012). Ancient Medicine, 232.
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outbreak of plague.9 Galen won the confidence of Marcus Aurelius by treating 
him on campaign in Germany,10 making a substantial reputation for himself 
and becoming an imperial protégé. Released from further military service by 
Marcus Aurelius in 169, Galen returned to Rome and found there all he needed 
to embark upon a protracted period of research and writing. He looked after 
the young Commodus on his father Marcus Aurelius’ orders and had earned 
praise from Annia Faustina for treating him for a fever while the emperor was 
away at war between AD 172 and 175.11 He was thus at pains, in happier times, 
to indicate his continuing relationship with the imperial house: one that was 
never wholly attractive to him, but which brought undeniable benefits of ma-
terial comfort and professional prestige (one fruit of this relationship, for ex-
ample, was that many of the works he wrote during this time were deposited in 
the imperial library of the Templum Pacis, surely a mark of favour).12
Galen is generally reticent on the subject of contemporary politics, whether 
through conviction, expediency, or the fact that his authorial interests lay else-
where.13 However, the PA is markedly more politically engaged. As Rothschild 
points out, it adds, though relatively short, three more references to Commodus 
to the previous total of six in Galen’s entire extant corpus, three of which refer 
to the medical care of the young Commodus and only one of which seems to 
offer criticism of the adult emperor, for discarding valuable stores of theriac.14 
The comments in the PA, by contrast, are all directly critical of Commodus’ 
tyranny, as if the events of 192 had prompted Galen to a much more explicit po-
litical position than he had adopted hitherto. What we have, then, is a text by 
a well-placed insider, someone with personal knowledge of the late emperor, 
who was in or near Rome during the dynasty’s dramatic last year and who felt 
9    Galen Libr. Prop. 1.15, 2.18 (XIX.14 and XIX.17–18 K.); cf Nutton, V. (1973). ‘The Chronology 
of Galen’s Career’, Classical Quarterly 23 no. 1, 158–71.
10   Galen Praen. 11 (XIV.660 K.).
11   See below n.14.
12   Libr. Prop. 2.19 (XIX.19 K.). Cf the similar honouring of Josephus, who received Titus’ auto-
graph imprimatur for his work (Josephus Vit. 363): Eusebius Hist. eccl. 3.9.2, Jerome De vir. 
ill. 13.1.
13   For Galen’s political comments elsewhere, see Hankinson, R. J. ‘The Man and his work’ in 
id. ed. (2008). The Cambridge Companion to Galen, 1–33.
14   Ant. XIV.65.3 K.; the other passages regarding Galen’s medical care of the young Commodus 
are Praen. XIV.650K.; Praen. XIV.657 K.; Praen. XIV.661K.; Lib. Prop. XIX.18–19K. See also 
Nutton, V. (1979). Galen: On Prognosis, 218. Hipp Epid. XVIIB.150.7 K. is about the paternity 
of Commodus. cf. Rothschild Apocolocyntosis, 178 with n.20. There is also Galen’s account 
of the ability of Perennis’ slaves to resist torture, an episode which implies criticism of the 
regime’s abuses. It is preserved in the Arabic epitome of the lost On Moral Character; see 
Hankinson ‘The Man and His Work’, 21.
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moved by the fall of Commodus to make relatively direct political remarks. 
What can this add to our understanding of the period?
The passages in which Galen directly refers to court life under Commodus 
in the PA come in a cluster in paragraphs 49, 50a and 54–55, just over half way 
into the text. Paragraph 49 is a straightforward testimony to Galen’s unwilling 
participation in the life of the Antonine court:
Ὥστε οὐδ᾽ἐμοὶ μέγα τι πέπρακται καταφρονήσαντι παντοδαπῆς ἀπωλείας 
κτημάτων, ὥσπερ τῆς ἐν αὐλῇ μοναρχικῇ διατριβῆς ἣν οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἐπεθύμη-
σα τότ᾽ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς τύχης βιαίως εἰς αὐτὴν ἑλκούσης ἀντέσχον οὐχ ἅπαξ 
οὐδὲ δὶς ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλάκις.
It was no great matter for me to scorn the loss of all my possessions, as I 
scorned also my time in the imperial court, which I not only did not want, 
but when Fate forcefully drew me towards it, I resisted not once, or twice, 
but many times.
Ind. 4915
This claim is particularly convenient to Galen in the aftermath of Commodus’ 
downfall; he made it again in e.g. Libr. Prop. ΧΙΧ.18 Κ. where the phrase ἐξ 
ἀνάγκης echoes the βίαιως of the PA. To be fair, a reluctance to serve in the 
imperial court (at least an affected one) also colours other mentions of Galen’s 
imperial connections.16
Galen’s claim that he was a reluctant member of the court is amplified by 
the immediately following statement that he had many enemies there:
οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ τοῦτο μέγα μὴ μανῆναι τὴν μανίαν πολλῶν τῶν ἐν αὐλῇ βασιλικῇ 
κατηγορησάντων.
It was not even a great matter to avoid falling into madness despite the 
number of my accusers in the imperial court.
Ind. 50
15   Text here and throughout: Galien. Ne pas se chagriner (περὶ ἀλυπίας). Ed. V. Boudon-Millot 
and J. Jouanna, with A. Pietrobelli. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2010.
16   See Boudon-Millot and Jouanna Galien, 132. cf n.9 above and Praen. XIV.647–9 
K. with Gleason, M. ‘Shock and Awe: the performance dimension of Galen’s Anatomy 
Demonstrations’ in Gill, C., Whitmarsh, T., and Wilkins, J. eds., Galen and the World of 
Knowledge, 2009, 85–114, for Galen’s reluctance to have his successes brought to the atten-
tion of Marcus Aurelius, for fear that he would be summoned to return to Rome when his 
desire was to go home to Pergamum.
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This is not the only time that Galen mentions enemies and accusers, wheth-
er at court or elsewhere.17 The effect here is to show that not only was Galen 
reluctant to join the court, but also that he was not a popular member once 
there: he was not, then, a creature of the regime, but a reluctant outsider, re-
sentful of the poisonous environment he had been drawn into and (it is im-
plied) not complicit in the emperor’s crimes.
With Galen’s reluctant presence established in the reader’s mind, there fol-
lows the PA’s most explicit passage of criticism of Commodus:
Πέπεισαι δ᾽οἶμαι καὶ αὺτὸς παρ᾽ὅλον τὸν χρόνον, ὡς τὰς ἱστορίας ἔγραψαν οἱ 
τοῦτ᾽ἔργο<ν> ἔχοντες, ἥττω γεγονέναι κακὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὧν νῦν ἔπραξεν 
Κόμοδος ὀλίγοις ἔτεσιν, ὥστε καθ᾽ἑκάστην ἡμέραν κἀγω θεώμενος ἕκαστον 
αὐτῶν ἐγύμνασά μου τὰς φαντασίας πρὸς ἀπώλειαν πάντων ὧν ἔχω, μετὰ 
τοῦ καὶ αὐτός τι κλασθῆναι προσδοκήσας, ὥσπερ ἄλλοι μηδὲ ἀδικήσαντες, εἰς 
νῆσον πεμφθῆναι ἔρημον.
You are persuaded yourself, I believe, that in all of history, judging by the 
historical accounts written by those whose metier that is, fewer evils have 
befallen men than Commodus has recently committed in just a few years, 
such that I, who witnessed each of them daily, exercised my imagination 
against the loss of everything that I owned, expecting that I too would 
also be snapped off, so to speak, as had others who had done no wrong, 
and sent to a desert island.
Ind. 54–55
Galen gives a damning verdict on the reign, and tells us that it is shared by 
his correspondent. The suggestion is that although Galen’s position afforded 
a particularly close-up view of the horrors of Commodus’ reign, they were by 
192 generally known. There is a literary allusion in Galen’s citation at Ind. 52 of 
lines from an unknown play of Euripides in which Theseus undergoes simi-
lar mental preparations for possible adversities, including exile and untimely 
deaths,18 but it is the reference to previous writers of history that is particu-
larly important here: Galen is claiming an acquaintance with historical writers 
and explicitly comparing (his account of) Commodus’ reign to their historical 
accounts of other bad emperors. This is significant given the comparisons to 
17   cf e.g. Praen. XIV.625 11–14 K. for accusations of φθόνος and criticisms from others at court; 
Libr. Propr. XIX.21 K. for numerous intellectual rivals at Rome.
18   See Kaufman, D. H., ‘Galen on the Therapy of Distress and the Limits of Emotional 
Therapy’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 47, 2014, 275–296 (p. 281).
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Nero which we will consider below, and it also implies Galen’s awareness that 
he is creating a historical testimony of a sort.
There is no reason to doubt the tenor of what Galen says here. The pros-
pect of banishment and/or confiscation of goods was real enough under 
Commodus, in the unanimous testimony of our sources. Execution, whether 
summary or judicial, seems to have been more common, or at least more com-
monly reported by authors with no shortage of grim material to choose from, 
but both the punishments mentioned here by Galen are attested fairly often in 
the principal surviving accounts of the reign.19
Galen returns to the idea of banishment and confiscation again at Ind. 71:
Ἐγὼ δὲ εἰ μέν τίς ἐστιν τοιοῦτος σοφὸς ὡς ἀπαθὴς εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν, 
τοῦ δ᾽αὐτὸς εἶναι τοιοῦτος ἀκρίβῆ γνῶσιν ἔχω· χρημάτων μὲν γὰρ ἀπωλείας 
καταφ<ρ>ονῶ μέχρι τοῦ μὴ πάντων ἀποστερηθεὶς εἰς νῆσον ἑρήμην πεμφθῆναι, 
πόνου δὲ σωματικοῦ μέχρι τοῦ μὴ καταφρονεῖν ἐπαγγἐλ<λ>εσθαι τοῦ Φαλά-
ριδος ταύρου. Λυπήσαι δέ με καὶ πατρὶς ἀνάστατος γενομένη καὶ φίλος ὑπὸ 
τυράννου κολαζόμενος ὅσα τ᾽ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. Καὶ θεοῖς εὔχομαι μηδέν μοι τούτων 
συμβῆναι ποτε· καὶ διότι μέχρι τοῦ δεῦρό μοι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον συνέβη, διὰ τοῦτο 
ἄλυπόν με τεθέασαι.
For my part, I cannot say whether there exists a man so wise that he is 
totally immune to suffering, but I have an accurate understanding of the 
sort of man I am: I can scorn the loss of money, until the point of being 
exiled to a desert island, deprived of everything, and physical suffering, 
until the point of declaring that I can hold the Bull of Phalaris in disdain. 
What will grieve me is my homeland ruined, a friend punished by a tyrant, 
and I pray the gods that none of these things will befall me. And since up 
until now none of those things has befallen me, you see me undistressed.
Ind. 71–72
19   Instances of confiscation and exile/banishment:
   SHA Comm.: 3.4 (actors), 4.4 (Paralius’ mother and Lucilla); 4.11 (Aemilius Iuncus and 
Atilius Severus, the consuls); 5.7 (Commodus’ sister, Lucilla, subsequently killed); 5.9 
(his wife Crispina, subsequently killed); 5.13 (Perennis confiscates the wealth of provin-
cials after false accusations); 6.9–10 (peculation of Cleander); 6.10 (recall of exiles at 
Cleander’s whim); 7.8 (multiple murders for the sake of financial gain); 13.8 (ditto); 14.2 
(ditto); 14.4 (substitution of punishments for financial gain).
   Dio: 73.4.6 (Lucilla and Crispina); 73.6 (flight into presumed self-imposed exile of Sextus 
Condianus); 73.12.3 (a joking reference to Julius Solon’s ‘banishment’ to the senate at the 
cost of all of his property).
   Herodian: confiscation of property (8.2, 17.2), expulsion from the palace of men of intel-
ligence (13.8).
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Here Galen locates his tolerance on a scale of suffering, from mere confisca-
tion of assets (bearable) to desert island exile (not bearable), and from physi-
cal punishment to roasting alive in the legendary bronze bull of the Sicilian 
tyrant Phalaris.20 The reintroduction of the themes of confiscation and exile, 
heightened here by corporal and grotesque capital punishment, strengthens 
by repetition the criticisms of Commodus made in the earlier passages.
Galen also adds something new in this passage, taking the time to remind 
his correspondent and readership that his homeland, presumably Asia Minor, 
has not suffered ruin, and his own friends have not been exiled. This small 
addition, seeming almost an aside, serves several purposes. It sets up a pre-
emptive defence against accusations of betrayal from contacts at home in 
Pergamum, and it also helps deflect any charge that Galen should have spoken 
out: not only was he afraid for his own safety, but (and one must admit the 
rather thin moral grounds of this argument) his own friends and countrymen 
were not in danger. Moreover, it would insulate him against association with 
those punished by the regime, should a pro-Commodus faction come to power 
looking for revenge. Granted, Commodus was a tyrant; but, as his death even-
tually showed, he was right to suspect plots against him,21 and Galen is keen 
to let us know that he was not associated with those who were punished by 
Commodus, whether deservedly or not. Given the uncertainty still in air when 
Galen was writing, as discussed below, this series of statements adds up to a 
calculated declaration of almost complete neutrality in Commodus’ court: he 
didn’t want to be there, he was not party to any crimes, he feared for his own 
safety, he was not friends with anyone who was punished, he did not stand idly 
by while anyone or anywhere close to him suffered.
Galen’s testimony, short as it is, is that of an eyewitness and is the closest 
in date to the reign of any of our sources. It is undoubtedly valuable, but our 
reading of it must be tempered, as we have started to see, by an understanding 
of its limitations and context. We must first acknowledge that the new his-
torical testimony offered by the passages of the PA discussed above, though an 
important early witness to Commodus’ brutality, is not particularly extensive 
or dramatic.22 Moreover, for all the relatively apolitical status he tries hard to 
20   Cicero Verr. 4.73; Diodorus Siculus 9.19.1. cf. Rothschild ‘Apocolocyntosis’, 185–87, which 
suggests that the connection in AD 192/3 of a tyrannical ruler with a bull would have 
brought to mind Commodus (as Hercules).
21   cf. Suet. Dom. 21: “[Domitian] used to say that the lot of princes was most unhappy, since 
when they discovered a conspiracy, no one believed them unless they had been killed.”
22   Rothschild ‘Apocolocyntosis’ combs the text for further implied criticisms of Commodus; 
of these the most convincing are an allusion at Ind. 76 to “τἠν Ἡρακλέους Ῥωμην” (“the 
strength (ῥώμη) of Heracles”, but a play on Commodus’ megalomaniac association with 
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establish, Galen cannot be thought of as a disinterested observer. His proximi-
ty to the discredited regime, a useful professional connection during the reigns 
of the Antonines, could have become dangerous for him in the aftermath of 
Commodus’ fall. We have already begun to read the PA as an initial attempt to 
outline a defence against the multitude of intellectual and perhaps political 
enemies who often lurk at the margins of Galen’s accounts of himself, or the 
accusations of whatever faction would eventually come to power:23 his case 
here is that he had, like a Tacitus or a Pliny, been an unhappy bystander in a 
tyrant’s court, and was now finally in a position to reveal Commodus’ guilt, and 
his own innocence. In such a context, the brevity of these remarks compared 
to Galen’s overall silence on politics might itself be eloquent, a claim to be ab-
sorbed in the life of letters that occupies much of the first part of the PA, rather 
than caught up in the extraordinary political dramas that were playing out in 
the year that Rome burned: dynasties might fall and rise, and the city is in 
ashes, but Galen presents himself as barely a participant, bookishly concerned 
instead with the loss of his glossaries of Attic old comedy and prose.24
Moreover, we might reasonably believe that Galen is hedging his bets. His 
distancing of himself from Commodus is cautious, and incidental to the pur-
ported substance of the PA. He was writing at an uncertain moment. Commodus 
was dead, but the next emperors Pertinax and Didius Julianus would follow 
him within a matter of months, with three more claimants still in play. It was 
not until 197 that Septimius Severus finally saw off the challenges to his reign. 
It is not surprising, then, if Galen, writing when the final outcome of the ‘year 
of the five emperors’ was far from clear, used the PA to put some distance be-
tween himself and Commodus without committing himself too far. Historical 
verdicts on emperors’ reigns took some time to settle down, even if they came 
in hindsight to look immutable. The tussle over Nero’s reputation in 68–9 and 
afterwards, with the emergence of false Neros as late as the reign of Domitian,25 
is an obvious case in point. There is some suggestion that an alternative histo-
riographical tradition retained a measure of praise for Commodus, indicating 
that his negative reputation was not immediately established and may not (as 
with Nero) have been universally shared.26 Hekster suggests that Commodus 
Hercules and his attempts to refound Rome (Ῥώμη) in his own image), and at Ind. 62 a 
suggestion of Rome’s (or Commodus’) moral decline through sexual incontinence in the 
metaphor of breeding birds rented out to stud.
23   See Ind. 50a and n.17 above for enemies explicitly in the court and elsewhere
24   Ind. 20.
25   Suet. Nero 57.
26   e.g. the 5th C AD testimony of Dracontius Satisfactio 187–190, calling Commodus “vir pi-
etate boni” (perhaps echoing the Pius legend added to his coinage from AD 182–3: Hekster 
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retained a greater measure of popularity among the army and in the provinces 
than with the later authors who shape our view.27 Galen’s anonymous corre-
spondent, and his initial intended audience, may have been at home in Asia 
Minor, and we have seen that Galen takes care to point out that this homeland 
did not suffer: perhaps this was a nod to a sceptical provincial audience.
We must also, of course, remember that Septimius Severus, into whose ser-
vice Galen passed,28 reversed the senate’s damnatio memoriae of Commodus, 
promulgated his deification, renamed his son Caracalla as Marcus Aurelius 
Antoninus, and included Divi Commodi Frater in his own titulature.29 Evidently 
Septimius Severus prized an adoptive association with the Antonines, includ-
ing their last emperor, above any negative memories of Commodus’ recent 
reign. He also, of course, continued to claim a very strong association with 
Commodus’ patron deity Hercules.30
There was still an audience, then, to whom the memory of Commodus was 
not entirely toxic in the 190s and the 200s; the Senate were clearly hostile to 
his memory, but Severus had other constituencies to consider. In this context 
Galen’s restraint in his criticism of Commodus proved to have been wisely 
judged, allowing him to escape any fatal recrimination in the immediate af-
termath of Commodus’ fall, and to remain in imperial service once the new 
Severan regime (if not senatorial opinion, or the overall judgement of poster-
ity) had decided that Commodus’ reputation was to be rehabilitated for politi-
cal reasons of its own.
With all these caveats in mind, the fact remains that the PA is far more po-
litically engaged than the rest of Galen’s work, strongly suggesting that part of 
its purpose was to place on record (muted, cautious) criticism of Commodus’ 
reign.31 Galen is protecting himself, distancing himself from a regime he had 
Commodus p. 92 for coin legend date). Although no modern author seeks to rehabilitate 
Commodus entirely, recent scholarship has tried to achieve a more balanced view. Olivier 
Hekster’s Commodus applies a careful attention to image-making and self-presentation, 
reading the ideological implications of Commodus’ Bildprogramm as expressed in vi-
sual media like coinage, architecture, sculpture, and spectacle. He finds some echoes of 
Commodus’ self-presentation in contemporary art.
27   Hekster Commodus, 201.
28   Galen XIV.217f K.; Birley, A. (1971). Septimius Severus, The African Emperor, 286–87.
29   Dio 76.7.4; cf SHA Sev. 10.6, 11.4; Aurelius Victor 20.30. Hekster Commodus, 189ff.
30   cf Jordanes Rom. 372, Malalas 12.1; 283 and the neutral description of Commodus’ associa-
tion with Hercules by Athenaeus, whose patron Larensis was that emperor’s procurator 
patrimonii: Ath. 12.537ff. and Hekster Commodus, 184 n.116–7.
31   Which does not rule out other aims – a genuine essay in philosophical consolation, for ex-
ample; an announcement to his friends and supporters that he was alive and undaunted 
after the fire; and a warning against purported copies of works now irredeemably lost: the 
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every reason to have loathed but with which he was nonetheless associated; he 
was hedging because the position was still fluid and he knew he had enemies 
at court and elsewhere. For all these limitations – indeed, in a sense because 
of the fact that Galen is treading carefully, holding back – this immediate but 
carefully limited condemnation of the reign is a valuable addition to the histo-
riographical record.
Galen was not the first author to wait until the fall of a regime to criticise it, 
and would not be the last: Tacitus earlier in the century, and Dio in the next, 
did the same. We have already seen that Galen was aware of historical and 
historiographical precedent. In Ind. 54 he compares Commodus’ reign to what 
can be found in the accounts of historical writers and in doing so alludes to 
Commodus’ place, and of his own brief account of it, in the historiographical 
record. With this in mind, I will spend the rest of this chapter looking at Galen’s 
treatment of the fire of Rome in AD 192, which provides the backdrop for the 
whole of the περὶ ἀλυπίας, and suggest that it may be intended to evoke earlier 
disasters in Rome and particularly to invite comparisons with Nero.
The fire of 192 seems to have come in a period of growing tension, when 
Commodus’ divinising self-aggrandisement was already causing, or respond-
ing to, faltering popularity and the alienation of the senatorial order. A riot in 
190 at the fall of Commodus’ freedman and Praetorian commander Cleander, 
linked to rising grain prices, seems to have alarmed the emperor or caused a 
change of tactics in his self-presentation.32 His promotion of a ‘Commodian’ 
golden age and increasing self-presentation as Hercules had accelerated from 
around that time; Hercules-Commodus was celebrated in coin issues, going 
“well beyond what all but the most extravagant Roman emperors had put 
forward”.33
At this critical juncture came the fire of 192. There are several points of con-
nection between the accounts offered by Galen and Dio, who were contempo-
raries and both in or near Rome at the time. Dio, a senator under Commodus, 
may have been an eyewitness; Galen was away in Campania, but clearly re-
turned to Rome shortly afterwards.34 They may have had similar sources for 
their accounts of the fire and there is little reason to doubt the congruence in 
points of detail. For example, Dio (whose account of the fire is at 73.24) men-
tions dwelling houses as a starting point, and Galen stresses the understood 
detail entered into suggests that Galen was trying to establish firmly what had been lost. 
He returns to his warning against plagiarized and fraudulent literary works in Lib. Propr., 
XIV.8–48 K.
32   Dio 73.13.1; Herodian 1.13.7; SHA Comm. 14.1–3, cf Dio 73.15.6.
33   Hekster Commodus, 103.
34   Ind. 11.
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risk of fire posed by proximity to dwelling houses (Ind. 8). The route of the fire 
and its path of destruction from the Templum Pacis across the Sacra Via to 
the Palatine is broadly similar in both authors (see map), and – the most tell-
ing point of detailed correspondence – both mention the destruction of state 
records, with Dio turning this loss into a portent of global misfortune.35 If Dio 
was right that this destruction had been seen at the time as a portent of a more 
universal turmoil, then by the time of Galen’s writing the following year, after 
Commodus’ fall, it might have begun to acquire an air of retrospective con-
firmation: although, as we have seen, Commodus is absent from the PA until 
past the half-way point of the text, Galen flags up this ominous destruction of 
imperial records early on at Ind. 8.
Both authors, then, give the fire a similar treatment. It is not surprising that 
for Dio, writing with the benefit of hindsight, the fire acquired a teleological 
force, forming part of a crescendo of events that would sweep Commodus from 
power. He links the fire explicitly to the downfall of the emperor, placing it in 
a sentence that begins “before the death of Commodus the following portents 
occurred”.36 In fact, his account of Commodus’ reign and the entire (excerpted) 
book ends with a sentence ostensibly describing the fire but clearly referring 
also to the emperor’s career and death: “But when it had destroyed everything 
which it had seized, it spent its force and died out”.37 Herodian follows Dio in 
making it a portent of the end of the reign, with the blaze started either by a 
lightning bolt or an earthquake (either way, a sign of divine displeasure).38 It 
is not unreasonable to suggest that this view of the fire was available immedi-
ately to contemporaries, including Galen who was writing, we should remem-
ber, when the fallout of the events of 192 was still occurring: he might well have 
intended the PA’s account of the fire to point towards the fall of the emperor at 
whom the same work direct unprecedented criticism.
Moreover, since it is also possible to observe deliberate echoes of the 
Neronian fire in Dio’s treatment of the fire under Commodus, this trope – which 
35   Dio 73.24.2 (the text throughout is Dio Cassius. Roman History. Ed. H. B. Foster. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press 1927): “… ὥστε καὶ τὰ γράμματα τὰ τῇ ἀρχῇ προσήκοντα ὀλίγου 
δεῖν πάντα φθαρῆναι. ἀφ᾿ οὗ δὴ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα δῆλον ἐγένετο ὅτι οὐκ ἐν τῇ πόλει τὸ δεινὸν 
στήσεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσαν τὴν οἰκουμένην αὐτῆς ἀφίξεται.” “… so that almost all the re-
cords belonging to the state were destroyed. From this in particular it was clear that the 
evil would not stay within the city, but would spread to its whole empire.” Galen Ind. 8: 
“τεττάρων ἐπιτρόπων Καίσαρος ἀποκεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸ χωρίον ἐκεῖνο γράμματα.” “because of the 
presence in that place [the burned storehouse] of the archives of four imperial procura-
tors.” Cf Herodian 1.14.6.
36   Dio 73.24.1: “Πρὸ δὲ τῆς τοῦ Κομμόδου τελευτῆς σημεῖα τάδε ἐγένετο.”
37   Dio 72.24.3: “ἀλλ᾿ ἐπειδὴ πάντα ὅσα κατέσχε διέφθειρεν, ἐξαναλωθὲν ἐπαύσατο”.
38   Herodian 1.14.2.
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is, after all, a fairly obvious one – could also have been in Galen’s mind as he 
described the devastation caused by the fire and more cautiously alluded to 
the tyrannical reign of the late emperor. We have already seen that Galen was 
able to connect Commodus’ reign to the historiographical tradition of bad em-
perors. There was also a historiographical tradition of disaster-narrative, link-
ing the ruination of cities across time both to make comparisons and to imply 
the cyclicality of human affairs. Thus Scipio wept for the future fall of Rome 
as he watched Carthage burn,39 while Tacitus’ account of the Neronian fire of 
64 explicitly connects it in the Roman imagination with the sack of the city 
by the Gauls 418 years previously,40 implying that disasters like the fire were 
understood through comparison to accounts of earlier catastrophes. In literary 
terms, the antecedents for Tacitus’ fire narrative draw heavily on Livy’s account 
of the Gallic sack and also on Virgil’s account of the fall of Troy (while Scipio 
quoted Homer), depicting historical events through a series of literary refer-
ences stretching all the way back to the founding story of Classical literature.41
Galen, and later Dio, placed their own accounts of the fire of 192 into this tra-
dition. We would expect to find historiographical connections in the accounts 
left by the historians. We can certainly observe commonalities in Dio’s and 
Tacitus’ accounts; Dio explicitly follows Tacitus, for example, in claiming that 
as the Neronian fire advanced to consume the city as a whole, it was compared 
to national disasters like the Gallic sack.42 Another theme shared by Tacitus 
and Dio’s account of the earlier fire, which also emerges in Galen’s account 
of the later one, is the self-defeating response of the overwhelmed citizens. 
Dio writes that “many, crazed by the disaster, were leaping into the flames”.43 
Tacitus similarly reports irresolute and ill-advised conduct during the fire, and 
claims that some were engulfed by despair afterwards: “some who had lost 
their entire fortunes – including their daily bread – and others, through love 
for the relatives whom they had been unable to rescue, chose to die, though an 
escape route was open”.44 These reports of irrational, self-harming surrender to 
emotions of various sorts sound like the sort of conduct Galen warns against 
39   Appian Bellum Punicum 19.132.
40   Tac. Ann. 15.41.
41   Livy 5.43–59 with Kraus, C., ‘No second Troy: topoi and refoundation in Livy Book V’, 
Transactions of the American Philological Association 124, 1994, 267–89 and Champlin, E. T., 
Nero, 2003, 178–209. For Tacitus and Virgil: Feeney, D., Caesar’s Calendar: Ancient Time and 
the Beginnings of History, 2007, 107. Cf. Edwards, C. ‘The City in Ruins’ in Erdkamp, P., ed., 
The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Rome, 2013, 549–557.
42   Dio 62.17.3.
43   Dio 62.18.1: “καὶ πολλῶν καὶ ἐς αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους ἐμπηδώντω.”
44   Tac. Ann. 15.38: “quidam amissis omnibus fortunis, diurni quoque victus, alii caritate suo-
rum, quos eripere nequiverant, quamvis patente effugio interiere.”
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in the PA. In particular, the PA’s account of Galen’s own exemplary resistance 
to grief in the aftermath of the fire, placed in contrast with the conduct of the 
grammarian ‘Philides’ and unnamed others who suffered grief at their losses 
to the point of mourning or even death,45 may itself have been patterned after 
these historical accounts of similar self-destructive grief of Romans and others 
after earlier disasters, and in particular the fire of AD 64, as well as by the paral-
lel tradition of evoking city-ruins in consolation.46
Galen and Dio may therefore have had accounts of Nero’s fire in mind when 
they wrote of the fire under Commodus. The parallels between Commodus’ 
and Nero’s involvement in and response to fires at Rome, and the ways in 
which Dio and (for Nero) earlier writers portrayed them, are therefore worth 
exploring.
Firstly, and most obviously, the Neronian fire of Rome in 64 seems to have 
been viewed in retrospect as one of the turning points in Nero’s reign, just as 
we have seen for the fire of AD 192. Suetonius places the fire at the end of his 
account of Nero in a list of “disaster and abuses” which herald his downfall;47 
Tacitus includes it in a year which ends with “portents heralding disaster 
to come” and moves straight into the Pisonian conspiracy of 65.48 Dio, who 
blames the fire squarely on Nero himself, gives some space to Corbulo’s suc-
cessful exploits in Armenia in the sort of chiaroscuro alternation that Tacitus 
also enjoyed, and then moves on to the conspiracy against Nero, whose repres-
sion marked a new low in the reign.49
The conduct attributed to each emperor during and after the fires was simi-
lar. Both were outside Rome when it broke and out, and both came into take 
(fairly ineffectual) measures against it. Nero, according to Tacitus, was staying 
at Antium and only returned to Rome when his Domus Transitoria was threat-
ened. He then opened up the Campus Martius, the buildings of Agrippa, and his 
own Gardens to homeless refugees from the fire, and built shelters for them.50 
Though traces of a practical and humane response are evident in Suetonius 
and Tacitus’ account, the fire is explicitly attributed to Nero (Suetonius Nero 
38, Dio 62.16.2) or linked to his agency by strong and undenied rumour (Tacitus 
45   Ind. 7.
46   E.g. Cicero Fam. 4.5.4 for Servius Sulpicius Rufus’ famous evocation of the ruins of Aegina, 
Megara, Piraeus and Corinth to console Cicero on the death of his daughter Tullia.
47   Suet. Nero 38–9.
48   Fire: Tac. Ann. 15.38–44; portents (“fine anni vulgantur prodigia, inminentium malorum 
nuntia”) listed at 47–8.
49   Fire: Dio 62.16–18. Corbulo and Armenia: 62.19–23. Plot against Nero and its repression: 
62.24–28.
50   Tac. Ann. 15.39.
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Ann. 15.38). Commodus, according to Dio, also travelled into Rome, from the 
suburbs, and encouraged ineffective military and civilian measures to extin-
guish the blaze.51
A more substantial correspondence between the emperors is found in their 
conduct after the fire. The reason for Nero’s alleged culpability for the fire lay 
in his megalomaniac building ambitions, while Commodus’ actions around 
the time of the fire and in the aftermath show similar vainglorious tendencies. 
Commodus is only blamed for the fire by the unreliable Historia Augusta (“He 
ordered the burning of the city, as if it were his private colony”),52 but while we 
have no reason to believe this, the obvious patterning of the accusation after 
accounts of Nero’s arsonism is illuminating in this context: while not explicitly 
blaming Commodus for the fire of 192, the more reputable sources do agree 
that both emperors allegedly wanted to rebuild Rome in their own image, re-
naming it and refashioning it to suit their own ends.
The evidence for Nero’s architectural ambition and actual achievements 
is plentiful; multiple literary testimonies, the renaissance rediscovery of the 
Golden House, and more recent archaeological work shows a huge construc-
tion effort which reshaped parts of the Palatine, Esquiline, and Caelian hills 
and the low ground between them, where the Colosseum now sits, and the 
equally rapid effacement of these projects in the succeeding reigns.53 The 
evidence for Commodus’ ambitions, both literary and archaeological, is more 
slender, but the point here is that the way Dio, the SHA, and perhaps Galen 
viewed and wrote about the fire in his reign was shaped by the way that they 
and others had viewed Nero’s.
For Tacitus, who professes to be uncertain on the question of whether Nero 
actually started the fire, “it seemed that Nero was seeking the glory of founding 
a new city and calling it by his own name”.54 The emperor “made use of the 
destruction of his fatherland by building a palace”, which Tacitus called “hated 
and built of the spoils taken from citizens”.55 Particularly objectionable was 
51   Dio 73.24.3.
52   SHA Comm. 15.7: “urbem incendi iusserat, utpote coloniam suam.”
53   Domus Aurea: Suet. Nero 31, 39; Pliny NH 33.54, 36.111; Martial Spect. 2; Tacitus Ann.15.42. 
Champlin, Nero, 178–209. For the archaeology, see e.g. Steinby, E. M. ed., Lexicon 
Topographicum Urbis Romae, Vol. II, 1995, 49–64; Panella, C. et al. Meta Sudans I: un area 
sacra in Palatio e la valle del Colosseo prima e dopo Nerone, 1996.
54   Tac. Ann. 15.40: “videbaturque Nero condendae urbis novae et cognomento suo appellandae 
gloriam quaerere.”
55   Tac Ann. 15.42 (“Nero usus est patriae ruinis exstruxitque domum”), 15.52 (“in illa invisa et 
spoliis civium extructa domo”). Ann. 14.53 (cf Suet. Nero 16) does in fairness list a series of 
impressive and practical rebuilding measures taken by Nero after the fire with a view to 
preventing a recurrence, including regulations on building heights and materials and the 
260 Nicholls
the Colossus, an enormous (120ft) bronze statue of Nero in the palace vestibule 
which – too impressive to go to waste after Nero’s fall – was later remodelled as 
the sun god Helios, becoming the eponym of the nearby Colosseum.56
Nero’s ambitions extended beyond the palace and over the entire city, 
which the palace was rapidly swallowing up, as the famous pasquinade related 
by Suetonius complains.57 Suetonius claims that he wanted to rename the city 
Neropolis, deftly signaling both the emperor’s megalomania and his unseemly 
philhellenism; the same passage reports that the emperor also wanted to re-
name the month of April ‘Neroneus’.58 Tacitus also reports the emperor’s pur-
ported ambition to rename Rome after himself, linking it to his widely believed 
responsibility for the fire.59
We can now turn to what Dio tells us about Commodus’ conduct around 
the time of the fire of 192. He posed as the founder of a renascent Rome, to 
be renamed after himself: Colonia Antoniniana Commodiana.60 The Colossus 
near the Colosseum was, according to Dio, remodelled in his likeness, its head 
replaced with Commodus’, a lion skin and club added to evoke his patron 
deity, and a bathetic list of the gladiator-emperor’s arena victories added to the 
base.61 Commodus’ onomastic vainglory extended to the months of the year, 
all twelve of which he intended to name after himself.62
This sequence, linking fire and megalomaniac rebuilding with the renam-
ing of the months and the remodelling of the Colossus, sounds suspiciously 
familiar: Dio surely has Nero in mind. His portrayal of the stagey, degenerate 
emperor whose reign ended in a conflagration naturally looked back to his and 
others’ accounts of Nero, adding or emphasising those elements –  renaming 
the city and the months, representing himself in the giant Colossus – that 
would remind his readers of that proverbially disastrous reign. A sense of crisis 
mounts as the emperor’s deeds and ambitions spiral out of any semblance of 
provision of fire-fighting equipment, but only after strongly implying Nero’s involvement 
in firing the city for his own gain, and mentioning the Gallic sack again.
56   Suet. Nero 31, Pliny NH 34.45, Dio 65.15. For the remodelling, Pliny loc. cit., Suet. Vesp. 18, 
Martial I.70.7 and Spect. 2.1.
57   “The whole of Rome’s becoming a single house! Move to Veii, citizens, unless that house 
doesn’t spread to Veii as well”. Suet. Nero 39.
58   Suet. Nero 55.
59   Tac. Ann. 15.40.
60   Dio 73.15.2; cf SHA Com. 8.6–9, 15.7. RIC 3, 247, 629.
61   Dio 73.22.3, SHA Com. 17.9–10; Herodian 1.15.9; Hekster Commodus, 123–4; Bergman, M., 
Der Koloß Neros, die Domus Aurea und der Mentalitätswandel im Rom der frühen Kaiserzeit, 
1994, 12. For Nero’s own disreputable career as a performer and its pseudo-triumphal com-
memoration in Rome, see e.g. Suet. Nero 1–14, 20–25.
62   Dio 73.15.3–4; Herodian 1.14.9.
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rational control, and the fire is used as the final point of correspondence with 
Nero, and the harbinger of Commodus’ downfall.
Galen, though not a historian and writing much closer in time to these 
events, uncertain of their final outcome, was nonetheless able to see 
Commodus’ reign in both a historical and a historiographical context. He 
seems to have been aware of previous accounts of bad emperors, and of the 
way previous urban catastrophes at Rome had been written about and linked 
to these reigns. Connections between Galen’s treatment of Commodus’ reign 
and the fire and those of later authors suggest a degree of similarity in their 
respective approaches. The comparison with Nero, which is so strongly evi-
dent in Dio’s account, would have been available to Galen as well, and earlier 
accounts of Nero’s fire may have shaped his thinking and writing in the im-
mediate aftermath of Commodus’ downfall. In the context of what is by far the 
most politicised treatment of Commodus that Galen gives us, these connec-
tions help show us how immediate contemporaries thought about the terrible 
events of 192, and point the way forward to what would become the conven-
tional historiographical verdict on Commodus and his reign.
References
Alföldy, G. ‘Bellum Desertorum.’ Bonner Jahrbuch, 171 (1971): 367–76.
Bergman, M. Der Koloß Neros, die Domus Aurea und der Mentalitätswandel im Rom der 
frühen Kaiserzeit. Mainz: Trierer Winckelmannprogramm, 1994.
Birley, A. Septimius Severus, The African Emperor. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1971.
Champlin, E. T. Nero. Cambridge, Mass and London: Harvard, 2003
Edwards, C. ‘The City in Ruins’ in The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Rome, ed. 
Erdkamp, P., 541–57. Cambridge, 2013.
Feeney, D. Caesar’s Calendar: Ancient Time and the Beginnings of History. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2007.
Gleason, M. ‘Shock and Awe: the performance dimension of Galen’s Anatomy 
Demonstrations’ in Galen and the World of Knowledge, edd. Gill, C., Whitmarsh, T., 
and Wilkins, J., 85–114. Cambridge: 2009.
Hankinson, R. J. ‘The Man and his work’ in The Cambridge Companion to Galen, ed. id. 
1–33. Cambridge: 2008.
Hekster, O. Commodus: An Emperor at the Crossroads. Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 2002.
Kaufman, D. H. ‘Galen on the Therapy of Distress and the Limits of Emotional Therapy’, 
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 47 (2014), 275–96.
Kolb, F. Literarische Beziehungen zwischen Cassius Dio, Herodian, under der Historia 
Augusta. Bonn: Antiquitas Reihe 4.9, 1972.
262 Nicholls
Kraus, C. ‘No second Troy: topoi and refoundation in Livy Book V’, Transactions of the 
American Philological Association 124 (1994), 267–89.
Nutton, V. ‘The Chronology of Galen’s Career’, Classical Quarterly 23 no. 1, (1973): 158–71.
Nutton, V. Ancient Medicine. 2nd ed., London: Routledge, 2012.
Panella, C. (ed.). Meta Sudans I: un area sacra in Palatio e la valle del Colosseo prima e 
dopo Nerone. Rome: IPZS, 1996.
Rothschild, C. K. ‘The Apocolocyntosis of Commodus’ in Galen’s De Indolentia, ed. 
ead. and T. W. Thompson, 175–202. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, Studien und Texte zu 
Antike und Christentum 88: 2014.
Steinby, E. M. (ed.). Lexicon Topographicum Urbis Romae, Vol. II, D–G. Rome: Edizioni 
Quasar, 1995.
 Texts Used
Dio Cassius. Roman History. Ed. H. B. Foster. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 
1927.
Historia Augusta, Commodus. Ed. D. Magie. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1921.
Galien. Ne pas se chagriner (περὶ ἀλυπίας). Ed. V. Boudon-Millot and J. Jouanna, with 
A. Pietrobelli. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2010.
Tacitus. Annals. Ed. J. Jackson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1937.
Epilogue
The Lost Readership of Galen’s Περὶ Ἀλυπίας

© Antoine Pietrobelli, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004383302_013
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the prevailing CC-BY-NC-ND License 
at the time of publication.
chapter 11
Arabic Περὶ Ἀλυπίας: Did al-Kindî and Râzî Read 
Galen?
Antoine Pietrobelli
The starting point of my question is a previous inquiry I made some years ago 
about two chapters of Oribasius’ Medical collections on sexual pleasures (Peri 
aphrodisiôn). In a paper published in 2011,1 I showed that both of the small 
chapters of excerpta drawn by Oribasius from Rufus and Galen were consid-
ered by Arabic scholars as independent short treatises written by two Greek 
authorities. They imitated them, giving birth to a specific literary genre On 
coitus (Kitâb al-bâh). We may count up to one hundred Arabic medical texts 
on that topic. Letters, short treatises, dialogues On coitus were produced by 
famous Arabic thinkers such as al-Jâḥiz, Ḥunayn ibn Isḥâq, al-Kindî, Râzî, 
Avicenna or Maimonides, each of them taking up, developing and amplifying 
every single remark or idea held in nuce in Oribasius’ excerpta.
Considering the numerous Arabic texts dealing with the topic of dispel-
ling sorrow or avoiding grief, I wondered if a similar relationship could be es-
tablished between Galen’s περὶ ἀλυπίας and the later Arabic production. We 
have a letter of Al-Kindî (ca 800–873) On dispelling Sorrow.2 A chapter of Râzî 
(865–925) is devoted to this topic in his Spiritual Medicine.3 The physician 
1   Pietrobelli, A., “La scientia sexualis des médecins grecs: histoire et enjeux du corpus Peri aph-
rodisiôn”, Mètis n. s. 9, 2011, pp. 309–338.
2   For the Arabic text, see Ritter, H./Walzer, R., “Uno scritto morale inedito di al-Kindî (Temestio 
Περὶ ἀλυπίας ?)», Atti della R. Accademia nazionale dei Lincei, Memorie della classe di scienze 
morali, storiche e filologiche, serie VI, vol. 8, 1938–39, pp. 3–63 or better Badawi, A., Traités 
philosophiques par al-Kindî, al-Fârâbî, Ibn Bajjah, Ibn ‘Adyy, Beirut, 19833, pp. 6–32; for the 
English translation, see Adamson, P./Pormann, P., The Philosophical Works of Al-Kindî, 
Oxford, 2012, pp. 245–266). On this text, see also Adamson, P., Al-Kindî, Oxford, 2007, pp. 150–
156; Butterworth, C. E., “Al-Kindî and the Beginnings of Islamic Political Philosophy”, in 
eiusd. (ed.), The Political Aspects of Islamic Philosophy. Essays in Honor of Muhsin S. Mahdi, 
Cambridge Mass., 1992 pp. 11–60; Druart, Th. -A., “Al-Kindi’s Ethics”, The Review of Metaphysics. 
A Philosophical Quarterly 47, 1, n° 185, 1993, pp. 329–357 and “Philosophical Consolation in 
Christianity and Islam: Boethius and al-Kindi”, Topoi 19, 2000, pp. 25–34; Mestiri, S./Dye, G., 
Al-Kindî, Le moyen de chasser les tristesses et autres textes éthiques, Paris, 2004.
3   Chapter 12. For the Arabic text, see Kraus, P. Abi Bakr Mohammadi Filii Zachariae Raghensis 
(Razis) Opera Philosophica fragmentae quae supersunt, Cairo, 1939, pp. 15–96; for an English 
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Miskawayh (932–1030), in a section of his Refinement of Character,4 includes a 
discussion of how to prevent and cure grief. Such reflections can also be found 
in Ibn Gabirol’s Ethics5 (XIth century) or Maimonides Regimen of health6 (XIIth 
century). Even in Christian Arabic literature the topic is well represented. The 
Copt Elias al-Jawharî (fl. late IXth century), Severus ibn al Muqaffa‘ (Xth cen-
tury), and Elias bar Shinâya of Nisibis (975–ca 1050) wrote specific treatises on 
the dissipation of sorrows.7 Could Galen’s περὶ ἀλυπίας underlie this flourishing 
literature, as Oribasius’ chapters did for writing De coitu?
The problem is that the basis of sources among which the Arabs could pick 
is much wider than two small chapters. Galen, in his περὶ ἀλυπίας, gives an 
autobiographical adaptation of a prevalent philosophical genre. The story of 
this genre starts, as far as we know, with Antiphon the Sophist’s περὶ ἀλυπίας8 
(5th century BC). Among the lost ones, two are attested by authors living in the 
Hellenistic period (3rd–2nd century BC): one is by the famous Eratosthenes 
of Cyrene,9 the other by the Epicurean Diogenes of Seleucia, better known as 
Diogenes of Babylon.10 There is also a papyrological testimony mentioning a 
περὶ ἀλυπίας by an obscure Aristophanes the Peripatetic.11 The only one pre-
served in Greek is by Maximus of Tyre.12 Apart from these texts with the same 
title, there are many others dealing with the same issue: book three of Cicero’s 
Tusculan Disputations13 or Plutarch’s On Tranquility of Mind, developing the 
  translation, see Arberry, A.J., The Spiritual Physick of Rhazes, London 1950. On this text, see 
also Brague, R., Razi, La Médecine spirituelle, Paris, 2003.
4    For the Arabic text, see Zurayk (1967:217–222); for the English translation, see Zurayk 
(1967: 192–196).
5    Wise, S. S., The Improvement of Moral Qualities. An Ethical Treatise of the Eleventh Century 
by Solomon Ibn Gabirol …, New York, 1902, pp. 78–81.
6    Bar-Sela, A./Hoff, H. E./Faris, E., ‘Moses Maimonides’ Two Treatises on the Regimen 
of Health Fî Tadbîr al-Sihhah and Maqâlah fi Bayân Baʿd al-ʿrâd wa-al Jawâb ʿanhâ’, 
Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 54, 4, 1964, pp. 26–27.
7    Griffith, S. H., “The Muslim Philosopher al-Kindi and his Christian Readers: Three Arab 
Christian Texts on the “The Dissipation of Sorrow”“, Bulletin of the John Rylands University 
Library of Manchester 78, 1996, pp. 111–127.
8    Ps.-Plutarch, Lifes of the Ten Orators, 833c–d, see below n. 21.
9    Suda E 2898.
10   Goulet, R. (ed.), Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, t. II, Paris, 1994, p. 810.
11   P. Oxy. 3656, l. 12–15; see Goulet, R., Dictionnaire, tome I, 1989, p. 406.
12   See oratio 28 in Trapp, M. B., Maximus of Tyre, The Philosophical Orations, Oxford, 1997, 
pp. 231–236.
13   Graver, M., Cicero on the Emotions. Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4, Chicago-London, 2002, 
and D’Jeranian, O., Cicéron. Du chagrin, Paris, 2014.
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genre of consolation.14 Consequently, we have to be more cautious in crediting 
Galen with a seminal influence on Arabic authors.
2. Many Orientalists (Bar-Asher,15 Druart16 or more recently Adamson17) 
who have worked on Arabic ethics have underlined that Galen was extremely 
influential in this field. P. Adamson18 stressed that Galen was “a direct source 
for much of al-Râzî’s Spiritual Medicine” and more generally, he attributes to 
Galen the introduction of a medical pattern to speak about the soul. The soul 
has to be cured from its illness or passions (fear, sorrow, anger, greed, etc.) by 
philosophy as well as the body has to be freed from pain, suffering and illness 
by medicine. According to Adamson,19 this medical view of Arabic ethics goes 
back to Galen. But it must be also specified that such an analogy is very ancient. 
It can be found for example in Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations,20 in Epicurus’ 
metaphor of the tetrapharmakon or even earlier in Antiphon the Sophist, who 
erected a little house in the agora of Corinth to practice the art of alupia.21
14   Boudon-Millot, V., “Un traité perdu miraculeusement retrouvé, le Sur l’inutilité de se 
chagriner: texte grec et traduction française”, in Boudon-Millot, V./Guardasole, A./
Magdelaine, C. (ed.), 2007, pp. 72–123; and Nutton, V, “Avoiding Distress”, in Singer, P. (ed), 
Galen. Psychological Writings, 2013, pp. 45–106.
15   Bar-Asher, M. M., “Quelques aspects de l’éthique d’Abû-Bakr al-Râzî et ses origines dans 
l’œuvre de Galien”, Studia islamica 69, 1989, pp. 5–38 et 119–147.
16   Druart, Th. -A., “Al-Razi’s Conception of the Soul: Psychological Background to his Ethics”, 
Medieval Philosophy and Theology 5, 1996, pp. 245–263 (p. 246, 248); Druart, Th. -A., 
“Philosophical Consolation in Christianity and Islam: Boethius and al-Kindi”, Topoi 19, 
2000, pp. 25–34 (p. 25).
17   Adamson, P., “The Arabic Tradition”, in Skorupski, J. (ed.), The Routledge Companion to 
Ethics, London-New York, 2012, pp. 63–75, (p. 64–65); Adamson, P., “Arabic Ethics and the 
Limits of Philosophical Consolation”, in Baltussen, H. (ed), 2013, pp. 177–96, (p. 177). More 
generally on Arabic ethics, see Gutas, D., “Ethische Schriften im Islam”, in Heinrichs, W. 
(ed.), Orientalisches Mittelalter, Wiesbaden, 1990, pp. 346–365.
18   Adamson, P., “The Arabic Tradition”, 2012, p. 69.
19   Adamson, P., ibid. p. 69: “Again, there is Greek precedent for this “medical” way of seeing 
ethics. […] But the chief Greek model for this approach is Galen”.
20   Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, III, 3–5 (5–11).
21   Ps.-Plutarch, Life of the Ten Orators, 833c–d: […] τέχνην ἀλυπίας συνεστήσατο, ὥσπερ τοῖς 
νοσοῦσιν ἡ παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν θεραπεία ὑπάρχει· ἐν Κορίνθῳ τε κατεσκευασμένος οἴκημά τι παρὰ 
τὴν ἀγορὰν προέγραψεν, δύναται τοὺς λυπουμένους διὰ λόγων θεραπεύειν “he invented a 
method of curing distress, just as physicians have a treatment for those who are ill; and at 
Corinth, fitting up a room near the market-place, he wrote on the door that he could cure 
by words those who were in distress” (ed. and trans. by Fowler, p. 350). On the medical 
model applied to ethics in Greek philosophy, see Nussbaum, M., The Therapy of Desire, 
Princeton, 1994.
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On the other hand, before the discovery of Galen’s περὶ ἀλυπίας, some editors 
or translators of the Arabic texts of al-Kindî22 and Râzî,23 as well as M. Zonta24 
editing the Hebrew text of Ibn Falaquera, used to reckon in their prefaces or 
footnotes that Galen’s περὶ ἀλυπίας was a source for the Oriental authors. If the 
editors25 of περὶ ἀλυπίας have clarified the links between the fragment of Ibn 
Falaquera and the Galenic text, they have not shown any interest in al-Kindî 
and Râzî. Now that the περὶ ἀλυπίας has been discovered, edited and trans-
lated several times, these issues need a reappraisal. I would like to deepen the 
question: Are there hints of Galen’s περὶ ἀλυπίας in al-Kindî and Râzî’s texts? 
P. Adamson26 has supposed that both authors had common sources they re-
worked. Could Galen be one of them? If so, what are the ressemblances and 
the differences in the literary form used by our three authors? Do they pre-
scribe the same remedies to cope with sadness and sorrow? What are their 
respective technai alupias? How did the Arabs adapt the Galenic ethics to their 
monotheist and Islamic context?
I will first briefly recall the evidence of the Arabic translation of the περὶ 
ἀλυπίας. Secondly, I will try to show the influence of Galen on the literary form 
of the ethical works of Al-Kindî and Râzî. Finally I would like to emphasize 
the inheritance or the rejection of the Galenic model by both Islamic authors.
1 The Arabic Tradition of περὶ ἀλυπίας
3. It cannot be denied that the περὶ ἀλυπίας was translated into Arabic and thus 
well-known and widespread in the Islamic world since Ḥunayn’s translation. 
In his Risala27 (n°120) first written in 855 and completed in 863, Ḥunayn as-
serts that there were two Syriac translations of Galen’s booklet: one by Ayyub 
al-Ruhâwî or Job of Edessa, the other by Ḥunayn himself. Ḥunayn’s translation 
22   Mestiri, S./Dye, G., Al-Kindî, Le moyen de chasser les tristesses et autres textes éthiques, 
Paris, 2004, p. 28.
23   Brague, R., Razi, La Médecine spirituelle, Paris, 2003, p. 113, n.1.
24   Zonta, M., Un interprete ebreo della filosofia di Galeno, Torino, 1995, pp. 18–20.
25   Boudon-Millot, V., “Un traité perdu miraculeusement retrouvé, le Sur l’inutilité de se chagri-
ner: texte grec et traduction française”, in Boudon-Millot, V./Guardasole, A./Magdelaine, C. 
(ed.), 2008, pp. 72–123, (p. 86 n. 42); Boudon-Millot, V. /Jouanna, J./Pietrobelli, A., Galien, 
Ne pas se chagriner, Paris, 2010, LXXIII, n. 76; see also Davis, D., “Some Quotations from 
Galen’s De indolentia”, in Rothschild, C. K./Thompson, T. W. (ed.), 2014, pp. 57–61.
26   Adamson, P., “Arabic ethics”, 2013, p. 183.
27   Bergstässer, G., “Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq, Über die syrischen und arabischen Galen-
Übersetzungen”, Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, XVII, 2, 1925, p. 40, n°120.
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was made for Dâʿûd al-Mutaṭabbib,28 who was probably a physician working 
for the caliph Hârûn al-Rashîd and his wife Zubayda. One of Ḥunayn’s pupil, 
his nephew Ḥubaysh, translated the περὶ ἀλυπίας from Syriac to Arabic for 
Muḥammad ibn Mûsâ,29 the eldest of the three famous Mûsâ brothers, fond of 
mathematics, astronomy and mechanics, who sponsored Ḥunayn’s activities.
But Ḥubaish’s translation did not remain only in the Banû Mûsâ’s private 
library. Both Mubashshir Ibn Fâtik from Cairo in the XIth century and Ibn ʿAbî 
Uṣaybiʿa, a physician who lived between Damascus and Cairo in the XIIIth 
century, could provide a more or less accurate summary of Galen’s booklet.30 
Maimonides’s disciple, the Jewish writer Ibn ʿAknîn,31 settled in Fez (Morocco), 
could quote Galen’s treatise in Hebrew at the end of the XIIth or at the be-
ginning of the XIIIth century. So we may think that Ḥunayn’s translation was 
available in Baghdad in the second half of the IXth century and that al-Kindî 
and Râzî could read it. Can we trace signs of Galen’s Περὶ ἀλυπίας in their re-
spective texts?
2 Formal Connections
4. There are prima facie noteworthy formal coincidences between Galen and 
both Arabic writers’ text. In one of his paper on Arabic ethics, P. Adamson32 
has stated that the literary form of Arabic ethical works often follows that used 
by Galen, but this statement was based on Galen’s On Character Traits and On 
the Error and Passions of the Soul which were models for Râzî, Miskaway or al-
Fârâbî. What about the περὶ ἀλυπίας?
The most obvious formal parallel is between Galen and Al-Kindî. περὶ 
ἀλυπίας and On Dispelling Sorrows are both short treatises in the shape of an 
epistle, whereas Râzî’s Spiritual Medicine is a much longer and systematic essay. 
Unlike Galen’s letter, Al-Kindî’s does not rely on his own misfortune. We know 
28   Micheau, F., “Mécènes et médecins à Bagdad au IIIe/IXe siècle. Les commanditaires des 
traductions de Galien par Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq», in D. Jacquart (ed.), Les Voies de la science 
grecque, Paris-Genève, 1997, pp. 147–179, (p. 159–161).
29   Micheau, F., ibid. pp. 167–169.
30   On these passages, see Meyerhof M., “Autobiographische Bruchstücke Galena us 
arabischen Quellen”, Archiv für Geschichte der Medizin 22, 1929, pp. 72–86 (p. 85); 
Boudon-Millot, V., “Un traité perdu”, 2007, pp. 84–85; and Boudon-Millot, V. /Jouanna, J./
Pietrobelli, A., Ne pas se chagriner, 2010, pp. LXXI–LXXIII.
31   Halkin, A, S., “Classical and Arabic Material in Ibn ‘Aknin’s “Hygiene of the Soul”“, 
Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 14, 1944, pp. 25–147, (p. 60–65 
and 110–115).
32   Adamson, P., “Arabic ethics”, 2013, p. 177.
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that the Banû Mûsâ brothers had developed a real hostility to al-Kindî and that 
they managed to get him beaten and maybe also jailed.33 This allowed them 
to sequestrate his comprehensive library. We could have expected al-Kindî’s 
epistle to start with a complaint about the loss of his books, but it did not. 
Like Galen’s letter however, al-Kindî’s is addressed to a good friend, “a beloved 
brother”. Both Galen and al-Kindî wrote to fulfill the request of a friend:
Gal.: I have received your letter in which you invite me to show you what 
kind of training, what arguments or what considerations had prepared 
me never to be distressed.34
Al-K.: May God keep you, beloved brother, from all vileness […]. I un-
derstand that you ask me to put down in writing arguments which coun-
teract sadness, show its weak spots, and fortify one, by possessing them, 
against pain.35
And at the end of their letters both authors express in a similar way that they 
hope to have carried out their friend’s request:
Gal.: Finally, while I believe I have responded completely to the question 
you raised about avoiding distress, I do hold the view, nevertheless, that 
this requires a further definition.36
Al-K.: This is sufficient for what you asked me, even if there are many 
[other] possible points one could make on the subject. If the proposed 
aim has been achieved, we have arrived at the end of what was wanted, 
even if there are many [other] ways to reach the goal, ways which are 
nearly endless.37
Furthermore both recipients are well-educated and persons with high moral 
standards:
Gal.: In writing for others on avoiding distress I have given you some 
advice that is superfluous for you, for I have been aware from the start 
that, both by nature and by education, you always prefer simple food and 
dress, and are most restrained in sexual matters.38
33   Adamson, P./Pormann, P., The Philosophical Works of Al-Kindî, 2012, pp. XXII–XXIII.
34   Gal., Ind., 1; tr. Nutton, 2013, p. 77.
35   Al-Kindî, On Dispelling Sorrows, prol.; tr. Adamson/Pormann, 2012, p. 249.
36   Gal., Ind., 69; tr. Nutton, 2013, p. 95.
37   Al-Kindî, On Dispelling Sorrows, 13, 4; tr. Adamson/Pormann, 2012, p. 266.
38   Gal., Ind., 79; tr. Nutton, 2013, p. 98.
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Al-K.: An excellent soul and a just character like yours recoil from pos-
sessing vices and strive fortify themselves against the pains which they 
bring and against the tyranny of their rule.39
Nevertheless these similarities make it hard to argue that al-Kindî read Galen. 
Most of al-Kindî’s works are epistles addressed to members of the political 
elite. And the coincidence between the two recipients is to linked far more 
with the aristocratic status of writers and readers in Antiquity and Middle 
Ages than to a formal filiation. The fact remains that Galen’s and Al-Kindî’s let-
ters are exceptions in their respective corpus: on the one hand Galen’s letter is 
much more autobiographical, historical and philosophical than the rest of his 
surviving corpus; on the other hand, al-Kindî’s epistle polishes a literary style, 
which stands out from the usual prose of “the Philosopher of the Arabs”.
Galen, al-Kindî and Râzî use anecdotes in their demonstrations. From § 39 
to § 45, Galen recalls two stories about of Aristippus of Cyrene: Aristippus’ bag 
full of gold and Aristippus’ lost field. In section 6 and 9, al-Kindî relates many 
different anecdotes, each one borrowed from Greco-Roman Antiquity: one in-
vokes the last letter written by Alexander the Great to his mother Olympias;40 
another is about Emperor Nero’s disappointment with the destruction of his 
crystal pavilion; a third story is about a Cynic Socrates, content with very little, 
if not with nothing. Râzî resorts also to some anecdotes about a childless phi-
losopher or a woman afraid of giving birth. The topic of the loss of a child is 
also present in section 6 of al-Kindî. But none of these anecdotes is identi-
cal. None of the Arabic authors borrows his stories from Galen. Nevertheless 
Galen, al-Kindî and Râzî’s anecdotes have parallels in Plutarch.41 It seems that 
they draw to a same common stock, conveyed from Hellenistic period up to 
Late Antiquity and Islamic world. All three texts also exhibit a gallery of phi-
losophers, who are summoned for their exemplary conduct. Galen (§ 45) takes 
Crates and Diogenes as paragons of poverty, while al-Kindî (§ 9) chooses a 
39   Al-Kindî, On Dispelling Sorrows, prol.; tr. Adamson/Pormann, 2012, p. 249.
40   This letter belongs to the extensive apocryphal literature about Alexander the Great. It de-
rives from one of the numerous versions of the Alexander Romance, wrongly attributed to 
Callisthenes. This letter of consolation can also be found in Ḥunayn’s Nawâdir al-Falâsifa, 
in al-Mas‘ûdi, al-Ya‘qûbî or Mubashshir Ibn Fâtik; see Badawi, A., Histoire de la philosophie 
en islam, Paris, 1972, pp. 471–473. On Alexander Magnus Arabicus, see Doufikar-Aerts, F., 
Alexander Magnus Arabicus. A Survey of the Alexander Tradition through Seven Centuries: 
from Pseudo-Callisthenes to Ṣûrî, Paris-Leuven-Walpole MA., 2010.
41   Galen’s anecdote about Aristippus and his lost field is also related in Plutarch’s On 
Tranquillity of Mind (469c–d). Razi’s brief anecdote about the childless philosopher has 
a parallel in Plutarch’s Life of Solon (6). The story of Nero and his crystal pavilion told by 
Al-Kindî can be found in Plutarch’s De cohibenda ira (13).
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Cynic Socrates living in a barrel. These common features did not prove a direct 
borrowing, since they are topoi of the ethical literature.
5. A more striking stylistic similarity appears between Galen and Râzî. Twice 
Galen quotes six verses pronounced by Theseus from a lost tragedy of Euripides 
to illustrate the exercise of praemeditatio malorum, which Galen says he used 
to practice every day:
As I once learned from a wise man,
I fell to considering disasters constantly,
Adding for myself exile from my native land,
Untimely deaths and other ways of misfortune,
So that, should I ever suffer any of what I was imagining,
It might not gnaw at my soul because it was a novel arrival.42
Strangely enough, when Râzî mentions the same technique, he also quotes six 
verses, attributing them to an anonymous poet:
The wise man pictures in his soul,
The disasters before they fall on him
So, if they fall on him suddenly, he is not afraid,
Since he copied them into his soul,
He sees what is the latest end,
And make of this end a beginning (my transl.43).
None of the editors44 of Spiritual Physicks could identify the Arabic poet who 
composed those verses. Both poems express the same idea, even if the final 
message seems a bit different. It is really puzzling to see that the method of 
praemeditatio malorum is highlighted by some poetry in Râzî’s text as it was 
in Galen with the words of Theseus. These verses could have been forged by 
Râzî himself but they are more likely Ḥunayn’s translation of the Galenic quo-
tation of Euripides. Such a hypothesis must be backed up, because the initial 
42   Gal., Ind., 52 and 77, tr. Nutton, 2013, p. 93 and 97.
43   For the Arabic text, see Kraus, P., Abi Bakr Mohammadi Filii Zachariae Raghensis (Razis) 
Opera Philosophica fragmentae quae supersunt, Cairo, 1939, p. 68, 8–10. I give here a new 
translation of these verses, the previous versified translation by Arberry (The Spiritual 
Physick of Rhazes, 1950, p. 71) is the following: ”The man of prudence pictures in his soul/ 
Ere they descend, what mishaps may befall/ So, come they sudden, he is not dismayed, / 
Having within his soul their image laid. / He views the matter reaching to its worst, / And 
what must hap at last, faces at first”.
44   Brague, R., Razi, 2003, p. 138, n. 161.
273Arabic Περὶ Ἀλυπίας
Greek text is quite different from the Arabic version. The context of enouncia-
tion is modified: the pagan figure of Theseus is not mentioned and the master/
disciple relationship is obliterated. All misfortune’s examples (exile, untimely 
deaths) are omitted and the discourse is more general. If the idea of anticipa-
tion of a future pain is preserved in the first four verses, the two last express 
a slightly different teaching. It seems that the translator rewrites the idea of 
not being chocked by a sudden misfortune in a exquisitely crafted sentence 
based on an antithesis between end and beginning.45 Such a divergent transla-
tion is neither very helpful for editing the Greek Galenic text nor for choosing 
between the variants of the Euripides’ fragment.46 Ḥunayn’s testimony is not 
as faithful as it is for medical texts. How to explain, if Ḥunayn is the translator, 
such differences in his translation of poetry?
First of all, it is a topos of Arabic literature that poetry is untranslatable.47 
The six verses given as an equivalent of Euripides’s could in such a context 
illustrate Ḥunayn’s virtuosity. The fourteenth-century historian al-Ṣafadî de-
scribes the translation technique of Ḥunayn in a famous passage:
The translators use two methods of translation. One of them is that of 
Yuḥannâ ibn al-Biṭrîq, Ibn al-Nâʾimah al-Ḥimsî and others. According to 
this method, the translator studies each individual Greek word and its 
meaning, chooses an Arabic word of corresponding meaning and uses it. 
Then he turns to the next word and proceeds in the same manner until in 
the end he has rendered into Arabic the text he wishes to translate. This 
method is bad […]
The second method is that of Ḥunayn ibn Isḥâq, al-Jawharî and others. 
Here the translator considers a whole sentence, ascertains its full mean-
ing and then expresses it in Arabic with a sentence identical in meaning, 
without concern for the correspondence of individual words. This 
45   Remi Brague (ibid.) wants to recognize a sentence attributed to Aristoteles in the last 
verses; he refers to Stern M. S., “The first in thought is the last in action. The history of a 
Saying attributed to Aristotle”, Journal of Semitic Studies 7, 1962, pp. 234–252. But this coda 
could also be interpreted as a Christian rewriting.
46   On this problem, see Boudon-Millot/Jouanna/Pietrobelli, Ne pas se chagriner, 2010, 
pp. 139–142; and Lami, A., “Il nuovo Galeno e il fr. 964 di Euripide”, Galenos 3, 2009, 
pp. 11–19.
47   Al-Jâḥiẓ, in The Book of Animals (Kitâb al-Ḥayawân, ed. Cairo, I, 75), could write: “If one 
were to transpose the wisdom of the Arabs [into another tongue], however, then the won-
derful splendour of the meter would be lost, and those attempting to do so would not 
comprehend the meaning”; this translation is given by Pormann, P. E./Savage-Smith, E., 
Medieval Islamic Medicine, Washington D. C., 2007, p. 23 and p. 39, n. 29.
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method is superior, and hence there is no need to improve the works of 
Ḥunayn ibn Isḥâq.48
Al-Ṣafadî refers to an old debate, as ancient as the translation itself, between 
the word-for-word (verbum de verbo) and the meaning-by-meaning (sensum de 
sensu) methods,49 to praise the superiority of Ḥunayn over his colleagues and 
competitors. If such an assertion about the progress of Ḥunayn’s method has 
to be tempered50 and if Ḥunayn seems to endorse a much more literal tech-
nique in translating medical texts,51 these verses could offer a new aspect of 
Ḥunayn’s philological talent. Ḥunayn is said to have known his Homer by 
heart52 and to have undertaken, during his imprisonment, a translation of the 
Bible in Arabic, which the historian and geographer al-Masʿûdî53 considered 
the best one available. If this translation is Ḥunayn’s work, these Arabic verses 
provide new evidence of his multifaceted art of translation and we should con-
siderer it as a sign of Galen’s influence upon Râzî.
6. As far as the literary form is concerned, we must also stress the differ-
ences between Galen and the others. Galen’s περὶ ἀλυπίας is autobiographical 
and based on his personal experience, whereas al-Kindî and Râzî’s texts are 
more general and neutral. At the end of his epistle (§ 11), al-Kindî offers a 
marvellous parable. Al-Kindî starts a long simile in which he compares our 
life in this world to a sea travel interrupted by a landing on an island. Some 
of the passengers stay in the ship when it drops anchor at the island, whereas 
others are distracted by the island’s beauties, collecting stones, sea-shells and 
flowers. Some of these lovers of pleasures and distractions will miss the call of 
48   This translation is borrowed from Rosenthal, F., The Classical Heritage in Islam, Berkeley-
Los Angeles, 1965, p. 17 and Pormann/Savage-Smith, Medieval Islamic Medicine, 2007, p. 27 
and p. 39, n. 34.
49   The opposition between verbum de verbo and sensum de sensu translations is formulat-
ed by Cicero, De optimo genere oratorum (14) or Jerome, Letters (57). On this topic, see 
Brock S., “Aspects of Translation Technique in Antiquity”, Greek, Roman and Byzantine 
Studies 20, 1979, pp. 69–87.
50   See Gutas, D., Greek Thought, Arabic Culture. The graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in 
Baghdad and Early ʿAbbâsid Society (2nd–4th/8th–10th centuries), London-New York, 1998, 
pp. 142–143.
51   For some examples of Ḥunayn’s technique in translating Galen, see Overwien in Gundert 
2009, pp. 131–138; eiusd. “The Art of the Translator, or: How did Ḥunayn ibn ’Isḥâq and his 
School Translate”, in Pormann, P. E. (ed.), Epidemics in Context. Greek Commentaries on 
Hippocrates in the Arabic Tradition, Berlin-Boston, 2012, pp. 151–169.
52   According to Yûsuf ibn Ibrâhîm, quoted by Ibn Abî Uṣaybiʿa; see Strohmaier, G., “Homer 
in Bagdad”, Byzantinoslavica 41, 1980, 196–200.
53   Strohmaier, G., s. v. “Ḥunayn b. Isḥâq al-ʿIbâdî”, in Encyclopédie de l’Islam, t. III, Leiden-
Paris, 1971, pp. 598–601, (p. 599).
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the captain and remain on the island for ever, without coming back to their 
homeland. Others will come back to the ship with their burden, getting the 
worst places to sit and being annoyed by the putridness of the flowers and 
sea-shells. Al-Kindî explains the parable: the ship is our life, the destination is 
the next world, afterlife, and one should not be attached to material and transi-
tory goods. This parable does not come from Galen, but we find it in Epictetus’ 
Enchiridion (§ 7).54
These remarks show a variety of literary models interacting in al-Kindî’s On 
Dispelling Sorrows. It is well admitted that the Arabs did not translate Greek 
literary texts such as theatre, novels or rhetoric to focus their interests and ef-
forts on scientific texts, which were available.55 But we have noticed here that 
philosophical and medical texts could be vectors for literary forms and not 
only for ideas. Except perhaps for Râzî, there is however no cogent proofs of 
the use of Galen’s περὶ ἀλυπίας, as if the two Arabic authors had wanted to 
mask their debt towards Galen.56
3 Technai alupias
7. Let us now consider more precisely the content of the texts and especially 
their τέχνη ἀλυπίας, the way they prescribe how to alleviate and dispell sorrow. 
As Adamson57 noticed, the medical pattern is a topos of every περὶ ἀλυπίας: 
sorrow is a pain of the soul. Just as the body has to be cured from its pains 
by drugs, surgery or dietetics, the περὶ ἀλυπίας treatises display themselves as 
remedies for the soul. This analogy between the illness of the body and the 
passions of the soul, between the remedies of medicine and the consolation of 
philosophy is obvious in Râzî’s title, Spiritual Medicine. Al-Kindî also endorses 
this analogy, but claims the superiority of the soul over the body, to defend 
54   See Pohlenz M., “Die Araber und die griechische Kultur”, Göttingen Gelehrte Anzeigen, 200, 
10, 1938, pp. 409–416. It is not so surprising to find the Stoic Epictetus as a formal model 
of al-Kindî’s epistle. Epictetus’ Enchiridion has been commented by Simplicius (VIth cen-
tury) and it was part of the basic Neoplatonic curriculum; see Hadot, I., Le néoplatonicien 
Simplicius à la lumière des recherches contemporaines. Un bilan critique, Sankt Augustin, 
2014, pp. 149–152.
55   For a revision of the misconceptions about the Greco-Arabic translation movement, see 
Pormann/Savage-Smith, Medieval Islamic Medicine, 2007, pp. 27–29.
56   It is worth noting that al-Kindî tells the story of Nero and his crystal pavilion without 
mentioning his sources and omitting the name of the philosopher Seneca who was in 
discussion with Nero in Plutarch’s account; see Badawî, Histoire de la philosophie en islam, 
1972, pp. 469–471.
57   Cf. supra n. 18.
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the preeminence of the soul’s care over bodily cure and thus the primacy of 
philosophy over medicine:
Since sorrow is caused by pains of the soul; since it is incumbent upon us 
to remove pains of the body from ourselves by way of nasty drugs, cauter-
ization, bandaging, abstinence and similar things which cure the body, 
and to bear the great expense consisting of the moneys owed to the per-
son who cured the illness; and since the welfare of the soul and curing it 
from its diseases is superior to the welfare of the body and curing it from 
its diseases in the same way as the soul is superior to the body – for the 
soul rules and the body is ruled, and the soul remains while the body is 
obliterated … Therefore it is much more incumbent upon us to improve 
the soul and cure it from its ailments than it is that we improve the body.58
I would not, with Adamson, interpret this analogy as Galen’s inheritance, be-
cause it is also, for example, the main point of Maximus of Tyre’s περὶ ἀλυπίας, 
and because we can date it back at least from Antiphon (5th century BC). But 
another idea seems more Galenic.
The trigger of Galen’s περὶ ἀλυπίας is, of course, the fire of 192 and the loss of 
his goods and books. Al-Kindî and Râzi and both give a first definition of sor-
row in relation to the loss of beloved persons or objects:
Al-K.: Every pain for which one does not know the causes is incurable. 
We therefore ought to set out both what sadness is and what causes it in 
order to find a cure and to apply it with ease. Hence we say that sadness is 
a psychic pain occurring because one loses what one loves or is frustrate 
in obtaining what one seeks. Therefore, the causes of sadness are already 
apparent from what has just been said: it occurs because one loses what 
one loves or is frustrated in obtaining what one seeks.59
Râz.: When the passion through the reason pictures the loss of a be-
loved associate, grief thereby follows … Since the substance out of which 
sorrows are generated is simply and solely the loss of one’s loved ones, 
and since it is impossible that these loved ones should not be lost be-
cause men have their turns with them and by reason of the fact that they 
are subject to the succession of generation and corruption, it follows that 
the man most severely afflicted by grief must be he who has the greatest 
58   Al-Kindî, On Dispelling Sorrows, 4, 1; tr. Adamson/Pormann, 2012, p. 252.
59   Al-Kindî, On Dispelling Sorrows, 1, 1; tr. Adamson/Pormann, 2012, p. 247.
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number of loved ones and whose love is the most ardent, while the man 
least affected by grief is he whose circumstances are the reverse.60
In his On the Errors and Passions of the Soul and περὶ ἀλυπίας, Galen methodi-
cally seeks the causes of distress and his principal explanation is cupidity 
(φιλοχρηματία) and insatiability (ἀπληστία).61 Râzî is likely to have made his 
own this Galenic idea, including it in his very first definition of sorrow and Al-
Kindî also points out frustration in obtaining sought after objects as a major 
cause of sadness.
Such an analysis leads to a similar set of advice. Through the example of 
Aristippus, Galen calls on us to forget what is lost and to focus on what is left. 
He exhorts readers to limit themselves to the necessary and to despise the su-
perfluous. This precept that Galen inherited from his father can be found at the 
very beginning of Râzî’s discourse. Râzî emphasizes that one should draw away 
from material and transient things or at least limit ones attachment to them:
It would therefore seem that the intelligent man ought to cut away from 
himself the substance of his griefs, by making himself independent of the 
things whose loss involves him in grief.62
Al-Kindî gives a more Platonic and religious emphasis to this idea repeating 
that one must focus on the psychic goods and the immortal soul. He illustrates 
the notion of autarky through the zoological models of the “great whale and 
the marvellously created elephant”, which only need food and a shelter to have 
a good life without lacking anything (§ 10).
8. We can draw other parallels between the three technai against sadness. 
Galen, after his addressee, mentions as a counterexample the case of Philistides 
the grammarian, his companion of misfortune, who died of depression and 
distress after the loss of his books in the fire. According to al-Kindî, since the 
wise man yearns for happiness, it is a sign of ignorance and lack of intellect 
to be sad. Both Arabic authors recommend us to remember how limited past 
sorrows were and how they could turn to happiness again. They exhort readers 
60   Râzî, Spiritual Medicine, 12; tr. Arberry, 1950, pp. 68–69.
61   Becchi, F., “La psicopatologia di Galeno: il Περὶ ἀλυπίας”, in Manetti, D (ed.), 2012, 
pp. 23–31; eiusd. “Dalla τέχνη ἀλυπίας di Antifonte al περὶ ἀλυπίας di Plutarco e di Galeno: 
evoluzione storica di un ideale di vita”, Studi italiani di filologia classica, n. s. 10, 2012, 
pp. 88–99; Kotzia, P., «Galen, De indolentia: Commonplaces, Traditions and Contexts», in 
Rotschild, C. K./Thompson, T. W. (ed.), 2014, pp. 91–126.
62   Râzî, Spiritual Medicine, 12; tr. Arberry, 1950, p. 69.
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to keep in mind examples of the numerous sufferers of misfortune who have 
overcome pain and sorrow:
Al-K.: A nice method for this is to remember the things which made us 
sad in the past, and from which we were consoled, as well as the things 
which made other people sad, whose sadness and consolation we have 
witnessed.63
Râz.: Moreover the loss of those things that are not necessary to the 
continuance of life does not call for everlasting grief and sorrow; they are 
soon replaced and made good, and this leads on to consolation and obliv-
ion; gaiety returns, and things come back to what they were before the 
misfortune happened. How many men we have seen struck down by a 
terrible and shocking calamity, and presently pick themselves the blow 
fell, enjoying life to the full and entirely content with their circumstances!64
Such advice could echo back to the reminder, at the beginning of Galen’s letter, 
of the loss of his slaves during a major attack of the plague. Putting the present 
loss into perspective, all of the three authors intend to moderate the sadness, 
following the Aristotelian way of metriopathy.
When Galen reveals the secrets of his alupia, he enumerates his natural 
talent and his education, but as an example for others, he mentions his daily 
spiritual exercise of praemeditatio malorum.65 Râzî also lists this training in his 
collection of remedies against sorrow:
After this it follows that a man should picture and represent to himself 
the loss of his loved ones, and keep this constantly in his mind and imagi-
nation, knowing that it is impossible for them to continue unchanged 
forever. He should never for a moment give up remembering this and 
putting it into his thoughts, strengthening his resolve and fortifying his 
endurance against the day when the calamity happens. That is the way 
to train and gradually to discipline and strengthen the soul, so that it will 
protest little when misfortunes occur.66
If al-Kindî praises the power of habituation in ethical behaviour, he does not 
explicitly mention this method, he goes further in criticizing the process:
63   Al-Kindî, On Dispelling Sorrows, 6, 1; tr. Adamson/Pormann, 2012, p. 254.
64   Râzî, Spiritual Medicine, 12; tr. Arberry, 1950, p. 72.
65   See above n. 42.
66   Râzî, Spiritual Medicine, 12; tr. Arberry, 1950, p. 71.
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For if we are sad before that which causes sadness occurs, then we impart 
to ourselves a sadness which might not occur because that which was 
going to cause sadness desists from doing so. Then we impart to ourselves 
a sadness which nothing else imparts to us.67
Such a polemic can be traced back to a Hellenistic context. Al-Kindî’s posi-
tion was also Epicurus’ feeling: Cicero68 reports that the philosopher con-
sidered it pure madness to envision bad things that will probably never 
happen. According to Cicero, Epicurus was reacting against the teaching of the 
Cyrenaean school, which recommended the practise of praemeditatio malo-
rum, considering the element of surprise as the major cause of distress. Râzî 
also adopts some Epicurian precepts when he offers distraction or prescribes 
non-exclusive attachment to fight against distress.
Reading those three texts, we can understand that all authors are attentive 
to the need to draw an eclectic panel of remedies or a spectrum of doxographi-
cal positions, in which they select examples and ideas to express a personal 
thought. In a doxographical sequence, Râzî juxtaposes the ways to protect 
from sadness before it happens and the means to repel it when it is happen-
ing. Some of his techniques are borrowed from Galen, Epicurus or Aristippus. 
P. Adamson has tried to identify every argument of al-Kindî’s demonstration 
with Hellenistic references. Describing On Dispelling Sorrows, Adamson writes: 
“It blends together arguments, themes and gnomological materials beholden 
to several ethical traditions – Stoicism, Cynism (we find Socrates conflated 
with Diogenes) and Aristotelianism”.69 Already Galen defined his own posi-
tion against the rigorism of the Stoic to endorse a more Cyrenaic inspiration. 
The material gathered by Cicero in the Tusculan Disputations links the prae-
meditatio malorum, as well as the examples of Socrates and Diogenes to the 
Cyrenaic school.70 Galen twice mentions its founder Aristippus and he might 
have borrowed his diagnosis of insatiability (ἀπληστία) and his ideal of autarky 
from Aristippus as well.71
The major difference between Galen and the two Arabic authors is, how-
ever, that the physician of Pergamon gives a personal and self-centred version 
67   Al-Kindî, On Dispelling Sorrows, 5, 3; tr. Adamson/Pormann, 2012, p. 253.
68   Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, III, 15 (31–33).
69   Adamson, P., Al-Kindî, p. 155.
70   Zilioli, U., The Cyrenaics, Durham, 2012, sp. 157–164.
71   Kotzia, P., “Galen, De indolentia: Commonplaces, Traditions and Contexts” (2014) in a bril-
iant paper has rendered the doxographical background of Galen’s περὶ ἀλυπίας in con-
necting it with a Cynic, Cyrenaic and Stoic tradition. Kotzia attributes rightly the tech-
nique of praemeditatio malorum to the Presocratic Anaxagoras.
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of the philosophical genre, whereas Râzî and al-Kindî’s discourses are more 
universal. Râzî calls for common sense and stresses the notion of pleasure as 
the criterion of human existence to avoid sadness. Al-Kindî believes in the all-
mighty reason. He delights in providing an irrefutable, mathematical demon-
stration and resorts heavily to his favourite technique of reductio ad absurdum 
to show that every distressful thought is a sign of lack of intellect. He displays 
a rigourous logic and rationalism, considering that the rational and immortal 
soul is the main essence of the person.
9. Let us turn back to our initial question: are there hints of περὶ ἀλυπίας in 
al-Kindi and Râzî’s writings? I would say that Râzî had read and imitated the 
Galenic περὶ ἀλυπίας. The formal and thematic coincidences should not be for-
tuitous from such a connoisseur of Galen like Râzî. In Al-Kindî’s On Dispelling 
Sorrows, there are no patent traces of any interest for the Galenic περὶ ἀλυπίας 
neither of a tribute to Galen. We could recall the fact that the Arabic transla-
tion of the treatise was sponsored by one of the Banû Mûsâ, Al-Kindî’s en-
emies, and that the Nestorian school of Ḥunayn, specializing in the translation 
of medical texts, was in rivalry with al-Kindî’s own circle,72 which translated 
mostly philosophical texts. Galen and Râzî are physicians who acknowledged 
a strong interaction between body and soul in the analysis and therapy of dis-
tress, whereas Al-Kindî did not care at all about physical health but praised a 
“thoroughly intellectualist ethics”.73 In his undertaking to reunite the Platonic 
demiurge and the God of the Muslims, he sometimes seems to borrow from 
the Galenic De usu partium. But his On Dispelling Sorrows betrays a rejection of 
the Galenic medical approach. Above all, he adapted the Greek philosophical 
tradition to the Islamic context in which he wrote.
Beyond the influence of Galen’s περὶ ἀλυπίας on Al-Kindî and Râzî, I 
would like to conclude with another question: How could Presocratic, Cynic, 
Cyrenaean, Epicurean or Stoic materials reach Râzî and al-Kindî, since no 
translations of the Hellenistic authors are preserved in Arabic74? What access 
did they have to a knowledge that we can nowadays only reach through Cicero 
or Plutarch? Questioning Galen’s περὶ ἀλυπίας through the filter of the Arabic 
72   Endress, G., “The Circle of al-Kindî. Early Arabic Translations from the Greek and the Rise 
of Islamic Philosophy”, in Endress, G./Kurk, R. (ed.), The Ancient Tradition in Christian and 
Islamic Hellenism, 1997, pp. 43–76.
73   Adamson, P., Al-Kindî, 2007, p. 150.
74   The Aetius Arabus, a Greek doxographical collection translated by Qusṭâ ibn Lûqâ in 
the IXth century, provided the Arabic thinkers with access to Presocratic and Hellenistic 
philosophy, see Daiber, H., Aetius Arabus. Die Vorsokratiker in arabischer Überlieferung, 
Wiesbaden, 1980. But another way of access to this ancient doxography was Aristotle’s 
neoplatonic commentators; see above n. 55.
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authors seems to bring a new light to understand how each one, at a differ-
ent level, inherited a doxographical set from the Hellenistic period and made 
it vivid, centuries later, to fit to their own context. Seven centuries separate 
Al-Kindî and Galen, the same time period as between Galen and Antiphon or 
Anaxagoras, and we should not forget that the Abbasid renaissance was the 
first to translate and assimilate the Greek pagan inheritance in a monotheistic 
context, long before the European Renaissance.
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